Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 03RANGOON1452, INDIAN VP VISIT TO BURMA: DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS TAKE A BACK SEAT

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #03RANGOON1452.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
03RANGOON1452 2003-11-14 05:18 2011-03-24 01:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Rangoon
Appears in these articles:
http://www.thehindu.com/news/the-india-cables/article1565400.ece
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 001452 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE ALSO FOR EAP/BCLTV; TREASURY FOR OASIA JEFF NEIL; 
USPACOM FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2013 
TAGS: PREL PGOV BM IN

SUBJECT: INDIAN VP VISIT TO BURMA: DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS TAKE A BACK SEAT 
REF: A. NEW DELHI 6235 
     B. RANGOON 1117      C. RANGOON 889 

Classified By: COM Carmen Martinez for Reasons 1.5 (B,D) 

1. (C) Summary:  Indian Vice President Shekhawat's November 2-5 visit to Burma was the most senior mission by an Indian leader in 16 years and the latest in a string of high-profile visits from India and other neighboring countries.  The Burmese regime pulled out all the stops for the visit, though concrete results were limited.  However, from a public relations perspective, the SPDC scored a major victory and demonstrated its ability to draw in regional leaders who are keen to pursue bilateral objectives, but willing to overlook Burma's deplorable political situation.  Notably absent from Shekhawat's proceedings was a human rights agenda and anything more than a passing reference to democratization. End Summary. 

A ""Special Place"" for Burma 

2. (C) On November 5 Indian Vice President Bhairon Singh Shekhawat concluded a 4-day visit to Burma that included stops in Rangoon, Mandalay, and Bagan.  The visit, the highest-level mission by an Indian leader in 16 years, received extensive and laudatory official press coverage. The Vice President met with numerous SPDC officials, including Chairman Senior General Than Shwe and Shekhawat's counterpart and host, SPDC Vice Chairman Vice-Senior General Maung Aye.  The official government newspaper, the New Light of Myanmar, gave daily coverage to Shekhawat's schedule and published a lengthy joint statement on the visit. 

3. (U) Vice President Shekhawat announced publicly that Burma has a ""special place"" in India's ""Look East"" policy and that India is seeking to double bilateral trade to $1 billion in the next three years.  However, concrete results of the trip were limited to a $57 million ""credit line"" to upgrade a rail link between Rangoon and Mandalay; a bilateral agreement on visa exemptions for official and diplomatic passports; and an unspecified MOU between the Burmese Ministry of Education and India's Ministry of Human Resource Development.  In late October, prior to the visit, the two sides also signed an agreement extending a $25 million credit line to Burma for importing Indian capital goods and ""consultancy"" services.  A glossy 50-page magazine issued by the Indian Embassy in commemoration of the Shekhawat visit extolled ""age old ties, new age relations"" between the two countries. 

Concern Over China Outweighs All 

4. (C) Indian Embassy officials characterized the trip primarily as a ""goodwill visit,"" and acknowledged that India might face criticism from the West for sending such a high-level official to exchange pleasantries with Burma's totalitarian regime, particularly in the wake of a massive crackdown on the democratic opposition.  However, our Indian contacts were quick to point out that India had numerous bilateral objectives that outweighed any trepidation about international reaction.  India, they said, had experienced decades of frosty relations with Burma, exacerbated by a thorny insurgency along the border between Manipur and Chin States.  The current warming between New Delhi and Rangoon created an opportunity to seek progress in resolving mutual border concerns and to secure Burma's support for India's aspirations to join the UN Security Council.  Most importantly, according to our Indian interlocutors, India intends to seize every opportunity to counter growing Chinese influence in Burma, even if this requires cozying up to the SPDC. 

5. (C) Contrary to the GOI's assertions that Shekhawat underscored the importance of democratization during his trip to Burma (ref A), our GOB contacts indicate that the Indians raised few political issues and ""nothing that was objectionable"" to the SPDC.  The regime gave Shekhawat a standard presentation on its seven-point road map for democracy, a plan notable for its glaring omission of Burma's pro-democracy parties and a timeline for a transition to a democratic government.  In the November 5 joint statement, the Indian Vice-President ""expressed support for the national reconciliation process and progress in the transition to democracy,"" a position that echoed the recent endorsement by ASEAN of Burma's road map. 

Comment:  A Missed Opportunity 

6.  (C) Vice President Shekhawat's visit was a domestic public relations success for the Burmese regime and reflects an emerging SPDC strategy to host senior-level leaders and regional meetings to increase its legitimacy and bolster its international image.  The Indian Embassy here will likely maintain a veneer of support for democratization, but will actively pursue trade promotion and other exchanges to counterbalance what India perceives as unchecked (by the U.S.) Chinese influence in Burma.  Ironically, Shekhawat's visit coincided with that of UN Special Rapporteur for Human Rights Pinheiro and the Indians thus missed an easy opportunity to address serious democracy and human rights issues with the SPDC.  Indian Embassy officials told us that Shekhawat put no pressure on the regime behind the scenes and his symbolic unveiling of a statue of Mahatma Gandhi at the University of Rangoon received scant press coverage. Meanwhile, democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi, inspired by the non-violence tactics of Gandhi, remains under house arrest on University Boulevard, less than a mile from the University of Rangoon and the new statue.  End Comment. 

Martinez