Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 03THEHAGUE1453, DUTCH COURT ACQUITS ISLAMIST TERRORIST SUSPECTS

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #03THEHAGUE1453.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
03THEHAGUE1453 2003-06-06 15:36 2011-01-18 17:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy The Hague
Appears in these articles:
http://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2011/01/18/amerikanen-de-aivd-keek-neer-op-nctb/
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 001453 
 
SIPDIS 
 
Sensitive 
 
DEPT FOR S/CT, EB/ESC/ESP, EAP/PIMBS, EUR/ERA, EUR/UBI 
 
JUSTICE FOR DAAG SWARTZ AND OIA/JUDI FRIEDMAN 
BRUSSELS FOR KERBER, WONG, RICHARD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER ASEC KCRM PREL CASC ETTC XG NL EUN
SUBJECT: DUTCH COURT ACQUITS ISLAMIST TERRORIST SUSPECTS

REF: 2002 THE HAGUE 03525


1. (SBU) Summary: On June 5, the District Court of Rotterdam
acquitted all twelve suspects charged (under a variety of
statutes) for offenses related to the provision of support to
a terrorist organization. This was the second such loss for
the government before the same court, following the December
2002 acquittal of four men accused of providing support in a
plot to attack the U.S. Embassy in Paris. In the new case, the
presiding judge refused to allow "unverified" intelligence
information to serve as evidence and disallowed the
prosecution´s use of "wartime" statutes in a peacetime
terrorism case. The prosecutor´s office announced that it
would appeal the decision because it disagreed with the
court´s ruling on the use of intelligence. The outcome has
strengthened political support in the Netherlands for new laws
giving prosecutors new tools in terrorism cases. Amb. Sobel
has scheduled meetings with the Justice Minister and attorney
general to accelerate existing bilateral cooperation aimed at
strengthening Dutch counterterrorism laws. End summary.

----------------------
A Catch-all of Charges
----------------------

2. (SBU) Twelve alleged Muslim extremists, including five
Algerians, one Moroccan, one Mauritanian, one Iraqi, one
Libyan, one Egyptian and two Dutch nationals of Turkish and
Moroccan descent respectively, stood trial before the
Rotterdam District Court, Judge S.J. Van Klaveren presiding,
on May 12-20. They were charged with participation in a
criminal organization, providing assistance to the enemy at
times of war, forging travel documents, people smuggling, drug
trafficking, violation of the Dutch Arms and Ammunition Act,
trafficking in identity documents, and forgery. The
prosecution accused them of belonging to radical Islamic
networks and engaging in recruitment of young Muslims for
"Jihad."

3. (SBU) During the course of the trial, it became clear that
most of the charges could not be proven. Prosecutor Jo Valente
was therefore obliged to take the unusual step of dropping
most of the charges before the trial concluded. He conceded
that he could not prove most charges but that he had
nonetheless persevered because of "the seriousness of the
threat and impact of terrorist action on society." He argued
that it was virtually impossible to corroborate intelligence
information as long as suspects do not carry out their plans
and refuse to talk. He called the existence of terrorist
networks equally hard to prove, and complained about
disappointing intelligence cooperation with such countries as
France, Germany and Morocco. There was no doubt that most
suspects embraced anti-western views and had hardly any ties
with Dutch society but the question was whether it could be
proven that they actually committed criminal offenses.

------------------
Charges Not Proven
------------------

4. (SBU) The Judge had no trouble reaching the same conclusion
- that most charges could not be proven. The judge opined
that, although it had been established that several defendants
maintained contact with each other, it did not appear from
either statements that were made by the defendants or
intercepted telephone conversations or material found during
house searches that they were part of a criminal organization.
Nor did he find compelling the prosecution´s evidence that
this was in fact a "network" organization. He also dismissed
the charge of "providing assistance or attempting to provide
assistance to the enemy in time of war" because he said the
Netherlands was not at war with Afghanistan, the Taliban, Al
Qaeda and/or other pro-Taliban fighters during the period
covered by the charges.

5. (SBU) Consequently, he acquitted all suspects, with the
exception of two convicted for the possession of forged
documents, receiving prison sentences of two and four months
respectively. Four suspects had already been released from
custody during the trial because they faced possible prison
sentences shorter than the time they had spent in pre-trial
detention. The judge ordered the release of the others when he
issued his verdict. Several of them, however, were rearrested
on charges of illegal immigration.

---------------------------------------
Limits on Intelligence in the Courtroom
---------------------------------------

6. (SBU) The case turned in large part on the admissibility of
intelligence information. In a previous case, the same court
acquitted four suspects on December 18, 2002 (reftel) ruling
the prosecutor had failed to corroborate intelligence
information. It therefore came as no surprise that the court
again decided June 5 to acquit all suspects in light of the
absence of any substantive evidence to corroborate
intelligence information - the source of which the government
declined to reveal in court. Judge Van Klaveren explicitly
ruled that intelligence information as such could not serve as
evidence of any charge unless its origin and accuracy can be
verified.

7. (SBU) The prosecutor´s office immediately announced that it
would file an appeal against the District Court´s decision
because it disagreed with the court´s ruling that intelligence
cannot be used as evidence. Spokesmen for the ruling Christian
Democrat (CDA) and Liberal (VVD) parties as well as the
opposition Labor and populist List Pim Fortuyn (LPF) parties
opined that the law should be changed to permit the use of
intelligence information as evidence under certain
circumstances. The party spokesmen also endorsed the opinion
voiced during the trial by Chief Attorney General Joan de
Wijkerslooth, in favor of making recruiting for the "Jihad" a
specific criminal offense in the Dutch Criminal Code.

8. (SBU) Comment: Justice Minister Piet Hein Donner (who
supports use of intelligence in court proceedings) has
received his wake up call. The outcome of the trial is already
helping to galvanize governmental, parliamentary, and public
support for new judicial tools to target terrorism. Embassy is
consulting with the Dutch on "best practices" - e.g., means of
establishing a mechanism for the use of intelligence
information in court; strengthening action on terrorist
financing; expanding the nascent use of undercover infiltrants
in terrorism cases. In the wake of this ruling, Amb. Sobel has
scheduled meetings with Justice Minister Donner and Chief
Attorney General De Wijkerlslooth to accelerate existing
bilateral cooperation aimed at strengthening Dutch
counterterrorism laws. We will look to Washington agencies for
support and expertise. End Comment.