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Viewing cable 03ANKARA6535, TURKEY: GREY WOLVES RE-ELECT PACK LEADER BAHCELI

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
03ANKARA6535 2003-10-17 14:47 2011-04-20 21:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Ankara
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 006535 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/17/2013 
TAGS: PREL PGOV TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY: GREY WOLVES RE-ELECT PACK LEADER BAHCELI 
 
(C) Classified by Deputy Political Counselor Charles O. 
Blaha. Reason: 1.5 (b,d). 
 
 
1. (C) Summary: Ultra-nationalist MHP delegates Oct. 12 
re-elected Devlet Bahceli as party Chairman.  Our contacts in 
the party suggest there will not be many changes either to 
the party administration or the party line -- deep skepticism 
towards the EU and US and paranoia concerning Kurds in Turkey 
and Iraq.  Without significant changes, at least in the party 
hierarchy, contacts outside the party suggest MHP will not be 
able to regain its 1999 form, when it garnered 19 percent of 
the vote in the national elections. End Summary. 
 
 
2. (C) At an uninspired Oct. 12 party convention attended by 
poloff, delegates for the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) 
overwhelmingly supported the re-election of former Deputy PM 
Devlet Bahceli as party chairman.  Bahceli received 688 votes 
of the 1127 cast.  His next closest competitor, long-time MHP 
grassroots figure Ramiz Ongun, received 300 votes.  In a 
distant third place, Koray Aydin -- whose time as Public 
Works Minister in the most recent Ecevit government was 
clouded by corruption allegations -- received 137 votes. 
 
 
3. (C) The atmosphere at the MHP convention contrasted 
starkly with ruling AK Party's scripted convention held on 
the same day.  Perhaps an indicator of internal party 
tensions, delegates could not agree on the convention's 
supervisory board until 2 p.m., after which the official 
proceedings began -- long after the 10 a.m. start time listed 
in the convention agenda handed out at the gate.  Although 
the convention hall was packed with party supporters, the 
audience lacked enthusiasm and only offered half-hearted 
attempts at chanting "Prime Minister Bahceli." 
 
 
4. (C) In his address to the crowd, Bahceli strongly 
criticized the AK Government's Iraq policy, claiming the GOT 
had surrendered to outside powers.  He said the GOT has 
dishonored Turkey and has not pursued any policies that have 
benefited the Turkish nation.  Opposition CHP Vice Chairman 
and close Embassy contact Sinan Yerlikaya, who attended the 
MHP convention, told poloff Oct. 17 that after hearing 
Bahceli's speech, he believes MHP will react quickly and 
loudly to any Turkish casualties resulting from a troop 
deployment to Iraq (Note: CHP also opposes deploying Turkish 
troops. End Note).  In a subsequent Oct. 17 conversation, 
Huseyin Kocabiyik, who once served as advisor to former PM 
Ciller and who maintains extensive contacts on the political 
right, echoed Yerlikaya's sentiment, saying that Bahceli's 
speech suggests the party will organize its extensive 
grassroots youth organizations in universities and elsewhere 
to demonstrate against the GOT, especially if Turkish troops 
take casualties. 
 
 
--------------- 
Change of Heart 
--------------- 
 
 
5. (C) Following the Nov. 2002 national elections, which left 
MHP entirely out of Parliament after being the second largest 
party in the legislature, Bahceli had promised not to stand 
again for party chairman -- at the time, a nearly 
unprecedented move by a Turkish political leader.  However, 
in the months leading up to the convention, our MHP contacts 
began telling us Bahceli would make a comeback. 
 
 
6. (C) In a Sept. 24 meeting with poloff, MHP Deputy 
Secretary General Mehmet Telek said one reason Bahceli 
 
SIPDIS 
decided to stand for election again is that he has 
re-discovered the MHP idealists (Ulkuculer) -- also known as 
Grey Wolves -- with whom he had tried to break since first 
becoming MHP chairman in 1997.  (Note: Many of our contacts 
on the political right point to the Bahceli-idealist 
disconnect as a major factor in the party's failure last Nov. 
End Note).  Telek explained that, originally, Bahceli wanted 
to disassociate the party from the idealists' deserved 
reputation for violence.  To do so, Bahceli began closing 
down idealist organizations and purging the administrative 
ranks of the more seedy elements.  Telek claims that the 
idealists "have gotten the message" and are now more 
"moderate."  As a result, Bahceli feels more comfortable 
dealing with this important element of the party's grassroots 
organization. 
 
 
------------ 
What's Next? 
------------ 
7. (C) Our contacts suggest that Bahceli will make at least 
some changes to the party administration.  Mehmet Telek 
acknowledged that the party will bring in some new faces, but 
he does not believe there will be very many additions.  MHP 
Vice Chairman and close Embassy contact Sevket Bulent Yahnici 
told us after the convention that the party assembly will 
choose MHP executives (Vice Chairmen, administrative board) 
next week.  Yahnici, who has largely withdrawn from party 
activities and does not expect to serve as Vice Chairman 
again, was dismissive of any potential changes.  He averred 
that any new party executives will be chosen by the current 
unsuccessful, Bahceli-led administration.  As a result, the 
party will have the same uninspired leadership with little 
"vitality," he claimed. 
 
 
8. (C) Many of our contacts tell us that Bahceli's 
re-election will not lift MHP out of the doldrums.  Kocabiyik 
claimed that with Bahceli as chairman, MHP supporters may 
increasingly slide to center-right True Path Party (DYP), led 
by strong nationalist Mehmet Agar.  Yahnici said Bahceli and 
his team will not be able to rally the party's grassroots to 
their full potential. 
 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
 
9. (C) Although our contacts largely dismiss Bahceli and his 
cronies as uninspiring, MHP is a rooted political phenomenon 
in Turkey with a solid base of support -- a base with a 
sordid past.  At times, MHP has been able to mobilize this 
base in support of its hard-line nationalist policies -- 
including a skepticism towards the EU and US intentions and 
neuralgia concerning the Kurds.  Support for the party could 
increase if nationalist sentiments rise.  Nevertheless, right 
now support for the party seems a far cry from the numbers it 
enjoyed in 1999, when voters -- caught up in the nationalist 
fervor following Ocalan's capture and tired of politics as 
usual -- made MHP the second largest party in Parliament. 
Indeed, the party -- its current leadership, in particular -- 
are still tainted by the perceived failures of the last 
coalition government. 
EDELMAN