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Viewing cable 03ANKARA7451, TURKEY MFA CYPRUS DEPARTMENT HEAD ON UPCOMING

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
03ANKARA7451 2003-12-04 15:35 2011-06-15 08:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Ankara
Appears in these articles:
www.tanea.gr
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 007451 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/04/2013 
TAGS: CY PGOV PREL TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY MFA CYPRUS DEPARTMENT HEAD ON UPCOMING 
CYPRUS INITIATIVE, ELECTIONS 
 
REF: STATE 327579 
 
 
(U) Classified by Political Counselor John Kunstadter, E.O. 
12958, reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
 
1.  (C) Summary.  MFA Cyprus Department Head Levent Bilman 
worries that despite its planned initiative for a Cyprus 
settlement, Turkey will be unfairly blamed for future 
breakdowns in negotiations.  He claims Turkey's initiative 
will be prepared in line with the SYG's requirements and 
said, without giving details, that the GOT will prepare 
public opinion for the concessions necessary for final 
settlement.  He requested U.S. intervention with the SYG once 
Turkey's proposal is submitted and with the Greek Cypriots to 
reach an agreement.  End Summary. 
 
 
Turkey's Upcoming Initiative 
 
 
2.  (C) Calling in poloff on December 4, Bilman handed over 
copies of recent media interviews of Cypriot President 
Papadopoulos and former President Clerides.  He pointed out 
Clerides' quotes to the effect that "we had to put blame on 
the Turkish side for the failure of negotiations, while not 
accepting anything or making any concession during the 
negotiations."  He particularly emphasized Papadopoulos' 
statements that he had no intention of signing the Annan Plan 
in Hague. 
 
 
3.  (C) According to Bilman, these showed that Turkey had 
been unfairly blamed for breakdown of Annan Plan 
negotiations.  He worried this would happen again if there 
were a breakdown when Turkey offered its new Cyprus 
initiative after the elections.  "If we're going to get 
blamed, what's the point?" he asked rhetorically.  Bilman 
quickly added that the GOT was still committed to going 
forward with its initiative, but was concerned about what the 
response would be. 
 
 
4.  (C) Poloff replied these quotes demonstrated the 
importance of Turkey framing its initiative in Annan Plan 
terms, both procedurally and substantively, in order not to 
leave room for anyone to claim Turkey had not done its part. 
If it did not agree to Annan Plan procedures, or if it 
contained substantive non-starters that re-opened basic 
principles, Turkey's initiative would be rejected and Turkey 
would again be blamed for the impasse. 
 
 
5.  (C) Bilman claimed Turkey was preparing its initiative in 
line with the SYG's requirements.  However, he worried that 
in evaluating the proposal, the SYG, although 
well-intentioned, would rely on advisors who would take a 
harsh view of the initiative.  He said Turkey would need help 
with "access" to the SYG. 
 
 
6.  (C) Bilman asked for examples of non-starters; poloff 
cited insistence on pre-settlement recognition of the "TRNC" 
(reftel).  Asked whether the GOT had thought about how to 
prepare Turkish public opinion for the concessions necessary 
to reach final settlement, Bilman replied the GOT had thought 
about this, but he offered no details.  He said PM Erdogan's 
December 3 statements that there were "two different states, 
two different religions, two different languages" on Cyprus, 
fit with the Annan Plan's bicommunality provisions.  He was 
confident the public would accept a final agreement. 
 
 
7.  (C) Bilman predicted that even if an ostensible agreement 
were reached, Greek Cypriots would use the Russians to block 
approval in the Security Council.  The Russians, he pointed 
out, voted with the Greek Cypriots in the COE against the 
recent Loizidou settlement proposal.  He said the Greek 
Cypriot side needed to be pressured in order for real 
agreement to be reached; he asked for U.S. help in doing 
this.  Even if Turkey did everything in its power to reach 
agreement, the Greek Cypriots would not have sufficient 
pressure on them and felt they would suffer no consequences 
for failing to respond.  Poloff responded that leverage with 
the Greek Cypriots would be highest prior to Cyprus' May 1 EU 
accession. 
 
 
December 14 Elections 
 
 
8.  (C) On elections, Bilman noted that voters lists were 
complete; he claimed the "TRNC High Election Board" ("HEB") 
had received 1232 objections and had stricken 921 names from 
voter rolls due to insufficient proof of residency.  He 
claimed the "HEB" had received no additional objections to 
the voter lists outside those in pending court cases. 
Despite opposition claims to unequal time on local 
television, Bilman said "reports from the island" suggested 
these were untrue.  He said the "Speaker" of the "TRNC 
Parliament" had invited COE and OSCE observers to the island, 
but none had come.  Europe, he complained, had prejudged the 
results and would recognize an opposition victory, but not a 
victory but the current government parties. 
EDELMAN