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Viewing cable 03ABUJA159, NIGERIA: 2002 INCSR SUBMISSION
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| Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 03ABUJA159 | 2003-01-27 08:31 | 2011-08-25 00:00 | UNCLASSIFIED | Embassy Abuja |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 ABUJA 000159
SIPDIS
FOR INL
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: SNAR KCRM NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: 2002 INCSR SUBMISSION
The following is Post's submission of the 2002 Nigeria
INCSR Chapter.
¶I. Summary
Nigeria remains a hub of narcotics trafficking and money
laundering activity. Nigerian organized criminal groups
dominate the African drug trade and transport narcotics to
markets in the United States, Europe, Asia, and Africa.
Some of these criminal organizations are engaged in
advance-fee fraud, commonly referred to in Nigeria as "419
Fraud," and other forms of defrauding U.S. citizens and
businesses. Years of military rule and an associated
economic decline contributed significantly to the expansion
of drug trafficking and criminality in Nigeria. The
resulting severe unemployment and widespread corruption
provided both an incentive and a mechanism for Nigerian
criminal groups to capitalize on Nigeria's central location
along the major drug routes and access to global narcotics
markets. Nigeria remains one of the world's most corrupt
nations, according to Transparency International, a well
respected international NGO. The democratically elected
government of President Olusegun Obasanjo has faced steep
challenges in checking organized crime emanating from
Nigeria. Southeast and Southwest Asian heroin smuggled via
Nigeria accounts for a significant portion of the heroin
imported into the United States. Nigerian criminal elements
operating in South America trans-ship cocaine through
Nigeria to Europe, Asia, and Africa. South Africa is a
major destination for Nigerian-trafficked cocaine within
Africa. Nigerian-grown marijuana is exported to
neighboring West African countries and to Europe, but not
in significant quantities to the United States. Aside from
marijuana, Nigeria does not produce any of the drugs that
its nationals traffic.
Commitments to confronting organized crime and drug
trafficking made by the Administration of President
Obasanjo led to several watershed events in 2002 including
the first extradition of a U.S. fugitive in August and the
passage of crucial money laundering legislation in
December. On January 14, 2003, the instruments of
ratification of the U.S.-Nigerian Mutual Legal Assistance
Treaty (MLAT) were formally exchanged and the Treaty was
entered into force.
However, throughout the year, the looming April 2003
elections demanded increasing attention by senior elected
GON officials. As a result, the fulfillment of previous
law enforcement commitments diminished. A 2002 budget
battle between the executive and legislative branch --
provoked largely by the looming elections -- resulted in an
impasse and caused funding shortfalls for key law
enforcement agencies such as the Independent Corrupt
Practices and Other Related Offenses Commission (ICPC) and
the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA). The
former, Nigeria's fledgling agency charged with addressing
the country's image as the world's most corrupt nation,
received far less funding that it had requested to build a
dedicated staff and bring high-level corrupt officials to
justice. Similarly, the NDLEA, Nigeria's sole anti-drug
agency, suffered from far below-normal operational funding
through most of the year, though it was given a special
allocation by President Obasanjo in the final quarter of
the year. Nigeria's drug enforcement performance has not
advanced significantly from past years, in part due to this
funding problem. Major traffickers remain difficult to
reach by the GON's investigative and prosecution efforts.
Kanu Agabi became Attorney General in March 2002, filling a
void in the top law enforcement position created by the
December 2001 assassination of the late Bola Ige. Strong
law enforcement cooperation begun under Ige's tenure
continued and is expanding under Attorney General Agabi's
strong leadership. We are concerned, however, about the
Nigerian Government's inability to solve the murder of its
top law enforcement official, who was killed over a year
ago.
Despite budgetary shortfalls and challenges to its
authority from legislative members under investigation for
corruption, Nigeria's anti-corruption commission -- the
ICPC -- produced significant gains in 2002. Nigeria
instituted a campaign to root out corruption that started
shortly after President Obasanjo's inauguration in May
1999, a campaign that was sustained and strengthened in
¶2001. In late 2001, the ICPC hired 93 investigators,
prosecutors, and administrators, its first contingent of
personnel not detailed from other agencies. The Obasanjo
administration supports the domestically controversial 1990
NDLEA Act Number 33. This law dictates that Nigerians
convicted of drug offenses abroad will be arrested upon
their deportation back to Nigeria, and, if convicted, will
be liable for a maximum of five years additional
imprisonment for harming the reputation of Nigeria. Use of
this law, however, has diminished; only one conviction was
handed down in 2002. Corruption embedded over 16 years of
continuous military rule continues to be a problem for the
Obasanjo government, with the administration itself having
suffered from a number of corruption scandals.
In 2002, the NDLEA encountered limited success in combating
the various elements of the drug trade. Typically, street
pushers and trafficker "mules" were apprehended; the effort
against large-scale traffickers, however, was less
effective. While operational efforts against the drug trade
remain modest, the Obasanjo government in 2002 made good on
previous commitments to create a structure to identify and
interdict the proceeds of crime -- a major criminal issue
in Nigeria, as highlighted by the Financial Action Task
Force (FATF). This body, the Financial Crimes
Commission, will be established through the December 14,
2002 enactment of the Terrorism, Economic and Financial
Crimes Commission Act. Moreover, the Obasanjo government
introduced, and the National Assembly in December passed,
legislation to improve the existing 1995 Money Laundering
Act that had previously only criminalized money laundering
related to drug trafficking. Asset forfeiture has not been
a successful deterrent against money laundering or drug
trafficking activities. Corruption among enforcement
officials and the judiciary raises serious questions about
whether this particular sanction can be applied
consistently enough to have a salutary effect, quite apart
from the technical difficulty of putting together a
particular case.
Interdiction and enforcement efforts are complicated by an
absence of inter-agency cooperation and a serious lack of
resources. Years of neglect by successive military regimes
left the law enforcement community demoralized and ill-
equipped to deal with sophisticated international criminal
networks. This problem is compounded by pervasive
corruption throughout all levels of government. There have
been a few arrests of major traffickers; however, it can
take years for a case to come to trial and no mechanism
exists to track cases. Cases are often "systematically
lost" within Nigeria's judicial system.
II. Status of Country
Nigeria produces no precursor chemicals or drugs that have
a significant effect on the United States, but it remains a
major drug-transit country. In addition, Nigerian criminal
elements operate global trafficking/criminal networks.
The NLDEA is the law enforcement agency with sole
responsibility for combating narcotics trafficking and drug
abuse. It was established in 1989, and works alongside
Nigerian Customs, the State Security Service, the National
Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control
(NAFDAC), the National Police, and the Nigerian Immigration
Service at various ports of entry. The NDLEA's most
successful interdictions have taken place at Nigeria's
international airports, with over 50 percent of hard drug
seizures (e.g. cocaine and heroin) at the Lagos
international airport. The agency has successfully
apprehended individual drug couriers transiting these
airports and some of the drug traffickers sponsoring these
couriers. An improved interdiction effort at the Lagos
international airport during 2001 has forced some smugglers
to change tactics and ship contraband via Nigeria's five
major seaports or to neighboring countries.
NDLEA seizures of hard drugs in 2002 were modest; no one
seizure exceeded 15 kilograms, unlike its success in 2001
in seizing a shipment of 60 kilograms of cocaine at the
Lagos port and despite continuing evidence of large drug
shipments transiting Nigeria en route to the United States
and Europe. Prosecutions of drug couriers -- those
carrying small amounts of hard drugs in baggage or
internally ingested -- remained strong, while prosecution
of major drug barons evidenced little progress. The
improved access of the NDLEA to Nigeria's major seaports,
as granted by Presidential decree in 2001, has not resulted
in any significant improvement in drug enforcement at
these key interdiction points, in part due to the under-
funding of the NDLEA and resistance to NDLEA operations by
the Nigerian Customs Service.
Nigerian criminal organizations, sophisticated specialists
in moving narcotics and other contraband, are heavily
involved in corollary criminal activities such as document
fabrication, illegal immigration, and financial fraud.
Their ties to criminals in the United States, Europe, South
America, Asia, and South Africa are well documented.
Nigerian poly-crime organizations exact significant
financial and societal costs, especially among West African
states with limited resources for countering these
organizations.
III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 2002
Policy Initiatives. In 2002, the democratically elected
Obasanjo Administration pushed forward a number of new
legislative and executive initiatives to combat narcotics
trafficking and organized crime. These initiatives
included: the passage of new money laundering legislation
and the creation of an Anti-Terrorism, Economic and
Financial Crimes Commission to coordinate government-wide
efforts against money laundering and financial crimes.
The draft bill to create an Anti-Terrorism, Economic and
Financial Crimes Commission shows the government's
commitment to meeting its international obligations,
particularly the criteria of the FATF. Nigeria's counter-
narcotics policy is based on the National Drug Control
Master Plan (NDCMP), which has been in place since 1998.
This plan assigns responsibilities to various government
Ministries and agencies as well as NGOs and other interest
groups. The Master Plan also outlines basic resource
requirements and time-frames for the completion of
objectives. Many of these goals have not yet been met.
Both chambers in the National Assembly have Narcotics
Affairs Committees, which monitor the performance of the
NDLEA and implementation of Nigeria's counter-narcotics
strategy. While frequent leadership changes at the NDLEA
impaired the agency's effectiveness in the past, the
current NDLEA Chairman, Alhaji Bello Lafiaji, who assumed
office in October 2000, has given the agency new life and
much greater direction. Chairman Lafiaji has declared an
all-out offensive against drug trafficking and has
instituted a number of internal reforms to improve the
professionalism of NDLEA staff, including the retirement of
officials suspected of corruption and improved training and
benefits for NDLEA personnel. Chairman Lafiaji also has
called for harmonization of Nigeria's narcotics legislation
and has sought increased international assistance for his
agency. The NDLEA has also embarked upon a publicity
campaign to combat narcotics trafficking and drug abuse by
staging various contraband destruction events around the
country.
Accomplishments. The increased level of drug enforcement
begun in 2001 was sustained but not improved in 2002. With
assistance from the Department of State's Bureau for
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL)
and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the NDLEA
was given enhanced capacity to launch more aggressive drug
interdiction campaigns and investigative efforts against
drug barons.
The Nigerian government also improved its record of drug-
related prosecutions. Using special drug courts, a more
energetic effort by the NDLEA to prosecute drug traffickers
efficiently and successfully produced over 2,000
convictions in 2001. The NDLEA also demonstrated stronger
efforts to enforce Nigeria's money laundering law; by the
end of 2002, five banks were under NDLEA investigation for
alleged complicity in the laundering of drug proceeds.
The NDLEA has also proven itself as an effective drug
enforcement leader in the region. With DEA assistance, the
NDLEA created the West African Joint Operation (WAJO)
initiative, bringing together drug enforcement personnel
from 15 countries in the region to improve regional
cooperation. Several WAJO meetings organized by the NDLEA
and DEA during 2002 culminated in a month-long joint
interdiction operation in ten countries, leading to
cumulative seizures of hard drugs totaling more than 50
kilograms. The NDLEA remains committed to continued
regional cooperation and also has expanded counter-
narcotics cooperation with the police in South Africa,
where Nigerian criminal organizations are responsible for
the bulk of drug trafficking. In 2002, NDLEA attended the
International Drug Enforcement Conference (IDEC) in Santa
Cruz, Bolivia and became the first African permanent member
of this forum.
The Government of Nigeria also pledged to design a
mechanism to process U.S. extradition requests
expeditiously while observing due process under Nigerian
law, in accordance with the Nigerian constitution. This
mechanism will include the creation of an exclusive
extradition team of public prosecutors and the designation
of a High Court judge dedicated to extradition cases. In
December 2001, the (late) Attorney General designated a
High Court judge exclusively to hear extradition cases.
While extradition requests were formerly heard in any
court, including lower magistrates courts, the government
has now centralized the handling of all U.S. extradition
requests in the Federal High Court of Abuja. In late 2002,
Gabriel Umoh was extradited to the United States to serve a
prison sentence for financial fraud. This marked the first
judicial extradition of a U.S. fugitive from Nigeria in
over 10 years.
At Nigeria's initiative, a high level U.S.-Nigeria law
enforcement dialogue began in 2001. The first meeting of
this semi-annual forum, the Bilateral Law Enforcement
Committee, took place on November 9 in Washington, D.C. and
was followed by a second meeting in Abuja in December 2002.
These meetings covered the full range of U.S. and Nigerian
law enforcement interests: drug control; financial fraud;
trafficking in persons; corruption; immigration crimes;
police reform; extradition; and money laundering. The
dialogue has already led to commitments by Nigeria to take
significant steps toward mutually agreed goals by March
¶2002.
Law Enforcement Efforts. Nigerian counter-narcotics efforts
primarily focus on the interdiction of couriers transiting
Nigeria's air and seaports as well as a public campaign
focused on destroying plots of cultivated marijuana
throughout the country. Improved drug interdiction efforts
at the Lagos airport and seaports led to a 40 percent
increase in total drug seizures over 2000. 91.79 kilograms
of heroin and 24.04 kilograms of cocaine were seized during
2002, as compared with 43 kilograms of heroin and 98
kilograms of cocaine seized in 2001. Combined hard drug
seizures declined 20 percent in 2002. The number of drug-
related arrests fell to 1,960 from 3,592 in 2001, and 915
drug convictions were handed down during 2002, compared to
2,041 in 2001. Major narcotics smugglers and their
networks continue to elude arrest and prosecution, despite
a NDLEA commitment to launch an intensified effort to
investigate major international drug traffickers operating
in Nigeria. Attempts by the NDLEA to arrest and prosecute
major traffickers and their associates often fail in
Nigeria's courts, which are subject to intimidation and
corruption. Asset seizures from narcotics traffickers and
money launderers, while permitted under Nigerian law, have
never been systematically utilized as an enforcement tool,
but some convicted traffickers have had their assets
forfeited over the years. The number of traffickers so far
penalized, however, remains small.
Corruption. Corruption is pervasive in Nigerian society and
a systemic problem in Nigeria's government. Estimated
unemployment is over 25 percent. Civil servants' salaries
are low. In addition, salaries are frequently months in
arrears, compounding the corruption problem. After its
inauguration, the Obasanjo Administration embarked on a
public anti-corruption campaign. Legislation was enacted
and the ICPC was formed. This commission began prosecution
of several minor officials on corruption charges, and
initiated investigations into allegations of high-level
corruption, but has been stymied by slow recruitment,
inadequate federal funding, and a series of court
challenges questioning the legitimacy legality of the
Commission. The ICPC hired its first non-seconded staff of
prosecutors, investigators, and administrators in 2001 but
has been unable to expand its staff further in 2002.. The
U.S. Department of Justice, with INL funding, is providing
the ICPC with training and technical assistance for its new
staff.
The Obasanjo Administration, unfortunately, has made
limited progress toward transparency and openness in its
contracting and decision making process. A number of
criminal cases, launched by the Anti-Corruption Commission
against public officials accused of bribe-taking, are
moving forward and are expected to conclude early in 2002,
although an appeal to the Supreme Court challenging the
ICPC's constitutionality has delayed these cases.
Meanwhile, corruption remains a significant obstacle to
counter-narcotics efforts, especially in the courts. While
the NDLEA has attempted to purge its ranks of officers
suspected of corrupt practices, a fear of corruption
hampers inter-agency cooperation as agencies are often
distrustful and unwilling to share information.
Agreements and Treaties. Nigeria is a party to the 1988 UN
Drug Convention, the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic
Drugs, as amended by the 1972 Protocol, and the 1971 UN
Convention on Psychotropic Substances. Nigeria has signed
the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime,
the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in
Persons, the Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants,
and the Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and
Trafficking in Firearms. The 1931 U.S.-UK Extradition
Treaty, which was made applicable to Nigeria in 1935, is
the legal basis for pending U.S. extradition requests. In
1989, the United States and Nigeria entered into a mutual
cooperation agreement for reducing demand, preventing
illicit use, and combating illicit production and
trafficking in drugs. The United States and Nigeria also
signed in 1989 a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT),
which was ratified in 2001 and is entered into force on
January 14, 2003. Nigeria is a party to the World Customs
Organization's Nairobi Convention, Annex on Assistance in
Narcotics Cases.
Cultivation/Production. Cannabis is the only illicit drug
produced in any large quantities in Nigeria. The drug is
cultivated in all 36 states. Major cultivation takes place
in central and northern Nigeria and in Delta and Ondo
states in the south. Marijuana, or "Indian Hemp" as it is
known locally, is sold in Nigeria and exported throughout
West Africa and into Europe. To date, there is no evidence
of significant marijuana imports from Nigeria into the
United States. The NDLEA has been engaged in an active
eradication campaign. Throughout 2002, the NDLEA claimed to
have seized more than 304 metric tons of cannabis, a slight
increase from the 290 metric tons seized in 2001. In June
2002, the NLDEA invited dignitaries and the diplomatic
corps to a narcotics destruction ceremony in Lagos to
highlight the agency's seizures of illicit drugs throughout
the country.
Drug Flow/Transit. Nigeria is a major staging point for
Southeast and Southwest Asian heroin smuggled to Europe and
the United States and for South American cocaine trafficked
to Europe. While Nigeria remains Africa's drug transit hub,
there are indications that the preferred methods of trans-
shipment have changed. Improvement of the overall security
posture at Lagos' Murtala Mohammed International Airport
has prompted some drug traffickers to ship more narcotics
through Nigerian seaports, concealing large quantities of
contraband in shipping containers. They also use other West
African airports and sea ports with more lax security
controls.
Domestic Programs (Demand Reduction). Local production and
use of marijuana have been a problem in Nigeria for some
time; however, according to the NDLEA and NGOs, the abuse
of harder drugs (e.g., cocaine, heroin) is now on the rise.
Heroin and cocaine are readily available in many of
Nigeria's larger cities. Law enforcement officials admit
that Nigeria remains a major narcotics trans-shipment
point, but some officials deny that domestic drug abuse is
on the rise. U.S. officials and training instructors find
that many Nigerian officials do not understand that by
serving as a transit point, Nigeria may itself begin to
suffer significant drug abuse problems, like many other
similar transit points worldwide. The NDLEA continues to
expand its counter-narcotics clubs at Nigerian universities
and distribute counter-narcotics literature. The NDLEA also
has instituted a teacher's manual for primary and secondary
schools, which offers guidance on teaching students about
drug abuse.
IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs
Policy Initiatives. U.S.-Nigerian counter-narcotics
cooperation focuses on interdiction efforts at major
international entry points and on professionalizing the
NDLEA and other law enforcement agencies. U.S. training and
material assistance have continued, with the NDLEA as the
primary target. The DEA office in Nigeria deals with a
small group of NDLEA representatives to lessen the chance
of compromise by corrupt individuals. USG working-level
representatives enjoy good excellent access to their
counterparts and there is an evident desire on both sides
to strengthen these relationships. The current NDLEA
chairman appears committed to meeting agency goals and
improving the morale of NDLEA officers. The United States
and Nigeria signed a Letter of Agreement covering many
aspects of law enforcement assistance, including a new
U.S.-funded police reform program in 2002. The Nigerian
government has reviewed plans for reform and U.S. agencies
have presented their own suggestions for ways to proceed,
but the task will be formidable as the police lack so much
in the way of equipment, logistical support and a living
wage. Police morale has suffered over the years as the
situation deteriorated. For example, salaries, in addition
to being low, are frequently months in arrears.
Bilateral Accomplishments. In 2001, at the request of the
GON, a U.S.-Nigeria Bilateral Law Enforcement Committee was
created to advance mutual drug and crime control issues.
Co-chaired by Nigeria's Attorney General and the State
Department's Assistant Secretary for International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, the group met for
the first time in November 2001 in Washington. A second
meeting convened in Abuja in December 2002. These meetings
produced joint declarations containing Government of
Nigeria pledges to: introduce new money laundering
legislation; begin investigations of major drug
traffickers in cooperation with DEA; commence extradition
proceedings of individuals wanted for prosecution by the
U.S. government; and boost resources for the new Anti-
Corruption Commission. Most of these benchmarks have been
met and some have been exceeded. Meanwhile, the DEA office
in Nigeria continues to work with the NDLEA on expanding
their relationship. New Department of State assistance to
the NDLEA allowed for a stronger interdiction posture at
the Lagos international airport, Nigeria's largest drug
transit point, forcing many traffickers to route drug
shipments through neighboring countries. Department of
State assistance and U.S. Secret Service operational
support have also been provided to the Nigerian Police
Force to improve investigations and enforcement operations
against criminal organizations involved in advance fee or
419 Fraud, which largely targets American citizens and
businesses and other Western nationals. The United States
also provided training for NDLEA personnel on general
investigative techniques and embarked on a project to
support the NDLEA's training academy in Jos, Plateau State.
The Road Ahead. After yeas of non-cooperation, the U.S.-
Nigerian relationship expanded after the 1999
reintroduction of democratic government in Nigeria. Despite
a prolonged budgetary impasse in 2002 that limited most GON
agencies to operating budgets of 40-50 percent of 2001
levels, President Obasanjo demonstrated his commitment to
the international drug fight by granting the NDLEA a
special allotment exceeding the NDLEA's 2001 budget.
Nevertheless, federal funding for the NDLEA and other key
Nigerian law enforcement agencies remains insufficient and
erratic in disbursement. This inadequate funding is
believed partially the cause of key weaknesses -- including
the processing of U.S. extradition requests and the local
prosecution of major drug traffickers -- that need to be
addressed by the Nigerian Government. As noted elsewhere in
this report, the narcotics and crime problems in Nigeria
are deeply rooted in Nigeria's present governmental system,
and in Nigerian society. It will require strong and
sustained political will and continued international
assistance for any Nigerian government to confront these
difficult issues and bring about meaningful change.
The U.S. government has expanded aid to Nigeria's counter-
narcotics efforts; anti-drug assistance provided since
February 2001 now totals over $1.2 million. Another area
of key concern is the performance of Nigeria's judiciary.
Law enforcement efforts are often stymied by the slow pace
of the judicial system, which can be attributed to both
intimidation and corruption of the judiciary by criminal
organizations. The U.S. Agency for International
Development is expanding a "rule of law" program with the
Nigerian government to help strengthen and professionalize
the judiciary. Through the framework of the new Bilateral
Law Enforcement Committee, the Nigerian government has made
good on its commitment to the establishment of a reliable
extradition process that allows extradition requests to be
heard expeditiously and fairly. Nevertheless, many U.S.
extradition requests for narcotics traffickers have been
outstanding for years.
Although Nigeria does not produce reliable crime
statistics, most observers agree that public security
deteriorated throughout the country in 2002. The police
remain grossly mistrusted by the Nigerian populous and
organized crime groups exploited that mistrust by preying
on citizens throughout the nation, but particularly in key
urban areas such as Lagos, Enugu, Port Hartcourt, Jos, Kano
and Kaduna.
In early 2002 the Inspector General of Police was removed
by the President, a move widely believed to have been
linked to the IGP's alleged corruption and the failure to
contain un unprecedented December 2001-January 2002 police
strike over unpaid salaries and allowances. A newly
appointed IGP, Tafa Balogun, began his tenure by announcing
an eight-point plan to tackle corruption and crime,
including an approach to dealing with violent criminals he
termed "Fire-for-Fire" This was later followed by a
"Shoot-To-Kill" policy announced by the Inspector General.
These policies, while designed to address aggressively
violent crime, resulted in a dramatic increase in the
excessive use of force by police officers and the killing
of numerous innocent civilians throughout the country.
Nigerian police are poorly trained. Most new constables
and corporals -- the bulk of the force -- have never
qualified in the use of a firearm, yet they are given
automatic weapons and the implicit and explicit license to
use excessive force. A standing internal police order
allows police personnel confronting an unarmed riotous
group to use firearms if they feel threatened.
Implementation of a 2001 Presidential order to recruit
40,000 new police constables each year exacerbates the
problem of absorbing poorly trained police into the force.
In late 2002 the U.S. government embarked on a project to
assist the Nigerian Police Force in addressing fundamental
problems caused or exacerbated by 16 years of military
rule, during which the Police Force was denied material and
human resources. This project seeks to provide the
Nigerian Police with a roadmap for adopting reforms that
will provide greater transparency and checks and balances
to current management practices, and reorient police
officers to community policing. While President Obasanjo
and his advisors are aware of the need to modernize the
police as a key pillar of democratic consolidation, little
has been done to address key issues such as a living wage
for the police and other law enforcement personnel. Salary
arrears also remain a problem. The Government of Nigeria
needs to demonstrate a commitment of its own resources to
reorienting the police to serve the public rather than
preying on the population to earn a living.
The U.S. government will continue to actively engage
Nigeria on the issues of counter-narcotics and money
laundering. There have been important successes in the last
year, but long-term progress will only come through the
continuation of serious dialogue and cooperation, and a
willingness on the part of Nigeria's government to confront
difficult issues. The underlying institutional and societal
factors that contribute to narcotics-trafficking and money-
laundering activities in Nigeria are deep-seated and
require comprehensive, long-term solutions. Progress can
only be made through sustained effort, political will, and
support by Nigeria's friends.
JETER