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Viewing cable 03HANOI669, VIETNAM AND CAMBODIA: LOOKING FORWARD

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
03HANOI669 2003-03-19 02:49 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Hanoi
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 HANOI 000669 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV AND INL/AAE 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PREL SNAR SOCI PHUM ETRD ECON EAID CB VM ETMIN CNARC ASEAN TIP
SUBJECT:  VIETNAM AND CAMBODIA:  LOOKING FORWARD 
 
REF:  A.  Hanoi 527  B.  02 Hanoi 2980  C.  02 Hanoi 701 
 
1.  (U)  SUMMARY.  Vietnam and Cambodia have a complex 
relationship with a volatile history, but both sides now 
appear to focus on the future.  Cross border smuggling of 
drugs and other goods as well as human trafficking have 
emerged as significant problems.  Vietnam reportedly does 
not view the 2001 Montagnard exodus as having much impact on 
the bilateral relationship.  Border demarcation remains an 
unresolved issue.  Two-way trade is quite low but there is 
mild optimism.  Bilateral cooperation on Vietnamese missing 
in action (MIA) is good.  END SUMMARY. 
 
------------------------------------ 
A LONG BORDER AND INTERTWINED HISTORY 
------------------------------------ 
 
2.  (SBU)  Vietnam and Cambodia share an approximately 1,000 
kilometer border, including the Vietnamese provinces (from 
north to south) of Kon Tum, Gia Lai, Dak Lak, Binh Phuoc, 
Tay Ninh, Long An, An Giang, and Kien Giang.  Due to a 
common French colonial past and, later, the "American" War, 
Vietnam and Cambodia have much in common.  Vietnam's late 
1978 invasion, according to Cambodia Embassy Counselor Tauch 
Kemary, while viewed "by many, even most" as "liberating" 
the country from the Khmer Rouge, also "reminded us of our 
vulnerability."  There are many who continue to "fear the 
Vietnamese" because "they have demonstrated the power to 
dominate Cambodia at different times in our history." 
Notwithstanding that episode, in recent years, the two 
countries have been "trying to find more common ground" and 
advance the bilateral relationship, Kemary noted. 
 
3.  (U)  Since the 1990s, bilateral ties have seen a slow 
but steady improvement, with the signing of various 
agreements.  Among the more important ones relate to: 
--Trade and economic cooperation (1995); 
--establishment of the Joint Committee on Economic, 
Cultural, Scientific, and Technical Affairs (1995); 
--cooperation between Vietnam's Ministry of Agricultural and 
Rural Development and Cambodia's Ministry of Agriculture, 
Forestry, and Fishery (1997); 
--Anti-criminal cooperation between the two Ministries of 
Interior (1997); 
--Land transport cooperation (1998); 
--Counternarcotics cooperation (1998); 
--Education and training cooperation 2000 - 2005 (1999); 
--Labor cooperation 2000 - 2002 (2000); 
--Investment protection and incentives (2001); and, 
--Trading, exchange of goods and trade services in border 
areas (2001). 
 
4.  (SBU)  According to information provided by Vietnam's 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), senior-level visits from 
Vietnam to Cambodia predominate official exchanges.  Nguyen 
Phuong Binh, MFA Institute of International Relations (IIR) 
Deputy Director, suggested that this could be because 
Cambodian government leaders are "reluctant" to appear too 
close to the GVN leadership.  Visits to Vietnam "could leave 
them open" to criticism from opposition politicians, she 
added.  Binh predicted that this imbalance "may change as 
bilateral relations continue to improve."  However, upcoming 
Cambodian elections in July will "influence to what extend 
and how fast relations improve," she predicted. 
 
5.  (U)  Since 2000, GVN leaders who have visited Cambodia 
have included then-National Assembly Chairman (and now 
Communist Party General Secretary) Nong Duc Manh (2000); 
Deputy Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung (2000); then-Minister 
of Public Security Le Minh Huong (2001); President Tran Duc 
Luong (2001); Minister of Defense Pham Van Tra (2002); and 
National Assembly Chairman Nguyen Van An (2002).  On the 
Cambodian side, high level visits included Prime Minister 
Hun Sen in 1998 (on a bilateral visit) and again in 2002 (as 
head of the Cambodian delegation to a tripartite meeting 
with Vietnam and Laos held in Ho Chi Minh City); Foreign 
Minister Hor Nam Hong in 2001; and most recently, Princess 
Norodom Vachara, chairman of the National Assembly's Foreign 
Affairs Commission, in January 2003 to discuss border issues 
with Vietnam's National Assembly Chairman An. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
SIGNIFICANT CROSS BORDER SMUGGLING AND TRAFFICKING 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
6.  (SBU)  The Cambodian Embassy's Kemary admitted that 
cross-border smuggling is a "major problem" and one that "we 
must continue to work on."  Drug smuggling from Cambodia, 
according to DEA's Hanoi Country Office, includes heroin and 
amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS), mainly into Ho Chi Minh 
City.  Some of the heroin is for domestic use and some is 
transshipped to Australia.  Cambodia is Ho Chi Minh City's 
major ATS source.  Large quantities of marijuana also enter 
southern Vietnam from Cambodia, mainly for transshipment to 
the PRC (Ref b).  Kemary claimed that Cambodian police meet 
"regularly" with their Vietnamese counterparts; however, he 
lamented that the Cambodian police have "very few" 
resources" for patrolling the border areas.  Kemary also 
noted that the smuggling of manufactured goods is "very 
common and works against real economic growth between 
Cambodia and Vietnam."  He added that most of the goods 
smuggled into Vietnam come from Thailand.  He claimed that 
most of this smuggling was due to "Thai criminal gangs" who 
"encourage corruption" among Cambodian border officials. 
 
7.  (SBU)  Human trafficking is also a major issue.  While 
few reliable statistics exist, the UN Office of Drugs and 
Crime's (UNODC) Hanoi staff have reported that, of the 
estimated 20,000 Vietnamese prostitutes in Cambodia, a 
significant number are the victims of human traffickers. 
Several dozen Vietnamese trafficking victims were officially 
repatriated from Cambodia in 2002, but because victims tend 
to avoid notoriety, experts suspect many more return through 
unofficial channels.  In 2002, the International Office for 
Migration (IOM) again confirmed that human trafficking from 
Vietnam to Cambodia had become more serious in recent years. 
 
8.  (U)  As the Embassy's Trafficking in Persons Reports 
(ref a is for 2002) noted, women and girls trafficked abroad 
from Vietnam go primarily to Cambodia and the PRC.  There is 
also evidence that some Vietnamese citizens are trafficked 
through Cambodia to third countries.  Nguyen Sy Tuan, Deputy 
Director of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 
commented that, while the human trafficking problem is a 
major issue, it has received "less bilateral attention" than 
drugs.  He opined that, as international pressure increases 
on the human trafficking issue, Vietnam and Cambodia's 
leaders "will have to focus more on the human trafficking 
issue." 
 
---------------- 
MONTAGNARD ISSUE 
---------------- 
 
9.  (SBU)  The IIR's Binh discounted the impact on the 2001 
exodus of about 1,000 Montagnards into Cambodia following 
February/March 2001 demonstrations in the Central Highlands 
and the 2002 collapse of the Cambodia/Vietnam/UNHCR 
Tripartite Agreement as ongoing issues in bilateral ties. 
People from the Central Highlands who crossed "illegally" 
into Cambodia did so with the intent of reaching a third 
country, he claimed.  Once the United Nations became 
involved, the problem took on a "multilateral context," he 
added.  He declined to comment on fresh reports of active 
Cambodian police cooperation in returning additional 2002 
cases of would-be Montagnard escapees, which, according to 
Vietnamese media accounts, led to multi-year prison 
sentences for at least five Gia Lai residents on March 12. 
 
------------------------------- 
BORDER DEMARCATION:  SLOW GOING 
------------------------------- 
 
10.  (SBU)  Notwithstanding periodic MFA announcements over 
the past few years that the border issue will be settled 
"this year," border demarcation remains unresolved. 
According to the Southeast Asia Institute's Tuan, the 
current border essentially represents the old French 
colonial demarcation.  However, he noted that the border 
"does not always agree with the current maps."  He added 
that people who live and try to make a living near the 
border "tend to move back and forth; border lines do not 
mean much to them."  Even though "both governments warn 
their people" against farming close to the border, such 
activities continue to take place because of "the demand for 
rice fields and access to water," he added. 
 
11.  (SBU)  Nguyen Du Hanh, Director of the Western Border 
Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' (MFA) Border 
Commission, admitted separately that the border issue is 
"complicated," but stated that both sides would like to 
settle it.  He pointed out that, in the early 1980s, Vietnam 
and Cambodia had signed "a number" of international 
conventions concerning border demarcation.  In addition, 
there was a bilateral agreement in 1985 that led to "some 
demarcation activity" from 1986-1990.  Hanh noted that this 
activity ceased with a change of governments in Cambodia 
after the UN-sponsored elections.  However, Hanh claimed 
that the two sides "are not far apart" - of the nearly 1,000- 
kilometer border, "under 200 kilometers are in dispute."  At 
the June 2002 joint border commission, both sides agreed to 
"join hands" to solve the border issue, he noted.  Hanh 
suggested that "in the end, the border will be based on the 
French demarcation, with minor adjustments."  Commenting on 
recent developments, Hanh stated that there have been talks 
at the "expert" working level "once or twice a year." 
However, progress has been "slow" because more senior 
officials have been "busy" and because there is a lack of 
"legal documents on which to base final negotiations." 
 
12.  (SBU)  Separately, the Southeast Asia Institute's Tuan 
noted that the border had become a "hot" issue in Cambodia's 
politics.  (Note:  it has not become a hot issue in Vietnam, 
unlike the more controversial land border agreement with the 
PRC in 1999.  End note)  Tuan added that the opposition 
parties have "severely" criticized the present government 
for appearing "too willing" to make concessions to Vietnam. 
He predicted that there would be no further progress until 
after the Cambodian elections in July.  Further progress 
will depend "to some extent on who is in power," he 
predicted.  He claimed that an expected senior level meeting 
to discuss seven outstanding border issues -- scheduled for 
March 2003 -- had been postponed due to "domestic political 
considerations" in Cambodia. 
 
------------------------ 
TWO-WAY TRADE:  NOT MUCH 
------------------------ 
 
13.  (SBU)  Without citing a specific figure, Hanh admitted 
that two-way trade was "very low."   MFA press releases 
concerning Vietnam-Cambodia relations between 2001 and 2003 
include numerous proclamations and pledges of "continued 
support and cooperation" but almost none related 
specifically to two-way trade.  The Cambodian Embassy's 
Kemary suggested that there is some potential for improving 
legal two-way trade, especially once the border issue is 
settled and authorities on both sides take further steps to 
reduce smuggling.  Kemary said that the Cambodian government 
is "hopeful" about the potential for Cambodia "modestly" to 
improve especially its exports of clothing and shoes to 
Vietnam.  (Comment:  Since clothing and shoes are well- 
developed domestic and export industries in Vietnam, this 
would seem unlikely.  End Comment.)  Separately, the 
Southeast Asia Institute's Tuan opined that improved two-way 
trade is "unlikely until border and smuggling issues are 
addressed and the Cambodian economy produces more." 
 
14.  (U)  In addition to trade, Kemary noted that Cambodia 
"appreciates" Vietnam's rice assistance.  (Note:  According 
to an October 2002 MFA announcement, the GVN donated 500 
tons of rice to Cambodia's Kandal province.  End note.) 
 
--------------- 
MIA COOPERATION 
--------------- 
 
15.  (SBU)  Tuan pointed to the MIA issue as one that 
demonstrates a "good" level of bilateral cooperation.  He 
said that Cambodia has been helpful in providing information 
on Vietnamese remains.  According to the Detachment Two 
Joint Task Force - Full Accounting office in Hanoi, 
Vietnam's military has conducted dry-season recovery 
operations in Cambodia over the past three years.  Each 
year, the two sides meet, work out an operations plan, 
deploy Vietnamese troops into agreed-upon areas, conduct 
operations, and repatriate the remains to Vietnam.  An 
August 2002 visit by GVN Defense Minister Senior Lieutenant 
General Pham Van Tra also focused on this issue.  During 
Prime Minister Hun Sen's trip to Ho Chi Minh City for the 
2002 tripartite meeting, he visited the commander of 
Vietnam's Military Zone 7 in Dong Nai (southern Vietnam). 
Tuan opined that Hun Sen "may have" raised MIA cooperation 
during that visit as well.  According to a January 2003 MFA 
announcement, 2,344 sets of remains have been repatriated to 
Vietnam. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
16.  (U)  A mix of historical animosities, cultural 
rivalries, and complex leadership relations stemming from 
Vietnam's decade-long occupation and efforts to install its 
own favorites in power in Phnom Penh complicate the 
bilateral relationship.  Vietnamese now appear to put aside 
the recent past and deal with Cambodia as just another 
fellow ASEAN member and good neighbor, while still seeking 
to dominate a mini-Indochina lobby within ASEAN seeking 
extra help from richer members.  While Vietnam prefers to 
look forward in its 21st century relations with Cambodia, 
the likelihood is that Cambodia will be less and less 
important to Vietnam, as it focuses on more important 
economic and political relationships with the U.S., Japan, 
and the EU and seeks WTO accession. 
BURGHARDT