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Viewing cable 03USUNNEWYORK299, UNSC/IRAQ: SECRETARY POWELL MAKES THE CASE; THE
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| Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 03USUNNEWYORK299 | 2003-02-06 01:36 | 2011-08-24 16:30 | UNCLASSIFIED | USUN New York |
O 060136Z FEB 03
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3593
INFO IRAQ COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ABUJA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BANGKOK IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY KIEV IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON IMMEDIATE
JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5/DDPMAW// IMMEDIATE
JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5/UNMA// IMMEDIATE
JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J-3// IMMEDIATE
HQ USCENTAF SHAW AFB SC//A3-DO// IMMEDIATE
NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
OSD WASHDC IMMEDIATE
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL//CCJ3// IMMEDIATE
USEU BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE
USINT HAVANA IMMEDIATE
WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 09 USUN NEW YORK 000299
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PARM PTER UNSC IZ
SUBJECT: UNSC/IRAQ: SECRETARY POWELL MAKES THE CASE; THE
COUNCIL DELIVERS PRELIMINARY RESPONSES
¶1. (U) SECRETARY POWELL MADE AN HOUR AND FIFTEEN
MINUTE-PRESENTATION FEBRUARY 5 TO THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL
(SC) IN WHICH HE OUTLINED, IN DETAIL: IRAQI EFFORTS TO DEFEAT
UNMOVIC AND IAEA INSPECTIONS; IRAQ'S FAILURE TO ACCOUNT FOR
WMD AND OTHER MATERIALS IT WAS KNOWN TO HAVE POSSESSED; AND
IRAQ'S RELATIONSHIP TO THE AL-QAEDA TERRORIST NETWORK, WITH
PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE ACTIVITIES OF AL-QAEDA OPERATIVE
ABU MUSAB AL-ZARQAWI. USING A COMBINATION OF TRANSLATED
INTERCEPTS, SATELLITE IMAGERY, AND REPORTS FROM HUMAN
SOURCES, THE SECRETARY, FLANKED BY AMBASSADOR NEGROPONTE AND
CIA DIRECTOR TENET, LAID OUT THE U.S. POSITION THAT UN
INSPECTIONS WERE NOT WORKING, AND COULD NOT SUCCEED, IN THE
ABSENCE OF ACTIVE IRAQI COOPERATION. IN THE POST-SEPTEMBER
11 ENVIRONMENT, HE WARNED, THE USG COULD NOT EXPOSE ITS
CITIZENS TO THE KIND OF DANGERS POSED BY A NEXUS BETWEEN
IRAQI WMD AND TERRORIST GROUPS. THE SECURITY COUNCIL, HE
WARNED, HAD TO FACE UP TO THE CHALLENGES POSED BY IRAQI
NON-COMPLIANCE OR FACE "IRRELEVANCE." REACTIONS FROM COUNCIL
MEMBERS WERE MUTED, IN PART BECAUSE THEY HAD HAD NO ADVANCE
KNOWLEDGE OF THE CONTENTS OF THE SECRETARY'S BRIEFING. SOME
EXISTING FAULT LINES IN THE COUNCIL REMAINED CLEAR, WITH
CHINA, GERMANY, SYRIA, AND PAKISTAN ARGUING THAT MORE TIME
SHOULD BE ALLOTTED TO THE INSPECTIONS PROCESS. SPAIN AND
CHILE EXPRESSED EXASPERATION WITH IRAQI NON-COMPLIANCE BUT
DID NOT GO AS FAR AS BULGARIA, WHICH DECLARED IRAQ IN
MATERIAL BREACH OF UNSCR 1441. ANGOLA, CAMEROON, AND GUINEA
FIRMLY FENCE-STRADDLED WHILE FRANCE APPEARED TO EMBRACE ALL
OPTIONS SIMULTANEOUSLY. FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER DE VILLEPIN
MADE SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STRENGTHENING THE
INSPECTIONS REGIME WHILE DEMANDING AT THE SAME TIME
"IMMEDIATE AND COMPLETE" IRAQI COMPLIANCE WITH UN
INSPECTIONS. IRAQI PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE AL-DOURI ROUNDLY
REJECTED THE ENTIRE U.S. PRESENTATION AND ALLEGED THAT ISRAEL
REPRESENTS THE "REAL WMD THREAT" IN THE MIDDLE EAST. END
SUMMARY.
SECRETARY POWELL MAKES THE CASE
-------------------------------
¶2. (U) THE SECRETARY BEGAN HIS DETAILED, ONE HOUR AND FIFTEEN
MINUTE PRESENTATION BY FOCUSING ON IRAQ'S EFFECTS TO DECEIVE
UN INSPECTORS. HE PLAYED SEVERAL RADIO INTERCEPTS, DETAILING
EFFORTS BY IRAQI MILITARY OFFICERS TO HIDE ITEMS FROM
INSPECTORS. HE OUTLINED THE SCALE OF GOI GOVERNMENTAL
EFFORTS TO MISLEAD INSPECTORS AND SHOWED SATELLITE PHOTOS
DETAILING IRAQI MILITARY ACTIVITY IN ADVANCE OF THE ARRIVAL
OF INSPECTORS. HE ALSO DESCRIBED THE THREATS MADE BY THE GOI
TO IRAQI SCIENTISTS TO PRECLUDE THEIR COOPERATION.
¶3. (U) THE SECRETARY THEN GAVE A SENSE OF IRAQI WMD
STOCKPILES AND EXPLAINED WHY THEY WERE OF CONCERN:
-- BIOLOGICAL: IRAQ HAS NOT ACCOUNTED FOR LARGE AMOUNTS OF
BIOLOGICAL AGENTS. THE SECRETARY HELD UP A TEASPOON OF
ANTHRAX SIMULANT, DESCRIBED HOW AN EQUIVALENT QUANTITY MAILED
IN AN ENVELOPE HAD SHUT DOWN THE UNITED STATES SENATE IN
2001, AND NOTED THAT THE UNDECLARED IRAQI AMOUNTS EQUATED TO
TENS UPON TENS OF THOUSANDS OF TEASPOONFULS. THE SECRETARY
ALSO EXPLAINED IRAQI PROGRAMS TO MAKE THEIR BIOLOGICAL
PROGRAMS MOBILE, AND SHOWED CONCEPTUAL IMAGES OF IRAQI LABS
LOCATED ON ORDINARY TRUCKS AND TRAINS.
-- CHEMICAL: THE SECRETARY PROVIDED A SENSE OF HOW MANY
IRAQI CHEMICAL WEAPONS WERE MISSING, CITING THE NUMBER USED
IN THE PRESIDENT'S STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESS AND RECENT USG
STATEMENTS. HE EXPLAINED THAT IRAQ HAD SPECIFICALLY DESIGNED
ITS DUAL-USE FACTORIES TO WITHSTAND INSPECTION, WHICH MEANT
THAT IRAQI CW PRODUCTION DID NOT HAVE TO BE MOBILE. THE
SECRETARY DISPLAYED SATELLITE IMAGERY OF AN IRAQI CW
TRANSSHIPMENT AREA THAT HAD BEEN BULLDOZED AND DENUDED OF
TOPSOIL TO ENSURE THAT INSPECTORS DID NOT DETECT ANY CW
TRACES IN THE SOIL. HE PLAYED ANOTHER INTERCEPT OF IRAQI
MILITARY OFFICERS DISCUSSING NERVE AGENT.
-- NUCLEAR: THE SECRETARY DESCRIBED IRAQI MOVES TO KEEP
THEIR NUCLEAR PROGRAM ALIVE, SAYING THEY LACKED ONLY FISSILE
MATERIAL, HAVING MAINTAINED CADRES OF NUCLEAR SCIENTISTS AND
NUCLEAR BOMB DESIGNS. HE DESCRIBED IRAQI NUCLEAR-RELATED
PROCUREMENT ACTIVITIES, SUCH AS ACQUISITION OF NUCLEAR TUBES,
BALANCING MACHINES, AND SPECIALIZED MAGNETS. HE REMINDED THE
WORLD THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAD UNDERESTIMATED THE
IRAQI NUCLEAR PROGRAM BEFORE AND CHALLENGED IT NOT TO DO SO
AGAIN.
-- DELIVERY SYSTEMS: THE SECRETARY EXPLAINED GOI WORK ON
BALLISTIC MISSILES AND UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES (UAVS). HE
DESCRIBED IRAQI HOLDINGS OF AL-SAMOUD AND AL-FATAH MISSILES,
EXPLAINING THAT BOTH HAVE RANGES EXCEEDING UN LIMITS AND THAT
THEY ARE THEREFORE PROHIBITED. HE NOTED IRAQI EFFORTS TO
ILLEGALLY IMPORT MISSILE COMPONENTS SUCH AS SA-2 ROCKET
ENGINES, AND TOLD THE COUNCIL THAT SOME HAD BEEN ACQUIRED
AFTER THE PASSAGE OF UNSCR 1441. HE DESCRIBED THE IRAQI UAV
PROGRAMS, QUOTING EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS OF UAV DEVELOPMENT,
DEPLOYMENT, AND ABILITY TO DISTRIBUTE BIOLOGICAL AND
CHEMICAL AGENTS. HE DESCRIBED A RECENT IRAQI UAV FLIGHT THAT
STRETCHED FOR 500 KILOMETERS, VIOLATING UN RANGE LIMITS, AND
REMINDED THE COUNCIL THAT IRAQ HAD NOT PROVIDED UAV
INFORMATION IN ITS DECEMBER 7 DECLARATION.
¶4. (U) TURNING TO TERRORISM, THE SECRETARY DESCRIBED IRAQ'S
LONG-STANDING TIES TO PALESTINIAN TERROR GROUPS. HE NOTED
TERRORIST ACTS COMMITTED IN EUROPE BY THE IRAQI INTELLIGENCE
SERVICE. THE SECRETARY DESCRIBED IN DETAIL IRAQ'S LINKS WITH
AL-QAEDA OPERATIVE ABU MUSAB AL-ZARQAWI, OUTLINING HIS
ACTIVITIES IN BAGHDAD, THE LACK OF IRAQI RESPONSE TO REQUESTS
FOR HIS DETENTION AND EXTRADITION, AND HIS INVOLVEMENT IN THE
ASSASSINATION OF U.S. DIPLOMAT LAURENCE FOLEY IN JORDAN IN
¶2002. HE EXPLAINED CONNECTIONS BETWEEN AL-QAEDA AND
AL-ZARQAWI WITH TERRORIST ACTIONS IN THE UK, SPAIN, ITALY,
GERMANY, AND RUSSIA. HE DESCRIBED IN DETAIL AL-QAEDA'S
EFFORTS IN GAINING WMD ASSISTANCE FROM IRAQ, PARTICULARLY IN
OBTAINING TRAINING IN THE PRODUCTION AND USE OF CHEMICAL AND
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS.
¶5. (U) THE SECRETARY CONCLUDED BY DESCRIBING IRAQ'S
DEPLORABLE HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD, INCLUDING ATROCITIES
COMMITTED AGAINST THE KURDS, SHIA, AND MARSH ARABS. HE
REMINDED THE COUNCIL THAT SADDAM HAS ATTEMPTED TO INTIMIDATE
THE MIDDLE EAST FOR MORE THAN 20 YEARS AND OF HIS DETERMINED
EFFORTS TO ACQUIRE MORE WMD. HE ASKED THE COUNCIL WHETHER
THE WORLD SHOULD TAKE THE RISK THAT IRAQ WOULD USE WMD IN A
TIME AND PLACE OF ITS CHOOSING, AT A FUTURE POINT WHEN THE
WORLD WAS IN A MUCH WEAKER POSITION TO RESPOND TO IRAQI
ACTIONS. HE DECLARED THAT THE U.S. WILL NOT AND CAN NOT RUN
SUCH A RISK, SAID IRAQ HAD PLACED ITSELF IN DEEPER MATERIAL
BREACH UNDER UNSCR 1441, AND CHALLENGED THE WORLD NOT TO
SHRINK FROM WHATEVER IS AHEAD OF IT.
STATEMENTS BY THE PERMANENT FIVE MEMBERS:
FRANCE: WE DO NOT RULE OUT ANY OPTION
--------------------------------------
¶6. (U) FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER DE VILLEPIN SAID THE
SECRETARY'S PRESENTATION CONTAINED ELEMENTS OF INTEREST THAT
THE INSPECTORS SHOULD ASSESS. IN RESPONSE TO THE SECRETARY'S
INDICTMENT OF IRAQI NON-COOPERATION WITH UN INSPECTIONS,
VILLEPIN STRESSED THAT, BY ADOPTING UNSCR 1441, THE COUNCIL
HAD REAFFIRMED RELIANCE ON AN INSPECTIONS PROCESS, AND
ASSERTED THAT THE SECRETARY'S PRESENTATION PROVIDED FURTHER
JUSTIFICATION "TO THE COURSE OF THE UN" AND INTERNATIONAL
INSPECTIONS. HE ARGUED THAT, THROUGH THE INSPECTIONS REGIME,
RESULTS HAD BEEN ACHIEVED: UNMOVIC AND THE IAEA WERE BOTH IN
IRAQ AT WORK, THERE HAS BEEN A MULTIPLICATION OF SITES
INSPECTED, AND THERE WERE MORE THAN 100 INSPECTORS ON THE
GROUND. "GOOD PROGRESS" HAD BEEN ACHIEVED IN DEEPENING THE
IAEA'S KNOWLEDGE OF IRAQI NUCLEAR CAPACITY, ACCORDING TO
EL-BARADEI, AND ACCORDING TO BLIX, THERE HAD BEEN NO TRACE OF
CBW MATERIALS IN THE TRACE SAMPLES TAKEN TO DATE. BUT,
VILLEPIN SAID, "IRAQI COOPERATION CONTAINED GREY AREAS." THE
JANUARY 27 BLIX REPORT CONTAINED EVIDENCE OF REAL PROBLEMS IN
THIS AREA. TO HELP ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF COOPERATION, FRANCE
WILL CONTINUE TO PASS INFORMATION TO FACILITATE THE
INSPECTIONS, HE ADDED. THE ABSENCE OF LONG-RANGE DELIVERY
SYSTEMS HAS, TO DATE, LARGELY CONTAINED THE THREAT OF CBW,
BUT THERE WERE "DISTURBING INDICATIONS ABOUT ATTEMPTS TO
ACQUIRE SUCH SYSTEMS." HE ALSO STRESSED A NEED TO "KEEP AN
EYE ON" THE ALUMINUM TUBES ISSUE AND WHAT THEY MIGHT SIGNIFY.
¶7. (U) THE COUNCIL AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY MUST
DELIVER A DIFFICULT MESSAGE TO IRAQ, VILLEPIN STATED. THE USE
OF FORCE WAS THE FINAL RECOURSE, AND WHY GO TO WAR, HE ASKED,
IF THERE IS "UNUSED SPACE" IN UNSCR 1441? VILLEPIN ARGUED
THAT THE COUNCIL MUST DETERMINE TO WHAT EXTENT THE "NATURE
AND SCOPE" OF IRAQI VIOLATIONS JUSTIFIED THE USE OF FORCE,
DECLARING "WE WILL NOT RULE OUT ANY OPTION, AS WE HAVE SAID
ALL ALONG." VILLEPIN MADE THE FOLLOWING KEY POINTS:
--THE UN MUST BE AT THE CENTER OF THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE
TO IRAQ, AS A MEANS TO GUARANTEE THE UNITY OF IRAQ, ASSURE
REGIONAL STABILITY, PRESERVE INTERNATIONAL UNITY, AND PROTECT
CIVILIAN POPULATIONS;
--THERE SHOULD BE "DECISIVE REINFORCEMENT OF THE MEANS OF
INSPECTIONS." THIS WOULD INCLUDE INCREASING BY TWO TO THREE
TIMES THE NUMBER OF INSPECTORS, ESTABLISHING SURVEILLANCE OF
SITES INSPECTED BY INTERNATIONAL FORCES, DEPLOYING AERIAL
SURVEILLANCE AIRCRAFT, AND CREATING A COORDINATING AND
PROCESSING CENTER FOR RELEVANT INTELLIGENCE;
--WE SHOULD LIST AND "RANK" UNRESOLVED DISARMAMENT QUESTIONS;
--THERE MUST BE REGULAR PROGRESS IN DISARMAMENT. IT WOULD BE
USEFUL TO ESTABLISH A POSITION FOR A NEW DISARMAMENT
COORDINATOR IN BAGHDAD TO COORDINATE WITH BLIX AND
EL-BARADEI;
--IRAQ MUST "IMMEDIATELY AND COMPLETELY" COMPLY BY AGREEING
TO U-2 FLIGHTS, ADOPTING A LEGAL PROHIBITION ON WMD, AND
HANDING OVER ALL PROBABLE INFORMATION ON CBW PROGRAMS; AND
--BAGHDAD MUST ALSO NOW PROVIDE ANSWERS TO THE QUESTIONS
RAISED BY SECRETARY POWELL'S BRIEFING. BY THE NEXT REPORT OF
THE INSPECTORS ON FEBRUARY 14, IRAQ MUST HAVE DEMONSTRATED
THAT IT IS PROVIDING CONCRETE SUPPORT AND COOPERATION.
FRANCE HAS A "MORAL AND POLITICAL DUTY TO DIRECT MORAL AND
POLITICAL ENERGY" TO ENSURE THE DISARMAMENT OF IRAQ.
RUSSIA: NO CONCRETE TIME LIMITS TO 1441,
BUT IT'S TIME FOR BAGHDAD TO GET THE MESSAGE
--------------------------------------------
¶8. (U) FM IVANOV NOTED RUSSIA'S DESIRE FOR A POLITICAL
SETTLEMENT TO THE IRAQ CRISIS AND CALLED ON IRAQ TO FULLY AND
UNCONDITIONALLY COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF UNSCR 1441.
HE STATED THAT GIVEN THE UNANIMOUS DESIRE OF THE COUNCIL TO
DEAL WITH WMD CONCERNS WORLD-WIDE, IT WAS IN THE INTEREST OF
ALL MEMBERS TO WORK TOGETHER THROUGH THE COUNCIL AND THE UN
TO SOLVE THIS PROBLEM. THE INFORMATION PROVIDED BY SECRETARY
POWELL WAS SERIOUS AND REQUIRED THOROUGH STUDY BY MOSCOW. HE
ASKED THAT THIS INFORMATION ALSO BE HANDED OVER TO THE
INSPECTORS, IN ORDER TO ALLOW IRAQ AN OPPORTUNITY TO RESPOND
TO THE QUESTIONS RAISED. IVANOV URGED THE COUNCIL TO DO
EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO SUPPORT THE WORK OF THE
INSPECTORS--RUSSIA, HE NOTED, FOR ITS PART WAS READY TO
PROVIDE AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE PLANES AND ADDITIONAL
INSPECTORS AS NEEDED.
¶9. (U) IVANOV STATED THAT IT WAS TIME FOR BAGHDAD TO
UNDERSTAND THE CRITICAL NATURE OF THE SITUATION. HE POINTED
OUT "IRAQ SHOULD BE THE FIRST CONCERNED" WITH PROVIDING FINAL
CLARITY TO ACHIEVE A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT AND THAT THE END OF
SANCTIONS RESTED IN IRAQ'S WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE. HE ALSO
STATED THAT, ALTHOUGH HE HAS OFTEN HEARD THAT "TIME IS
RUNNING OUT" FOR IRAQ, THERE ARE NO CONCRETE TIME LIMITS
ATTACHED TO UNSCR 1441, AND THE COUNCIL SHOULD NOT RULE OUT
THE POSSIBILITY OF ONE--OR MORE--RESOLUTIONS. IN CLOSING,
IVANOV OPINED THAT THE MORE SERIOUS CHALLENGE FACING THE
WORLD--INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM--WAS BEING DEALT WITH
EFFECTIVELY AS A RESULT OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND
UNITY. HE URGED THE MEMBERS TO DEAL WITH THIS ISSUE IN THE
SAME MANNER.
UK: IRAQ HAS FAILED THE TEST,
COUNCIL ON THE EDGE OF A SLIPPERY SLOPE
----------------------------------------
¶10. (U) UK FM STRAW WELCOMED THE POWERFUL AND AUTHORITATIVE
EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE U.S. AND STATED THAT THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY OWED THANKS TO SECRETARY POWELL FOR
ILLUSTRATING THE GRAVE DANGERS POSED BY IRAQ. STRAW NOTED
THAT THE COUNCIL HAD GIVEN IRAQ ONE LAST CHANCE TO COMPLY
FULLY WITH ITS DISARMAMENT OBLIGATIONS IN UNSCR 1441--A
RESOLUTION TO WHICH SADDAM HUSSEIN HAD RESPONDED WITH THE
SAME CONTEMPT AS THE MANY RESOLUTIONS BEFORE IT. STRAW STATED
THAT IRAQ HAD VIOLATED BOTH "TESTS" SET FORTH IN OP 4 OF
1441--NAMELY THE OMISSION OF INFORMATION IN ITS DECLARATION,
AND ITS UNWILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE AND DISARM WILLINGLY,
INCLUDING ITS REFUSAL TO PERMIT U-2 FLIGHTS. STRAW DECLARED
THAT IRAQ'S ACTION TO DATE COULD ONLY BE INTERPRETED AS
FURTHER MATERIAL BREACH AND, WHILE THE UK DOES NOT WANT WAR,
HMG DOES WANT THE CREDIBILITY OF THE UN SYSTEM TO BE UPHELD.
STRAW NOTED THAT, WHILE SADDAM HUSSEIN AND THE GOI HAD
SERIOUS CHOICES TO MAKE, THE COUNCIL HAD A SERIOUS CHOICE AS
WELL. CITING THE LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE FAILURES OF THE
LEAGUE OF NATIONS, HE OBSERVED THAT THE COUNCIL WAS AT RISK
OF SLIPPING DOWN THE SAME SLOPE IF IT CHOSE INACTION. WE OWE
IT TO HISTORY, HE SAID, NOT TO MAKE THE SAME MISTAKES AGAIN.
CHINA: AVOID WAR IF POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IS AT ALL POSSIBLE
--------------------------------------------- --------------
¶11. (U) CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTER TANG UNDERSCORED THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY'S DESIRE TO MAINTAIN COUNCIL UNITY
AND COOPERATION ON THE ISSUE OF IRAQ. TANG NOTED THAT THE
U.S. INITIATIVE TO PROVIDE THE COUNCIL AND THE INSPECTORS
WITH ADDITIONAL INFORMATION WAS IN KEEPING WITH THE SPIRIT OF
UNSCR 1441, AND HE URGED ALL OTHER STATES TO FOLLOW THE U.S.
EXAMPLE. HE FURTHER NOTED THAT THE COUNCIL'S UNITED GOAL TO
DISARM IRAQ WAS EXEMPLIFIED BY THE UNANIMOUS ADOPTION OF
UNSCR 1441, AND HE CALLED ON IRAQ TO ADHERE TO ITS
RESPONSIBILITIES TO FULLY AND UNCONDITIONALLY IMPLEMENT THE
MEASURES CALLED FOR IN THAT RESOLUTION. TANG ALSO STATED
THAT THE UNIVERSAL DESIRE FOR A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT SHOULD
BE ADDRESSED THROUGH THE UN FRAMEWORK AND HE URGED THE
COUNCIL TO AVOID WAR IF A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT WAS EVEN
REMOTELY POSSIBLE IN THE FUTURE.
THE ELECTED TEN MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL:
GERMANY: VITAL TO EXPAND AND ENHANCE INSPECTIONS REGIME
--------------------------------------------- -----------
¶12. (U) GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTER FISCHER AFFIRMED THAT THE
UNSC SHOULD BE PLAY A CENTRAL ROLE IN DECISION MAKING ON
IRAQ. THE SECRETARY'S PRESENTATION WARRANTED CAREFUL
EXAMINATION AND A QUICK AND CLEAR RESPONSE BY IRAQ. FOR
INSPECTIONS TO BE BETTER TARGETED, DETAILED INFORMATION WAS
NECESSARY. FISCHER ACKNOWLEDGED THAT IRAQ HAS REPEATEDLY
FLOUTED UNSCRS OVER THE TWELVE-YEAR SPAN IN WHICH IT HAS
FIGURED ON THE COUNCIL AGENDA; HE SAID IRAQ WAS A BRUTAL
REGIME THAT HAD ATTACKED IRAN, KUWAIT, ISRAEL, AS WELL AS THE
KURDS, AND IT WAS THAT AGGRESSION THAT JUSTIFIED THE
IMPOSITION OF NO-FLY ZONES. WHILE THE PRESENCE OF INSPECTORS
IN IRAQ HELPED CONTAIN THE DANGER, LASTING DISARMAMENT
REMAINED THE TRUE OBJECTIVE. THE INSPECTIONS REQUIRED
GREATER REINFORCEMENT AND, ABOVE ALL, MORE TIME. THE
UPCOMING TRIP OF BLIX AND EL-BARADEI TO BAGHDAD WAS A CRUCIAL
CHANCE FOR IRAQ TO DISPEL SUSPICIONS ABOUT THEIR PROGRAMS AND
CAPACITIES. WARNING AGAINST THE "CLEAR DANGERS" OF MILITARY
ACTION, FISCHER CALLED FOR A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE
CRISIS WITHIN THE UN FRAMEWORK. IT WAS VITAL TO EXPAND AND
ENHANCE THE INSPECTIONS REGIME OF UNSCR 1441 WHICH, FISCHER
SUGGESTED, COULD PROVE A PARADIGM FOR APPROACHING CRISES
ELSEWHERE. HE EMPHASIZED THAT IRAQ MUST COMPLY WITHOUT DELAY
WITH UNSCR 1441.
MEXICO: POWELL'S PRESENTATION VALUABLE
TO PROCESS OF DISARMING IRAQ
--------------------------------------
¶13. (U) MEXICAN MINISTER OF STATE (FOREIGN MINISTER) DERBEZ
SAID THAT THE SECRETARY'S PRESENTATION HAD CONTAINED VALUABLE
MATERIAL TO DETERMINE AND SHAPE THE PROCESS OF DISARMING
IRAQ, AND HE REINFORCED THE NEED TO DEVELOP VERIFIABLE IRAQI
COOPERATION. HE UNDERSCORED THAT MEXICO'S OBJECTIVE WAS THE
UNEQUIVOCAL DISARMAMENT OF IRAQ BY PEACEFUL MEANS, WITHOUT
UNDERMINING THE BATTLE ON TERRORISM. MEXICO HAD DIRECTLY
APPROACHED IRAQ TO "ENCOURAGE" COOPERATION WITHOUT DELAY, AND
HE REITERATED THE CALL "TO THE IRAQI REPRESENTATIVE AT THIS
TABLE" TO ACTIVELY AND GENUINELY COOPERATE ACCORDING TO THE
PROVISIONS OF UNSCR 1441. HE LATER "REITERATED THE DEMAND TO
THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT THAT THEY WORK URGENTLY TO MAKE ALL
FACILITIES" ACCESSIBLE TO THE INSPECTORS. CONCLUDING, HE
STRESSED MEXICO'S DESIRE FOR A MULTILATERAL APPROACH TO
RESOLVING THE IRAQ CRISIS.
SYRIA: COUNCIL SHOULD PERMIT MORE TIME FOR INSPECTIONS
--------------------------------------------- ----------
¶14. (U) SYRIAN PERMREP WEHBE, READING A STATEMENT ON BEHALF
OF FOREIGN MINISTER AL-SHARA', SIDESTEPPED DIRECT COMMENT ON
SECRETARY'S PRESENTATION BY RECOMMENDING THAT THE INFORMATION
IT CONTAINED SHOULD BE REVIEWED BY UNMOVIC AND IAEA. HE
APPEALED TO OTHER MEMBER STATES ALSO TO SUBMIT RELEVANT
INFORMATION. HE NOTED SYRIA HAD JOINED CONSENSUS ON UNSCR
1441 AFTER RECEIVING GUARANTEES FROM UNNAMED PERMANENT
MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL THAT THE RESOLUTION WOULD NOT BE USED
AS A PRETEXT FOR WAR. WEHBE SAID THAT SYRIA INTERPRETED
ONGOING DISCUSSIONS OF A SECOND RESOLUTION AS CONFIRMATION OF
THOSE ASSURANCES. URGING THE SC TO FIND A PEACEFUL
RESOLUTION OF THE CRISIS, WEHBE DECRIED CONSIDERATION OF WAR
AS AN INDICATION OF THE FAILURE OF UNSCR 1441 AND, MORE
GENERALLY, OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ITSELF. AVERTING CONFLICT
WAS IMPERATIVE IN ORDER TO SPARE THE LIVES OF IRAQI
CIVILIANS, AS WELL AS THE "LIVES OF THE SOLDIERS WHO HAD
TRAVELED TO THE REGION." IRAQ -- "UNLIKE ISRAEL" -- NEITHER
OCCUPIED TERRITORY ILLEGALLY NOR POSED A DANGER TO
NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES; INSPECTIONS WOULD ALWAYS INVOLVE
HITCHES, YET THESE HITCHES DID NOT JUSTIFY WAR. THE COUNCIL
SHOULD PERMIT MORE TIME FOR INSPECTIONS AND ALL MEMBER STATES
SHOULD ACTIVELY COOPERATE WITH UNSCR 1441 BY PROVIDING
INFORMATION TO INSPECTORS. IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS PREVIOUS
RESOLUTIONS, THE COUNCIL SHOULD LIFT SANCTIONS ON IRAQ AND
IMPLEMENT THE CALL FOR A WMD-FREE ZONE IN THE MIDDLE EAST.
WEHBE LAUDED REGIONAL EFFORTS TOWARDS A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION,
AND STRESSED THAT ANY MILITARY OPTION SHOULD ONLY BE
EXERCISED WITHIN AN INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK.
PAKISTAN: INSPECTORS' REPORTS
SHOULD CONSTITUTE BASIS FOR SC DECISION
----------------------------------------
¶15. (U) PAKISTANI FOREIGN MINISTER KASURI DESCRIBED THE DAY
AS A CRITICAL AND HISTORIC MOMENT IN INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND
SECURITY, AND HE WELCOMED THE U.S. "DETERMINATION IN WORKING
THROUGH THE UN VIA UNSCR 1441." SECRETARY POWELL HAD
PROVIDED CONSIDERABLE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION IN RESPONSE TO
THE PROVISIONS OF 1441, WHICH SHOULD ENHANCE THE INSPECTORS'
EFFECTIVENESS. SUCH ENHANCEMENT WOULD BE A SIGNIFICANT STEP
FORWARD IN ELIMINATING IRAQ'S WMD PROGRAMS. HE HOPED THE
"CONCERNS" RAISED WOULD RECEIVE "CREDIBLE ANSWERS." THE
PROVISIONS OF UNSCRS 687, 1284, AND 1441 WERE ALL CLEAR, HE
STRESSED. THE COUNCIL BROADLY SHARED THE VIEW THAT MORE
ACTIVE COOPERATION WAS REQUIRED, AND IN THAT CONTEXT, BLIX
AND EL-BARADEI HAD SET OUT THREE CONDITIONS: USE OF UNMANNED
AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE VEHICLES (UAVS); PRIVATE INTERVIEWS;
AND IRAQI LEGISLATION. IRAQ SHOULD MOVE SWIFTLY TO MEET
THESE REQUIREMENTS AND TO RESPOND TO ANY SUBSEQUENT
REQUIREMENTS. KASURI ASSERTED THAT THE JANUARY 27 BRIEFINGS
TO THE COUNCIL WERE NOT MEANT TO BE CONCLUSIVE. THE
INSPECTORS' REPORTS SHOULD CONSTITUTE THE CENTRAL BASIS ON
WHICH A UNSC DECISION WOULD BE PREDICATED, CONSISTENT WITH
THE OBJECTIVES OF EARLY COMPLIANCE BY IRAQ, AMELIORATION OF
THE SUFFERING OF THE IRAQI PEOPLE, THE PRESERVATION OF IRAQ'S
SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, AND THE PRESERVATION
OF PEACE IN THE REGION, "INCLUDING THE DISPUTE OVER JAMMU AND
KASHMIR."
SPAIN: IRAQ VIOLATED 1441,
OPTION FOR PEACE RESTS WITH SADDAM
----------------------------------
¶16. (U) SPANISH FOREIGN MINISTER PALACIOS RECOGNIZED THAT,
ONCE AGAIN, THE U.S. HAD COME TO THE FRAMEWORK OF THE UNITED
NATIONS BY BRINGING IMPORTANT INFORMATION TO THE SECURITY
COUNCIL. SECRETARY POWELL HAD SET COMPELLING DATA BEFORE THE
COUNCIL: THE EXISTENCE OF WMD PROGRAMS AND CONFIRMATION OF
IRAQI DECEPTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. PALACIOS
SAID THAT IRAQ HAD VIOLATED ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER UNSCR 1441.
THE COUNCIL COULD NOT ALLOW A COUNTRY TO ACQUIRE WEAPONS OF
MASS DESTRUCTION, AS SUCH ACQUISITION WOULD ENDANGER
INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY. IT JEOPARDIZED THE VERY
EXISTENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. ONLY ONE
EXPLANATION OF THE IRAQI RESPONSE TO UNSCR 1441 WAS POSSIBLE:
SADDAM HUSSEIN HAS NOT RENOUNCED HIS PLANS TO USE SUCH
WEAPONS AS HE HAS USED THEM IN THE PAST. SPAIN WAS GREATLY
CONCERNED THAT THESE WEAPONS MIGHT ALSO FALL INTO THE HANDS
OF A TERRORIST.
¶17. (U) INSPECTIONS COULD ONLY BEAR FRUIT IF IRAQ COOPERATED
ACTIVELY, SHE STRESSED. IT WAS TIME FOR IRAQ TO VOLUNTARILY
DISARM, AND THE INSPECTORS WERE THERE TO WITNESS DISARMAMENT
ON BEHALF OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. BUT SADDAM HUSSEIN
LACKS THE WILL TO RESPECT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY'S
DEMAND FOR DISARMAMENT WITHOUT DELAY AND WITHOUT CONCEALMENT.
ALTHOUGH INSPECTIONS WERE A VALUABLE INSTRUMENT, IN TWELVE
YEARS, IRAQ HAS STILL NOT DISARMED. IT WAS TIME FOR A CLEAR
MESSAGE THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN'S PROGRAMS WERE A THREAT TO
INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY, AND THAT DISARMAMENT MUST
BE IMMEDIATE, COMPLETE, AND FINAL. DESPITE IRAQ'S CONTINUED
NON-COMPLIANCE, THERE WAS STILL A CHANCE FOR PEACE IF IRAQ
RADICALLY MODIFIED ITS BEHAVIOR. THE FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR
PEACE IN IRAQ RESTS WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN. THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY IS OFFERING ONE LAST CHANCE UNDER 1441 FOR PEACEFUL
DISARMAMENT, SHE WARNED.
CHILE: PARTIAL COMPLIANCE VIOLATES UNSCR 1441,
COUNCIL MUST USE ALL MEANS AVAILABLE
--------------------------------------------- -
¶18. (U) CHILEAN FOREIGN MINISTER VALENZUELA SAID THE
SECRETARY'S PRESENTATION POINTED TO A PATTERN OF DEFIANCE AND
RESISTANCE TO UNCONDITIONAL, IMMEDIATE, AND COMPLETE
DISARMAMENT, AS FIRST CALLED FOR UNDER UNSCR 687. UNSCR 1441
GAVE ONE LAST OPPORTUNITY FOR DISARMAMENT, YET A REGIME THAT
HAD DRAGGED THE IRAQI PEOPLE INTO TWO WARS AND A SANCTIONS
REGIME WAS TAKING MAJOR RISKS AGAIN. PARTIAL COMPLIANCE IN A
"PIECEMEAL" WAY AND THE NEGOTIATIONS OVER EVERY PIECE OF
INFORMATION PROVIDED, INSTEAD OF PRESENTING IT VOLUNTARILY,
WERE ALL IN VIOLATION OF 1441. SUCH A MENTALITY DERIVED FROM
A TOTALITARIAN REGIME, SHE EMPHASIZED, QUOTING BLIX'S
STATEMENT THAT IRAQ HAD NOT ARRIVED AT A GENUINE ACCEPTANCE
OF ITS OBLIGATION TO DISARM.
¶19. (U) VALENZUELA NOTED THAT CHILE STILL SUPPORTED
INSPECTIONS. INSPECTIONS ALONE COULD "IMPOSE THE LOGIC OF
PEACE" IF PRESSURE WAS KEPT UP ON IRAQ. IT WAS UP TO UNMOVIC
UNDER OP11 OF 1441 TO INFORM THE COUNCIL IMMEDIATELY OF ANY
INTERFERENCE OR NON-COMPLIANCE WITH RESPECT TO THE
INSPECTIONS, AND SECRETARY POWELL'S ACCUSATIONS REQUIRED A
FULL AND URGENT EXPLANATION BY IRAQ. CHILE SUPPORTED
"RETAINING MULTILATERAL CONTROL IN ACCORDANCE WITH
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS;"
THE PASSAGE OF 1441 WAS A DEMONSTRATION OF UNITY, AND THE
COUNCIL SHOULD CONTINUE TO BUILD UNITY IN THE CRUCIAL
SITUATION AHEAD. THE IRAQI PEOPLE HAD SUFFERED OVER THE LONG
TERM UNDER SANCTIONS. IF THERE WAS NO "RADICAL CHANGE" IN
IRAQ'S ATTITUDE, THE COUNCIL MUST USE "ALL MEANS AVAILABLE."
BULGARIA: IRAQ IN MATERIAL BREACH,
ALL MEANS SHOULD BE USED TO DISARM IRAQ
---------------------------------------
¶20. (U) BULGARIAN FOREIGN MINISTER PASSY SAID THAT "THE FACT
THE U.S. HAD COME WITH STRONG, COMPELLING EVIDENCE SHEDS
ADDITIONAL LIGHT ON IRAQI FAILURE IN IMPLEMENTATION OF UNSCR
1441." HE HOPED THE INFORMATION COULD BE USED TO ASSIST
UNMOVIC AND THE IAEA. THE SECRETARY'S PRESENTATION WOULD
HAVE THE SAME "MOBILIZING EFFECT" ON THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY AS UNSCR 1441, REAFFIRMING TO THE IRAQIS THAT THIS
WAS THEIR LAST CHANCE FOR DISARMAMENT BY PEACEFUL MEANS. THE
JANUARY 27 UNMOVIC AND IAEA REPORTS TO THE COUNCIL NOTED THAT
ACTIVE COOPERATION WAS A PREREQUISITE TO 1441, AND THE IRAQI
LEVEL OF COOPERATION WAS NOT SATISFACTORY. BULGARIA INSISTED
THAT IRAQ SUPPLY ALL INFORMATION ABOUT WEAPONS PROGRAMS AND
PROVIDE EVIDENCE IT HAD UNCONDITIONALLY AND FULLY CHANGED ITS
ATTITUDE TO INSPECTIONS. IRAQ WAS IN MATERIAL BREACH OF
PREVIOUS COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS, INCLUDING UNSCR 1441, AND
SECRETARY POWELL HAD PROVIDED NEW EVIDENCE OF THAT BREACH TO
THE COUNCIL IN HIS PRESENTATION. ALL MEANS SHOULD BE USED TO
DISARM IRAQ, AND PEACEFUL DISARMAMENT WAS STILL POSSIBLE. IF
THE INSPECTORS DO NOT REPORT IN THE NEAR FUTURE THAT IRAQ HAS
CHANGED ITS ATTITUDE, HOWEVER, THE SECURITY COUNCIL MUST TAKE
UP ITS RESPONSIBILITIES, HE CONCLUDED.
CAMEROON: WAR IS NOT INEVITABLE,
ANNAN SHOULD GO TO BAGHDAD
--------------------------------
¶21. (U) CAMEROONIAN MINISTER NGOUBEYOU STATED THAT THE
INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE SECRETARY WAS "TROUBLING," AND HE
URGED THE U.S. TO PROVIDE THE INSPECTORS THIS INFORMATION AS
SOON AS POSSIBLE. HE ALSO URGED THE COUNCIL TO GIVE THE
INSPECTORS ADEQUATE TIME TO STUDY AND USE THIS INFORMATION.
NGOUBEYOU NOTED THAT, WHILE THE COUNCIL IS NOT OBLIGED TO
DEAL WITH PUBLIC OPINION, IT WAS UNDENIABLE THAT THE ISSUE OF
IRAQ HAD BECOME A HIGH PROFILE ISSUE GLOBALLY. AT STAKE, HE
SAID, WAS THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY
AND THE RESPECT OF THE UN AS A WHOLE. FOR THIS REASON, HE
WAS CONVINCED, HE SAID, THAT THE U.S. AND THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY WOULD PROCEED IN THE SPIRIT OF THE UN CHARTER AND
WOULD SOLVE THIS ISSUE THROUGH THE COUNCIL. NGOUBEYOU ALSO
RECOMMENDED THAT, GIVEN THE GRAVITY OF THIS ISSUE, THE SYG BE
ASKED TO GO TO IRAQ TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE IRAQIS, IN ORDER TO
ALLOW A SPEEDY RESOLUTION TO THIS PROBLEM. DESPITE THE
SERIOUSNESS OF THE SITUATION, HE CLAIMED, WAR WAS NOT
INEVITABLE.
ANGOLA: COMPELLING INTELLIGENCE
--------------------------------
¶22. (U) ANGOLAN DFM CHIKOTY STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF
PRESIDENT BUSH'S INITIATIVE TO SEND SECRETARY POWELL TO THE
COUNCIL, "TO SHARE WITH US THE COMPELLING INTELLIGENCE JUST
SEEN." FOR TWENTY YEARS, IRAQ HAD BEEN AT THE CENTER OF THE
WORLD'S SECURITY CONCERNS. THE JANUARY 27 REPORT TO THE
COUNCIL, WITH THE SUPPLEMENTAL PRESENTATION BY THE U.S.,
ENABLED THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO TAKE IMPORTANT DECISIONS.
THE INFORMATION PRESENTED TODAY BROUGHT NEW ELEMENTS, WHICH
MUST BE ADDRESSED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE SECURITY
COUNCIL. THE IMPORTANCE OF INSPECTORS SHOULD NOT BE
MINIMIZED, AS ONLY THROUGH COOPERATION WITH THEM COULD IRAQ
PROVE ITSELF READY TO EMBARK ON A DISARMAMENT PROGRAM.
COUNTRIES SHOULD URGENTLY PURSUE PROVIDING INFORMATION TO
UNMOVIC, HE ADDED. PEACEFUL DISARMAMENT WAS STILL POSSIBLE,
AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAD NOT EXHAUSTED ALL THE
OPTIONS BEFORE RESORTING TO WAR, HE CONCLUDED.
GUINEA: LIFT SANCTIONS TO INDUCE IRAQI COOPERATION
--------------------------------------------- -----
¶23. (U) GUINEAN PERMREP TRAORE, SPEAKING IN THE ABSENCE OF
HIS FOREIGN MINISTER, PRAISED THE SECRETARY'S INITIATIVE IN
MAKING HIS PRESENTATION. HE SAID THAT THE JANUARY 27 BLIX
/EL-BARADEI PRESENTATION REVEALED SOME IMPROVEMENT IN IRAQI
COOPERATION, YET CLEARLY THERE WERE SUBSTANTIVE DEFICITS.
IRAQ MUST OFFER COGENT EVIDENCE ON THE DESTRUCTION OF ITS
WMD, ENCOURAGE PRIVATE INTERVIEWS WITH SCIENTISTS, PROVIDE A
CREDIBLE UPDATED LIST OF SCIENTISTS, AND AUTHORIZE U-2
OVERFLIGHTS. ITS PAST FAILURE TO COOPERATE DEMONSTRATED
THAT THE COUNCIL COULD NOT ACCEPT MERE WORDS. LIFTING
SANCTIONS, HE SUGGESTED, WOULD ENCOURAGE IRAQI COOPERATION.
IRAQ SPEAKS LAST
----------------
¶24. (U) IRAQI PERMREP AL-DOURI COMPLAINED THAT HE DID NOT
HAVE EQUAL TIME TO REBUT THE U.S. PRESENTATION, WHICH HE
DECRIED AS "UTTERLY UNRELATED TO THE TRUTH." THE SECRETARY
HAD PRESENTED NO NEW INFORMATION, MERELY SOUND RECORDINGS
WHOSE AUTHENTICITY COULD NOT BE ASCERTAINED, HE ASSERTED. HE
AVERRED THAT THE SOLE AIM OF THE U.S. WAS TO JUSTIFY WAR; BUT
IRAQ IS WMD-FREE, AS NUMEROUS IRAQI OFFICIALS HAVE REPEATED
FOR MORE THAN A DECADE. MOREOVER, THE SECRETARY SHOULD HAVE
SPARED HIMSELF THE EFFORT OF APPEARING BEFORE THE COUNCIL BY
TAKING THE PRESENTATION DIRECTLY TO UNMOVIC AND IAEA, IN
ACCORDANCE WITH OP10 OF UNSCR 1441, THUS ALLOWING THE
INSPECTORS TO "PROCEED WITH THEIR WORK IN PEACE AND QUIET."
THE FEBRUARY 8-9 VISIT TO IRAQ BY BLIX AND EL-BARADEI OFFERED
AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THEM TO ASCERTAIN THE VALIDITY OF THE U.S.
ALLEGATIONS, HE ADDED, CLAIMING THAT THE INSPECTORS HAD
PREVIOUSLY DEMONSTRATED THE "FALSITY" OF U.S. AND UK
ALLEGATIONS. AS PROOF OF IRAQI COOPERATION, HE REFERRED TO
IRAQ'S 12,000 PAGE DECEMBER 7 DECLARATION, THE PRESENCE OF
MORE THAN 250 INSPECTORS IN IRAQ, AND THE 575 INSPECTIONS
COMPLETED AT MORE THAN 300 SITES AS OF FEBRUARY 4. UNMOVIC
AND IAEA ANALYSES HAD CONFIRMED THE ABSENCE OF ANY PROSCRIBED
WMD AGENTS, HE STATED. MOREOVER, BLIX HAD NOT FOUND ANY
EVIDENCE OF MOBILE LABS AND BLIX HAD DISCOUNTED THE ASSERTION
THAT IRAQI AGENTS WERE POSING AS SCIENTISTS IN A NEW YORK
TIMES PIECE PUBLISHED ON JANUARY 30, HE ADDED. IRAQ HAD NO
OBJECTION TO U-2 OVERFLIGHTS IN PRINCIPLE; HOWEVER, THESE
COULD NOT GO FORWARD UNTIL THE U.S. AND UK SUSPENDED THEIR
"ILLEGAL" NO-FLY ZONES.
¶25. (U) AL-DOURI REJECTED U.S. EVIDENCE OF IRAQI
CONCEALMENT AND TRUCK TRANSPORTATION OF INCRIMINATING
MATERIALS PRIOR TO INSPECTIONS, DECLARING THAT INSPECTIONS
WERE TAKING PLACE WITHOUT ADVANCE WARNING. MOREOVER,
UNMOVIC, THANKS TO ITS HELICOPTERS AND OTHER RESOURCES, WAS
TOO WELL-INFORMED FOR SUCH ALLEGED CONCEALMENT TO ELUDE
NOTICE, HE SAID. WMD PROGRAMS "WERE NOT ASPIRIN PILLS THAT
COULD BE EASILY HIDDEN." ON THE CONTRARY, THE U.S. EVIDENCE
"COULD EASILY BE FABRICATED." AL-DOURI REPUDIATED ANY
LINKAGE BETWEEN IRAQ AND AL-QAEDA, CITING NEW YORK TIMES
REPORTING ON COMPLAINTS BY CIA ANALYSTS THAT THE U.S.
EXAGGERATED EVIDENCE ON AL-QAEDA TO BOLSTER ITS CASE FOR WAR.
SIMILARLY, HE ACCUSED FM STRAW OF WILLFULLY IGNORING UK
ANALYSIS CASTING DOUBTS ON A LINKAGE TO AL-QAEDA. AGAIN
QUOTING THE NEW YORK TIMES, HE ASSERTED THAT THE USG HAD
KNOWN, SINCE 1988, THAT IRAQ HAD NOT, IN FACT, DEPLOYED
CHEMICAL AGENTS. THE SECRETARY'S PRESENTATION WAS DESIGNED TO
SELL U.S. AND WORLD PUBLIC OPINION ON THE CASE FOR WAR IN THE
ABSENCE OF CONVINCING LEGAL, MORAL, OR POLITICAL
JUSTIFICATIONS, HE ALLEGED. IRAQ, HOWEVER, OFFERED A PATH OF
PEACE, HE CONCLUDED, APPENDING A LAST COMMENT THAT IT WAS
ISRAEL THAT POSED THE REAL WMD THREAT IN THE REGION.
NEGROPONTE