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Viewing cable 03LAGOS1479, Attempted Coup in Anambra State: Harbinger of

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
03LAGOS1479 2003-07-25 11:01 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Consulate Lagos
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

251101Z Jul 03
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 LAGOS 001479 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED 
 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PINS KDEM NI
SUBJECT: Attempted Coup in Anambra State: Harbinger of 
Things to Come? 
 
 
1. (SBU) Summary.  A mid-July attempt by a cadre of 
business and political leaders to surreptitiously 
unseat a recently-elected state governor has created an 
ongoing political imbroglio and leaves Nigerians and 
Nigeria watchers asking if, instead of the military 
coups of the past, leaders here now face gangster-style 
threats to their power and safety.  Chris Ngige is back 
in power in Anambra state, but for how long and to what 
extent remains to be seen.  "Coup" plotters have been 
expelled from the ruling party and mostly removed from 
office, and prosecutors publicly state their intention 
to pursue criminal charges.  Meanwhile, a federal court 
has issued an injunction barring Ngige from acting as 
governor, pending a lawsuit filed by those who 
attempted to oust him.  President Obasanjo and his 
closest advisors have remained mostly out of the public 
fray, but the botched "civilian coup" continues to keep 
his party and political leaders at both the federal and 
state level reeling.  End summary. 
 
 
2. (U) Introduction.  On July 10, Chris Ngige, governor 
of Anambra State, was taken into custody and held 
incommunicado by police officers led by Raphael Ige, 
Assistant Inspector General of the national police for 
the region.  Simultaneously, State Assembly Speaker 
Eucharia Azodo delivered to legislators a purported 
letter of resignation from Ngige, and the Anambra State 
Assembly assented to the swearing-in by the state 
attorney general of the deputy governor, Okey Udeh, as 
new governor.  Later in the day, Ngige managed to call 
supporters and denied that he had resigned.  He was 
eventually released and regained control of the state's 
affairs the following day. 
 
 
3. (SBU) April pre-electoral environment. Anambra State 
has long been the setting for particularly 
dysfunctional politics, and past events presaged what 
occurred on July 10. Former Governor Chinwoke 
Mbadinuju's relationship with the State's power brokers 
had been as difficult as any during the last decade. 
Initially beholden to political godfather Sir Emeka 
Offor, Mbadinuju had refused to toe the line during 
1999-2003, essentially at the expense of the common 
people.  The closure of schools for a year, salary 
arrears stretching ten months, and chronic 
individualized and group violence characterized the 
Anambra State pre-electoral environment in April 2003. 
 
 
4. (SBU) Changing of the Guard.  Given Mbadinuju's 
unwillingness to comply with the wishes of the ruling 
power brokers, the People's Democratic Party (PDP) 
twice blocked his re-election bid for governor early in 
2003. Three weeks before the April 19 gubernatorial 
election, the PDP chose Ngige to run against several 
contenders including Peter Obi of the All Progressives 
Grand Alliance (APGA), who by some accounts would have 
carried the vote had it not been for fraud perpetrated 
by the PDP.  Pre-election side-deals with party power 
brokers represented the price Ngige had to pay for PDP 
support.  These deals would have benefited business 
mogul Chris Uba, the most recently self-anointed 
kingmaker in Anambra State.  Following Ngige's 
questionable victory (which his rival is contesting), 
Uba expected to name Anambra State commissioners and 
other prominent members of the state government, as 
well as members of Ngige's personal staff.  Uba also 
anticipated lucrative contracts and payment of three 
billion naira (approximately $24 million USD), which he 
said Ngige owed for services related to his election 
victory. Reports indicate Uba intended to arrange for 
Ngige to eventually cede the governorship to Deputy 
Governor Okechukwu Udeh.  Ngige publicly admitting 
having signed a letter of resignation and preparing a 
videotaped resignation before he took the oath of 
office. 
 
 
5. (SBU) Settlement of political debts.  Uba had thus 
expected deference and a free hand to conduct business 
as usual.  Once in office, Ngige punctured Uba's 
expectations, failing to make expected payments and 
maintaining control of the auspices of the governor's 
office.  Uba responded by sending Ngige's purported 
letter of resignation to the Speaker of the Anambra 
House of Assembly, Eucharia Azodo, who is Uba's cousin. 
Expecting to reap benefits from this raw power play, 
the House quickly legitimized the attempted coup and 
designated Deputy Governor Udeh, Governor. Meanwhile, 
Assistant Police Inspector General Raphael Ige 
dispatched 200 anti-riot police to Ngige's office, 
abducted him, and held him in the hotel where he 
resided until Ngige called for help via an unnoticed 
cell phone.  Subsequent media reports generated a 
public outcry that facilitated Ngige's return to office 
on July 11. 
 
 
6. (SBU) The Presidency and the PDP.  In testimony 
before an investigative committee of the Senate, 
Governor Ngige stated that Inspector General Ige told 
him the orders to restrain him came from "the big men" 
in Abuja.  However, immediately after it appeared that 
the attempted coup in Anambra State had failed, the 
Presidency and the PDP denounced it. (Comment. A 
recurring complaint heard by Emboffs is that Obasanjo 
did not personally condemn the attempt, but only said 
"differences should be handled within the party."  End 
comment.) We have heard that at the insistence of VP 
Atik, the PDP dismissed the putschists from the party, 
and PDP governors called for a judicial commissio of 
inquiry to probe the botched abduction of Ngge. 
Professor Itse Sagay, a well-known constitutonal 
lawyer in Lagos, has suggested that such a tep would 
only serve to postpone and delay the cause of justice. 
What the country faces, he said, s not a political 
crisis, but a crime against th Constitution. 
 
 
7. (SBU) Critics at large.  In letters to the editors 
and other channels, critics have roundly condemned the 
bungled coup.  They consider it an affront to 
democracy, and many wonder how long Nigeria will 
continue to be held hostage by "money-bags" who care 
little about their people's general welfare.  For 
example, novelist and political commentator Okey Ndibe 
told Econoff that the link between the attempted ouster 
of Ngige and President Obasanjo is clear.  Ndibe, a 
former Fulbright scholar, resides mostly in the U.S. 
but writes for the Guardian newspaper while in Nigeria. 
Ndibe insists that Uba's wealth, his business dealings 
with Stella Obasanjo, the President's wife, and his 
brother's status as one of Obasanjo's personal 
assistants gives him easy access to the President, who, 
according to Ndibe, knew full well that members of his 
party were planning an ouster of an uncooperative 
governor.  Ndibe wrote a scathing editorial to this 
effect on July 17 in the Guardian. 
 
 
8. (U) Possible legal actions.  Section 1(2) of the 
1999 Nigerian Constitution stipulates that "the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria shall not be governed nor shall any 
part thereof, except in accordance with the provisions 
of the Constitution."  And Section 41(B) of Nigeria's 
Criminal Code stipulates "any person who forms an 
intention to effect the removal of a governor of a 
state during his tenure in office is guilty of a 
felony."  Relying on these provisions, Bukhari Bello, a 
constitutional lawyer and Executive Secretary of the 
National Human Rights Commission, states there is 
enough evidence to bring charges of treason against Ige 
and others.  Many of the players may benefit from 
immunity, however.  Section 308 of the 1999 
Constitution protects Deputy Governor Udeh from 
criminal and civil prosecution, if not investigation, 
unless he is impeached; currently an unlikely prospect 
given the extent of support he received from the state 
Assembly. 
 
 
9. (SBU) Political accommodation.  On July 14 Obasanjo 
met with twenty-one PDP governors to review 
developments in Anambra State, and the next day he 
invited key players to Abuja.  On July 17 the PDP's 
National Working Committee dismissed from the party 
several of the actors involved in the attempt to remove 
Ngige from office, including Deputy Governor Udeh and 
Speaker of the Assembly Azodo.  The Anambra State 
Assembly also removed Azodo from the Speaker's chair. 
According to Presidential insiders, Police Inspector 
General Tafa Balogun ordered Assistant Inspector 
General Ige to retire, a rather cosmetic gesture since 
Ige had planned to retire soon, and reorganized the 
security teams assigned to the Government House in 
Anambra.  Anambra state prosecutors have stated they 
intend to file criminal charges against the plotters 
behind the governor's kidnapping and attempted removal. 
But on July 22, Justice Wilson Egbo-Egbo of the Federal 
High Court in Abuja issued an injunction preventing 
Ngige from acting as governor, and the PDP from taking 
action against the coup plotters, until a hearing is 
held on a lawsuit filed by Uba.  Ngige vowed to ignore 
the ruling as inoperable against a sitting governor. 
Earlier, the PDP leadership had also censured Ngige, 
expressing "deep disappointment" with his 
"comportment." 
 
 
10. (SBU) Comment.  Chris Ngige is a medical doctor by 
profession and a political novice.  He may be back in 
charge of Anambra State, but given the scope of the 
plot against him, it is unlikely that he will be able 
to muster support or maintain authority if he does not 
learn to play ball with to those who put him in power. 
It is probable that he will have to struggle for his 
position in the state and in his party unless he makes 
amends quickly.  His personal safety may also be in 
jeopardy. 
 
 
11. (SBU) Comment continued.  While the Presidency has 
condemned the coup attempt, the President himself has 
been strangely mute on the issue except to say that the 
PDP should deal with the "disagreement" as if were a 
family affair. Observers of the Nigerian political 
scene will be scrutinizing subsequent developments to 
see if the cabal will get away with what nearly became 
the hijacking of Anambra State.  Should they remain 
immune to the law, plotters with far greater ambitions 
will be scanning the political horizon for similar 
opportunities on a broader field.  This incident has 
reflected politics in its crudest form, and revealed 
that the underlying system of political payoff that 
seems to be part of Nigeria's burgeoning democratic 
process may crack the stoic veneer the ruling party has 
tried to apply to its second term in power. What has 
been described as an attempted civilian coup d'tat at 
the state level suggests that the country's democratic 
framework is shakier than its leaders acknowledge.  End 
comment. 
 
 
Hinson-Jones