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Viewing cable 03BRASILIA907, BRAZIL: SERVICES HELD HOSTAGE TO AGRICULTURE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
03BRASILIA907 2003-03-24 13:12 2011-07-11 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Brasilia
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 000907 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
GENEVA - PLEASE PASS TO USTR - ALICIA GREENIDGE 
USTR FOR AMAIN 
DEPT FOR EB/TPP/MTA/MST AWHITTEN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ETRD ECON WTRO FTAA
SUBJECT: BRAZIL: SERVICES HELD HOSTAGE TO AGRICULTURE 
 
REF: SECSTATE 50753 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED 
 
1. (U) Econoff met on March 12 with Felipe Hees of the 
Services, Investment and Financial Issues Division of 
Itamaraty to discuss prospects for Brazil's submission of 
services offers in the WTO (reftel) and FTAA negotiations. 
 
WTO - Submission by Deadline Is Doubtful 
 
2. (U) Although Hees stressed that a final decision has not 
been made, he confirmed reports that Brazil may not submit a 
WTO services offer by March 31.  The hold-up would not be 
technical.  Echoing comments made by Brazilian negotiators in 
Geneva, Hees explained that the GOB is considering the 
tactical pros and cons of withholding its services offer to 
protest what it views as a lack of progress in areas of vital 
interest for Brazil.  The most important of these areas is 
agriculture, and the GOB sees little prospect that modalities 
for the agriculture negotiations will be agreed to by the 
March 31 deadline.  Hees laid blame for the difficulties in 
the agriculture negotiations squarely on the European Union 
(EU).  Econoff noted USG concerns that momentum for the Doha 
Development Agenda (DDA) may unravel if a mounting number of 
benchmarks are missed, but Hees responded that without 
movement by the EU in agriculture, the DDA is dead anyway. 
In discussions with Ambassador on March 17, Foreign Minister 
Amorim suggested that if Brazil does submit a services offer 
by March 31, it will be modest. 
 
3. (U) While Brazil's principal focus is agriculture, Hees 
claimed that missed deadlines in other sensitive areas (TRIPS 
and Public Health, Special and Differential Treatment), and 
low expectations for results on rules (antidumping, etc.) all 
make it extremely difficult for the GOB to domestically 
defend moving forward in negotiating areas where its posture 
is more "defensive."  He restated the GOB position that all 
areas of the DDA must progress together, rejecting as 
improbable that a satisfactory agreement would result if 
evaluation of the negotiations as a single-undertaking only 
transpires at the end of the process. 
 
FTAA - Services Lever 
 
4. (SBU) The GOB has already decided to use its services 
offer within the FTAA as a tactical lever.  According to 
Hees, the GOB had prepared its offer for the February 15 
deadline, but it was withheld at the last minute by order of 
Foreign Minister Amorim, with the acquiescence of President 
Lula.  While claiming that he is not privy to Minister 
Amorim's reasoning, Hees said he understood from 
conversations within the Ministry that the decision was a 
reaction to disappointment with other aspects of the FTAA 
negotiations. In particular, he noted the GOB's very negative 
reaction to Canada's market access offers for goods, because 
it excluded 97 agricultural products, including many key 
Brazilian exports. 
GOB Demands Respect 
 
5. (U) Leaving aside Brazil's decision to delay submission of 
its offer, Hees used the opportunity to express frustration 
with the U.S. approach in FTAA services negotiations.  His 
core accusation was that discussions between the U.S. and 
Mercosul delegations are less than frank, within plenary as 
well as within bilateral meetings.  He was particularly vexed 
by what he portrayed as a lack of forthrightness in the way 
the initial U.S. services offer was characterized in Panama. 
According to Hees, the U.S. delegation described the U.S. 
offer in plenary as covering "all levels of the USG," but 
that after reading the text, the Mercosul delegation 
concluded that it does not.  To illustrate, Hees cited an 
exception given in Annex 1 (p.17) that allowed all 
sub-federal levels of government to enact legislation that 
did not accord national treatment.   By his read, this means 
that any state within the United States would be able to 
enact legislation that discriminates against Brazilian 
service providers, without violating USG commitments.  Hees 
said the GOB recognizes that the U.S. government structure 
poses challenges for devising services commitments; he 
suggested that the GOB would display more understanding 
regarding this difficulty, if the exchanges between the U.S. 
and Mercosul delegations would be more candid.  He also 
claimed that information provided on U.S. willingness to 
negotiate Mode 4 concessions was misleading.  Hees stressed 
that more candid exchanges between the delegations could 
reduce friction and help move the negotiations forward 
through productive dialog. 
6. (U) Hees also termed the U.S. "mantra" that offers be 
constructed as "negative" lists as a source of friction. 
Hees claimed that the GOB has not yet rejected the 
possibility of using a negative list.  However, he asserted 
that the U.S. delegation's insistence that the negative list 
approach be adopted, without the benefit of a substantive 
discussion of the pros and cons of other approaches, forces 
Brazil to react defensively, taking a similarly rigid stance 
in favor of a positive list.  More or less, Hees said that 
Brazil has to be convinced ) not told -- that a negative 
list approach is better.  He noted that Peru and Colombia had 
constructed their offers in yet different ways and thought 
these approaches might also have something to offer to the 
debate. 
 
7. (U) Hees argued that the premise that a negative list 
provides for more comprehensive commitments is basically 
flawed, noting that some negative list offers submitted by 
FTAA countries were far from comprehensive ) the devil being 
in the details of the annexes ) including for future 
services.  Countries intent on liberalizing can do so under 
either approach, just as countries can also opt for keeping 
their markets closed, he opined.  Furthermore, he claimed 
that a negative list, at least according to the U.S. offer, 
provides less, not more, specificity regarding restrictions. 
He noted an annex entry covering "all sectors," which 
identified applicable U.S. laws, but without indicating how 
the laws would affect provision of the services in the 
sector; there was no mention of the specific subsectors or 
modes affected.  Expanding on this, Hees argued that there is 
also real value to sticking to a system (GATS) that 
government officials throughout the hemisphere now know how 
to read and use, pointing out that they will have to be able 
to explain to their exporters in detail what services 
openings and restrictions they will face. 
 
8. (U) In a final note, Hees asked that due respect be given 
to Brazil considering the extent to which services have 
already been liberalized in the country.  Hees complained 
that the U.S. appears to approach Brazil much in the same way 
as it approaches countries with closed services sectors, he 
presumes because constitutional difficulties prevented 
ratification of Brazil's GATS commitments.  He suggested that 
acknowledgment of Brazil's current openness would create a 
more positive environment for Brazil to consider requests for 
improving access. 
HRINAK