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Viewing cable 03HARARE2024, NEW UTETE LAND AUDIT REPORT OFFERS LITTLE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
03HARARE2024 2003-10-07 10:17 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Harare
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 HARARE 002024 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR J. FRAZER 
LONDON FOR C. GURNEY 
PARIS FOR C. NEARY 
NAIROBI FOR T. PFLAUMER 
PRETORIA FOR SREYNOLDS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON EAGR PGOV ZI
SUBJECT: NEW UTETE LAND AUDIT REPORT OFFERS LITTLE 
 
1. (SBU)  Summary:  The Utete commission report on anomalies 
in the land resettlement program, widely anticipated as an 
indicator of how the GOZ will address the chaotic situation 
in the agricultural sector, is a non-event.  Despite 
stringent attempts to keep this document secret, Post 
recently obtained a copy, which may indicate that the 
"leaked" report will soon be widely distributed.  While some 
rumors had indicated that the Utete report would be 
"explosive" if actually implemented, a careful reading 
discovers nothing new.  The report acknowledges that some 
problems regarding multiple farm ownership by beneficiaries, 
political inconsistency in the allocation of land, and lack 
of funding for input schemes for new farmers must be 
resolved.  Further, the report concedes that resolution of 
those pesky outstanding legal details (such as inconsistent 
application of procedures, discrepancies between the law and 
the constitution, and the issue of title) must be addressed. 
However, this report is nowhere near as explosive as the 
permanently unpublished Buka report, which "named names" of 
the political beneficiaries (including a number of ministers) 
who had manipulated the system by seizing multiple prime 
farms -- lock, livestock, and standing crops.  This report, 
by contrast, whines plaintively about "the activities of 
certain persons," "certain prominent persons," and even "some 
Governors... themselves" who are possibly guilty of engaging 
in "political interference" in the allocation process.  This 
latest commission report continues to blame drought, outside 
political interference, and ephemeral Western sanctions for 
the agricultural mess which Zimbabwe must now address.  End 
summary. 
 
-------------------------- 
"New and Improved" Numbers 
-------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU)  Despite continued claims in the GOZ-controlled 
press that 300,000 families have been settled under the A1 
(communal land decongestion) model, and 54,000 families have 
been settled under the A2 (de-segregation of communal 
farming) model, the numbers reported by the Utete commission 
are considerably lower.  The Utete report states that only 
127,192 families have been settled on 4,321,080 hectares 
under the A1 model (representing a 97% "uptake" rate), and 
7,260 beneficiaries have been settled on 2,198,814 hectares 
under the A2 model (average of 66% "uptake").  These numbers 
should be balanced against an estimated 300,000 displaced 
commercial farm worker families.  At any rate, the new, 
realistic, downward-revised numbers are one of the few 
indications of credibility in the entire report. 
 
3. (SBU)  Other signs of credibility include suggestions for: 
the Grain Marketing Board's monopoly on grain purchases and 
sales to be partially de-controlled; renewed efforts to 
create a single farmers' union; new efforts to create private 
sector partnerships with agro-businesses; efforts to develop 
an Agricultural Development Bank to fund farmers at all 
levels; and efforts to increase skills among the new farmers. 
 However, in a theme which runs throughout this report, there 
is no advice as to how to implement even the most 
self-evident strategies.  One of the most significant 
recommendations is that the GOZ should reinvent the wheel and 
once again split the Ministry of Land, Agriculture and Rural 
Resettlement into two bodies:  the Ministry of Agriculture 
and a proposed Ministry of Land Affairs.  However, there is 
little hope that a series of small, isolated actions 
(unsupported by massive infusions of foreign exchange) can 
turn the land resettlement program, as it currently stands, 
into a success. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
White Commercial Farmers Remain A Factor? 
----------------------------------------- 
 
4. (SBU)  One of the more interesting elements of this report 
is the "documented" number of white commercial farmers 
remaining in the agricultural sector.  Despite continuous and 
ongoing listing of farms for acquisition (the latest lists of 
81 farms were "gazetted" on October 3, 2003), the report 
presents a picture of some 1,377 farms remaining in white 
hands.  The report cites this as "about 3% of land in the 
country, excluding land held by corporate entities."  The 
Commercial Farmers Union (CFU) and Justice for Agriculture 
(JAG) concede that there are still a number of white farmers 
on the land, but both claim that many of these farmers are 
merely holding out until the last possible moment.  Some of 
these commercial farmers are still in operation, and some are 
attempting to farm after voluntary sub-division of their 
property, but some are cultivating only a fraction of their 
land, while others are simply occupying their homestead 
despite ongoing attempts (both legal and extra-legal) to 
evict them.  These two farmers' groups agree that only about 
600 former commercial farmers are still fully in possession 
of their land.  In fact, even the Utete report is a bit 
ambiguous on the status of its claim, stating that "The 
presence or otherwise of these farmers on the land could not 
in all cases be verified at the time of the compilation of 
this Report," which raises the question of what other basis 
could be used for such a figure. 
 
---------------------------- 
One Man, One Farm -- Sort Of 
---------------------------- 
 
5. (SBU)  The biggest surprise, after the brutal frankness of 
the Buka report (produced by a commission headed by 
Government minister Flora Buka), was the bland tone taken by 
the Utete commission on the issue of multiple farm ownership 
by new beneficiaries.  Whereas the Buka report listed 
numerous ministers who had acquired two, three, or even more 
prime pieces of commercial farm property through the 
resettlement program, the Utete report barely acknowledges 
this.  Instead, the Utete report repeatedly claims that the 
decongestion of the rural areas has been compromised by A1 
settlers who receive a new A1 plot without returning their 
original communal plot.  This is undoubtedly true; the 
infrastructure, including availability of schools, clinics, 
roads, and water, in the newly resettled A1 areas is grossly 
inadequate.  Many A1 settlers have moved to their new plots 
while leaving wives and school-going children on their old 
communal holding.  In addition, many A1 settlers have been 
"relocated" from one acquired farm to another as new 
claimants or errors in allocations have emerged, convincing 
many to retain their communal entitlement as a backup.  The 
report calls for enforcement of the one man, one farm 
concept, which is cast not as a policy, but rather as a 
"guideline"  for sharing a scarce resource between the 
numerous land-hungry peasant farmers.  Any hope that this 
report would compel the worst A2 offenders to relinquish part 
of their spoils is apparently futile. 
 
6. (SBU)  The report states, however, that "Any beneficiary 
of the land resettlement program whether on A1 or A2 models 
with more than one piece of land is expected to surrender 
excess land."  It goes on to claim that a total of 24,562 
hectares, which will be re-allocated to A1 settlers, have 
actually been recovered.  The commission suggests that "one 
family, one farm" might be a better way to address the 
situation, but even so it cites the difficulties of enforcing 
compliance.  For instance, the report addresses the 
complications inherent in polygamous marriages and marriages 
where both spouses are ex-combatants, and where the wives 
would therefore want to maintain "ownership" in their own 
right.  In its typically noncommittal fashion, the report 
continues that "Government has still to firmly pronounce 
itself on this matter." 
 
7. (SBU)  Many of the former commercial farmers have used 
this "one man, one farm" mantra to justify their own legal 
challenges to compulsory acquisition.  The report, however, 
states that "In the case of a single owned farm being 
acquired due to its being contiguous to a communal area, 
Government undertook to provide the affected farmer with 
another elsewhere around the country."  Currently, neither of 
the farmers organizations are aware of any white commercial 
farmer receiving such an offer.  In fairness, it is unlikely 
that many commercial farmers would accept this offer, since 
it implies that any beneficiary would have to voluntarily 
relinquish claim and title to the first farm. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Land Subdivisions -- or Lack Thereof 
------------------------------------ 
 
8. (SBU)  The report offers a fascinating glimpse into the 
power struggles which must have consumed all players in this 
process.  Provincial governors complain that they have been 
ignored, and cite for support the situation regarding 
voluntary subdivision of white commercial farms.  Apparently, 
some provincial governors (such as Governor Msipa of the 
Midlands province) were fairly assertive about negotiating 
farm reductions with some of their larger landowners.  Many 
landowners actually signed over either a second farm, or a 
portion of their single farm, via a GOZ-generated LA3 form. 
Many others complained that they were never given the 
opportunity to reduce their holdings.  Most farmers who did 
voluntarily yield part of their land did so under the belief 
that they would then be allowed to stay on their reduced 
landholding, and in their own home. 
 
9. (SBU)  However, the Ministry of Land did not formalize any 
of the voluntary reductions, and in fact has allegedly said 
that it would not do so, as it had not participated in the 
process.  In the meantime, many farmers who had submitted to 
the authority of the land resettlement program found 
themselves evicted, either through a continuation of the 
legal process or by gangs of war vets.  In typical fashion, 
the report advised that "a conclusive position be taken on 
the allocation of land subdivisions to which the LA3 forms 
were designed to apply," without advising what position would 
be most beneficial.  A response from the GOZ, incorporated 
into the report, states that an exercise to settle this issue 
would include interviewing farmers still interested in 
pursuing farming, after which the Land Acquisition Act will 
be amended.  Under these amendments, "Affected farmers will 
be given offer letters and allocated either parts of their 
original farms or given alternative land elsewhere in the 
country." 
 
----------------------------- 
Legal Issues, Including Title 
----------------------------- 
 
10. (SBU)  This report acknowledges the legal morass 
surrounding the land resettlement exercise.  Many former 
commercial farmers have built legal cases by demonstrating 
that their land did not fit into any of the categories 
identified for compulsory acquisition -- derelict land, 
underutilized land, land under multiple ownership, 
foreign-owned land, or land adjoining  communal areas. 
Others have cited their exemption under one of the published 
categories -- church-owned land, agro-industrial or 
plantation land, land protected by a Bilateral Investment 
Promotion and Protection Agreements, land designated as a 
Export Processing Zone, or projects approved by the Zimbabwe 
Investment Center.  The report attempts to bypass these 
original criteria by stating that these were never 
"policies," but merely guidelines ("neither a legal 
requirement nor conclusive criteria") to help the Land 
Identification Committees to prioritize land for acquisition. 
 
 
11. (SBU) In addition to admitting errors in processing 
acquisitions and allocating plots, the Commission concedes 
that the entire process is not quite constitutional.  "Above 
all, there was a major contradiction observed as between the 
1992 Land Acquisition Act as amended, which provides for the 
compulsory acquisition of land, and the provision embedded in 
the Constitution which requires that such acquisition be 
confirmed by the Administrative Court.  This contradiction 
ought to be removed (last sentence bold and italic in 
original)." 
 
12. (SBU)  The issue of title to the newly acquired land 
continues to present difficulties for the GOZ.  The report 
recognizes that leases or "other forms of legal title" are 
necessary to allow A2 farmers to finance commercial 
agriculture.  However, the Commission seems to sidestep the 
issue of competing claims by existing title deed holders, and 
recommends long-term (and possibly inheritable) leases 
several times in the lengthy document.  In fact, the report 
states several times that A2 beneficiaries should only be 
leased land on a complete cost-recovery basis, and suggests 
passing the complete burden of compensation onto the new 
farmers.  The report calls several times for comprehensive 
assessment of all improvements, including houses, barns, 
irrigation systems, and moveable equipment, so that a proper 
lease price can be determined.  Regarding A1 beneficiaries, 
the report states that "the issue of tenure is still under 
consideration, although indications are that the tenure 
system is likely to be similar to the one obtaining for 
communal areas (e.g., no bankable title)." 
 
13. (SBU)  The unspoken conflict is that the GOZ seems 
determined to maintain control of the allocations in a manner 
which would make title -- even a transferable lease -- 
useless.  At various points throughout the report, the 
Commission emphasizes the need for both A1 and A2 farmers to 
submit to the GOZ's need to control agricultural planning, 
and its right to assess and confirm productivity.  At the 
same time, the report concedes that investment in property 
will only flourish where the landowner has the security of 
knowing that he (or his financier) will reap the benefits of 
his investment.  While the GOZ is understandably concerned 
with food security, any system of title or lease which allows 
the holder to be dispossessed based on the whims of a 
government functionary defeats the purpose. 
 
------------------------------------- 
Former Farm Workers Blamed, Dismissed 
------------------------------------- 
 
14. (SBU)  The lack of attention to this vulnerable group is 
startling.  The report claims, several times throughout the 
text, that the former farm workers fall into one of three 
groups:  some farm workers were given A1 plots; some have 
found employment with the new farmers; and some returned to 
their rural homes or "opted to ... return to their country of 
origin" (despite the fact that many are third- or 
fourth-generation Zimbabwe-born).  The report advises that 
most in this third category  remain in their former 
compounds, a festering problem waiting for GOZ action.  In 
several instances, the report blames much of the lawlessness 
(illegal squatting, illegal gold panning, crop theft, 
vandalism, poaching, misuse of farm equipment, and "general 
criminal activities") on the farm workers.  In several 
others, the report states that "they were reportedly 
unwilling to work for the newly resettled farmers, preferring 
to be engaged in gold panning activities which they 
considered to be more lucrative.  Whilst unwilling to take up 
employment, they remained a burden to the new farmers in 
terms of water and electricity usage..."  It must be noted 
that according to GAPWUZ (the union previously representing 
the bulk of commercial farm workers), the "new farmers" were 
in January strenuously fighting an increase in the minimum 
wage from around Zim $5000/month to $7,500/month (an increase 
from US $3.36 to US $5.05 per month). 
 
 
15. (SBU)  The total number of the approximately 300,000 
former farm workers who reportedly received some land in the 
program is detailed below. 
 
Province     Total workers    Total beneficiaries 
 
Manicaland    90,000 (est.)   1,080 
Mash Central  not provided    "a small number" 
Mash East     not provided    "some" 
Mash West     not provided    "some," but very few 
Masvingo      not provided      128 
Mat North     not provided      225 
Mat South     not provided      361 
Midlands      not provided      377 
                      Total   2,171 
 
----------------------- 
Status of Conservancies 
----------------------- 
 
16. (SBU)  Many of the wildlife conservancy landowners, 
including several Amcit couples, had hopes that the Utete 
commission would help resolve the ongoing threat to the 
peaceful possession of their property.  Unfortunately, 
nothing in this report offers any respite.  While the report 
decries the "attempt to subdivide these areas into individual 
plots which would clearly be unviable," there is no 
suggestion that land ownership revert to the existing model. 
Rather, the Utete commission recommends "a corporate-type 
model (of ownership) with a component to provide for local 
community participation."  "A2 beneficiaries would be 
allocated shares in and participate in managing the entities 
running the Safari farms, Plantations or Conservancies." 
 
17. (SBU)  The report also addresses the situation of illegal 
occupiers in Gonarezhou, the national park to be incorporated 
into the Zimbabwe-South Africa-Mozambique Transfrontier Park. 
 Although the governor of Masvingo reportedly "settled" the 
families in Gonarezhou, the report states that "Government 
stance on National Parks and Gazetted Forests is that such 
areas should be exempted from acquisitions and resettlement. 
With particular reference to the Gonarezhou National Park, 
the Provincial Governor of Masvingo... is in the process of 
finding alternative land to resettle the families currently 
occupying" the park. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
Claims of Increased Productivity Misleading 
------------------------------------------- 
 
18. (SBU)  There are several credible and rational 
assessments included in this report, but few concrete 
suggestions for meaningful action. These are interspersed 
with unexpected claims of high crop production and 
beneficiaries making "full use of the land allocated to 
them."  In one case, the GOZ's own figures belie its previous 
claims.  According to this report, in the 2000 growing 
season, when most commercial farmers were still planting and 
harvesting, commercial farms had 160,577 hectares under 
maize, which produced 680,942 metric tonnes of grain.  In 
that same year, communal farmers had 1,217,115 hectares under 
maize, which produced 808,709 metric tonnes.  While it is 
clear that seven times more communal land than commercial 
land was cultivated for maize, it is not true that the 
communal farmers largely carried the burden of feeding the 
country (a statistic often repeated and seldom supported). 
Elsewhere, the report claims that "Many of those (A1 
beneficiaries) whom the Committee met stated that even 
against the unfavourable weather conditions in the 2002 to 
2003 agricultural season (note:  when rains were delayed, but 
average in amount, end note), they had harvested better 
yields than in the past."  This could be entirely true yet 
completely misleading.  Even when a communal farmer increases 
his yield from .66 tonnes/hectare, he still does not begin to 
reach the commercial productivity of 4.2 tonnes/hectare. 
 
19. (SBU) In fact, the report claims, "For both old and new 
farmers, but particularly the latter, the prevailing 
macro-economic environment, and in particular the relentless 
capital equipment and input price inflation, represented a 
serious challenge if not a major obstacle to the 
significantly increased production on the land envisaged 
under the Programme."  It is unclear why the GOZ would have 
envisaged such an increase in production by deconstructing a 
highly sophisticated and functional system. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
20. (SBU)  This is a bland and sanitized report.  Given the 
contents, there is little explanation for the GOZ's great 
secrecy.  The tone combines a selective history lesson, 
outdated anticolonial jargon, platitudes, 
blame-apportionment, and self-absolution.  The style is 
filled with passive voice and arms'-length references, as if 
the commission is commenting on remote and distant events. 
The international community was looking to this report as an 
indication of whether the winds of reform are blowing.  Based 
on this report, they are not. The three elements which must 
be addressed in order to "reform" the crisis-ridden 
agricultural sector are developing a viable economic model, 
tackling the issue of compensation, and reining in 
politically-connected A2 abuse.  Not one of these issues has 
been confronted.  The fact that the Buka report, which could 
have formed the basis for reform, has been summarily shelved, 
is telling. 
 
21. (SBU)  The report raises more questions than it answers. 
Despite claims that wholesale gazetting of new properties is 
over, new lists appear in the GOZ press on a weekly basis. 
Regarding indigenous landowners who bought multiple farms 
before the resettlement program, the report states that "At 
this state, they are, also not targeted for compulsory 
acquisition."  The report hints at a third model of 
resettlement, euphemistically entitled a "Peri-Urban/Green 
Zone Resettlement Scheme," which is being finalized even now. 
 Although this is described as a way to "create space for the 
development of peri urban agriculture or green belts around 
urban areas...,"  there are insufficient details as to what 
this will entail. 
 
22. (SBU)  Although the report takes an obligatory swipe at 
"Western sanctions" which are destabilizing the economy, it 
does concede that national macro-economic instability has 
adversely affected smooth implementation.  That being said, 
it makes no suggestions for repairing the macro-economic 
environment.  The report addresses the problem of bringing 
all farms into compliance with the maximum farm size, but 
offers no recommendations as to how to combine this with its 
proposed farm-size flexibility.  The Executive Summary 
states, "it is also critical that value addition to 
agricultural produce be undertaken as a matter of deliberate 
policy.  For example, there is no plausible reason in the 
country exporting bulky cotton lint instead of weaving it to 
boost the textiles and clothing industry."  The unspoken 
plausible reason is that few independent investors would want 
to brave the perils of the Zimbabwean economy when investing 
in exports from AGOA-eligible countries is so much less risky. 
 
23. (SBU)  In places, the report does not refrain from utter 
falsehoods -- as in its claims that the GOZ fulfilled, but 
Britain did not honor, their respective commitments under the 
September 2001 Abuja agreements. 
 
24. (SBU)  The Executive Summary ends with the claim, "There 
can be no alternative to the Programme's success... Neither 
stagnation nor regression can be contemplated."  Therein lies 
this commission's raison d'etre:  justification of a 
fundamentally flawed program, the enormous costs (social, 
political and economic) notwithstanding. 
SULLIVAN