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Viewing cable 04BOGOTA2634, WILL CONGRESS COME THROUGH FOR URIBE?

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
04BOGOTA2634 2004-03-02 22:05 2011-04-16 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Bogota
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
id: 14489
date: 3/2/2004 22:05
refid: 04BOGOTA2634
origin: Embassy Bogota
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 04BOGOTA469
header:
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.



----------------- header ends ----------------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BOGOTA 002634 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/15/2014 
TAGS: PGOV ECON KJUS PTER CO GOV
SUBJECT: WILL CONGRESS COME THROUGH FOR URIBE? 
 
REF: BOGOTA 469 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood, Reasons: 1.5 B & D. 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary:  In January, President Uribe, in an effort 
to nudge a recalcitrant Congress toward passage of new 
reforms, announced plans to form three high-level special 
commissions to formulate proposals in the areas of economics, 
justice, and administration of the state.  On February 17, 
the Administration and six of the largest formal political 
parties signed a pact to work on the three fronts.  With 
Congress to reconvene on March 16, only the special justice 
commission has met, and its initial recommendations have 
already caused controversy.  Our congressional interlocutors 
stress that while the special commissions are 
headline-grabbers made up of high-profile national figures, 
the Congress will have the final say on any reforms.  We 
expect piecemeal progress on legislation at best.  End 
Summary. 
 
2.  (U) In the aftermath of difficult congressional relations 
in December, President Uribe in early January called for 
three national commissions of prominent legislators, current 
and former members of government, business leaders, and 
opinion makers, as recommended by the parties.  The 
commissions would study economic and fiscal reforms, justice 
sector reforms, and reforms to improve the efficiency of the 
state and reduce corruption.  The latter would address 
elimination of some state institutions and privileged pension 
schemes as well as potential territorial reforms to reduce 
duplication of administration functions and costs. 
 
3.  (U) On February 17, with much fanfare, President Uribe 
and Interior and Justice Minister Sabas Pretelt signed a 
national political pact with six leading political parties 
and a handful of additional smaller political organizations, 
all Uribista.  The pact committed the signatories to 
good-faith efforts to pass important economic, justice, and 
state reforms, including: 
 
--Pension reform; 
--Tax regime simplification; 
--Implementation of oral arguments in judicial proceedings; 
--Improvements in penal system; 
--Streamlining of the judicial branch bureaucracy; 
--Improvements to the civil service structure; 
--Improved public contracting and reduction of transaction 
costs; and 
--Elimination of unnecessary state structures and entities. 
 
Liberal Party President Camilo Sanchez and Team Colombia 
(Equipo Colombia) President Luis Alfredo Ramos qualified 
their signatures by stressing they had not given Uribe a 
"blank check" and that new taxes, for example, were out of 
the question.  Absent from the signing ceremony was the 
center-left Independent Democratic Party (PDI) of Bogota 
Mayor Luis Eduardo "Lucho" Garzon and Senator Antonio Navarro 
Wolff. 
 
4.  (U) The March 16-June 20 congressional session promises 
to have a loaded schedule.  In addition to likely 
deliberation on any formal recommendations the three special 
commissions might make, the Congress must pass implementing 
legislation to carry out anti-terrorism reforms passed in 
December.  The civil registry aspect of the anti-terrorism 
reform is already causing heated debate (septel). 
Furthermore, the conditional parole bill (alternatividad 
penal) for former fighters is a GOC priority for the session. 
 Legislation to permit presidential reelection (septel) is 
also likely to make the agenda. 
 
5.  (C) Comment:  The special commissions have their work cut 
out for them, as the subject matter they are charged with 
addressing is both complicated and controversial.  An initial 
offering of proposals by the special justice commission 
(streamlining the top levels of the national judiciary and 
establishing of new emergency speed-up procedures) launched a 
public feud between the heads of the Supreme and 
Constitutional Courts.  On the economic side, pension reform 
is considered urgent, but a key pension measure failed in 
last October's Referendum and the Congress balked at making 
any modifications in the context of last December's fiscal 
reform package.  Senior GOC economic officials tell us they 
are pessimistic about passage of sweeping pension reform. 
 
6.  (C) Comment (continued):  Despite Uribe's overtures to 
the traditional parties and Congress--consulting the parties 
in naming special commission members and replacing the 
contentious Fernando Londono with the conciliatory Sabas 
Pretelt as Interior Minister--a strong current of resistance 
and resentment continues to run through Congress.  Members 
continue to tell us that they resent Uribe's continued 
disparagement and/or neglect of the institution.  This 
includes both Senate President German Vargas and House 
Speaker Alonso Acosta, who have publicly (and the latter 
privately with us) distanced themselves from Uribe.  Rank and 
file members, meanwhile, have complained about not getting 
seats on the special commissions.  The concurrent initiative 
to permit presidential reelection will further strain 
executive-legislative relations, as several of the 
presidential aspirants are members of Congress.  While Uribe 
generally counts on majorities in both houses, those 
majorities have failed him (i.e., not showing up, breaking 
the quorum) on more than one key vote.  While it is likely 
that several reforms will pass the Congress by June, it 
remains to be seen exactly which ones--and how many--will 
become law. 
WOOD 

=======================CABLE ENDS============================