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Viewing cable 03ROME2045, REVIEW OF ITALY'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO OIF
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| Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 03ROME2045 | 2003-05-12 17:21 | 2011-03-14 11:00 | CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN | Embassy Rome |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 ROME 002045
SIPDIS
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 ROME 02045 01 OF 06 121721Z
NOFORN
CENTCOM FOR J5, POLAD
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/12/2013
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS IT MARR MOPS IT MARR MOPS IT MARR MOPS IT MARR MOPS IT MARR MOPS IT IZ IZPREL IZPREL IZPREL IZPREL IZPREL IRAQI FREEDOM
SUBJECT: REVIEW OF ITALY'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO OIF
REF: A. ROME 0292
¶B. ROME 0354
¶C. ROME 0600
¶D. ROME 0639
¶E. ROME 0699
¶F. ROME 0810
¶G. ROME 0842
¶H. ROME 1112
¶I. ROME 1143
¶J. ROME 1205
¶K. ROME 1264
¶L. ROME 1286
¶M. ROME 1347
¶N. ROME 1410
¶O. ROME 1679
¶P. ROME 1754
CLASSIFIED BY: AMBASSADOR MEL SEMBLER FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY. ITALY ANSWERED THE CALL TO ASSIST THE
COALITION WIN THE WAR IN IRAQ. THE GOI MADE A STRATEGIC
CHOICE TO KEEP ITS POLICY ALIGNED WITH THE U.S. AND STUCK TO
IT, DESPITE INTENSE INTERNAL POLITICAL PRESSURE TO FOLD.
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 03 ROME 02045 01 OF 06 121721Z
ITALY DID NOT SHY AWAY FROM THIS CHOICE, AGREEING TO BE NAMED
PUBLICLY AS A COALITION MEMBER. TOP OFFICIALS SPOKE OUT
REPEATEDLY AND FORCEFULLY ON THE NEED TO ENSURE IRAQI
COMPLIANCE WITH UN RESOLUTIONS. THEY STOOD UP FOR OUR
OBJECTIVES AT THE UN, SPOKE OUT AGAINST IRAQ'S WAR CRIMES,
AND EXPELLED IRAQI DIPLOMATS FROM ITALIAN SOIL. OUR CONTACTS
GAVE US HEARTBURN WITH THEIR PENCHANT FOR NOTIFYING THE
PARLIAMENT ABOUT OPERATIONAL MINUTIA, BUT IN THE END REGULAR
CONSULTATION KEPT POTENTIALLY UNRULY LEGISLATORS IN LINE AND
OPSEC WAS PROTECTED. WHEN PRESIDENT CIAMPI SEEMED ON THE
VERGE OF CALLING INTO CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION THE DEPLOYMENT
OF THE U.S. ARMY'S 173RD AIRBORNE BRIGADE DIRECTLY TO IRAQ
FROM ITALIAN SOIL, THE GOI WORKED TACTICS WITH US TO ADDRESS
HIS CONCERNS.
¶2. (C) LOGISTICAL SUPPORT TO THE U.S. MILITARY WAS
OUTSTANDING. WE GOT WHAT WE ASKED FOR ON BASE ACCESS,
TRANSIT, AND OVERFLIGHTS, ENSURING THAT FORCES -- INCLUDING
TROOPS ON CIVILIAN CHARTER JETS -- COULD FLOW SMOOTHLY
THROUGH ITALY TO GET TO THE FIGHT. ITALIAN AIRFIELDS, PORTS,
AND TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE WERE PLACED AT OUR DISPOSAL.
AUGUSTA BAY, SICILY BECAME A MAJOR RESUPPLY HUB, OVER 1,000
MISSIONS WERE SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED AT THE SIGONELLA NAS,
AND AVIANO SUPPORTED THE LARGEST COMBAT MOVEMENT OF C-17S IN
HISTORY FROM ITALIAN SOIL. MOREOVER, LAW ENFORCEMENT
AUTHORITIES PREVENTED DETERMINED PROTESTERS FROM STOPPING
TRAINS AND TRUCKS TRANSPORTING U.S. EQUIPMENT ACROSS ITALY TO
STAGING AREAS FOR DELIVERY TO SW ASIA. FORCE PROTECTION WAS
BUMPED UP AT U.S. MILITARY INSTALLATIONS THROUGHOUT ITALY AND
THE GOI GRANTED VIRTUALLY ALL OUR REQUESTS TO ENSURE THAT
U.S. VESSELS TRANSITING AUGUSTA BAY IN SUPPORT OF OIF WERE
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 04 ROME 02045 01 OF 06 121721Z
ADEQUATELY PROTECTED. THE GOI IS NOW MOVING AT A STEADY PACE
TO FILL OUT A RELIEF AND PHASE IV STABILIZATION PACKAGE.
ITALY IS PLANNING TO SPEND EUROS 79 MILLION ON RELIEF, IS
DEPLOYING A FIELD HOSPITAL, AND IS WORKING CLOSELY WITH THE
UK TO STAND UP A BRIGADE-SIZE ARMY FORCE (COMPLEMENTED BY
CARABINIERI) IN THE BRITISH SECTOR IN SOUTHERN IRAQ.
¶3. (C) WE LEARNED SEVERAL LESSONS FROM WORKING WITH THE GOI
ON OIF. FOR ANY FUTURE MILITARY OPERATIONS THAT INVOLVE
ITALY, KEEPING DIPLOMATIC COMMUNICATION IN SYNC WITH THE
MILITARY-TO-MILITARY CHANNEL WILL BE ESSENTIAL TO ACHIEVING
THE RIGHT RESULTS, QUICKLY. PRESIDENT CIAMPI CANNOT BE
IGNORED ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES. WHITE HOUSE
ENGAGEMENT WITH THE PRESIDENT WOULD, WE ARE CONVINCED, PAY
DIVIDENDS. WHILE THE BERLUSCONI GOVERNMENT CAN BE TRUSTED TO
MANAGE THE INTERNAL POLITICS OF THORNY SECURITY QUESTIONS,
HAD A DIFFERENT COALITION BEEN IN POWER--IN PARTICULAR ONE
CONTROLLED BY THE CENTER-LEFT--THE RIDE WOULD HAVE BEEN
BUMPIER. ITALY'S INTERAGENCY PROCESS IS IMPROVING, BUT STILL
INHIBITS THE SMOOTH MESHING OF INTENT WITH CONCRETE ACTION.
ALTHOUGH WE HAVE REFUSED TO ACT AS THE GOI'S ""MANAGEMENT
CONSULTANT,"" WE WILL HAVE TO CONTINUE TO HELP ELEMENTS OF THE
GOVERNMENT TALK TO, RATHER THAN PAST EACH OTHER. ALL SAID,
THE EMBASSY REMAINS CONVINCED THAT ITALY IS AN EXCELLENT
PLACE TO DO OUR POLITICAL-MILITARY BUSINESS, NOT LEAST
BECAUSE THE COUNTRY'S MUCH-MALIGNED BUREAUCRACY HAS A CASTE
OF TOP-NOTCH PROFESSIONALS WHO PROVED THEIR WILLINGNESS TO
HELP US GET THE OPERATIONAL JOB DONE ON OIF. END SUMMARY.
-----------------------------------
OVERVIEW OF ITALY OIF CONTRIBUTIONS
-----------------------------------
¶4. (C) AS THE COALITION SWITCHES GEARS AND MOVES FULL SPEED
AHEAD WITH PHASE IV, WE WANTED TO CALL ATTENTION TO ITALY'S
MANY CONTRIBUTIONS TO OIF AND HIGHLIGHT SOME LESSONS LEARNED
ABOUT WORKING WITH THE GOI. IT WAS A BUMPY RIDE AND WE WERE
AT TIMES FRUSTRATED THAT THE GOI COULD NOT MOVE ON OUR
REQUESTS AS RAPIDLY AS WE MIGHT HAVE PREFERRED. HOWEVER, IF
TANGIBLE RESULTS ARE WHAT COUNT, THEN BY ANY MEASURABLE
STANDARD ITALY SCORES WELL; INDEED VERY WELL. THE BERLUSCONI
GOVERNMENT BROUGHT A COUNTRY ROUNDLY OPPOSED TO WAR AS CLOSE
AS IT COULD POLITICALLY TO THE BRINK OF BELLIGERENT STATUS.
WITHOUT THE PRESSURE OF THE VATICAN, SEVERE POLITICAL AND
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 03 ROME 02045 02 OF 06 121721Z
PUBLIC OPPOSITION TO CONFLICT, AND UNEASE WITHIN THE
GOVERNING COALITION ABOUT THE USE OF FORCE, THE GOI MIGHT
HAVE DONE EVEN MORE. AS IT WAS, ITALY, ALTHOUGH IT DID NOT
PUT BOOTS ON THE GROUND, DID MAKE A MAJOR CONTRIBUTION TO
HELPING THE COALITION WIN THE WAR IN IRAQ. NOW, IT IS
HELPING ENSURE THAT STABILIZATION TAKES HOLD AND
RECONSTRUCTION CAN BEGIN. WE THINK THERE IS A GOOD STORY
HERE AND ONE WORTH REFLECTING ON. NEVERTHELESS, FOR THOSE
READERS WHO PREFER ONLY A SNAPSHOT OF ITALY'S CONTRIBUTIONS,
WE BEGIN WITH THE FACTS.
POLITICAL SUPPORT
-----------------
- ITALY AGREED TO BE NAMED PUBLICLY AS COALITION MEMBER
- GOI OPPOSED EFFORTS IN UN TO CRITICIZE U.S. IRAQ POLICY
- GOI EXPELLED FOUR IRAQI OFFICIALS SUSPECTED OF INTELLIGENCE
TIES
- GOI MAINTAINED PARLIAMENTARY BACKING FOR IRAQ POLICY
- GOI ENSURED THAT PRESIDENT CIAMPI DID NOT CHALLENGE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 173RD BRIGADE'S DEPLOYMENT FROM VICENZA
TO NORTHERN IRAQ, THE LARGEST COMBAT AIR DROP SINCE WW II
LOGISTICAL SUPPORT
------------------
- GOI SUPPORTED 124 GLOBEMASTER TAKEOFFS/LANDINGS AT AVIANO,
THE LARGEST EVER COMBAT MOVEMENT OF C-17S
- GOI ASSISTED IN SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF SOME 1,300
MISSIONS FROM SIGONELLA NAS
- GOI AGREED TO OUR REQUEST TO USE SIGONELLA AS DIVERT
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PAGE 04 ROME 02045 02 OF 06 121721Z
AIRFIELD FOR OVERFLIGHT OF WMD SAMPLES
- ITALIAN PORTS HOSTED 71 U.S. VESSELS
- AUGUSTA BAY, SICILY SERVED AS MAJOR RESUPPLY HUB
- U.S. CHARTER FLIGHTS TRANSPORTING OVER 8000 TROOPS TO SW
ASIA TOUCHED DOWN ON ITALIAN CIVIL/MILITARY AIRFIELDS
- GOI PREVENTED PROTESTERS FROM DISRUPTING FLOW OF
MEN/MATERIEL THROUGH ITALY, INCLUDING COMPLEX MOVES IN
SUPPORT OF THE 173RD'S DEPLOYMENT
FORCE PROTECTION SUPPORT
------------------------
- LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITIES CONTINUED CLOSE COOPERATION
WITH U.S. BASE COMMANDERS TO PREVENT SERIOUS INCIDENTS
- MAJOR FP INCREASE/SUPPORT AT SIGONELLA AND AUGUSTA BAY
INCLUDING ARMED ITALIAN NAVY ESCORT, ROVING GUARDS, NEW
WATERSIDE SECURITY SYSTEM
- U.S. NAVY SHIPS ALLOWED TO CONDUCT UNARMED TRAINING
EXERCISES IN ITALIAN TERRITORIAL WATERS
HUMANITARIAN/PHASE IV SUPPORT
-----------------------------
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0798
PAGE 01 ROME 02045 03 OF 06 121722Z
ACTION EUR-00
INFO LOG-00 NP-00 AID-00 ACQ-00 CIAE-00 INL-00 USNW-00
DOEE-00 DOTE-00 PERC-00 SRPP-00 DS-00 EAP-00 EB-00
FAAE-00 FBIE-00 VC-00 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-00 L-00
VCE-00 AC-01 NEA-00 NSAE-00 OMB-01 PA-00 PM-00
PRS-00 ACE-00 P-00 SCT-00 SP-00 SS-00 TRSE-00
T-00 USIE-00 PMB-00 DSCC-00 PRM-00 DRL-01 G-00
NFAT-00 SAS-00 SWCI-00 /003W
------------------63C25B 121722Z /38
P 121721Z MAY 03
FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9808
INFO NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY VATICAN PRIORITY
AMCONSUL FLORENCE PRIORITY
AMCONSUL MILAN PRIORITY
AMCONSUL NAPLES PRIORITY
COMUSNAVEUR LONDON UK PRIORITY
DEPT OF ARMY WASHDC PRIORITY
HQ EUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
HQ USAF WASHDC PRIORITY
JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
SECNAV WASHDC PRIORITY
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 06 ROME 002045
SIPDIS
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 ROME 02045 03 OF 06 121722Z
NOFORN
CENTCOM FOR J5, POLAD
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/12/2013
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS IT MARR MOPS IT MARR MOPS IT MARR MOPS IT MARR MOPS IT MARR MOPS IT IZ IZPREL IZPREL IZPREL IZPREL IZPREL IRAQI FREEDOM
SUBJECT: REVIEW OF ITALY'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO OIF
- INITIAL EUROS 15 MILLION TRANCHE DISTRIBUTED TO
INTERNATIONAL RELIEF AGENCIES
- DEPLOYMENT OF FIELD HOSPITAL TO IRAQ MOVING AHEAD
- COOPERATION WITH UK ON DEPLOYMENT OF BRIGADE-SIZE FORCE
PLUS CARABINIERI IN BRITISH PHASE IV SECTOR
---------------------------------
POLITICAL SUPPORT - DEPENDABILITY
---------------------------------
¶5. (C) PM BERLUSCONI MADE A STRATEGIC CHOICE TO STICK BY THE
U.S. WHICH HE ABIDED BY AND PERIODICALLY REAFFIRMED. HE
COULD HAVE BUCKLED UNDER HEAVY PRESSURE FROM SOME EU BRETHREN
TO PEEL AWAY FROM THE COALITION. OTHERS MIGHT HAVE;
BERLUSCONI DID NOT. SIGNING THE ORIGINAL LETTER OF THE EIGHT
WAS A CLEAR AND HELPFUL SIGN TO EU MEMBERS AND CANDIDATE
STATES OUTSIDE THE FRANCO-GERMAN AXIS THAT IT WAS ACCEPTABLE
TO STAND UP AND BE COUNTED, PUBLICLY. MOREOVER, STRONG
COMMENTS BY MINDEF MARTINO AND FM FRATTINI TO EU COLLEAGUES
AND THE MEDIA ON THE NEED TO ENFORCE UN RESOLUTIONS ON IRAQ'S
DISARMAMENT KEPT THE UK AND SPAIN FROM BEING ISOLATED IN THE
EU. ITALY READILY AGREED TO BE NAMED PUBLICLY BY THE USG AS
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 03 ROME 02045 03 OF 06 121722Z
A COALITION MEMBER AND, WITH THE CONFLICT RAGING, ACTED ON
OUR REQUEST TO SPEAK OUT AGAINST IRAQI WAR CRIMES. WE ASKED
THE GOI TO OPPOSE EFFORTS TO USE THE UNGA OR OTHER UN FORA TO
CRITICIZE COALITION ACTION IN IRAQ, AND IT DID. WE URGED THE
GOI TO EXPEL IRAQI OFFICIALS SUSPECTED OF INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITY IN ITALY AND, WITHIN DAYS OF OUR DEMARCHE, ALL BUT
ONE OF THOSE ACCREDITED TO ITALY WERE GONE (NOTE: WE HAD LESS
SUCCESS WITH THE IRAQIS RESIDENT IN ITALY BUT ACCREDITED TO
THE VATICAN OR THE UN FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION. END
NOTE).
¶6. (C) THE GOI PROVED TO THE EMBASSY THAT IT KNEW VERY WELL
HOW TO MANAGE A DELICATE INTERNAL POLITICAL SITUATION --
ESPECIALLY PARLIAMENT AND RELATIONS WITH PRESIDENT CIAMPI.
IN SOME INSTANCES, WE QUESTIONED GOI DECISIONS TO NOTIFY
PARLIAMENT OF SPECIFIC OPERATIONAL DETAILS. INDEED, MINDEF
MARTINO TOLD US THAT HE PROBABLY SET THE BAR TOO LOW AND
ULTIMATELY HAD TO WALK BACK PARLIAMENT FROM EXPECTING FINE
GRANULARITY ABOUT ITALY'S ASSISTANCE EFFORTS. AS WE HAVE
SAID PREVIOUSLY ABOUT MARTINO, HE OFTEN TAKES A CIRCUITOUS
ROUTE IN DEALING WITH CONTROVERSIAL SECURITY ISSUES. BUT HE
USUALLY GETS IT RIGHT IN THE END. THOUGH IT HAD TO
RECALIBRATE MIDSTREAM, THE GOI WAS ABLE TO RETAIN CRUCIAL
PARLIAMENTARY SUPPORT THROUGH REGULAR CONSULTATION AND
INFORMATION SHARING, ALL THE WHILE KEEPING ITS PROMISES TO
PROTECT OPSEC.
¶7. (C) PERHAPS EVEN MORE CRITICALLY, THE GOI, WITH OUR HELP,
KEPT PRESIDENT CIAMPI FROM BLOWING THE CONSTITUTIONAL WHISTLE
ON ITALIAN ASSISTANCE. HE NEGOTIATED A COMPLEX PACT WITH THE
GOI NOT TO INVOLVE ITALY ""IN DIRECT ATTACKS ON IRAQ."" WHEN
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 04 ROME 02045 03 OF 06 121722Z
THE PRESIDENT SAW THE 173RD AIRBORNE BRIGADE'S DEPLOYMENT TO
NORTHERN IRAQ FROM SETAF HQ'S IN VICENZA ON TELEVISION --
REPORTED AS AN OFFENSIVE OPERATION -- HIS FIRST REACTION WAS
THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAD VIOLATED THE AGREEMENT. THE GOI
WORKED CLOSELY WITH US ON TACTICS TO ENSURE THAT CIAMPI DID
NOT CALL INTO QUESTION THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE
DEPLOYMENT, RECOMMENDING A LETTER FROM THE AMBASSADOR TO THE
PRESIDENT EXPLAINING THE 173RD'S MISSION THAT, ACCORDING TO
THE GOI, HEADED OFF HIS INTERVENTION TO BLOCK IT. WHILE THE
GOI WAS RIGHT IN REQUESTING THAT THEY, NOT US, MANAGE THE
CIAMPI CONUNDRUM, IT REMINDS US FORCEFULLY THAT THE PRESIDENT
CANNOT BE OVERLOOKED ON KEY NATIONAL SECURITY MATTERS. AS
CHIEF OF STATE, HE EXPECTS WASHINGTON -- INCLUDING THE WHITE
HOUSE -- TO RECOGNIZE HIS ROLE.
-----------------------------------------
LOGISTICAL SUPPORT - GETTING TO THE FIGHT
-----------------------------------------
¶8. (C) DESPITE CONSTANTLY BUMPING UP AGAINST THE GOI'S
PRE-NOTIFICATION CRITERIA, WE RECEIVED OUTSTANDING SUPPORT ON
BASE ACCESS, TRANSIT, AND OVERFLIGHTS BY U.S. FORCES.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0802
PAGE 01 ROME 02045 04 OF 06 121722Z
ACTION EUR-00
INFO LOG-00 NP-00 AID-00 ACQ-00 CIAE-00 INL-00 USNW-00
DOEE-00 DOTE-00 PERC-00 SRPP-00 DS-00 EAP-00 EB-00
FAAE-00 FBIE-00 VC-00 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-00 L-00
VCE-00 AC-01 NEA-00 NSAE-00 OMB-01 PA-00 PM-00
PRS-00 ACE-00 P-00 SCT-00 SP-00 SS-00 TRSE-00
T-00 USIE-00 PMB-00 DSCC-00 PRM-00 DRL-01 G-00
NFAT-00 SAS-00 SWCI-00 /003W
------------------63C26D 121722Z /38
P 121721Z MAY 03
FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9809
INFO NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY VATICAN PRIORITY
AMCONSUL FLORENCE PRIORITY
AMCONSUL MILAN PRIORITY
AMCONSUL NAPLES PRIORITY
COMUSNAVEUR LONDON UK PRIORITY
DEPT OF ARMY WASHDC PRIORITY
HQ EUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
HQ USAF WASHDC PRIORITY
JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
SECNAV WASHDC PRIORITY
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 06 ROME 002045
SIPDIS
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 ROME 02045 04 OF 06 121722Z
NOFORN
CENTCOM FOR J5, POLAD
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/12/2013
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS IT MARR MOPS IT MARR MOPS IT MARR MOPS IT MARR MOPS IT MARR MOPS IT IZ IZPREL IZPREL IZPREL IZPREL IZPREL IRAQI FREEDOM
SUBJECT: REVIEW OF ITALY'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO OIF
THE GOI WAS ABLE TO ENSURE THAT U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL AND
EQUIPMENT WERE ABLE TO MOVE EFFICIENTLY IN, THROUGH, AND OVER
ITALY. ITALIAN RESOURCES COMMITTED TO HELPING US MEET ALL
OUR OPERATIONAL FLOW OF FORCES REQUIREMENTS WERE SUBSTANTIAL.
FOR EXAMPLE, THE GOI SUPPORTED THE LARGEST EVER COMBAT
MOVEMENT OF C-17S -- 124 TAKEOFFS AND LANDINGS OF THE
GLOBEMASTERS FROM AVIANO, WITHOUT INCIDENT. AT THE NAVAL AIR
STATION IN SIGONELLA, THE GOI ASSISTED US IN COMPLETING
ALMOST 1,300 MISSIONS (TAKEOFFS PLUS LANDINGS) TO THE THEATER
OF OPERATIONS. WHEN WE ASKED THE GOI FOR PERMISSION TO USE
THE NAS AS A DIVERT AIRFIELD FOR OVERFLIGHT OF WMD SAMPLES
OUR REQUEST WAS READILY GRANTED.
¶9. (C) SEASIDE, ITALIAN PORTS HOSTED 71 U.S. VESSELS
DIRECTED TO THE THEATER OF OPERATIONS. IN PARTICULAR, THE
PORT IN AUGUSTA BAY, SICILY BECAME A MAJOR RESUPPLY AND
SUPPORT HUB FOR A US NAVY CARRIER BATTLE GROUP, WITH THE GOI
PROVIDING INCREASED PIER SPACE FOR U.S. COAST GUARD AND NAVY
VESSELS. ITALY ASSISTED WITH ENHANCED COMMUNICATION
FACILITIES AND GROUND TRANSPORTATION ACCOMMODATIONS, REPAIRS,
STORAGE OF HAZMAT, EXPEDITED CUSTOMS CLEARANCE PROCEDURES,
AND ADDITIONAL FREQUENCY ACCESS AT BOTH AUGUSTA BAY AND
SIGONELLA. THE GOI ALSO RELAXED DIPLOMATIC CLEARANCE
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PAGE 03 ROME 02045 04 OF 06 121722Z
REQUIREMENTS INCLUDING FOR AIRCRAFT AND SHIPS CARRYING
HAZMAT, EXPEDITED ISSUANCE OF SPECIAL PERMITS FOR MOVING
OVERSIZED CARGO, AND INCREASED JET FUEL SUPPORT.
¶10. (C) THE GOI PLAYED A KEY ROLE IN KEEPING THE FLOW OF
PERSONNEL THROUGH THE EUCOM AOR TO SW ASIA SMOOTH AND TIMELY.
ALTHOUGH, AT FIRST, WE WERE TOLD THAT CHARTER FLIGHTS
CARRYING TROOPS AND AMMUNITION WERE RESTRICTED TO STOPOVERS
AT MILITARY AIRFIELDS, THE GOI ALLOWED THE USE OF CIVILIAN
TARMAC IN ROME AND MILAN AFTER THE AMBASSADOR PRESSED OUR
CASE WITH BERLUSCONI. IN THE END, OVER 8,000 U.S. TROOPS
TRAVELING ON COMMERCIAL CARRIERS TRANSITED ITALY ON THEIR
WAY TO THE THEATER OF OPERATIONS. ALTHOUGH THE GOI TOLD US
SEVERAL TIMES THAT IT PREFERRED WE AVOID USING CIVILIAN
AIRPORTS DUE TO THE HIGHER VISIBILITY, IT NEVER STEPPED BACK
FROM THE PM'S COMMITMENT TO THE AMBASSADOR.
¶11. (C) TIME AND AGAIN, THE GOI IMPRESSED US WITH ITS ABILITY
TO BALANCE THE POLITICAL IMPERATIVE OF NO VIOLENCE AGAINST
ANTI-WAR PROTESTERS WITH THE NEED TO HELP THE U.S. MILITARY
DO ITS JOB. ALTHOUGH ITALIAN AND U.S. METHODS DIFFER (OUR
HOSTS PREFER LATE NIGHT MOVEMENTS, LAST MINUTE SCHEDULE
CHANGES, AND GENERAL DECEPTION), THE GOI, WORKING
HAND-IN-GLOVE WITH THE U.S. ARMY AND THE EMBASSY,
SUCCESSFULLY PREVENTED PROTESTERS FROM STOPPING TRAINS AND
VEHICLES MOVING OUR MILITARY EQUIPMENT THROUGH ITALY. WHILE
THE ROLLING STOCK TRAVELED WITH PARAMILITARY CARABINIERI
ABOARD, THE INTERIOR MINISTRY COORDINATED AND PROVIDED ALL
GROUND MOVEMENT SECURITY AND ESCORTS. THE NATIONAL POLICE
CHIEF AND THE INTERIOR MINISTER WERE PERSONALLY ENGAGED IN
THE SUCCESSFUL EFFORT TO MISLEAD AND OUTWIT A SAVVY GROUP OF
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 04 ROME 02045 04 OF 06 121722Z
DEMONSTRATORS WHO, IF THEY HAD HAD LESSER OPPONENTS, MIGHT
WELL HAVE CAUSED SEVERE DISRUPTIONS TO MOVEMENT OF OUR
ITALY-BASED PERSONNEL AND MATERIEL. THIS EXPERIENCE RESULTED
IN NEW RELATIONSHIPS BEING FORMED BETWEEN EMBASSY PERSONNEL
AND PUBLIC SECURITY SPECIALISTS AT THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR
THAT WILL SERVE US WELL IN THE FUTURE.
¶12. (C) TO ASSIST US GET THE LOGISTICS RIGHT, THE GOI SET UP
A FORMAL INTERAGENCY TEAM UNDER THE GUIDANCE OF THE PM'S
MILITARY ADVISOR. THE GROUP STUMBLED AT FIRST, BUT ITS DAILY
MEETINGS FOCUSED ON COORDINATING RESPONSES TO OUR REQUESTS
PROVED USEFUL. EMBASSY REPS WERE INVITED TO ATTEND SOME OF
THE MEETINGS, WHICH HELPED US GET A BETTER HANDLE ON WHO WERE
THE KEY PLAYERS AT EACH MINISTRY. THIS WORKING LEVEL
MECHANISM WAS ESSENTIAL TO ENSURING THAT THE POSITIVE
RESPONSES WE TYPICALLY RECEIVED AT THE HIGHEST POLITICAL
LEVELS WERE INTEGRATED INTO OPERATIONAL DECISION MAKING.
----------------
FORCE PROTECTION
----------------
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0808
PAGE 01 ROME 02045 05 OF 06 121722Z
ACTION EUR-00
INFO LOG-00 NP-00 AID-00 ACQ-00 CIAE-00 INL-00 USNW-00
DOEE-00 DOTE-00 PERC-00 SRPP-00 DS-00 EAP-00 EB-00
FAAE-00 FBIE-00 VC-00 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-00 L-00
VCE-00 AC-01 NEA-00 NSAE-00 OMB-01 PA-00 PM-00
PRS-00 ACE-00 P-00 SCT-00 SP-00 SS-00 TRSE-00
T-00 USIE-00 PMB-00 DSCC-00 PRM-00 DRL-01 G-00
NFAT-00 SAS-00 SWCI-00 /003W
------------------63C280 121722Z /38
P 121721Z MAY 03
FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9810
INFO NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY VATICAN PRIORITY
AMCONSUL FLORENCE PRIORITY
AMCONSUL MILAN PRIORITY
AMCONSUL NAPLES PRIORITY
COMUSNAVEUR LONDON UK PRIORITY
DEPT OF ARMY WASHDC PRIORITY
HQ EUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
HQ USAF WASHDC PRIORITY
JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
SECNAV WASHDC PRIORITY
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 05 OF 06 ROME 002045
SIPDIS
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 ROME 02045 05 OF 06 121722Z
NOFORN
CENTCOM FOR J5, POLAD
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/12/2013
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS IT MARR MOPS IT MARR MOPS IT MARR MOPS IT MARR MOPS IT MARR MOPS IT IZ IZPREL IZPREL IZPREL IZPREL IZPREL IRAQI FREEDOM
SUBJECT: REVIEW OF ITALY'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO OIF
¶13. (C) ITALY DOES FIRST CLASS FORCE PROTECTION. LOCAL
ITALIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITIES WORKED CLOSELY WITH U.S.
BASE COMMANDERS TO BEEF UP FORCE PROTECTION AT MILITARY
INSTALLATIONS HOSTING U.S. PERSONNEL. WE ASKED FOR A
SIGNIFICANT BUMP UP IN FORCE PROTECTION MEASURES AT SIGONELLA
AND AUGUSTA AND WE GOT IT -- ACROSS THE BOARD. MORE ROVING
GUARDS, ITALIAN NAVY ESCORT, AND PATROLS FOR SPECIALLY
POSITIONED SENSOR PLATFORMS WERE ALL PART OF THE PACKAGE. WE
PUSHED FOR, AND RECEIVED PERMISSION FOR U.S. NAVY SHIPS TO
CONDUCT TRAINING EXERCISES IN ITALIAN TERRITORIAL WATERS THAT
SERVED AS A DETERRENT TO POTENTIAL TERRORIST ACTIVITY. THE
GOI IN APRIL APPROVED A LONGSTANDING REQUEST FOR NEW
WATERSIDE SECURITY SYSTEMS AT AUGUSTA AS WELL AS AT THE NAVAL
SUPPLY INSTALLATION IN NAPLES AND AT SIXTH FLEET HQS IN GAETA
THAT WILL HELP SIGNIFICANTLY TO PLUG VULNERABILITIES AT THOSE
PORTS.
---------------------------------------------
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE/PHASE IV - RAMPING UP
---------------------------------------------
¶14. (C) ITALY IS MOVING AT A STEADY PACE TO FILL OUT A
COMPREHENSIVE HUMANITARIAN RELIEF AND STABILIZATION PACKAGE.
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PAGE 03 ROME 02045 05 OF 06 121722Z
A FIRST EUROS 15 MILLION TRANCHE OF AN EVENTUAL EUROS 79
MILLION IN MULTILATERAL HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE HAS BEEN
ALLOCATED TO INTERNATIONAL RELIEF AGENCIES. THE MFA'S
EMERGENCY OFFICE IN THE DG FOR DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION HAS
ALREADY PAID FOR THE DISPATCH OF A PLANE CARRYING EUROS
250,000 WORTH OF MEDICAL SUPPLIES, SANITATION KITS,
NON-PERISHABLE FOOD, ELECTRIC GENERATORS, BLANKETS AND TENTS
TO KUWAIT CITY. MOREOVER, ITALY'S INTERAGENCY IRAQ TASK
FORCE IS MOVING TO DEPLOY A MODULAR FIELD HOSPITAL PROVIDED
BY THE ITALIAN RED CROSS TO AN AREA NEAR SADDAM CITY IN
BAGHDAD. PROBLEMS WITH WORKING THE DETAILS OF DEPLOYING THE
HOSPITAL THROUGH ITALY'S CENTCOM-ATTACHED LNO ARE ON THEIR
WAY TO BEING RESOLVED, THANKS IN LARGE PART TO CENTCOM'S
STEADFAST EFFORTS.
¶15. (C) PHASE IV INITIATIVES ARE GELLING AND ITALY WILL BE
IN ON THE GROUND FLOOR. PARLIAMENT ON APRIL 15 APPROVED AN
INITIAL DEPLOYMENT TO IRAQ OF UP TO 3000 PERSONNEL (MILITARY
PLUS CIVILIAN) IN SUPPORT OF HUMANITARIAN EFFORTS AND
RECONSTRUCTION. (NOTE: MINDEF MARTINO SAID ON MAY 6 THAT THE
GOI WOULD SEEK FURTHER PARLIAMENTARY AUTHORIZATION FOR
ITALY'S PHASE IV CONTRIBUTION; IT IS NOT CLEAR IF THIS WILL
COME IN THE FORM OF ANOTHER VOTE OR SIMPLY INVOLVE
NOTIFICATION. END NOTE). THE GOI, IN COORDINATION WITH THE
USG, IS WORKING CLOSELY WITH THE UK ON STANDING UP A
BRIGADE-LEVEL FORCE IN THE BRITISH SECTOR IN SOUTHERN IRAQ.
ITALY'S PHASE IV CONTRIBUTION ALSO WILL INCLUDE SOME 300-400
CARABINIERI FOR SPECIAL FORCE PROTECTION AND POLICING DUTIES.
OUR BRITISH CONTACTS SAY THE ITALIAN CONTINGENT SHOULD BE
FULLY OPERATIONAL BY LATE JUNE.
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 04 ROME 02045 05 OF 06 121722Z
---------------
EMBASSY COMMENT
---------------
¶16. (C/NF) ITALY COMMITTED NO MEN OR MATERIEL TO COMBAT IN
IRAQ, ALTHOUGH ITS SECURITY SERVICES PROVIDED US, FROM
SOURCES WITHIN IRAQ, OPERATIONALLY VALUABLE INFORMATION BOTH
BEFORE AND THROUGHOUT THE CONFLICT. LACKING A SECOND UN
RESOLUTION, THE GOI WOULD HAVE PROVOKED A CONSTITUTIONAL
CRISIS HAD IT PUSHED FOR DIRECT INVOLVEMENT IN COALITION
OPERATIONS. KNOWING THE ANTI-WAR VIEW OF THE MAJORITY OF
ITALIANS, PM BERLUSCONI WAS VISIBLY RELIEVED WHEN PRESIDENT
BUSH TOLD HIM IN JANUARY THAT THE U.S. DID NOT INTEND TO ASK
ITALY FOR COMBAT TROOPS. NEVERTHELESS, VIRTUALLY EVERYTHING
THE USG ASKED FOR -- EXCEPT STAND-BY TEAMS TO ASSIST WITH WMD
DISMANTLING, ARMED U.S. NAVY ESCORT IN AUGUSTA BAY, AND
EXPULSION OF IRAQI OFFICIALS ACCREDITED TO THE VATICAN AND
FAO -- WAS GRANTED.
¶17. (C) WHAT STRUCK US THE MOST ABOUT THE GOI'S EFFORTS TO
ASSIST WERE THE COMMITMENT TO SEE PROMISES THROUGH TO
COMPLETION DESPITE VERY UNFAVORABLE POLITICAL CIRCUMSTANCES
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0810
PAGE 01 ROME 02045 06 OF 06 121723Z
ACTION EUR-00
INFO LOG-00 NP-00 AID-00 ACQ-00 CIAE-00 INL-00 USNW-00
DOEE-00 DOTE-00 PERC-00 SRPP-00 DS-00 EAP-00 EB-00
FAAE-00 FBIE-00 VC-00 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-00 L-00
VCE-00 AC-01 NEA-00 NSAE-00 OMB-01 PA-00 PM-00
PRS-00 ACE-00 P-00 SCT-00 SP-00 SS-00 TRSE-00
T-00 USIE-00 PMB-00 DSCC-00 PRM-00 DRL-01 G-00
NFAT-00 SAS-00 SWCI-00 /003W
------------------63C288 121723Z /38
P 121721Z MAY 03
FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9811
INFO NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY VATICAN PRIORITY
AMCONSUL FLORENCE PRIORITY
AMCONSUL MILAN PRIORITY
AMCONSUL NAPLES PRIORITY
COMUSNAVEUR LONDON UK PRIORITY
DEPT OF ARMY WASHDC PRIORITY
HQ EUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
HQ USAF WASHDC PRIORITY
JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
SECNAV WASHDC PRIORITY
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 06 OF 06 ROME 002045
SIPDIS
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 ROME 02045 06 OF 06 121723Z
NOFORN
CENTCOM FOR J5, POLAD
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/12/2013
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS IT MARR MOPS IT MARR MOPS IT MARR MOPS IT MARR MOPS IT MARR MOPS IT IZ IZPREL IZPREL IZPREL IZPREL IZPREL IRAQI FREEDOM
SUBJECT: REVIEW OF ITALY'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO OIF
AND THE AGILITY OF THE GOVERNMENT IN MANAGING TOUGH
OPERATIONAL ISSUES. IN RETROSPECT, THE GOI MAY HAVE BEEN
OVERLY SKITTISH WHEN THE ROUTINE ALL OF A SUDDEN BECAME A
SENSITIVE ISSUE -- ITS BACK AND FORTH ON USING ROME'S
FIUMICINO AIRPORT FOR CIVILIAN CHARTERS COMES TO MIND -- BUT
IN THE END OUR NEEDS WERE ACCOMMODATED. WHILE BERLUSCONI
DESERVES CREDIT FOR HEWING TO A PRO-U.S. LINE, AT THE SAME
TIME WE WOULD NOT HAVE ACHIEVED A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME WITHOUT
THE ASSISTANCE OF DOZENS OF QUALIFIED AND PROFESSIONAL
MID-LEVEL OFFICIALS THROUGHOUT THE ITALIAN BUREAUCRACY.
-----------------------------------
COMMENT CONTINUED - LESSONS LEARNED
-----------------------------------
¶18. (C) AT THE END OF THE DAY, WE CAME AWAY FROM THE OIF
EXPERIENCE WITH FIVE FUNDAMENTAL CONVICTIONS.
-- FOR ANY FUTURE MILITARY OPERATIONS THAT INVOLVE ITALY,
KEEPING DIPLOMATIC COMMUNICATION IN SYNC WITH THE
MILITARY-TO-MILITARY CHANNEL IS IMPERATIVE TO ACHIEVE THE
RIGHT RESULTS, QUICKLY. THIS MISSION WORKED WELL IN DOUBLE
AND TRIPLE TRACKING REQUESTS THROUGH MILITARY AND POLITICAL
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 03 ROME 02045 06 OF 06 121723Z
CHANNELS. IN OUR EXPERIENCE, WE GOT THE FASTEST AND MOST
POSITIVE RESULTS FROM THE GOI WHEN WE HAD NOT ONLY THE
MILITARY-TO-MILITARY MESSAGE WITH DETAILS, BUT ALSO AN
INTERAGENCY CLEARED MESSAGE THAT PUT THE REQUEST IN THE
BROADER POLITICAL CONTEXT OF OIF.
-- PRESIDENT CIAMPI MATTERS. HE USED HIS MORAL AUTHORITY TO
STRETCH HIS CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY. HIS GOAL WAS TO
MAXIMIZE DOMESTIC CONSENSUS, BUT IT NEARLY HAD THE UNINTENDED
(BY HIM) CONSEQUENCE OF JEOPARDIZING A KEY DEPLOYMENT. WE
WOULD GET DIVIDENDS FROM HIGHER LEVEL ENGAGEMENT, INCLUDING
BY THE WHITE HOUSE, WITH CIAMPI.
-- THE BERLUSCONI GOVERNMENT CAN BE TRUSTED TO MANAGE THE
INTERNAL POLITICS OF THORNY SECURITY QUESTIONS, BUT HAD
ANOTHER GOVERNMENT BEEN IN POWER -- IN PARTICULAR ONE
CONTROLLED BY THE CENTER-LEFT -- WE WOULD HAVE HAD A FAR MORE
DIFFICULT SITUATION ON OUR HANDS. NOTHING CAN BE TAKEN FOR
GRANTED HERE, ALTHOUGH HOW WE MANAGE THE RECONSTRUCTION
PROCESS IN IRAQ WILL HAVE AN IMPACT ON THOSE WHO OPPOSED US
PRE-CONFLICT.
-- ALTHOUGH THE EMBASSY AVOIDED BECOMING A ""MANAGEMENT
CONSULTANT"" FOR FIXING AN INTERAGENCY PROCESS THAT, DESPITE
THE GOI'S BEST EFFORTS, STILL INHIBITS THE SMOOTH MESHING OF
INTENT WITH CONCRETE ACTION, WE CAN HELP ELEMENTS OF THE
GOVERNMENT TO TALK TO EACH OTHER. WE WILL CONTINUE TO FOLLOW
THIS NARROW PATH.
-- RECOGNIZING THAT ITALY CAN APPEAR FRUSTRATINGLY ARCANE AND
BYZANTINE, WE ARE CONVINCED THAT IT IS AN EXCELLENT PLACE TO
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DO OUR POLITICAL-MILITARY BUSINESS, AS LONG AS A HEALTHY
DEGREE OF PATIENCE IS THROWN INTO THE MIX. END COMMENT.
SEMBLER
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