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Viewing cable 03HANOI2996, THE CPV TRIES TO RE-VET ITSELF; PR STUNT?

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
03HANOI2996 2003-11-19 09:23 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Hanoi
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 HANOI 002996 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV SOCI VM DPOL
SUBJECT:  THE CPV TRIES TO RE-VET ITSELF; PR STUNT? 
 
REF:  A.  HANOI  2365   B. HANOI 2175 
 
-     C.  FBIS SEP20031028000088 
 
1.  (U)  Summary.  By Ho Chi Minh's 115th birthday 
anniversary in 2005, the CPV will in principle have re- 
certified the qualifications of each and every member to 
ensure that all meet the CPV high standards for behavior. 
Only then may they receive one of the new, more hi-tech 
membership cards.  The CPV will notably examine cases of 
poor party discipline, as well as malfeasance and 
participation in other "social evils."  Its overall 
reluctance in the past to expel non-performing members bodes 
ill for success in this campaign, which seems primarily 
another public relations campaign to try to convince the 
public that the CPV does care about allegations of bad 
behavior in its midst.  The bottom line remains, however, 
that the CPV's self-policing mechanisms remain weak.  End 
summary. 
 
2.  (U)  The Secretariat of the Communist Party of Vietnam 
(CPV) issued a formal directive on October 24 mandating that 
all CPV members go through a new re-vetting process in order 
to qualify for newly issued membership cards over the next 
eighteen months.  In a meeting with Pol/C on November 14, 
head of the office of the CPV's central Organization 
Department Dr. Nguyen Duy Hung described the program and its 
goals.  (The CPV's website -- www.cpv.org.vn -- carries the 
full directive, which FBIS translated in ref c.) 
 
Going hi-tech 
------------- 
 
3.  (U)  Dr. Hung highlighted that this was only the second 
time that the CPV had undertaken such a comprehensive 
membership renewal.  The 1979 precedent was only an 
"exchange" of cards, whereas the current campaign is a 
"change" of cards and is meant to require more in-depth 
scrutiny of the qualification of current CPV members.  He 
noted, however, that such self-scrutiny remained an 
"ongoing" and "consistent" effort by CPV chapters and 
offices.  Since 1979, members had been issued a membership 
"booklet," which Dr. Hung admitted was printed on "bad 
quality paper," was bulky, and usually only carried for 
events on the CPV's anniversary.  Many members no longer 
even knew where their membership booklets were, he admitted. 
 
4.  (U)  The new computer-generated cards will include 
photos, personal data about place/date of birth and entry 
into the CPV, and an emblem of Ho Chi Minh.  Like GVN-issued 
national identity cards and driver's licenses, it will be 
laminated and sized easily to fit into a billfold. 
 
Reforming bad apples 
-------------------- 
 
5.  (U)  Dr. Hung emphasized that the overall goal of the 
campaign is to "raise the quality" of CPV members, 
particularly on ideological grounds, while claiming that the 
CPV was "continuously" trying to do this, not just during 
this period of re-vetting.  The CPV's goal is not/not to 
expel bad members, he stressed, but rather to "improve" 
their performance and character.  Currently, the CPV expels 
only about 0.01 to 0.02 pct of its 2.5 million members in 
any given year, he said, predicting that the ratio would not 
be any higher during the re-vetting process. 
 
6.  (U)  Major problems that party cells will be looking for 
in CPV members are violations related to: 
--  CPV "organizational principles," which Dr. Hung 
described as the single biggest issue.  This includes CPV 
members who decline to take part in party activities, who 
"lack responsibility," who are "undemocratic," or who act in 
an "overly bureaucratic behavior"; 
--  corruption, which Hung claimed was only a "small 
problem" (note:  contrary to other major party campaigns 
against corruption in its midst, as described in refs a and 
b.  end note); 
--  support for CPV policies; 
--  humanitarian practices and "character."  Hung cited 19 
major CPV precepts for behavior, including "lacking culture" 
and prohibitions on gambling, use of narcotics, frequenting 
prostitutes, or regular public drunkenness.  Hung admitted 
that inebriation itself was not frowned upon per se, as this 
was seen as a somewhat regular occurrence in official 
Vietnamese society.  He noted that these "social problems" 
had increased among CPV members in the more free-wheeling 
society of the doi moi era, with more opportunities for bad 
behavior and more cash.  He claimed that CPV "discipline" 
was not so much less nowadays as that it had simply been 
"enforced less seriously." 
 
7.  (U)  The CPV directive also specified (although Dr. Hung 
did not) that CPV members with "mental problems," who are 
subject to complaints and denunciations, or who have an 
"unclear personal political history" will not receive new 
cards, unless local party committee certify that these 
problems have been rectified. 
 
The process 
----------- 
 
8.  (U)  Party cells at all levels will be responsible for 
verifying that existing party members remain eligible for 
membership in this re-vetting process.  Party cells overseas 
(which the directive clarified are appointed by the 
Politburo itself) will also conduct such reviews.  Dr. Hung 
admitted at least three CPV cells in the U.S. -- at the SRV 
Embassy in Washington, its Consulate General in San 
Francisco, and its Mission to the UN in New York -- but 
claimed not to know whether or not there are additional 
cells in the U.S. 
 
9.  (U)  In addition to the formal reviews by party cells, 
CPV members are also expected to "inspect themselves," as 
well as to offer frank criticisms of fellow members whose 
conduct does not meet expected standards.  Those found 
failing to meet standards will nonetheless have six months 
to "rectify errors and improve shortcomings."  An additional 
grace period of no more than six months may be possible in 
some cases.  If the members still are judged sub-standard, 
they will have a chance to resign voluntarily before facing 
mandatory expulsion.  Dr. Hung reiterated that the CPV's 
goal is not to expel members, but to make them better party 
members. 
 
10.  (U)  The issuance/vetting process will begin with the 
easy cases -- "outstanding" members and those who have been 
awarded the Party Emblem -- who will be issued their new 
cards on Ho Chi Minh's birthday May 19, 2004.  Subsequent 
rounds will take place in 2004 on September 2 and November 
7, as well as in 2005 on February 3 and May 19 (the 115th 
anniversary of Ho's birth).  Despite the options for six 
months improvement grace periods, Dr. Hung confirmed that 
the process would be entirely completed by that final date. 
 
The face of the CPV today 
------------------------- 
 
11.  (U)  Dr. Hung confirmed that at least 70 pct of today's 
CPV members still work for state or party organs, although 
he claimed that the CPV was "trying to reach out" to private 
sector employees (note:  but still not notably to 
entrepreneurs in most cases, unlike in China.  end note). 
He said he did not have exact statistics but guessed that 
entries into the CPV were on the upswing, although most new 
entrants continued to come from rural areas, not urban 
centers.  (Note:  Young Army draftees remain an important 
source of new members, judging from media reports.  end 
note)  The CPV is actively recruiting outstanding students 
even in their final year in high school, he added.  CPV 
regulations require members be at least 18 years old and 
literate.  Two current CPV members must either endorse or 
nominate a candidate, whose application will be inspected by 
the CPV cell in the workplace and/or neighborhood.  Dr. Hung 
confirmed that CPV members may be practicing members of any 
recognized religion, although he admitted that Protestant 
members were very few due to their low numbers in society as 
a whole.  He claimed that there had never been any bar 
against accepting religious believers into the CPV. 
 
Comment:  low chances of success 
-------------------------------- 
 
12.  (U)  Despite Dr. Hung's confident prediction that the 
results of this re-vetting process would be "wonderfully 
successful," the chances of genuinely reforming the behavior 
of virtually all of current CPV members are slim at best, as 
the CPV has discovered in its mostly ineffective fight 
against corruption.  The limitations of self-inspection, or 
inspection primarily by cronies and friends in local party 
chapters, are self-evident, despite the opportunities for 
maligning professional competitors or personal enemies. 
With the CPV clearly loathe to admit the extent of decay in 
standards within its midst through expulsions -- public or 
private -- or to engage in meaningful punishment or 
sanctions against bad behaving members, the card swapping 
project sounds mostly like another public relations gesture 
designed to reassure the public that it takes domestic 
concerns about malfeasance and misuse of Party positions 
seriously, without really doing much to solve the problem. 
BURGHARDT