Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 03ADANA107, RURAL-TO-URBAN MIGRATION BY KURDS:

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #03ADANA107.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
03ADANA107 2003-04-15 12:17 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Consulate Adana
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ADANA 0107 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE 
 
 
/////////////////// 
CORRECTED COPY 
////////////////// 
 
 
PLEASE DISREGARD ADANA CABLE 106. 
DUE TO FORMATTING PROBLEMS, THIS 
CABLE REPLACES ADANA CABLE 106 
 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM SOCI SCUL TU ADANA
SUBJECT:  RURAL-TO-URBAN MIGRATION BY KURDS: 
          OBSERVATIONS OF A SOCIOLOGIST 
 
1.  (SBU)  Summary:  Mehmet Erbas, a junior 
faculty member at Mersin University, has 
conducted scholarly research about the migration 
of Kurds from the countryside to the cities of 
Turkey.  He believes that "Kurdish identity" will 
survive transplantation to the metropolis as long 
as Kurdish migrants see a benefit to it.  The 
Turkish State has no ability to influence this 
process.  End summary. 
 
 
2.  (SBU)  Mehmet Erbas, a young assistant 
professor of sociology at Mersin University's 
Science and Literature Faculty, has carved out a 
niche in the study of a very significant 
phenomenon of contemporary Turkey: the massive 
migration by rural Kurds to urban areas.  This 
migration has dramatically changed the 
demographics of cities like Mersin, as well as 
other cities in the southeast, and indeed 
throughout the country.  Istanbul, by some 
reckonings, is now the largest Kurdish city in 
the world. 
 
 
3.  (SBU)  Erbas is not Kurdish.  He hails from 
Ordu, on the Black Sea.  He does not speak 
Kurdish.  Nevertheless, he has undertaken the 
study of Kurdish migration because he feels it is 
a crucially important topic for understanding 
where Turkey is headed. 
 
 
4.  (SBU)  In a wide-ranging April 11 discussion 
in his office at Mersin University, Erbas offered 
some perhaps unconventional thoughts about the 
nature, and consequences, of large-scale rural- 
to-urban migration by southeastern Kurds. 
 
 
5.  (SBU)  First, "it's not about language." 
According to Erbas, the ability to speak Kurdish 
is not crucial to Kurdish identity in Turkey. 
There are politicized Kurds who do not know the 
language.  He cited the case of the large Kurdish 
diaspora from Turkey that now resides in Western 
Europe.  These Kurds, he said, have made no 
attempt to set up Kurdish language schools for 
their children.  This stands in contrast to 
Turkish emigrants in Western Europe, who have 
done so.  At the same time, he noted, Kurds 
living in Western Europe who came from northern 
Iraq did work to set up Kurdish-language 
education for their children - in effect, 
replicating the Kurdish-language educational 
system they had back in Iraq. 
 
 
6.  (SBU)  Second, "it's not clear how much of 
the tenacity of the culture is its Kurdishness 
and how much is its ruralness."  This observation 
would likely be agreed upon by many residents of 
Turkey's cities who have been urbanized longer, 
and who have noted, often with dismay, the 
persistence of rural folkways (in dress, in 
ritual, in family stucture) in the city.  A 
family slaughtering its Kurban Bayram sheep on a 
fifteenth-floor balcony of a high-rise in an 
apartment complex is as likely to be Turkish as 
Kurdish. 
 
 
7.  (SBU)  Third, there is class-consciousness 
among Kurds, but it has a twist.  There is a 
large number of well-off, even wealthy, Kurds in 
a city like Mersin.  Those who buy a summer beach 
house do not go out of their way to make sure 
they will have Kurdish neighbors there.  On the 
other hand, if one goes to a typical Newroz 
(Nevruz, the Persian-Kurdish March 21 celebration 
of Spring) celebration in a large Turkish city, 
the crowd is likely to be made up of middle and 
lower-class Kurds.  Wealthy Kurds do not usually 
attend.  Why?  Interestingly, according to Erbas, 
it is not out of snobbery.  Rather, it is out of 
fear that being seen at such events by Turkish 
authorities might open them to accusations of 
being overly "politicized" in their Kurdishness. 
(Note:  Some contacts recall for us that in the 
1980s and 1990s there were wealthy and powerful 
Kurds who disappeared mysteriously.  End note.) 
A prosperous and successful Kurd in Turkey still 
might worry about the risks of "guilt by 
association" with more radical elements. 
 
 
8.  (SBU)  Fourth, the basic motivation for 
maintaining one's Kurdish identity after the move 
from the country to the city is, in Erbas' view, 
"to get something from it."  The "something" he 
has in mind is not an ineffable kind of ethnic 
pride.  Rather, it is something pragmatic in re 
housing and jobs.  Uniquely among citizens of 
Turkey, the Kurds of the southeast over their 
history developed an elaborate system of "clan" 
or "tribe" ("asiret" in Turkish) affiliation. 
This system is part and parcel of the phenomenon 
of the "aga" (large feudal landowner) system - 
also peculiar to Kurdish lands in southeast 
Turkey.  The salience of the clan system 
persists.  Polling done among Kurdish youth in 
the southeast, for example, is ambiguous; 
depending on how one looks at it, young people's 
belief in the value of the clan system is either 
(predictably) fading or (remarkably) still alive. 
(Note: It was in angry reaction to the 
"feudalism" of the clan and "aga" system that a 
young Kurd named Abdullah Ocalan first embraced 
revolutionary politics as a Marxist at Ankara 
University in the 1970s.  End note.) 
 
 
9.  (SBU)  As it effects rural-to-urban 
migration, the relevance of enduring clan values 
among southeastern Turkey's Kurds is that a 
typical Kurdish rural-to-urban migrant is not, 
and cannot be, "an individual actor."  While a 
random rural Turkish family from, say, Erzurum 
might be drawn to a neighborhood in Istanbul or 
Ankara that offers hometown contacts, there are 
many other neighborhoods to choose from.  The 
tighter bonds of clan connection in the Kurdish 
world dictate differently.  Clan is expected to 
seek out and be helped by clan.  To fly in the 
face of that practice, according to Erbas, means 
that an incoming migrant simply might not be 
cold-shouldered.  Concretely, that might mean not 
being offered informal assistance with job- 
seeking or not being invited to settle in a 
neighborhood, particularly a squatter 
("gecekondu" in Turkish) neighborhood.  Thus, 
maintaining one's "Kurdishness" is a practical 
necessity for access to housing and employment 
and social acceptance. 
 
 
10.  (SBU) Comment:  As long as new migrants 
remain dependent on personal, family, and clan 
networks to survive, Kurdish ethnic identity is 
likely to survive in contemporary urban Turkey, 
no matter what actions Turkish State authorities 
take.  End comment. 
HOLTZ