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Viewing cable 03HANOI2869, TOUR D'HORIZON WITH DEFMIN GENERAL TRA

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
03HANOI2869 2003-11-07 08:23 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Hanoi
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 HANOI 002869 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV AND PM 
 
DOD FOR ISA/STERN 
 
PACOM FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PREL MARR TH CH CB VM
SUBJECT:  TOUR D'HORIZON WITH DEFMIN GENERAL TRA 
 
REF:  HANOI 2846 
 
1.  (SBU)  Summary.  Defense Minister Tra's meetings in 
Washington next week are unlikely to produce any surprises, 
but should put the full stamp of approval on better mil/mil 
ties and lead to a more active program of exchanges.  Tra is 
keen to expand medical cooperation and also seeks more 
technical assistance and equipment for demining needs.  He 
seemed ill-prepared to discuss IMET or an Article 98 
agreement.  Tra described in brief joint naval patrols with 
Thailand (ongoing), the PRC (new), and Cambodia (in 
abeyance).  The GVN has still not made a "diplomatic 
decision" that would lead to Vietnamese participation in 
international peacekeeping, but demining could be an area 
where Vietnam could offer contributions eventually.  Tra was 
a pleasant interlocutor, but appears more focused on the 
optics of the visit -- sending a signal at home of better 
relations -- than a substantive discussion of strategic 
issues.  End summary. 
 
2.  (U)  Ambassador hosted Politburo member and Defense 
Minister Senior General Pham Van Tra, accompanied by ten 
members of his traveling delegation, at an unprecedented 
dinner on November 6 at the Residence in preparation for 
Tra's November 9-12 visit to the U.S.  (The delegation will 
then travel to Brazil and Belgium).   DATT and Pol/C also 
attended.  The Ambassador welcomed the first-ever visit to 
the U.S. by a SRV Defense Minister and expressed hope for 
continued expansion of military-to-military ties as well as 
overall expansion of U.S.-Vietnam relations. 
 
Goals of the visit 
------------------ 
 
3.  (SBU)  General Tra cited eight main goals for the trip: 
--  to return the March 2000 visit to Vietnam by then- 
Secretary of Defense Cohen; 
 
SIPDIS 
--  to promote exchanges between the two militaries in order 
to achieve better mutual understanding; 
--  to seek ways to cooperate even more effectively on the 
search for Missing in Action, and to thank the U.S. for the 
information it has provided that has helped Vietnam to 
conduct its own searches; 
--  to request an increase in demining-related assistance, 
particularly equipment needs (Tra later described demining 
cooperation as only "rather good" compared to the "good" 
cooperation on MIAs and medicine); 
--  to increase the number of exchanges at all levels of the 
military; 
--  to expand medical research cooperation (note:  Tra 
reiterated twice subsequently that he planned to make a 
proposal on this to Secretary Rumsfeld.  end note); 
--  to discuss USG assistance on dealing with the 
consequences of chemicals used at former U.S. bases, 
particularly in Danang, Bien Hoa, and Cu Mong Pass and Phu 
Cat (both in Binh Dinh province); and, 
--  to invite Secretary Rumsfeld to visit further to promote 
"mutual understanding and trust."   Tra commented that his 
trip would lead to more exchanges down the line, and also 
specifically expressed a willingness to receive PACOM 
Admiral Fargo in February. 
 
4.  (SBU)  Ambassador noted that we share these broad 
objectives, expressed appreciation for Vietnamese 
cooperation on POW/MIAs, and urged the MOD use its influence 
within the GVN and Prime Minister's Office to conclude 
negotiations on the Level One demining survey to make it a 
"deliverable" that could be signed during the December visit 
to the U.S. of Deputy Prime Minister Vu Khoan.  He commented 
that Secretary Rumsfeld and other USG interlocutors would 
also likely wish to discuss various strategic issues, 
including: 
-- the role of ASEAN, especially enhancing counter-terrorism 
cooperation (General Tra noted that, while the Ministry of 
Public Security had the lead on this, MOD was actively 
engaged); 
--  the rise of China and its influence in the region; 
--  the threat from North Korea and any helpful role the GVN 
might play in defusing the situation; 
--  conclusion of an Article 98 agreement; 
--  conclusion of an IMET agreement, like those the U.S. has 
with most other countries in Asia; and, 
--  expansion of other cooperation, including training, ship 
visits, etc. 
 
5.  (SBU)  General Tra cited problems in signing an IMET 
agreement, but expressed interest in English language 
training for MOD officials.  He noted the value of an 
ongoing English language program for MOD offered by the 
Australians.  He also expressed an interest in more MOD/DOD 
cooperation on science and technology.  (Note:  The Director 
of MOD's Military Center of Science and Technology, Lt. Gen. 
Nguyen Hoa Thinh, was also at the dinner and will be a 
member of Tra's delegation.  DATT will seek to coordinate 
meetings for him with DOD counterparts.) 
 
Regional defense relationships 
------------------------------ 
 
6.  (SBU)  General Tra explained the presence of the 
Commanders of Military Regions 3 and 7 (Haiphong and Ho Chi 
Minh City) on his delegation as related to their 
responsibilities in receiving foreign naval ships 
frequently, including the upcoming visit of a U.S. frigate. 
He said that he usually undertakes two foreign trips per 
year, usually with an all-Army delegation (like this one). 
He pointed to the ongoing visit to Vietnam by the Thai 
Defense Minister, and said that the two countries already 
conducted joint naval patrols (two vessels per country) and 
had seen a decrease in piracy as a result.   He said that 
Vietnam and China had also just reached agreement to conduct 
such joint patrols.  Noting that Vietnam and China still had 
not reached agreement on fishing zones (which Tra 
confirmed), the Ambassador asked what the mandate would be 
for the joint patrols.  Tra's answer was rather vague.  A 
similar joint patrol program with Cambodia had not worked 
well due to Cambodia's lack of resources, Tra said.  Once 
the new government in Phnom Penh was formed, he promised 
that Vietnam would make another attempt at resuming such 
patrols. 
 
Peacekeeping 
------------ 
 
7.  (SBU)  Ambassador noted General Tra's February 2002 
discussions with then-CINCPAC Admiral Blair about a possible 
role for Vietnam in international peacekeeping operations, 
especially as Vietnam continues its campaign for a 2008/9 UN 
Security Council seat.  General Tra emphasized that such a 
role would require a "diplomatic decision" first within the 
GVN and was not up to MOD per se.  He pointed to Vietnam's 
considerable experience in demining after fifty years of war 
as one future possible area where the Vietnam military (both 
Army and Navy) could make a contribution. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
8.  (SBU)  General Tra proved to be a pleasant -- if 
uninspiring -- interlocutor, notably less combative than in 
his talks last year with Admiral Blair and separately with 
the Ambassador.  He will likely strive to maintain this aura 
of goodwill in Washington, and will not be prepared to delve 
too much into broader strategic issues or concerns.  He and 
MOD appear much more focused on the optics of the visit than 
on any substantive outcomes or deliverables.  The visit 
appears designed mostly to send a signal within the 
Vietnamese military and to the Vietnamese public that the 
CPV and GVN have decided to move to a higher level of 
mil/mil cooperation with the U.S., rather than to achieve 
any specific goals vis--vis the USG at this point.  It is 
nonetheless an opportunity for us to convey our interests 
and concerns and to take the Vietnamese up on their 
willingness to engage further. 
BURGHARDT