Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 03HALIFAX93, CANADIAN TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #03HALIFAX93.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
03HALIFAX93 2003-03-27 19:08 2011-04-28 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Consulate Halifax
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS HALIFAX 0093 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR CA/OCS, WHA/CAN, AND EB/TRAN 
USDOT PLEASE PASS NTSB 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: CASC EAIR CA US
SUBJECT:  CANADIAN TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD 
RELEASES FINAL REPORT ON CRASH OF SWISSAIR FLIGHT 111 
 
 
1. THE TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD OF CANADA (TSB) TODAY RELEASED 
ITS FINAL REPORT ON SWISSAIR FLIGHT 111, WHICH CRASHED OFF THE 
COAST OF NOVA SCOTIA ON SEPTEMBER 2, 1998, KILLING ALL ABOARD, 
INCLUDING 103 AMERICAN CITIZENS.  THIS REPORT MARKS THE 
CONCLUSION OF THE TSB'S LONGEST AND MOST EXTENSIVE CRASH 
INVESTIGATION EVER, CONDUCTED AT A TOTAL COST OF C$ 57 MILLION. 
 
2. THE TSB CONCLUDED THAT THE ONBOARD FIRE WHICH LED TO THE CRASH 
OF SWISSAIR 111 STARTED IN A HIDDEN OVERHEAD AREA ON THE 
STARBOARD SIDE OF THE PLANE JUST ABOVE AND AT THE REAR OF THE 
COCKPIT AREA.  THE SOURCE OF IGNITION WAS AN ARCING EVENT IN THE 
AIRCRAFT'S ELECTRICAL WIRING.   THE TSB PINPOINTED ONE PARTICULAR 
SECTION OF WIRING FROM THE AIRCRAFT'S IN-FLIGHT ENTERTAINMENT 
SYSTEM FOR BUSINESS CLASS PASSENGERS AS BEING ASSOCIATED WITH THE 
INITIAL ARCING EVENT, THOUGH THEY COULD NOT SAY WITH CERTAINTY 
THAT THE ARCING THAT OCCURRED THERE WAS IN FACT THE LEAD EVENT. 
THE TSB CONCLUDED THAT ARCING ALSO OCCURRED AT OTHER POINTS IN 
THE WIRING FOR THE IN FLIGHT ENTERTAINMENT SYSTEM WHICH WERE NOT 
RECOVERED, MAKING IT IMPOSSIBLE TO ISOLATE THE LEAD ARCING EVENT. 
THIS ARCING IGNITED THE METALLIZED POLYETHELENE TEREPHTHALATE 
(MPET) MATERIAL ON THE INSULATION BLANKETS ABOVE THE CEILING OF 
THE RIGHT REAR COCKPIT AREA.  THE TSB CONCLUDED THAT THE MPET 
BLANKETS WERE EXCESSIVELY FLAMMABLE AND THAT ABSENT THE PRESENCE 
OF FLAMMABLE MATERIAL IN THE VICINITY OF THE INITIAL ARCING 
EVENT, THE DISASTER WOULD NOT HAVE OCCURRED. 
 
3. THE TSB NOTED THAT FIRE/SMOKE DETECTION AND SUPPRESSION 
DEVISES WERE NOT PRESENT IN THE AREA WHERE THE FIRE STARTED, AND 
WERE NOT REQUIRED AT THAT TIME.  THE TSB CONCLUDED THAT THE 
FLIGHT CREW DID NOT HAVE THE NECESSARY TOOLS, PROCEDURES, OR 
TRAINING TO LOCATE AND ELIMINATE THE FIRE BEFORE IT BECAME 
UNCONTROLLABLE.  THE TSB ALSO CONCLUDED THAT AIR CIRCULATION 
CHARACTERISTICS ABOARD THE AIRCRAFT VENTED SMOKE AWAY FROM THE 
CREW INITIALLY.  THIS CONTRIBUTED TO A DELAY IN RECOGNIZING THE 
EXTREMELY SERIOUS NATURE OF THE SITUATION, AND LED THEM INITIALLY 
TO ERRONEOUSLY BELIEVE THAT THE SMELL THEY DETECTED WAS THE 
RESULT OF AN ANOMALY IN THE AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEM INSTEAD OF AN 
ONBOARD FIRE. 
 
4. HOWEVER, THE TSB ALSO CONCLUDED THAT AN ACCURATE EARLY 
ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION WOULD STILL NOT HAVE GIVEN THE CREW 
OF SWISSAIR 111 SUFFICIENT TIME TO EXECUTE A SAFE EMERGENCY 
LANDING IN HALIFAX.  THE TSB CONCLUDED THAT, GIVEN IDEAL 
CONDITIONS, THE EARLIEST MOMENT THAT SWISSAIR 111 COULD HAVE 
LANDED WAS 22:27 LOCAL TIME.  HOWEVER, THE ONBOARD FIRE RESULTED 
IN A RAPID DETERIORATION OF FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEMS IN THE COCKPIT 
AT 22:25.  THE TSB THEREFORE CONCLUDED THAT THE CREW WOULD HAVE 
LOST CONTROL OF THE AIRCRAFT SHORT OF THE RUNWAY EVEN IF THEY HAD 
ACTED IMMEDIATELY TO EXECUTE AN EMERGENCY LANDING AT THE MOMENT 
THEY FIRST SMELLED SMOKE. 
 
5. IN ADDITION TO THE 14 AVIATION SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS ALREADY 
MADE IN THE COURSE OF THIS INVESTIGATION, THE TSB RELEASED AN 
ADDITIONAL NINE RECOMMENDATIONS IN CONJUNCTION WITH THEIR FINAL 
REPORT.  THESE RECOMMENDATIONS DEAL WITH TESTING AND FLAMMABILITY 
STANDARDS FOR INSULATION MATERIALS, WITH AIRCRAFT ELECTRICAL 
SYSTEMS INCLUDING CERTIFICATION OF ADD-ON ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS FOR 
COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT, AND IMPROVEMENTS TO THE CAPTURE AND STORAGE 
OF IN FLIGHT DATA. 
 
6. THE TSB OFFICIALS PRESENT EMPHASIZED THAT THE PURPOSE OF THEIR 
INVESTIGATION IS TO IMPROVE AVIATION SAFETY AND TO PREVENT FUTURE 
TRAGEDIES, NOT TO ASSIGN BLAME OR LIABILITY FOR THE CRASH OF 
SWISSAIR 111.  THEY EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE THAT THE RECOMMENDATIONS 
PRODUCED AS A RESULT OF THEIR INVESTIGATION HAVE AND WILL 
CONTINUE TO IMPROVE AVIATION SAFETY.  WHETHER THE INFORMATION IN 
THEIR FINAL REPORT WILL PROVIDE ANY MEASURE OF CLOSURE OR 
SATISFACTION FOR THE FAMILIES OF THE VICTIMS OF SWISSAIR REMAINS 
TO BE SEEN.  THE TSB REPORT IS AVAILABLE IN FULL AT: 
HTTP//WWW.TSB.GC.CA. 
 
SEIBEL