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Viewing cable 03HANOI353, DRUG TREATMENT CENTERS IN VIETNAM

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
03HANOI353 2003-02-13 09:16 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Hanoi
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 HANOI 000353 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV; INL/AAE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SNAR PGOV SOCI VM CNARC
SUBJECT:  DRUG TREATMENT CENTERS IN VIETNAM 
 
REFS:     A.  02 Hanoi 2980  B.  02 Hanoi 2836 
 
          C.   02 Hanoi 2232  D.  02 Hanoi 2054 
          E.  02 Hanoi 1684  F.  02 Hanoi 1611 
          G.  02 Hanoi 1506  H.  02 Hanoi 618 
          I.  02 Hanoi 126   J.  01 Hanoi 3280 
 
1.  (U) SUMMARY:  Vietnamese provincial drug treatment 
centers range from the most basic to relatively modern. 
Most suffer from a lack of physical and material resources. 
The addict population is a combination of those who enter 
voluntarily and others who are undergoing "compulsory" 
treatment.  While the GVN appears committed to helping 
addicts, treatment and vocational training specified under 
the law and relevant regulations are often lacking due to 
budget constraints.  Insufficient professionally trained 
staff also appears to be a systemic problem.  During 2002, 
there were a number of well-publicized escapes from 
provincial centers.  Septel will discuss community-based 
drug treatment.  END SUMMARY. 
 
------------------------- 
NATIONAL POLICY FRAMEWORK 
------------------------- 
 
2.  (U)  The GVN recognizes drug addiction as a serious 
problem.  The "official" number of addicts of all kinds, 
according to the GVN, is 142,000 people.  (Note:  Most 
experts view this as significantly understated. End note.) 
Even according to official figures, the number has risen 
over 40 percent in the past two years.  To address the 
problem, Vietnam has a network of drug treatment centers. 
According to the Standing Office of Drug Control (SODC), 
there are 73 centers at the provincial level, which have a 
capacity of between 50 to 3,000 addicts each.  Provincial 
authorities support most centers, but some are supported by 
mass organizations, such as the Youth Union. 
 
3.  (U)  The "National Law on Drug Prevention and 
Suppression," passed by the National Assembly in 2000, 
established the broad policy for drug treatment in its 
Chapter Four.  The law, while relatively general, notes that 
the "State encourages voluntary treatment" but recognizes 
the need for "compulsory detoxification centers."  Nguyen 
Hoang Mai, senior expert of the National Assembly's (NA) 
Social Affairs Committee, claimed that the NA never intended 
to pass a law that would describe drug treatment "in 
detail."  He asserted that, as with other "general laws," 
implementation details would follow in the form of separate 
administrative decrees and circulars. 
 
4.  (U)  Since the law's passage, the GVN has indeed issued 
additional directives pertaining to drug treatment. 
According to Dr. Tran Xuan Sac, Director of National Policy 
and Planning in the Ministry of Labor, Invalids, and Social 
Affairs' (MOLISA) Department of Social Evils Prevention, by 
issuing Decision 150 in late 2000, the GVN settled a "long- 
standing disagreement" between MOLISA and the Ministry of 
Health (MOH) over drug treatment.  Under this Decision, the 
GVN designated MOLISA as responsible for organizing and 
managing drug treatment and MOH as responsible for medical 
treatment in the centers.  In March 2002, the GVN issued 
Decree 34, which lengthened mandatory stays in provincial 
drug treatment centers for "hard drug" addicts to two years, 
up from the previous minimum of six months to one year, 
depending on the type of addiction (ref A).  Decision 605, 
signed by MOLISA Minister Nguyen Thi Hang in June 2002, 
required MOLISA staff to develop a plan on how to provide 
treatment to all registered addicts and to reduce the 
relapse rate to 60 percent, down from the probable 90-95 
percent current range (similar to other countries). 
 
5. (U)  Concerning treatment procedures, Interministerial 
Circular 31, issued in December 1999, specified a series of 
five steps for treatment, including (1) reception and 
classification; (2) detoxification; (3) education; (4) work 
and preparation for reintegration into society; and, (5) 
community-based long-term management.  Circular 31 also 
directed drug treatment centers to develop vocational 
training with the goal of providing recovering addicts with 
"basic skills." 
 
6.  (U)  Interministerial Circular 05, issued in February 
2002, updated Circular 31 and added more specifics on the 
centers.  According to the Circular, centers must: 
--receive drug addicts (and prostitutes, who are to be 
segregated within the complex) and provide a "safe 
environment" for treatment; 
--organize and provide treatment, rehabilitation, 
counseling, vocational training (either in-house or by 
outside contractors), and productive labor; 
--create opportunities within the center for putting 
vocational training skills into practice (Note:  At Hanoi 
Center number 6, run by and for Hanoi People's Committee but 
located in nearby Ha Tay province, recovering addicts 
working in the tailoring shop received "small amounts of 
money" for their labor, according to center director Dr. Le 
Duy Luan.  Proceeds from their products also were applied to 
buying items for the center library, he added.  End note.); 
--provide remedial education for illiterate addicts; and, 
--facilitate the addicts' reintegration into society. 
 
The circular also stipulated that centers: 
-- should have trained personnel in areas including 
medicine, vocational training, education, and security; and, 
--should, in conjunction with MOLISA, regularly organize 
training seminars and workshops for staff to improve their 
professional competence. 
 
------------------------------------- 
VOLUNTARY VERSUS COMPULSORY TREATMENT 
------------------------------------- 
 
7.  (U)  MOLISA's Dr. Sac said that, in addition the Drug 
Law, Decree 20 covered admission to drug treatment centers. 
According to Dr. Sac, "many" addicts seek treatment 
voluntarily because "their families are unable to cope" with 
home-based or community-based treatment.  Their hope is 
that, by entering a drug treatment facility, they will 
receive "more professional" care.  Addicts who voluntarily 
enter a center generally agree to stay one year.  During 
embassy visits on provincial visits over the past fifteen 
months, addicts with whom poloffs spoke (with officials 
present) said that their chances for eliminating drug 
addiction were better in a center than at home because (1) 
in the center they are removed from drug-using peer groups; 
and (2) they have some opportunity to learn skills that can 
help them upon return to society. 
 
8.  (U)  Dr. Sac further confirmed that terms for compulsory 
treatment are now longer -- up to two years, per Decree 34. 
In principle, a Provincial People's Committee Chairman has 
the final say on sending an addict for compulsory treatment. 
Dr. Sac noted, however, that in reality this decision is 
based on a consensus decision reached by a board consisting 
of provincial representatives from the Departments of Labor, 
Invalids and Social Affairs (DOLISA) and Health, as well as 
from the counternarcotics police and the National Committee 
for Aids, Prostitution, and Drug Control.  Dr. Sac added 
that it is "usually, but not always" true that those who 
enter voluntarily have "less serious" addictions compared to 
those who enter on a compulsory basis. 
 
----------------------- 
REALITIES ON THE GROUND 
----------------------- 
 
9.  (U)  SODC officials freely admit that the centers are 
often inadequate.  While center directors and other 
officials appear genuinely interested in trying to help the 
addict populations, resource constraints and a lack of 
trained staff mean that many of the centers do not even meet 
the GVN's legal requirements.  At the centers visited by 
poloffs (reftels), various directors stated their adherence 
to the "five step" approach specified under Circular 31, but 
admitted that implementation remained uneven, depending on 
center resources. 
 
10.  (U)  The most impressive center visited by poloffs has 
been the Hanoi Center number 6.  Living conditions for the 
addict population appeared considerably better than for 
students at Hanoi National University.  There were also 
substantial vocational training facilities, including 
welding, motorbike repair, carpentry, and tailoring. 
Several addicts with whom poloffs spoke (within earshot of 
center and DOLISA officials) said that the skills they were 
learning would be helpful when they returned to their 
families.  Poloffs also observed a recent university 
graduate teaching a literacy class, as well as a stand-alone 
PC used to teach basic computer skills.  This was the only 
computer observed in any drug treatment center.  Yen Bai 
province's center also appeared well above the norm, with 
new dorms, an island setting, and reasonable vocational 
training facilities. 
 
11.  (U)  Other centers  have ranged from poor to barely 
adequate.  At the low end of the scale, Ha Giang province 
(in northern Vietnam) had a temporarily vacant facility that 
was essentially nothing more than bamboo shelters surrounded 
by a barbed wire fence.  Quang Nam provincial center 
(central Vietnam) appeared understaffed and even 
dilapidated, with no facilities for vocational training or 
rehabilitation.  The center director attributed the poor 
conditions to the lack of provincial support.  Lai Chau, in 
northwest Vietnam, has "at least 10,000 addicts," according 
to the center's director, but its center has a capacity for 
only 70 addicts.  A relatively low wall, a lack of guards, 
and a "strong desire for drugs" had resulted in "quite a few 
escapes," he admitted.  Lai Chau's neighboring province, Lao 
Cai, is also another "drug hotspot."  Its facility was 
larger (200 beds) and had a program of basic education and 
vocational training, as well as considerable land outside 
the facility used for farming.  Sports and cultural 
activities also have improved the "quality of life, 
according to the center's director. 
 
--------------------------- 
ESCAPES - A CHRONIC PROBLEM 
--------------------------- 
 
12.  (U)  In addition to the apparently chronic escape 
problem in Lai Chau, other centers have also experienced 
escapes.  In June 2002, 369 addicts escaped from the drug 
treatment center in Can Tho province in southern Vietnam 
(ref F).  According to press reports at the time, this was 
the third escape within seven months.  In November 2002, 188 
addicts escaped from the same facility, according to another 
press report.  In addition to the Can Tho escapes, 54 
addicts escaped from a Ha Tay province facility last July; 
in August, 42 escaped from the Binh Duong provincial center 
(and eight others drowned while trying to escape); and 20 
escaped from the Nha Trang facility in December.  According 
to the UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Vietnam 
representative, there are "probably many other unreported 
escapes." 
 
13.  (U)  Officials have offered several possible 
explanations for the escape problem.  MOLISA's Dr. Sac 
opined that Decree 34, which lengthened compulsory treatment 
to two years, had "some impact," noting that the rate of 
escapes "seems to be increasing."  Dr. Sac claimed that 
Vietnam "badly needs" more support from foreign donors to 
improve the centers and provide better training for staff. 
Dr. Sac also cited "poor management and conditions" as other 
factors behind escapes.  Separately, the UNODC 
representative noted that the poor condition of many 
facilities, the generally untrained staff, and the lack of 
rehabilitation and vocational training opportunities were 
all factors "not only affecting the escape rate but also 
impacting the potential for reducing the high relapse rate." 
The representative lamented that "some officials" in Vietnam 
"still view drug treatment and detention synonymously." 
 
------------------------- 
SOME HOPE FOR THE FUTURE? 
------------------------- 
 
14.  (U)  MOLISA's Dr. Sac said his ministry was committed 
to a goal of treatment for 100 percent of all addicts, but 
without a "significant increase in capacity," it would be 
"extremely hard" to achieve.  MOLISA in February 2003 also 
proposed that the central government support additional drug 
treatment centers in "especially poor" provinces, according 
to a report in "Lao Dong" newspaper report. 
 
15.  (U)  Some new facilities are under construction. 
According to a Vietnam News Agency report in November 2002, 
a new 15,000 square meter facility is being built in 
southern Vietnam's Binh Phuoc province.  The facility should 
be completed by the end of April 2003 and will have the 
capacity to treat 2,000 addicts, according to the report. 
In 2002, Ho Chi Minh City opened six additional drug 
treatment centers, three in partnership with the city's 
Young Pioneers, a Communist Party mass organization.  A 
large regional center is under construction in Nghe An, 
about 12 kilometers from the provincial capital of Vinh; it 
will include an additional 700 beds for addicts.  MOLISA's 
Dr. Sac said that this center should be operational "within 
the first quarter of 2003." 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
16.  (U)  While many GVN drug officials appear committed to 
drug treatment and rehabilitation, the network of generally 
modest centers seems to place more emphasis on detention 
than actual treatment.  Vietnam's endemic problem of 
insufficient public sector resources exists in the drug 
treatment sector as well.  Without a big push from the 
foreign donor community, major improvements in the success 
of drug treatment are unlikely any time soon. 
BURGHARDT