Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 04RANGOON34, BURMA: LIBERALIZED RICE EXPORTS AREN'T SO LIBERAL

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #04RANGOON34.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
04RANGOON34 2004-01-09 07:31 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Rangoon
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 000034 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV, EB 
BANGKOK FOR FAS 
COMMERCE FOR ITA JEAN KELLY 
TREASURY FOR OASIA JEFF NEIL 
USPACOM FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAGR ETRD ECON PGOV BM
SUBJECT: BURMA: LIBERALIZED RICE EXPORTS AREN'T SO LIBERAL 
 
REF: 03 RANGOON 563 AND PREVIOUS 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: The GOB's sudden decision to "suspend" 
exports of rice was the latest foible in the move toward 
allowing the private sector to export rice for the first time 
in 40 years.  Aside from further underlining the regime's 
ambivalence about giving up control of Burma's most important 
political-economic commodity, the move also emphasizes its 
priorities for appeasement: the urban masses first, then 
everyone else.  End summary. 
 
Stop the Exporting! 
 
2. (SBU) Much to everyone's surprise, on January 2nd the 
government announced an abrupt "suspension" of all exports of 
rice, sesame, garlic, onion, chili, and corn.  This 
suspension applies to everyone, even if an export license or 
signed contract is in hand, the only exception being a single 
ship that was being loaded in the Port of Rangoon.  The 
announcement was disappointing considering the private sector 
was only beginning to take greater advantage of the rice 
market liberalizations offered by the GOB in April 2003. 
 
3. (SBU) The April policy change removes the government from 
all stages of the rice pipeline and allows all private sector 
comers to buy directly from farmers and export freely.  Of 
course "freely" is a relative term in Burma, but by all 
accounts in recent months some private entrepreneurs -- 
mostly those affiliated with the quasi-governmental Union of 
Myanmar Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry 
(UMFCCI) -- were buying rice, having it milled, and selling 
it to foreign buyers independently of government 
interference.  One source told us that after a very slow 
start (only about 10,000 tons actually shipped by the private 
sector since April), export contracts of 16,000 tons and 
18,000 tons had been inked for shipment in January.  By 
contrast, in 2002 -- when the agricultural trading parastatal 
exported about 900,000 tons -- Burma shipped out a minimum of 
40,000 tons per month. 
 
4. (SBU) Though the government did not publicly announce the 
suspension, a business journal affiliated with Military 
Intelligence ran a short article saying there would be a 
temporary freeze on exports to ensure the retail price of 
domestic rice did not rise.  The fear is that hundreds of 
thousands of government workers, who on January 4th lost 
their monthly rice ration in exchange for a 5,000 kyat (about 
US$5.50) monthly stipend, would rush out into the Rangoon 
market, buying up rice and pushing up prices -- potentially 
sparking instability.  The article stated that this 
suspension would last only a "short time," though the meaning 
of this is not clear. 
 
Stumbling Toward Controlled Liberalization 
 
5. (SBU) The government's justification is not logical -- 
though not necessarily false.  With exports way down from 
2002, this season's harvest (November-December) quite good, 
domestic paddy and retail rice prices falling steadily over 
the last few months, and the government no longer purchasing 
rice in the marketplace, there seems little reason to fear a 
price spike.  It's possible, therefore, that the suspension 
has a more sinister motive.  Perhaps the government, always 
starved for foreign exchange, wants to get back into the rice 
exporting game while the gap between domestic retail prices 
(now about US$90 per ton) and higher world prices is quite 
wide. 
 
6. (SBU) In either case, the move is indicative of the 
regime's half-hearted support of liberalization.  Following 
its April 2003 announcement, the government was silent for 
five months before finally issuing lengthy and convoluted 
guidelines that set unreasonably high price floors for the 
exported rice and required prospective exporters to seek 
approvals and clearances by several government agencies 
before shipping.  The guidelines also outlined how exporters 
would only be able to keep 50 percent of net foreign exchange 
earnings, the balance to be kept by the GOB in exchange for 
the equivalent in kyat -- converted at a rate favorable to 
the GOB of course. 
 
7. (SBU) In addition to issuing overly bureaucratic rules, 
the government has not approached the rice reforms 
holistically, instead just waving a wand and making the rice 
markets "free."  Systemic problems remain, and there has been 
no effort since April to fix any of them.  For instance, the 
government's skittishness on supply and prices is worsened by 
a complete lack of reliable statistics on rice production and 
consumption.  The Burmese regime remains unwilling to reach 
out for advice on rice market liberalization despite lessons 
available locally in India, Thailand, and Vietnam. 
 
Comment: Stability is Paramount 
 
8. (SBU) Even if the export restrictions on rice are lifted 
soon, we wonder if the already cautious private exporters 
will risk being burned twice.  This episode also illustrates 
two important points about the GOB's philosophy of control. 
First, it's clear that the sanctity of contracts and the 
rights of the private sector, even if it is operating at the 
request of the government, come second to political 
considerations.  Second, if we are to believe the 
government's explanation for the moratorium then the regime 
clearly fears pushing the urban masses too far -- even if the 
resulting policies damage the regime's credibility, and the 
bottom lines of traders, farmers, millers, and potentially 
the economy as a whole.  End comment. 
McMullen