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Viewing cable 04NASSAU384, BAHAMAS GOVERNMENT SEEKS SUPPORT FOR FUTURE UN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
04NASSAU384 2004-02-24 22:20 2011-07-29 03:30 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Nassau
Appears in these articles:
http://www.haiti-liberte.com/archives/volume5-1/Campagne%20des%20E.U..asp
http://www.haiti-liberte.com/archives/volume5-2/WikiLeaked%20Cables%20Reveal%20Obsessive.asp
http://www.haiti-liberte.com/archives/volume5-2/Campagne%20des%20E.U..asp
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NASSAU 000384 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/24/2014 
TAGS: BF HA PGOV PREL SMIG
SUBJECT: BAHAMAS GOVERNMENT SEEKS SUPPORT FOR FUTURE UN 
SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING ON HAITI 
 
REF: A) NASSAU 211 B) NASSAU 212 C) NASSAU 263 D) 
     NASSAU 322 E) NASSAU 364 
 
Classified By: Charge Abdelnour Zaiback for reasons 1.5 (B) and 1.5 (D) 
 
- - - - 
SUMMARY 
- - - - 
 
1) (C) On February 24, Acting Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Permanent Secretary Marilyn Zonicle separately demarched each 
UN Security Council member with representation in The Bahamas 
for support for a possible UN Security Council meeting on 
Haiti that may be requested by Jamaica Prime Minister 
Patterson as early as Thursday.  The original plan was to 
request the Security Council to meet on February 25 on Haiti, 
however, President Aristide asked that the meeting be 
deferred for 24 hours while he pursued the ongoing 
negotiations.  For its part, The Bahamas seeks the active 
support of the U.S. as the "most important" member of the 
Security Council as it engages on a full scale diplomatic 
press to achieve peace in Haiti.  If diplomacy fails, The 
Bahamas believes that military assistance will be essential, 
and is willing to contribute troops to a multinational effort 
to maintain law and order.  END SUMMARY 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
FOREIGN MINISTER MITCHELL ON STAND BY TO NEW YORK 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
2) (C) Anticipating that Prime Minister Patterson would make 
the request for the Security Council to hold a special 
session on Haiti tomorrow, FM Mitchell had already packed his 
bags and made plans to fly to New York tonight.  Patterson 
and CARICOM delayed making the request for the session only 
because Aristide convinced them that the opposition and 
rebels could still agree to CARICOM's peace plan.  However, 
as the situation on the ground in Haiti continues to 
deteriorate, Zonicle anticipates that Mitchell will fly to 
New York tomorrow for a requested Security Council special 
session on Thursday. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
SIX TALKING POINTS FOR PROJECTED SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
3) (C) Follows are the six talking points presented to Charge. 
 
i) (C) Pending the outcome of the OAS/CARICOM-sponsored 
negotiations between the Government and the Opposition in 
Haiti, the CARICOM countries may request the convening of an 
emergency meeting of the Security Council to address the 
matter, considering the deteriorating situation in that 
country and the inability of the Haitian National Police 
(HNP) to deal with the insurgency. 
 
ii) (C) An open debate in the Security Council would allow it 
to pronounce on the matter and would provide Haiti with the 
opportunity to request military/police assistance,  and, 
perhaps, increased humanitarian assistance, as may be 
necessary.  Haiti is reluctant to take the matter to the 
Security Council before the current political negotiations 
have been exhausted and wishes to avoid the matter being 
dealt with on "parallel tracks" by OAS/CARICOM and the UN. 
 
iii) (C) While France has indicated a willingness to send 
military assistance to Haiti, the specter of French troops in 
Haiti at this time is a very sensitive issue, particularly as 
France is the former colonizer and Haiti is currently 
"celebrating" the 200th anniversary of discarding that yoke. 
A joint dispatch under the UN banner would be more palatable. 
 
iv) (C) With the United Nations, CARICOM Ambassadors are 
seeking the support of the Group of Latin America and the 
Caribbean (GRULAC) for the initiative and a meeting of the 
GRULAC to discuss the matter is being convened Wednesday 
afternoon.  Brazil and Chile, the two members of GRULAC on 
the Security Council have indicated their support for the 
initiative.  Other member of the GRULAC that have voiced 
strong support are Mexico and Venezuela. 
 
v) (C) Beyond the GRULAC, CARICOM Ambassadors are in touch 
with Canada and France, as well as with President of the GA, 
Ambassador Colin Granderson of the CARICOM Secretariat, and 
the other Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs in 
seeking to garner support for the initiative and move it 
forward, as appropriate. 
 
vi) (C) It has been said, although not officially announced 
that, Ambassador Reggie Dumas, of Trinidad and Tobago, has 
been appointed as the Special Advisor on Haiti by the UN 
Secretary-general.  Perhaps, the stigma of a direct request 
from Haitian authorities for military assistance could be 
alleviated by having the request channeled through the 
Special Advisor. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
BAHAMAS VIEW ON OUTSIDE INTERVENTION CLARIFIED 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
4) (C) Charge and Political Chief sought clarification on 
Mitchell's vision for outside intervention.  In recent days 
Mitchell has made several statements that international 
support for Haiti's police was crucial, including "to disarm 
the rebels if they did not disarm themselves."  Zonicle 
relayed that the first priority of The Bahamas is the 
principles in the CARICOM proposal, most notably reinforcing 
the ability of the Haitian police to maintain law and order. 
However, if this fails, Zonicle reiterated Mitchell's oft 
stated plea of late, that "law and order must be restored." 
Zonicle volunteered that The Bahamas was prepared to 
contribute troops, "perhaps as many as 100."  While the 
preferred mechanism is the United Nations, Zonicle confirmed 
Mitchell's view that any outside intervention would be 
preferable to continued and increased chaos. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
BAHAMIAN AMBASSADOR TO CARICOM SEEKS INSIGHTS ON RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN OPPOSITION AND REBELS 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
5) (C) Ambassador to CARICOM Leonard Archer sought Charge's 
insight on the relationship between the rebels and the 
opposition, but in the exchange of views it became clear that 
all sides knew about the same.  Several rebel leaders have 
connections with the former military.  While the opposition 
may currently feel that they are the beneficiaries of rebel 
activity, they may soon learn that "the enemy of my enemy is 
not always my friend."  Archer is an experienced diplomat who 
has studied Haiti at length. 
 
- - - - 
COMMENT 
- - - - 
 
6) (C) As reported reftels, The Bahamas is seized on the 
Haitian crisis.  It is certainly Foreign Minister Mitchell's 
dominant preoccupation.  It is also clear that The Bahamas 
regards U.S. leadership and engagement on Haiti as crucial to 
any peaceful outcome.  As has also become increasingly 
explicit in Mitchell's recent statements, while The Bahamas 
and CARICOM lobby for peace, they have concluded that a 
peaceful outcome without international intervention is 
increasingly unlikely. 
WITAJEWSKI