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Viewing cable 03HANOI567, REVIEWING BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH DPM DUNG

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
03HANOI567 2003-03-11 01:34 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Hanoi
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 HANOI 000567 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PREL ETRD MARR SNAR KCRM VM
SUBJECT:  REVIEWING BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH DPM DUNG 
 
 
1.  (U)  Summary.  DPM Dung expressed general satisfaction 
with US-Vietnam relations, especially regarding trade and 
investment ties, along with the desire to do more to push 
the relationship further.  He complained about the recent 
flag cases, catfish, and the US desire for a textile 
agreement, which he claimed the US negotiator had promised 
the US would not pursue if Vietnam bought Boeing aircraft. 
End Summary. 
 
2.  (U)  Senior Deputy Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung 
requested a meeting with Ambassador March 10 to exchange 
views on how further to strengthen the bilateral 
relationship.  Septels will cover Iraq, the new Chancery 
site, and intelligence sharing. 
 
3.  (U)  Ambassador noted his efforts over the past 15 
months to implement the US-Vietnam Bilateral Trade 
Agreement, including through a variety of USG-funded 
programs, in order to help Vietnam better integrate into the 
international community and prepare itself for eventual 
accession to the World Trade Organization.  He also noted 
that he has encouraged non-governmental organizations, 
businesses, universities, and other private entities 
establish their own links with Vietnam to promote better 
ties and understanding.  He pointed to the success of the 
recent Asia Society corporate conference, the upcoming 
opening of the Vietnam exhibition at the American Museum of 
Natural History in New York, and the appointment of an 
executive director for the Vietnam Educational Foundation as 
concrete examples of progress in the latter field. 
 
4.  (U)  Ambassador cited three areas where much more needs 
to be accomplished to move our relationship to a more truly 
normal basis:  mil-to-mil ties, law enforcement cooperation, 
and intelligence sharing, all of which are among the most 
sensitive aspects in our still new relationship.  He noted 
that the time had come to move our relationship beyond just 
economic interests and the need by Vietnam for access to the 
US market in order to look for ways to develop a more 
comprehensive and strategic relationship. 
 
5.  (U)  On the military side, the prospect of a visit this 
year to the U.S. by Defense Minister Tra, ongoing 
discussions about US Navy ship visits, and greater access 
granted to our Defense Attache are welcome developments.  On 
a more negative note, we were disappointed with the last 
minute cancellation of a scheduled meeting with the 
Vietnamese Defense Ministry's Deputy Chief of General Staff 
for intelligence with the visiting Defense Intelligence 
Agency's chief of staff.  On the law enforcement side, 
despite the successful May 2002 conference bringing together 
a variety of related agencies from both governments, little 
progress has been made.  DEA's contacts and information 
sharing with the Ministry of Public Security remain very one- 
sided, demonstrating a continued reluctance by MPS to share 
information even about narcotics. 
 
6. (U)  DPM Dung noted that Vietnam had been "encouraged" 
with the results of the BTA implementation so far, and 
underscored the priority Vietnam attaches to trade and 
investment both in the present and in the long-term.  He 
complimented Ambassador for his personal role in BTA 
implementation.  He stressed that greater cooperation on the 
BTA was not just important for economic reasons, but also as 
a way of bringing our two countries and peoples together, 
improving mutual understanding, and building a long-standing 
friendship. 
 
7.  (U)  DPM Dung noted ongoing problems to solve, notably 
catfish and textiles;  resolution would require that both 
sides really listen to each other's viewpoints.  He noted 
that many Vietnamese felt that recent US decisions on these 
issues in particular had been "discriminatory" as well as 
bad for bilateral relations, and had especially been 
"lacking in goodwill."  He urged Ambassador to take personal 
responsibility for dealing with these issues.  On textiles, 
he claimed that then-Deputy USTR Fisher had "promised" 
during BTA negotiations that, if Vietnam agreed to buy 
Boeing aircraft, the US would not pursue a textile 
agreement.  Ambassador indicated surprise at such a claim, 
but DPM Dung said that Fisher had personally made this 
commitment to him in the same room in which we were now 
sitting.   Ambassador noted that, in any event, textile 
agreements were fairly routine, and would have only a short 
lifespan given the WTO decision to abolish them in 2005 
among members.  Once Vietnam acceded, it would have full 
access to this US market.   He noted that current 
uncertainty among US garment buyers could only hurt 
Vietnam's longer-term interests.  He stressed that purchases 
of Boeing aircraft made good sense in their own right.  He 
cited discriminatory actions on the side of the GVN -- film 
censorship, restrictions on certain areas of investment. 
 
8.  (U)  DPM Dung complained also about recent legislation 
in Virginia and California mandating use of the Republic of 
Vietnam flag.  While saying that he understood that the 
State Department's ability to stop such legislation was 
constitutionally limited, he stressed that such decisions 
have a "harmful" impact on international affairs and 
bilateral relations, and the State Department would be more 
active in opposing them.  Ambassador noted that the bottom 
line problem was that the GVN had not been more aggressive 
in reaching out to the Viet Kieu community in the United 
States.  He urged the GVN to take more steps toward 
reconciliation, such as sending out SRV Embassy and Congen 
staff to meet with them, or even inviting former South 
Vietnamese Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky to visit.  DPM Dung 
reacted emotionally, noting that the officials of the former 
regime in Saigon had been responsible for bringing in 1 
million US troops and resulting in the death of 3 million 
Vietnamese; they are "criminals" and would never be welcomed 
back.  He agreed with Ambassador's comment that, in that 
case, reconciliation would require "generations." 
 
9.  (U)  DPM Dung pledged that Vietnam would continue to try 
to improve cooperation and broaden the relationship, 
including in areas such as education and training, cultural 
exchanges, and dealing with the legacy of the war (Agent 
Orange, landmines, MIAs on both sides).  He noted that 
Defense Minister Tra indeed planned to visit the US, along 
with other probable visits by the National Assembly Chairman 
and DPM Vu Khoan.  He pointed to more joint efforts on 
military training.  He cited information sharing related to 
counter-terrorism.  He described Vietnam's commitment to 
combating narcotics, and said that only a few minor 
obstacles remained related to taxes paid by US staff. 
(Note:  an apparent reference to long-standing negotiations 
over a Counter-narcotics agreement with State's INL.  End 
note) 
 
10.  (U)  Ambassador noted that he had yet to meet with 
General Secretary Nong Duc Manh, the first time in his 32 
years as a diplomat that he had not met the most senior 
political figure in a country.  DPM Dung said that GS Manh 
had agreed to the meeting in principle, that he would 
personally again forward the request, and that it was only a 
matter of scheduling at this point. 
 
11.  (U)  Comment:  While sometimes a feisty interlocutor, 
DPM Dung appeared extremely well-briefed on bilateral ties, 
as well as sincerely dedicated to further improvement of 
relations.  Ambassador will attempt to seek more regular 
exchanges such as this one to get over some of our mutual 
misunderstandings and to clarify Vietnamese attitudes in the 
interests of promoting stronger and deeper ties. 
BURGHARDT