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Viewing cable 03HOCHIMINHCITY499, NAM CAM TRIAL: A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION FOR

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
03HOCHIMINHCITY499 2003-06-06 18:34 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 HO CHI MINH CITY 000499 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/BCLTV 
 
E. O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON KCRM PGOV PINR SOCI VM
SUBJECT: NAM CAM TRIAL: A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION FOR 
JUDICIAL REFORM IN VIETNAM? 
 
1.  Summary.  One day after the conclusion of the biggest trial 
related to corruption and organized crime in the history of 
Vietnam, the Vietnamese press is claiming that the judicial 
system has fundamentally changed.  The conviction of 18 GVN 
officials on charges of corruption and 136 private citizens for 
crimes ranging from murder to usury, while perhaps only the tip 
of the iceberg, seemed to bring some satisfaction to a public 
seeking justice.  There remains considerable skepticism, 
however, that this will reverse the tide of widespread 
corruption in Vietnam.   There was greater optimism about reform 
of the trial process, since in this trial the court gave defense 
attorneys greater access to the criminal investigations against 
their clients, greater access to their clients, and greater 
freedom of speech.  While the sentences may not have been 
uniformly applied between private citizens and government 
officials, and there is ongoing debate about specific 
individuals and/or charges, there was a sense that the 
convictions and sentences were basically fair.  End Summary. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Was Nam Cam Really the Biggest Fish? 
------------------------------------ 
 
2.  The headliner in the case was the organized crime kingpin 
Truong Van Cam (a.k.a. Nam Cam), whose penetration of HCMC 
police was allegedly so pervasive that a special police task 
force from other provinces had to be brought in to arrest him. 
In jail since December 2001, on June 5, 2003 he received two 
death sentences -- for the murder of Dung Ha and for bribery -- 
and a total of 42 years in prison for the additional crimes of 
causing intentional harm, organized gambling, concealing 
criminals and trying to flee the country.  During the pre-trial 
investigation and in trial testimony Nam Cam denied the charge 
of ordering the death of Dung Ha, a rival gangster.  Press 
reports said he plans to appeal the verdicts and sentences in 
his case.  But even if the sentence for murder is overturned, 
Nam Cam is unlikely to escape death by firing squad for the 
bribery conviction.  Both he and his lawyer told the 
international press they believed the trial was fair. 
 
3.  A total of 19 government officials were charged with crimes 
related to the Nam Cam syndicate.  Eighteen of them -- including 
Tran Mai Hanh(former head of Voice of Vietnam state radio) and 
Pham Sy Chien (former deputy chief of the Supreme People's 
Prosecutor's Office), both expelled from the Communist Party 
(CP) Central Committee (reftel) -- were sentenced to jail terms. 
The defense attorney for one official -- HCMC police detective 
Lam Xuan Phat -- succeeded in having the charges against his 
client dropped, because the statute of limitations had expired 
for any investigation into a crime he was accused of committing 
in 1988.  The three highest-ranking former GVN officials have 
not yet been taken into custody.  They will appeal their 
sentences to the Supreme Court in Hanoi.  While all but one of 
the government officials accused has been sentenced to jail, 
another 72 government officials from 37 different 
departments/organizations have been disciplined.  This includes 
52 policemen who have been suspended or removed from duty.  Many 
of the GVN officials were also expelled from party 
organizations, as an administrative punishment.  The HCMC 
People's Court also delivered 24 suspended sentences and 
released 10 individuals for time served or pending further 
investigation into their cases. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
Justice Better Served?  What Was Different This Time Around 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
4.  Several high-ranking GVN officials announced to the 
international media early on during the Nam Cam investigation 
that this would be a model case for reform within the justice 
system.  According to local Vietnamese lawyers and legal 
analysts who have been following the trial, this has been true 
in limited measure.  The Vietnamese legal system is loosely 
based on the French civil law system.  When an individual is 
arrested for breaking the law, the person is put into detention 
for up to four months while the criminal investigators prepare 
the case for prosecution.  Prior to the Nam Cam case, although 
exceptions have been known to occur, the individual was 
generally not allowed to meet with a defense attorney during 
this "investigation" period.  However, over the past year, a 
number of attorneys defending clients in the Nam Cam case have 
been able to meet with their clients -- whether in prison or at 
large -- to discuss defense strategy. 
 
5.  In the Vietnamese system, after the investigation phase is 
over, the investigator gives the results to the prosecutor's 
office.  The prosecutor's office then submits an analysis of the 
portions of the legal code the accused has allegedly violated. 
It also proposes a range of sentences based on these violations 
to the panel of judges who will hear the case in trial.  One 
legal analyst close to the Nam Cam case told us the Politburo 
had a great deal of input into what the eventual charges and 
sentences would be.  On the other hand, this analyst added, 
usually the results of an investigation are not available to the 
defense attorney until the first day of the trial, making it 
very difficult to mount a defense.  During the Nam Cam case, 
however, a number of defense attorneys were able to obtain the 
results of the investigations into their clients' alleged crimes 
prior to the trial. 
 
6.  At trial, the panel of judges listens to arguments from the 
prosecution and defense, and decides on the sentence, usually 
within the range proposed by the prosecutor.  Prior to the Nam 
Cam case, if the defense attorney attempted to present a line of 
reasoning that did not directly flow from the investigation, or 
criticized the facts presented by the prosecution as revealed in 
the investigation, the panel of judges would often silence the 
attorney, claiming that the argument was beyond the scope of the 
trial or simply "inappropriate".  However, one observer who 
attended part of the trial said that during the Nam Cam case, 
several defense attorneys pursued lines of questioning that did 
not reflect the "facts" of the investigation as presented by the 
prosecution, and the panel of judges did not overrule these 
attorneys.  In what several lawyers described to ConGenoff as a 
highly unusual occurrence, the prosecution was almost uniformly 
quiet, while the judges pursued more lines of questioning with 
the defense attorneys. 
 
7.  The same observer criticized the court for some of its 
actions.  He noted that the court did not pursue several senior 
government officials who had been subpoenaed but failed to 
appear.  The HCMC People's Court excused their absences for 
health reasons or with no explanation. 
 
8.  The actual decision on sentencing may also have been 
inappropriately influenced.  After the conclusion of the trial 
period on May 22, the court adjourned for 10 days, during which 
the panel of judges was to deliberate over the sentences. 
During this period, the Chief Judge traveled to Hanoi, a move 
that one Vietnamese lawyer contact interpreted to mean he had 
gone to receive instructions from the Politburo or Central 
Committee.  There was widespread discussion in the local 
newspapers as to which GVN or CP organ would ultimately 
determine the fate of the accused, and the international media 
called Nam Cam's death sentence a "foregone conclusion."  Legal 
analysts considered ten days a relatively short timeframe in 
which to decide the fate of 155 individuals accused of multiple 
crimes. 
 
9.  In the end, the various sentences handed down were not 
perceived as excessive or unfair either in the media or among 
the Vietnamese we talked with.  Rumors that some GVN officials 
would be given disproportionately light sentences had been 
sparked after June 4, when a judge prefaced the reading of their 
verdicts with the caveat that the "revolutionary sacrifices" of 
those officials and/or their family members would be taken into 
consideration during sentencing.  There appeared to be some 
relief that the key government officials had received jail 
sentences.  Since there is no public court record to disclose 
the details of the investigation and the arguments made at 
trial, the appropriateness of the sentencing will remain a 
source of legal debate. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
Media Access:  Organized but not Controlled 
------------------------------------------- 
 
10.  During the course of the trial, local Vietnamese reporters 
said they were granted reasonable access.  Daily coverage of the 
trial appeared in all five of Ho Chi Minh City's daily 
newspapers.  HCMC's two evening television news shows only 
reported on the trial's major developments: the testimony of 
government officials, the opening and closing statements, and 
the sentencing phase of the trial.  Only the Ho Chi Minh City 
state-run television station, HTV, was allowed to have 
television cameras in the courtroom.  Cameras were present for 
the duration of the trial, although only opening statements and 
the sentencing  were broadcast live on television.  Members of 
the international press were only permitted to cover the trial's 
opening statements and the sentencing phase. 
 
11.  Media coverage was organized, as each Vietnamese newspaper 
had to register with the Court for access to the proceedings.  A 
maximum of two reporters and one photographer from each 
newspaper were permitted to cover the entire trial.  Only 
reporters who had registered and received a press badge could 
enter the courthouse.  Due to space limitations, journalists 
were funneled into a small room where they could watch the trial 
via closed-circuit TV.  At the start of each day, photographers 
were allowed into the courtroom for ten minutes to photograph 
the defendants. 
 
12.  According to a reporter who works for Tuoi Tre and HCMC 
Radio, Vietnamese reporters were only censored in their coverage 
of the trial by their editors when the subject matter encroached 
on "national security" (loosely defined).  This reporter did not 
specify what comments were cut, but said journalists were able 
to include quotes from the prosecution, defense attorneys and 
defendants obtained inside or outside the courtroom. 
 
13.   Comment:  Mr. Bui Hoang Danh, one of the judges in the 
trial, tried to make the point repeatedly to the media that this 
case was not about widespread corruption, but about the crimes 
of private citizens and public officials alike.  This became a 
point of distinction between the local media, which portrayed 
the case as "the case of Nam Cam and his associates," and the 
international media, who described it as a major corruption 
scandal.  A few local legal analysts view this case as 
significant because the disparities in sentencing between 
average (if scumbag) Joes and mighty government officials was 
not extreme.  Despite the "revolutionary" sacrifices by some of 
the officials being tried, all but one received prison 
sentences, including up to 12 years.  This is a message that has 
met with widespread approval.  Still, a lot can happen between 
now and the appeal.  Once the dust settles on this large-scale 
organized crime and corruption trial, we will see whether the 
GVN will gear itself up for a sustained crackdown on official 
corruption.  End Comment. 
YAMAUCHI