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Viewing cable 03ANKARA7767, TURKEY REACTS TO THE ELECTIONS IN NORTHERN CYPRUS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
03ANKARA7767 2003-12-19 08:43 2011-06-15 08:00 SECRET Embassy Ankara
Appears in these articles:
www.tanea.gr
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 007767 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/17/2013 
TAGS: CY PGOV PREL TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY REACTS TO THE ELECTIONS IN NORTHERN CYPRUS 
 
 
REF: ANKARA 7662 
 
 
(U) Classified by DCM Robert Deutsch, E.O. 12958, reasons 1.5 
(b) and (d). 
 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  Close results in northern Cyprus' December 
14 elections have unleashed a wave of speculation about their 
meaning and possible coalitions on both sides in Turkey's 
Cyprus debate.  However, amid the media hype there is a clear 
sense that all eyes are now on Ankara.  Ankara's EU diplomats 
are still digesting the results and have no post-election 
action plan to engage the Turks.  MFA officials expressed to 
visiting UK officials hope for a broad-based coalition 
government with which the GOT could negotiate without 
worrying about being accused of a sellout.  As it had with 
Ambassadors Edelman and Westmacott on the eve of the 
elections, the MFA sketchily outlined its plans to move 
forward to re-start negotiations.  End Summary. 
 
 
Election Results Fodder for Both Sides 
 
 
2. (U) The election results have prodded both the pro- and 
anti-Denktash media to think harder about Cyprus than in the 
past.  Consistently pro-Denktash leftist-nationalist 
Cumhuriyet, under the banner headline "Peace Offensive from 
Denktash", called the elections a "lesson in democracy." 
However, even Cumhuriyet's hard-core socialist-nationalist 
columnist Hikmet Cetinkaya hinted at the question of poverty 
and corruption under Denktash in his Dec. 17 column.  A range 
of columnists in other papers, including establishmentarians 
like Murat Yetkin in Radikal, are urging the GOT to take 
advantage of the opening to solve the Cyprus question.  Most 
pro-settlement columnists believe that the election results 
have created more maneuvering space for the GOT to reach a 
settlement and increased GOT leverage on the "TRNC."  The 
Turkish press has also picked up on the dramatic increase in 
opposition votes over the last election as a signal of 
dissatisfaction with the Denktash status quo.  The media is 
awash in speculation about the possible permutations for 
coalitions and the effects upon a possible solution.  But 
while media predictions vary wildly, there is a clear sense 
that all eyes are on Ankara. 
 
 
No EU Post-Election Action Plan on Turkey 
 
 
3.  (C) With the exception of the UK, Ankara's EU diplomats 
are still digesting the election results and, like the media, 
are caught up in speculation about possible coalitions.  Seen 
from Ankara, there is no EU plan for engaging the Turks on 
Cyprus.  Asked what the EU's action plan is, the Dutch DCM 
shook his head and wished the EU had one; the German 
political counselor said the EU does not need an action plan 
-- Cyprus is Turkey's problem. 
 
 
4.  (C) Ankara's EU diplomats are uncertain about the effect 
of Cyprus settlement to Turkey's accession hopes.  Most agree 
that lack of a settlement will be fatal.  However, the Irish 
DCM claimed Turkey could still receive a date to begin 
accession negotiations without settlement on Cyprus, although 
he admitted it would be difficult.  Several others speculated 
that concern about Cyprus would get lost in December 2004 
amid concerns about an EU Constitution and the recent 
admission of 10 new members.  Nor is there unanimity among 
Ankara's EU diplomats on the criteria the EU will use in 
December 2004 to determine whether Turkey's performance on 
Cyprus is satisfactory.  Several recognized that, because the 
Cyprus question is not formally part of the political 
criteria, EU language on Cyprus is vague.  However, they 
agreed that once the settlement process appears 
"irreversible", Turkey will have cleared the EU's Cyprus bar. 
 
 
MFA Election Readout 
 
 
5.  (C) According to the UK Political Counselor, Turkish MFA 
U/S Ziyal and Deputy U/S Ilkin gave their election readouts 
to visiting UK Foreign Office Permanent U/S Jay on December 
15.  MFA spent much of the meeting asserting that the 
election in the North were free and fair.  Ziyal averred that 
he had personally instructed Turkey's "Embassy" in the "TRNC" 
and Turkish military on the island not to interfere.  The 
British side noted that NGOs had raised questions about 
fairness; the Turks charged that the NGOs were biased against 
the government parties and had given money to the opposition. 
 
 
 
 
6. (C) Ziyal and Ilkin said they hope for a broad-based 
coalition government that will avoid past divisions.  The GOT 
wants to be able to come to a solution without worrying about 
accusations of a sellout (of Denktash and Turkish honor) from 
important, disgruntled factions outside the AK government. 
U/S Ziyal interpreted the elections as showing that Turkish 
Cypriots are ready for a settlement, but not at any price. 
Turkey's Parliament will not settle for just anything, and 
the opposition Republican People's Party (CHP) will ratchet 
up its rhetoric, he predicted.  The government will have to 
expend much political capital to get a settlement approved. 
Another MFA official added that the AK government's 
calculations could be influenced by Turkey's March 28 local 
elections; according to the UK political counselor, the other 
Turkish officials quickly cut him off. 
 
 
GOT Timeline for a Settlement

7.  (S) Ilkin reviewed the GOT's envisioned timeline, as he 
had with Ambassadors Edelman and Westmacott on December 12 
(reftel): the GOT will begin talks with Denktash in January, 
with an eye toward opening talks with the Greek Cypriots in 
the beginning of February.  The GOT hopes for an agreed 
statement of basic principles and a basic government 
structure in place by late April.  The GOT does not think it 
can finalize all aspects of the negotiations by May 1, but 
thinks it can have the basic settlement outline in place, 
Ilkin asserted.  The GOT is amenable in principle to a 
referendum on the results of negotiations, but will not agree 
to a referendum without knowing what the text will be.  Ilkin 
appealed to the British for help in pressuring the Greek 
Cypriot side once Turkey tables its proposal. 
 
 
8.  (C)  Comment:  Despite the clear sense that the ball is 
now in Ankara's court to make the next move toward a 
settlement, there is currently no public consensus about what 
constitutes an acceptable settlement.  The GOT, relying to an 
extent on the expertise of MFA officials who themselves are 
in search of a way to break out of the 29-year stasis, wants 
a proposal that garners a degree of consensus.  It has not 
yet fleshed one out.  The lack of a clear plan is also due to 
entrenched opposition to a settlement from parts of the 
Turkish establishment which have enjoyed a cozy, mutually 
beneficial material relationship with Denktash.  In any case, 
P.M. Erdogan will face a major leadership challenge in 
convincing the public to accept compromises on a question 
that for decades has been a hot button for Turkey's strong 
nationalism.  End Comment. 
EDELMAN