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Viewing cable 04BRASILIA755, BRAZIL POSITIONS ON CUBA, CHINA, AND OTHER CHR

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
04BRASILIA755 2004-03-29 21:10 2011-07-11 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Brasilia
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 000755 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/28/2014 
TAGS: PHUM CH CU PREL BR UNHRC TIP
SUBJECT: BRAZIL POSITIONS ON CUBA, CHINA, AND OTHER CHR 
DEMARCHES 
 
REF: A. STATE 64048 
     B. STATE 44603 
     C. STATE 41252 
     D. BRASILIA 676 
     E. BRASILIA 616 
     F. STATE 65652 
 
Classified By: Poloff David G. Mosby for reasons 1.5 B/D. 
 
1.  (C) Summary: According to the head of the Brazilian 
Foreign Ministry's Human Rights Division, Brazil will abstain 
on any Cuba or China resolutions and on a Chinese "no-action" 
motion.  (Note: Ambassador will raise the Cuba and China 
resolutions at a more senior level again March 29.  End 
note.)  Brazil may support a resolution on Turkmenistan. 
Brazil will support resolutions on North Korea, and will wait 
to study the proposed text on Iran before deciding.  The GOB 
condemns the Israeli execution of Hamas' leader and considers 
it an obstacle to peace.  Brazil is more supportive than the 
USG of several proposed resolutions regarding economic, 
social, and cultural rights and the links between 
development, democracy, and human rights.  The GOB will wait 
to see the proposed texts for Iraq and Zimbabwe before 
deciding.  End summary. 
 
2.  (C) On March 24, Poloff met with Andre Saboia, head of 
the Foreign Ministry's (MRE) Human Rights Division, to 
deliver ref A talking points, on the Cuba and China 
resolutions (The GOB will abstain in both cases.  See 
paragraphs 3 and 4.), and to discuss USG and GOB priorities 
and cooperation with the GRULAC during the 60th session of 
the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (CHR) (refs B 
and C).  Poloff emphasized to Saboia the USG's interest in 
cooperating with GRULAC countries during this session of the 
CHR. 
 
(Note: Ambassador will again raise the Cuba and China 
resolutions March 29 with MRE Assistant Secretary for 
International Organization Affairs.  Ambassador raised the 
points previously with Under Secretary for Political Affairs 
Vera Pedrosa on March 19 and was told Brazil would abstain 
(ref D).  On March 12 Poloff had provided the MRE's Assistant 
Secretary for Human and Social Themes Department with talking 
 
SIPDIS 
points about USG CHR priorities and cooperation with the 
GRULAC drawn from refs B and C (ref E).  In addition, on 
March 26, Poloff provided the MRE's UN Division with copies 
of the CHR talking points and provided that office and the 
Human Rights Division the revised text on the China 
resolution (ref F).  End note. 
 
Brazil Says It Will Abstain on Cuba and China 
----------------------------------- 
 
3.  (C) Saboia reiterated that GOB policy is not to support 
country-specific resolutions, with few exceptions.  Saboia 
said Brazil will maintain its traditional position of 
abstention on any Cuba resolution.  While recognizing human 
rights problems in Cuba, the GOB prefers to maintain a 
bilateral dialogue with Castro's regime, he said.  He argued 
that President Lula's good relationship with Castro places 
the GOB in a position to have a quiet, but positive impact on 
the human rights situation in Cuba. 
 
4.  (C) While conceding that the GOB's bilateral dialogue on 
human rights with China "is not very profound," Saboia said 
it is unlikely the GOB will support a resolution condemning 
the human rights situation in China.  Moreover, Brazil will 
likely abstain on a no-action motion, as it has traditionally 
done in the past.  (Comment: Given that Brazilian Foreign 
Minister Celso Amorim recently visited China and floated the 
idea of a free trade agreement, in addition to other trade 
initiatives, the probability of the GOB changing its 
traditional position of abstention seems low.  End comment.) 
 
Turkmenistan 
------------- 
 
5.  (C) Saboia noted that during Third Committee meetings in 
the UN General Assembly (UNGA) the resolution condemning 
human rights violations in Turkmenistan had passed with wide 
support, though not Brazil's.  As a result, the GOB is 
considering supporting a resolution in the CHR, he said. 
According to him, the GOB has received useful information 
about the deterioration of the human rights situation in 
Turkmenistan from Great Britain and is now studying the 
matter.  While not willing to provide an official response, 
Saboia said the GOB will likely support a "balanced" 
resolution. 
 
Israel 
------ 
 
6.  (C) Saboia pointed out to poloff that the assassination 
of the head of Hamas was condemned by the GOB and said it, 
"complicates an already fragile situation and makes it very 
difficult for the peace process to move forward."  While 
saying the GOB will wait to see any text regarding the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, he made it clear that Brazil 
believes Israeli government's policies of targeted 
assassinations, in addition to the ongoing construction of 
the Israeli defense barrier, are the primary obstacles to the 
peace process. 
 
North Korea and Iran 
-------------------- 
 
7.  (C) Saboia said Brazil will support a resolution on North 
Korea.  The GOB has received "good information on the 
situation in North Korea from China," according to him. 
There is a possibility Brazil might support an Iran 
resolution, but the GOB will wait to see a text on Iran 
before making a determination.  Saboia stressed that Brazil's 
support for an Iran resolution -- in the Third Committee 
during the UNGA last year -- should not be interpreted as 
meaning Brazil will automatically support one during the CHR. 
 
 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and Democracy 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
8.  (C) Concerning economic, social, and cultural rights, 
Saboia said the GOB believes them to be as important as 
political and civil rights.  Therefore, the USG and the GOB 
may not be in complete agreement on some resolutions in this 
area.  Brazil will likely support the resolutions "Promotion 
of a Democratic and Equitable International Order" and 
"Strengthening of Popular Participation," he said.  Saboia 
was unable to respond to questions about the GOB's position 
on resolutions for Iraq and Zimbabwe, Romania's resolution on 
the Consolidation of Democracy, and Australia's resolution on 
Human Rights and Good Governance. 
 
9.  (C) Comment: Brazil's likely support for the Turkmenistan 
and North Korea country resolutions is considered exceptional 
by the MRE, the result of a broad consensus in the CHR, and 
what the GOB considers to be good, credible information it 
has received from Great Britain and China respectively. 
These exceptions demonstrate that the GOB can be swayed from 
its traditional position of non-support for country-specific 
resolutions, when a broad consensus among other CHR countries 
can be reached.  End comment. 
HRINAK