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Viewing cable 04YEREVAN449, RARE PRESIDENTIAL INTERVIEW SPARKS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
04YEREVAN449 2004-02-24 03:04 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Yerevan
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 YEREVAN 000449 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/CACEN, EUR/ACE, EUR/PGI, DRL, PPD 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV TU AJ AM
SUBJECT:  RARE PRESIDENTIAL INTERVIEW SPARKS 
SPECULATION ABOUT A DEFENSIVE KOCHARIAN 
 
REF:  YEREVAN 347 
 
1. (U) Sensitive But Unclassified.  Please treat 
accordingly. 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
2. (SBU) President Robert Kocharian's February 18 
extended press conference sparked speculation about 
his political posturing vis-a-vis an increasingly 
vocal opposition.  During the rare two-hour TV 
interview, Kocharian took pains to portray himself 
as a calm, unfettered executive in charge of his 
country.  He covered the entire range of political 
issues, dedicating significant time to U.S.-Armenia 
relations, Nagorno-Karabakh negotiations and 
corruption.  He suggested that the decline in USG 
military assistance to Armenia may have resulted 
from Armenia's lukewarm response to coalition calls 
for help with the war in Iraq.  His sharp criticism 
of local opposition leaders included a reprimand for 
the controversial January speeches by opposition 
parliamentarians at the Parliamentary Council of the 
Council of Europe (PACE).  Kocharian's nonchalant 
performance notwithstanding, his rare decision to go 
on the offensive may indicate that he (or those 
close to him) senses the need to maintain a firm 
grip on public perception.  End Summary. 
 
------------------------------- 
UNCOMMON AIR TIME FOR KOCHARIAN 
------------------------------- 
 
3. (SBU) President Robert Kocharian's two-hour 
television interview February 18 was his most 
extensive press availability since the 2003 
presidential elections.  Four local journalists from 
mostly pro-government television stations 
participated in the interview.  Kocharian took pains 
to portray himself as a calm, unfettered executive 
in charge of his country during his mostly 
unrehearsed responses to journalists' questions. 
Media analysts noted Kocharian's efforts to minimize 
bombastic language and called his interview "loaded" 
with nuanced messages to opposition leaders and the 
international community. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
A NOT-SO-SUBTLE WARNING TO THE OPPOSITION 
----------------------------------------- 
 
4. (SBU) Kocharian acknowledged the increased 
chatter in the political community about opposition 
initiatives to oust him from power.  Kocharian 
stated unequivocally that the GOAM would counter 
extra-constitutional measures and warned that "we 
[the government] have the resources" to quell such 
movements.  Kocharian categorized opposition protest 
methods as cowardly, including the call for street 
protests and rallies.  He had harsh words for 
opposition parliamentarians who openly criticized 
his administration during January 2004 meetings of 
the Parliamentary Commission of the Council of 
Europe (PACE).  Kocharian stopped just short of 
daring the opposition to put legal mechanisms of 
impeachment or national referendum into play. 
(Note:  Kocharian is well aware that the pro- 
government majority in parliament would not allow 
such legal maneuvering at this time.  End Note.) 
 
-------------------------------- 
MISQUOTE ON US-ARMENIA RELATIONS 
-------------------------------- 
 
5. (SBU) Kocharian responded to journalists' 
questions regarding U.S.-Armenia relations by 
defending his administration's policy of 
"complementarity" with Russia and the U.S.  When 
asked whether or not the GOAM was worried about a 
perceived increase in U.S. interest in the Caucasus, 
Kocharian replied, "The increase in the USG's role 
in the South Cacasus can favor Armenia, including 
the settlement of the N-K conflict."  (Note:  The 
President's response was widely misquoted in Armenia 
the following day, implying a more negative answer. 
This error has yet to be clarified by the 
President's office, but sources in Diaspora lobby 
groups tell the us that they will pressure news 
agencies to correct the error.  End Note.) 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
KOCHARIAN:  "INDEPENDENCE [ON IRAQ] HAD ITS PRICE" 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
6. (SBU) Journalists peppered Kocharian with 
questions about anticipated lower levels of USG 
military assistance to Armenia vis-a-vis USG 
military assistance destined for Azerbaijan. 
Kocharian refrained from outwardly criticizing the 
USG, but expressed nuanced disappointment that the 
USG had not "maintained its promises to the American- 
Armenian community."  He hypothesized that the 
decrease in military assistance was a commensurate 
USG response to Armenia's lukewarm cooperation with 
coalition efforts during the war with Iraq. 
Armenia's "independence [on the Iraq issue]," he 
said, "had its price, and yet its value." 
 
-------------------- 
COMMENT:  "WHY NOW?" 
-------------------- 
 
7. (SBU) Perhaps more important than Kocharian's 
remarks themselves was the timing of the press 
availability.  This interview may have been a 
reaction to the opposition's recent reentry into the 
policy fray following the splashy January speeches 
at PACE and the controversial Dashnak World Congress 
(reftel).  Alternatively, some within the Kocharian 
administration believe that Kocharian is irritated 
by the "exaggerated, overly congratulatory" 
attention Western governments, local opposition and 
policy think tanks have paid to Georgia over the 
past few months.  This interview may have been an 
effort to re-establish Kocharian's political prowess 
and defuse any hopes for a "rose revolution" in 
Armenia.  Lastly, some speculate that lower USG 
military assistance levels could be a potentially 
fatal policy issue for Kocharian and see the 
interview as a convenient way for him to pass the 
blame to the National Assembly and other more 
strongly pro-Russian political forces. 
 
8. (SBU) Regardless of the reason, and Kocharian's 
nonchalant performance during the interview 
notwithstanding, his rare decision to go on the 
media offensive indicates that he, or those close to 
him, senses the need to maintain a firm grip on 
public perception.  Ironically, it appears that the 
interview has done more to capture the attention of 
local conspiracy theorists than quell those who 
question Kocharian's authority.  Although Kocharian 
faces a potentially trying Spring given opposition 
leaders' calls for increased rallies and protests, 
we believe the prospects for any major political 
upheaval remain remote. 
ORDWAY