Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 03ANKARA701, TURKEY'S NATIONALIST MHP: GREY WOLF PACK SNAPS AT LONE WOLF LEADER BAHCELI

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #03ANKARA701.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
03ANKARA701 2003-01-28 14:38 2011-04-20 21:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Ankara
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 000701 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/22/2013 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINS TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY'S NATIONALIST MHP: GREY WOLF PACK SNAPS AT LONE WOLF LEADER BAHCELI 
 
(U) Classified by PolCouns John Kunstadter; reasons: 1.5 (b,d) 
 
 
1. (C) Summary: MHP members at all levels blame party leader 
Bahceli for the party's poor performance in Nov. 3 elections. 
 Meanwhile, Bahceli is reneging on his promise to step aside 
and is working to secure his grip on the party, but faces 
growing pressure from the MHP grassroots and "Grey Wolves" 
cadres.  MHP currently is keeping its powder dry and staying 
silent in the face of AK's overwhelming electoral victory and 
high approval ratings, but could become more of a 
street-level factor amid growing public anxiety and potential 
street protests over Iraq.  End summary. 
 
 
--------------------- 
The Bride Gimps Along 
--------------------- 
 
 
2. (C) Reeling from defeat in the Nov. 3 national elections, 
Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) officials are searching for 
answers.  Our MHP contacts -- both at the local and national 
levels -- blame the party's poor showing largely on 
idiosyncratic leader Devlet Bahceli and on Bahceli's 
hand-picked cronies in the MHP pack.  Bahceli and company 
failed to deliver, they say, on MHP's campaign promises, 
including hanging convicted PKK leader Ocalan and solving the 
Islamic headscarf problem.  Moreover, Bahceli's bungling of 
MHP's campaign list, which the MHP leader packed with names 
unpopular among the party's grassroots, underscored a growing 
division between the party elite yearning for mainstream 
acceptance and its more unrefined and hardcore base.  MHP 
member Abdullah Helvaci, mayor of Kutludugun town outside of 
Ankara, told poloff Jan. 17 that Bahceli lacks the courage 
and strong personality to push MHP's agenda.  Indulging in 
classic grim MHP rhetoric, Helvaci asserted that Bahceli had 
had his chance and blew it while in government:  "While 
(then-sickly P.M.) Ecevit was wetting his pants, Bahceli 
still acted like his bride," Helvaci exclaimed. 
 
 
3. (C) Bahceli announced just after the elections that he 
would not stand for party chairman at MHP's next convention. 
However, our contacts universally believe that he will try to 
hang on and suggest he is already hard at work. 
 
 
-- Riza Muftuoglu, a Movement intellectual and head of MHP's 
Turkic States and Societies Association, explained to poloff 
Jan. 14 that Bahceli is planning a comeback.  The MHP 
administration is still in Bahceli's hands, he said. 
Muftuoglu noted that Bahceli's return will exacerbate 
existing tensions between the leadership group and the base; 
since the elections, the number of new party membership 
applications has dropped dramatically.  Muftuoglu asserted 
that if Bahceli does stay, he has no choice but to appease 
the party base by purging the party's higher ranks of yes-men. 
 
 
-- Turgut Altinok, AK Party mayor of Ankara's conservative, 
nationalist Kecioren township (and a former MHPer), recently 
"guaranteed" to us that Bahceli will not step down, a move 
that he says will doom MHP in the next elections. 
 
 
4. (C) Beyond its own internal fractures, MHP must wrestle 
with the threat of the populist (and anti-American) movement 
on the political right of media mogul and Motorola deadbeat 
Cem Uzan's Genc Parti and the emergence of former Interior 
Minister Mehmet Agar as leader of True Path Party (DYP). 
Muftuoglu asserted that Genc's nationalist rhetoric had 
attracted some 3% of MHP's vote total -- enough to keep MHP 
out of Parliament.  Furthermore, Muftuoglu explained, with 
his deep pockets and multiple media outlets, Uzan will have 
little trouble keeping himself in the headlines.  For his 
part, Agar is a figure with nationalist credentials and, 
according to Muftuoglu, has a considerable base of support in 
rural Anatolia, where MHP -- especially at the local level -- 
has been strongest.  According to Muftuoglu, Agar will be a 
"serious threat" to MHP in the future. 
 
 
------------ 
What's next? 
------------ 
 
 
5. (C) Despite the competing currents at the higher levels of 
the organization, MHP is still a party of the streets.  It is 
likely to rely on its hardcore nationalists to maintain MHP's 
contact with alienated and other disaffected voters.  How 
loud they become will have direct influence on the outcome of 
the next MHP congress, expected to be held in October, 
according to our contacts.  More important is the effect this 
internecine struggle may have on more immediate matters.  As 
the GOT approaches decisions on Iraq and Cyprus, we need to 
watch MHP's rougher elements.  With their deserved reputation 
for violence, these elements will seek to make their presence 
felt amid the general clamor of protest -- potentially making 
street demonstrations more problematic for the authorities. 
PEARSON