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Viewing cable 03HARARE2286, MEETING WITH BROKERS OF POLITICAL RECONCILIATION

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
03HARARE2286 2003-11-24 13:39 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Harare
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 002286 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR J.FRAZER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM ZI MDC ZANU PF
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH BROKERS OF POLITICAL RECONCILIATION 
 
REF: A. HARARE 1794 
     B. HARARE 1711 
     C. HARARE 1599 
     D. HARARE 1130 
 
1. (SBU)  Summary.  Disparaging remarks about "talk about 
talks" between the ruling Zanu-PF party and the Movement for 
Democratic Change (MDC) have replaced hopeful reports of 
imminent breakthroughs.  A meeting on November 19, 2003, 
between Ambassador Sullivan, Director of USAID Paul 
Weisenfeld, and bishops Trevor Manhanga and Patrick Mutume 
indicated that the efforts of the religious community to 
bring the two divided political parties together (reftels) 
continue -- even if at an extremely slow pace.  End summary. 
 
--------------------------- 
Attempts to Mediate Ongoing 
--------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU)  The bishops stated that separate talks with each 
side continue, although the most recent meeting with Zanu-PF 
chairman John Nkomo took place about three weeks ago.  Bishop 
Manhanga stated that President Mugabe is "cordoned off" from 
the meetings, and that they must go through Nkomo and 
Politburo secretary for information and publicity Nathan 
Shamuyarira.  Shamuyarira recently called to urge patience on 
the bishops, and indicated that nothing substantial can be 
done before the upcoming party congress in December.  Both 
bishops believed that this is another in a long series of 
delaying tactics, and that the only party that can benefit 
from such delays is Zanu-PF. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Remaining Issues Preventing Engagement 
-------------------------------------- 
 
3. (SBU)  The bishops reported that the two parties are in 
agreement on many of the substantive issues, and that there 
remain only two contested issues: political legitimacy and an 
MDC call for lifting sanctions.  The bishops stated that 
Zanu-PF is demanding that the MDC publicly request Western 
and donor nations to lift all sanctions, although it is 
unclear from the party rhetoric whether the severe reduction 
of foreign direct investment, failure to qualify for AGOA, 
and withdrawal of World Bank/IMF support are considered to be 
formal "sanctions."  Any suggestion of a Zanu/Zapu-type 
"unity accord" has been abandoned, and the parties reportedly 
realized (despite the delaying tactics) that negotiation 
towards a transition, and a level playing field for both 
parties, was the only way forward. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
Public US Statement Regarding "Sanctions"? 
------------------------------------------ 
 
4. (SBU) When the Ambassador asked if a public statement 
clarifying US sanctions would help dispel any notions that 
the MDC was in control of such sanctions, the bishops 
responded positively.  They opined that Zanu-PF wants to 
believe that the MDC can simply make a public request, after 
which Western countries would comply and withdraw the 
sanctions.  The Ambassador reiterated that the sanctions are 
the result of the flawed presidential elections, ongoing 
human rights concerns, and US policy as reflected in the 
Zimbabwe Democracy and Recovery Act (ZDERA), rather than any 
desire or request by the opposition. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Meetings with Regional Leaders... 
--------------------------------- 
 
5. (SBU)  The bishops recently returned from Malawi, where 
they met with President Muluzi.  They reported that Muluzi 
was very outspoken regarding his belief that Mugabe must 
retire, and that Muluzi claimed to have made these frank 
statements directly to Mugabe in private meetings.  Bishop 
Manhanga pointed out that Muluzi's statement regarding his 
own retirement had effectively canceled out a simmering 
succession battle inside Malawi, which gained Muluzi a great 
deal of credibility.  With Muluzi's help, the bishops have 
also scheduled a meeting with Mozambique's President Chissano 
on November 28, and have scheduled a potential meeting with 
Tanzania's President Mkapa, although he is currently in 
Europe with health problems.  Both bishops believed that 
increased pressure from regional leaders was crucial in 
moving the country out of crisis. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
... But Failure to Secure Meeting with Mbeki 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
6. (SBU)  Despite numerous attempts, the bishops were unable 
to meet with South Africa's President Thabo Mbeki, although 
they did meet with his spokesman Bheki Khumalo.  Given 
Mbeki's public commitment to "quiet diplomacy," there would 
undoubtedly be repercussions if he were seen meeting with the 
bishops.  However, since "quiet diplomacy" had not earned any 
progress in addressing the multiple crises, the bishops hoped 
that Mbeki could be urged to take the next step and increase 
the pressure by meeting with the bishops. 
 
------------------------------ 
Need for a Regional "Champion" 
------------------------------ 
7. (SBU)  Both bishops agreed that a strong regional 
spokesperson should be identified to intercede with Mugabe. 
Although Obasanjo has the stature to take on the role, his 
continued participation is questionable for several reasons. 
First, he has never publicly stated any conviction that 
Mugabe must leave.  Rather, in his role as a member of the 
Commonwealth troika, he has made numerous apologies on behalf 
of the regime and interceded to increase inclusion rather 
than isolation.  Second, his current high profile is the 
result of Nigeria's role as host of the CHOGM meeting.  Once 
this meeting has taken place, Obasanjo would have little 
incentive to intercede, since there would be less direct 
benefit.  Third, Nigeria is perceived as "outside" of the 
Southern African region, and West African intervention might 
be less effective than the intervention of Zimbabwe's closest 
neighbors.  When Mandela was mentioned, Bishop Manhanga 
stated that the personal rivalry between Mugabe and Mandela 
would permeate and dilute the message.  However, he agreed 
that Mandela could be useful in encouraging Mbeki to take a 
more activist position.  Mbeki's participation could signal a 
strong regional demand for an end to the crisis, while 
Mandela's participation could shield Mbeki from any potential 
fallout within his own party. 
 
8. (SBU)  In the same vein, the bishops suggested 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan as an alternative "champion." 
 
SIPDIS 
Although there are clear limits on what the UN can impose on 
Zimbabwe from the outside, Annan has publicly articulated his 
concern about the deteriorating situation.  As a Ghanaian as 
well as a prominent politician, he might be a person of 
suitable stature to serve as a personal advocate for 
increased engagement by Zanu-PF. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
Implications of the New, Military Governor in Manicaland 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
9. (SBU)  When asked whether the appointment of a Zanu-PF 
military stalwart might be a deliberate attempt to isolate 
and counter the political ambitions of Simba Makoni, the 
bishops responded that Manicaland had never followed the 
Zanu-PF line nor voted for the Zanu-PF program, when given 
the choice.  In fact, most of the opposition to Zanu-PF (with 
the exception of the Ndebele-based Zapu) originated in 
Manicaland.  In the recent elections, both the mayor and 17 
of 18 council seats were MDC winners.  The 18th seat, won by 
the Zanu-PF candidate, was taken by a victory margin of only 
two votes. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
10. (SBU)  This meeting underscores the current political 
reality in  Zimbabwe:  considerable behind-the-scenes 
maneuvering with no meaningful accomplishments to show for it 
-- at least from the perspective of the bishops or the 
opposition.  Within the ruling party, vocal hard-liner 
opposition to the talks and rank-and-file ambivalence seem 
likely to sustain this status quo well into the new year. 
The bishops remain nonetheless positive and engaged.  As with 
many others committed to change in Zimbabwe, these two 
bishops realize that engagement and negotiation are necessary 
for resolution.  However, nobody has yet identified the 
appropriate leverage -- stick or carrot -- necessary to move 
the intransigent ruling party towards the negotiating table. 
At this point, delay not only complicates the eventual 
resolution, but it also deepens the social and economic 
morass from which Zimbabwe must emerge if it is to recreate a 
stable and prosperous state.  End comment. 
SULLIVAN