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Viewing cable 04PANAMA200, PANAMA'S NEW SUPREME COURT CHIEF JUSTICE PEREIRA

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
04PANAMA200 2004-01-30 19:47 2011-05-31 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Panama
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

301947Z Jan 04
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PANAMA 000200 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DEPT. FOR WHA/CEN/BRIGHAM 
DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO USAID AA/LAC AND LAC/CEN 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/26/2014 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KJUS PINR PM POLITICS FOREIGN POLICY
SUBJECT: PANAMA'S NEW SUPREME COURT CHIEF JUSTICE PEREIRA 
-- AN UNKNOWN QUANTITY 
 
 
REF: A. 03 PANAMA 1796 
     B. 03 PANAMA 2451 
     C. 03 PANAMA 3294 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Linda E. Watt for Reasons 1.5 (b) & (d). 
 
 
(SBU) Summary: Probing the unknown 
---------------------------------- 

1. (C) Elected by his colleagues for a two-year term as 
President (Chief Justice) of Panama's nine-member Supreme 
Court on October 23, 2003, Cesar Antonio Pereira Burgos (DOB: 
29 SEP 1929) has not yet shown strong interest in continuing 
the drive to reform Panama's judiciary that his predecessor, 
Adan Arnulfo Arjona, began two years ago.  Upon assuming the 
court's top spot on January 5, Pereira Burgos took a tough 
line with the press, limiting court access to one accredited 
representative of each media company, supposedly to stop 
"abusive" and false reporting on internal court 
deliberations.  Pereira told AID Director that he admires the 
U.S. Supreme Court's method of accrediting media (which gives 
the press greater continuity on complex legal issues) and 
wishes to mirror it in Panama's Supreme Court.  Legal 
insiders doubt Pereira acted to protect the integrity of the 
deliberative process and suggest instead that he wanted to 
shield the judiciary from public scrutiny. 
 
 
2. (C)  Justice Pereira has expressed interest recently in 
learning more about USAID's Administration of Justice Program 
in Panama, but his dedication to judicial reform remains 
untested.  Pereira paints his management style as inclusive, 
and he claims that he will base his decisions on the will of 
his peers, which represents an opportunity to generate 
"buy-in" for reform from other Justices.  Arjona's 
unflinching dedication to reform at all costs contributed to 
his peers' unwillingness to collaborate with him.  At the 
same time, Panama's Supreme Court, and other subordinate 
elements of the judiciary, continue to be subject to 
executive branch interference via patronage appointees and 
political manipulation.  If our long-term collaboration with 
the Supreme Court under Pereira turns out to be fruitless, 
Embassy is studying ways to increase its support to 
demand-based civil society initiatives that press for 
judicial reform from the outside in.  END SUMMARY 
 
 
(SBU) Anti-Arjona alliance 
-------------------------- 

3. (C) A bipartisan alliance of Justices linked to both the 
Arnulfista Party (PA) and its perennial opponent, the 
Revolutionary Democratic Party (PRD) united to elect Pereira 
Burgos.  Embassy interprets this unusual alliance as a 
backlash against Justice Arjona, who often operated on his 
own, without consulting the other Justices.  Resistance among 
the other Supreme Court Justices to Arjona's reform efforts 
often was rife (based as much on personal animosity towards 
Arjona's style as on opposition to the reforms themselves.) 
Arjona's colleagues actively politicked against him before 
the October internal elections. (See Reftel A.)  On October 
23, six of the nine Justices voted for Pereira, two voted for 
Arjona, and one abstained. 
 
 
(SBU) Pereira's political colors 
-------------------------------- 

4. (SBU) Cesar Pereira Burgos, one of five original "Special 
Advisors" to President Moscoso until his January 2000 
appointment to the Supreme Court, openly acknowledged his 
political inclination in a January 5 speech.  In addition to 
Moscoso's 1999 campaign, he participated in former President 
Guillermo Endara's 1989 campaign and served as Endara's 
Ambassador to the UN (1990-92) and Agriculture Minister 
(1992-94).  Pereira Burgos claims "an old friendship" with 
hardline Arnulfista and Legislative Assembly President Jacobo 
Salas, and was an opposition legislator from 1980-84, 
representing Herrera province, in the Azuero Peninsula. 
Several Supreme Court observers have also suggested that 
Pereira has ties to ill-reputed businessman and Moscoso 
confidant Augusto "Onassis" Garcia, part of the network 
described in Reftel B. 
 
 
5. (C) Before taking charge of the Court in January 2004, 
Pereira attempted to have the controversial PECC corruption 
case (Reftel C) transferred to his jurisdiction from that of 
another Justice, an unprecedented move that his colleagues 
vetoed.  That case may be an anomaly, indicative of Pereira's 
personal animosity toward the defendant, Comptroller General 
Alvin Weeden.  Observers suggest that Pereira was 
transmitting a message from President Moscoso who did not 
want to be next in line if Weeden were left unchecked to 
investigate her predecessor, Ernesto Perez Balladares 
(1994-99) for corruption.  Nevertheless, the fact that 
Pereira didn't insist on the transfer over the protests of 
his colleagues is a positive sign. 

(U) Comment: Getting to know you 
-------------------------------- 

6. (C) Prior to his election as Supreme Court President, 
Cesar Pereira Burgos was known primarily as a grumpy old man 
with a tendency to speak out of school, and for his indolence 
and conspicuous consumption.  Pereira is certainly not a 
model reformer, but he's the most direct avenue to influence 
the Panama's hierarchical judiciary.  A recent Embassy 
interaction might point to a more positive relationship with 
the Court. The Court's chief statistician asked Embassy to 
request formally that Pereira release statistics which should 
be available publicly, just to see whether he would approve. 
Pereira promptly released the statistics.  While structural 
reform in the judiciary requires greater conviction than 
releasing statistics, Embassy hopes that Pereira's goodwill 
thus far is indicative of a greater commitment.  However, we 
are preparing to pursue other (civil society-based) 
initiatives that would advance our judicial reform goals in 
the event that Pereira turns out to be obstructionist in his 
leadership of the Court. 
 
 
WATT