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Viewing cable 03ZAGREB1756, USAID-FUNDED PRE-ELECTION ACTIVITIES DELIVERING

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
03ZAGREB1756 2003-08-08 14:37 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Zagreb
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS  ZAGREB 001756 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
STATE FOR EUR/SCE (NARDI) AND EUR/ACE (HANSEN, ROBERTS) 
DEPARTMENT PASS TO USAID FOR EE/ECA (FARNSWORTH, CONVERY) 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID PGOV HR
SUBJECT: USAID-FUNDED PRE-ELECTION ACTIVITIES DELIVERING 
POSITIVE RESULTS 
 
REF: ZAGREB 913 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
1.  Croatia has made important progress on reforms since the 
elections in January 2000 brought an end to the nationalist 
regime of former President Tudjman's HDZ party.  But this 
progress is fragile, and if the next parliamentary elections 
result in a government that is not committed to continuing 
these reforms, it could stall Croatia's movement toward 
accession into Euro-Atlantic institutions, a key USG goal for 
regional stability in Southeast Europe. 
 
2.  One of the challenges to the USG's SEED-funded democratic 
governance assistance programs is to ensure the reform 
process in Croatia continues by helping reform-oriented 
political parties succeed.  To do this, USAID implementers 
are directed to assist parties in crafting messages that 
explain to voters how continued progress on reform is in 
their interest and also to appeal directly to citizens to 
participate in the electoral process.  This strategy is 
working.  Recent USAID-sponsored polls show that, with 
elections expected in late November 2003, it is likely that a 
coalition of reform-oriented political parties will be able 
to form a government committed to a progressive agenda.  End 
Summary. 
 
Political Environment for Assistance 
------------------------------------ 
 
3.  Expectations of voters following the elections that 
brought Croatia's first coalition government to power in 
January 2000 were unrealistically high.  Popular support for 
coalition parties began to slip when voters realized that it 
would take time for some reforms to show results.  The 
results of local-level elections held in May 2001 confirmed 
this, and coalition party leaders were stunned by the strong 
showing of the nationalist, right-wing HDZ.  USAID assistance 
programs implemented mainly by grantees National Democratic 
Institute and International Republic Institute are intended 
to help reform-oriented parties explain their successes and 
the benefits of remaining on the reform path. 
 
NDI Assistance 
-------------- 
 
4.  NDI's program works on political party training, both at 
the central and local level.  Croatia's current leadership 
has been frustrated by the public's persistent belief that 
there has been no progress toward making good on campaign 
promises.  NDI is working with the leading coalition party to 
develop a communications strategy which explains the 
government's achievements over the past three years.  In 
addition to its training program for members of Parliament, 
NDI is also helping parties develop better strategies to 
reach out directly to constituents. 
 
5.  During the campaign which brought the current coalition 
to government, NDI encouraged the development of a citizen 
action NGO, GONG.  This NGO now serves as a sub-grantee 
supported by NDI to carry out a range of pre-election 
activities to get out the vote, especially important for 
strengthening the momentum for reform.  GONG also holds 
"citizen hours" in communities around Croatia to bring 
citizens into direct contact with their elected officials at 
all levels.  Response to this program has been excellent, and 
has enjoyed participation from all political levels, 
including President Mesic. 
 
IRI Assistance 
-------------- 
 
6.  IRI assistance has had the highest public profile since 
it works not only with political party spokespeople but with 
journalists as well.  IRI's in-depth political polling has 
become invaluable to reform-oriented political parties as 
they make their appeals to voters.  Top U.S. political 
analysts help parties decide -- using extensive polls -- 
which campaign issues will be most resonant with voters and 
then help parties develop messages which will encourage 
voters to continue to support reform-oriented parties. 
 
7.  IRI completed its second in a series of three polls in 
late June 2003.  The first poll served as a "wake-up call" to 
 
 
coalition parties who began -- finally -- to heed advice of 
U.S. consultants.  They took responsibility for not 
fulfilling voter expectations, and then began to 
systematically explain their government's achievements of the 
past three years.  Coalition political leaders have focused 
on issues they knew (based on poll results) resonated with 
voters, like improving the tourism industry, transportation 
infrastructure and making progress toward membership in the 
EU.  The second IRI poll shows that this message is getting 
through and that support for coalition parties is increasing. 
 
8.  U.S. analysts presented the data to the senior levels of 
Croatia's leading political parties.  They explained the 
poll's most significant results: the coalition-leading SDP 
has begun to gain ground on the opposition HDZ, which has 
become stagnant.  Undecided voters have begun to lean toward 
coalition parties, and the key indicator, the number of 
respondents who think the Government is leading Croatia in 
the "right direction," is on the rise. 
 
9.  The poll showed that the majority of undecided voters -- 
still over twenty percent -- are women or younger voters, the 
natural constituency of reform-oriented parties.  The 
opposition-leading HDZ has not branched out from its core 
constituents of older, less-educated, rural voters and the 
percentage of undecided voters who declared that they would 
never vote for the HDZ is high.  The bottom line, according 
to IRI analysts, is that a return of a coalition similar to 
the current lineup of political parties and excluding the HDZ 
is very likely. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
10.  We are pleased that coalition parties took the advice of 
our USAID-funded experts and also that the advice had such 
immediate and positive results.  Coalition party leaders have 
become confident that they will return to government after 
elections in November, but we continue to warn against 
complacency.  We will continue to urge reform-minded parties 
to focus their message on how continued progress on reforms 
will help them achieve their long-term goals. 
FRANK 
 
 
NNNN