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Viewing cable 04HANOI377, MFA GOALS FOR 2004 AND BEYOND

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
04HANOI377 2004-02-11 10:22 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Hanoi
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 HANOI 000377 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PREL OVIP CH LA CB VM ASEAN
SUBJECT:  MFA GOALS FOR 2004 AND BEYOND 
 
Ref:  03 Hanoi 3351 
 
1.  (SBU)  Summary.  MFA Policy Planning Department Deputy 
Director General Bui Thanh Son, in a meeting with Pol/C on 
February 10, reiterated Vietnam's commitment to moving 
forward on U.S.-Vietnam relations "in all fields, including 
military" in 2004.  He pondered about the possibility of a 
bilateral meeting at APEC with the President for Prime 
Minister Khai, with a visit to the U.S. to follow in 2005 on 
the occasion of the 10th anniversary of bilateral relations. 
He cited Vietnam's relations with its three neighbors as the 
GVN's top foreign policy priorities, ranking relations with 
"Big Powers" -- including the U.S. -- as only number two. 
Vietnam remains committed to more active participation in 
regional organizations and continues its quest for a non- 
permanent seat on the UN Security Council in 2008.  Embassy 
does not believe that Son's comments mark a renunciation of 
GVN hopes for a 2004 Prime Ministerial visit to the U.S., 
and continues to welcome the possibility of a USG delegation 
soon discussing with the GVN our concerns and goals in 
advance of such a visit, whether this year or next year. 
End Summary. 
 
US-Vietnam 
---------- 
 
2.  (SBU)  DDG Son, who described his Department's role as 
providing advice to the Foreign Minister on overall foreign 
policy as well as specifically responsible for "coordinating 
policy initiatives" of the various other Departments within 
the MFA, reiterated the GVN's commitment to improving the 
bilateral relationship with the U.S. in 2004 "in all fields, 
including military."  He welcomed dialogue about "what we 
(the GVN) can do" to move the relationship forward.  When 
Pol/C noted unofficial GVN inquiries about the possibility 
of a visit to the U.S. in 2004 by the Prime Minister and the 
likelihood that such a trip would have to be preceded by a 
variety of positive steps by the GVN in fields such as human 
rights and religious freedom, DDG Son commented that "we are 
doing things that you may not know about."  Pol/C urged 
greater information-sharing and access, citing our recent 
frustration in not being able to obtain details about the 
Tet amnesty (which Vice Minister of Public Security Nguyen 
Van Huong had promised would include persons of concern to 
the USG) or about a reported December 2003 directive by the 
Committee on Religious Affairs (CRA) to speed up 
registration of churches in the Central Highlands.  DDG Son 
admitted that lack of transparency remained a problem in the 
GVN system, but offered no fixes. 
 
3.  (SBU)  DDG Son floated the possibility of a bilateral 
meeting at APEC between the President and Prime Minister 
Phan Van Khai, to be followed in 2005 with a Prime 
Ministerial visit linked to the 10th anniversary of 
establishment of diplomatic relations.  Pol/C noted that the 
USG had originally been contemplating a Prime Ministerial 
visit in late 2003, but the apparent GVN moratorium on high 
level visits to the U.S. during U.S.-led military action in 
Iraq in early 2003 had slowed momentum in relations for 
several months.  He urged greater coordination by the GVN on 
high-level visits, so that the USG does not have to handle 
three to four GVN ministerial-level visits within the space 
of a few weeks, as in September/October 2003.  He urged 
positive GVN actions that would justify an eventual Prime 
Ministerial visit, which will need to be substantive, not 
merely ceremonial.  He urged the MFA to ensure that all 
future high level dialogues increasingly focus on strategic 
issues, not litanies of complaints on minor problems like 
catfish, flag bills, etc.  Additional cooperation on 
counterterrorism would also be especially welcome, even if 
only in the form of more responsiveness to U.S. watchlists 
and other information shared with the GVN. 
 
4.  (SBU)  Pol/C asked about the MFA's plans for a bilateral 
political dialogue in 2004, citing the interest expressed by 
Vice Foreign Minister Le Van Bang to Ambassador in December 
2003.  DDG Son, whose Department hosted the 2001 political 
dialogue in Hanoi, welcomed the resumption of such a 
dialogue but was unaware of any specific plans in 2004.  He 
promised to investigate this possibility.  He asked about 
the likelihood also of holding a human rights dialogue; 
Pol/C reviewed USG disappointment that previous dialogues 
had not yet led to enough substantive progress on issues of 
concern to the USG to justify another round.  DDG Son 
indicated that the MFA might nonetheless issue another 
invitation for a human rights dialogue in 2004, or at least 
incorporate human rights issues in the eventual political 
dialogue. 
 
Priorities 
---------- 
 
5.  (SBU)  When asked about competing priorities among the 
GVN's various diplomatic activities and partners, DDG Son 
insisted that relations with neighboring countries were at 
the top of Vietnam's list, since these relations directly 
affect national security.  He claimed that, from this 
perspective, relations with Laos and Cambodia were virtually 
just as important as those with China.  He pointed to border 
demarcation, outflows of people (the 2001 Montagnard 
problem), and economic disparities as issues the GVN had to 
handle well in the interests of national security, and 
pointed to new forms of economic cooperation with and 
investment in Laos and Cambodia in particular.  He expressed 
satisfaction over land and sea border demarcation with 
China, while admitting that fishing rights might remain 
under negotiation without resolution for the foreseeable 
future. 
 
6.  (SBU)  Son described Vietnam's perception that China's 
foreign policy had undergone a sea change in 2002, with a 
"dramatic" shift away from security issues -- like the South 
China Sea -- and instead toward economic issues and a new 
attention to Southeast Asia.  No longer, he said, was 
Vietnam concerned about any threats from Chinese 
"misbehavior."  However, he cited shared concerns by Vietnam 
and ASEAN partners about China's "increased weight" and 
influence in the region, while commenting that Beijing was 
not trying to "interfere" in domestic policy decisions of 
these countries per se (unlike the U.S., he noted).  He 
described Chinese "influence" primarily as taking the forms 
of heightened exports and economic competition.  The best 
hope of Vietnam and ASEAN, he predicted, was to continue to 
ensure China's "integrated interests" within the region 
through the ASEAN+3 process, free trade agreements (with 
expected concessions for countries like Vietnam, he added), 
and other contacts. 
 
7.  (SBU)  According to Son, Vietnam's relations with "Big 
Powers" -- including the U.S. -- were important but clearly 
secondary to the ties with the neighboring countries.  He 
acknowledged the economic imperatives in particular of 
better relations with the U.S., EU, and Japan, however. 
 
Multilateral ties 
----------------- 
 
8.  (SBU)  Son described Vietnam's participation in regional 
organizations -- notably ASEAN and APEC -- as its most 
important multilateral goal this year and in the decade 
ahead.  He promised more pro-active cooperation by the GVN 
in ASEAN counterterrorism initiatives in particular.  He 
acknowledged the potential threats to the region from 
terrorism that required coordinated planning and responses, 
and again indicated that the GVN was doing more than the USG 
might realize.  He urged more USG attention to anti-Vietnam 
"terrorists" such as Ly Tong and Vo Van Duc (both of whom, 
Pol/C reminded him, were now in custody).  Pol/C encouraged 
an even more pro-active stance by the GVN on 
counterterrorism not only as important for its ASEAN 
responsibilities but also as Vietnam continues its quest for 
a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council in 2008, a 
goal that Son acknowledged was a high priority for the GVN 
over the next few years. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
9.  (SBU)  This appointment had been in the works for 
months; Embassy does not believe that the MFA chose this 
opportunity to send a signal that the GVN is no longer 
interested in a 2004 Prime Ministerial visit.  The APEC 
alternative would be a logical fallback, however, given 
likely difficulties over scheduling and substance of a visit 
to Washington this year.  Embassy continues to believe that 
it would be useful to bring a USG delegation to Hanoi to 
discuss specific U.S. expectations for further progress, 
both in Vietnam's respect for human rights and in bilateral 
ties, that would pave the way for an eventual visit, whether 
in 2004 or 2005. 
BURGHARDT