Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 02HANOI2871, HANOI'S VIEW OF CHINA'S 16TH PARTY CONGRESS

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #02HANOI2871.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
02HANOI2871 2002-12-02 09:21 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Hanoi
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS HANOI 002871 
 
SIPDIS 
UNCLASSIFIED     PTO2951 
 
SIPDIS 
 
PAGE 01        HANOI  02871  01 OF 02  020948Z 
ACTION EAP-00 
 
INFO  LOG-00   NP-00    AIT-03   CIAE-00  DS-00    FBIE-00  UTED-00 
      VC-00    TEDE-00  INR-00   LAB-01   VCE-00   M-00     NSAE-00 
      PER-00   TEST-00  DSCC-00  PRM-00   DRL-02   NFAT-00  SAS-00 
        /006W 
                  ------------------111AF1  020948Z /38 
R 020921Z DEC 02 
FM AMEMBASSY HANOI 
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8229 
INFO AMCONSUL HO CHI MINH CITY 
AMEMBASSY BEIJING 
AMCONSUL CHENGDU 
AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU 
AMCONSUL HONG KONG 
AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 
AMCONSUL SHENYANG 
AIT TAIPEI 0711 
ASEAN COLLECTIVE 
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI 
SECDEF WASHDC//ISA/ACHAO// 
 
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 HANOI 002871 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV, EAP/CM 
 
 
                       UNCLASSIFIED 
 
PAGE 02        HANOI  02871  01 OF 02  020948Z 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV CH VM CVR
SUBJECT:  HANOI'S VIEW OF CHINA'S 16TH PARTY CONGRESS 
 
REF:  A.  HANOI 1290    B. HANOI 2417 
 
1.  (SBU)  SUMMARY.  OBSERVERS IN HANOI ASSESSED THE 
RECENTLY CONCLUDED CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY (CCP) 16TH PARTY 
CONGRESS AS "POSITIVE" AND PREDICTED THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF 
VIETNAM'S (CPV) LEADERSHIP WOULD CLOSELY STUDY ITS DECISIONS 
WHILE STEERING ITS OWN COURSE OVER THE NEXT DECADE.  CPV 
OFFICIALS DECLINED TO MEET WITH EMBOFFS ON THIS SUBJECT, 
DESPITE OUR REPEATED REQUESTS.  END SUMMARY. 
 
---------------------- 
WE'RE PAYING ATTENTION 
---------------------- 
 
2.  (SBU)  DR. NGUYEN HUY QUY, DIRECTOR OF THE INSTITUTE OF 
CHINA STUDIES OF THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR SOCIAL SCIENCES AND 
HUMANITIES IN VIETNAM, COMMENTED TO POLOFF THAT "PARTY 
LEADERS IN VIETNAM ALWAYS WATCH CLOSELY WHAT HAPPENS IN 
CHINA AND WILL DO SO THIS TIME."  SPECIFICALLY, DR. QUY 
NOTED THAT THE 16TH CCP CONGRESS HAD "REAFFIRMED THE 
PROGRESS" MADE DURING THE TENURE OF PRC HEAD OF STATE AND 
PARTY JIANG ZEMIN, AND ENSHRINED JIANG'S "THREE REPRESENTS" 
THEORY AS ONE OF THE "FOUNDATIONS" OF THE CCP.  DR. QUY 
ASSESSED THAT JIANG'S TENURE HAD EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE 
OF "BUILDING A WELL-OFF SOCIETY" AND "INCLUDING PRIVATE 
ENTERPRISE ELEMENTS" IN THE CCP.  DR. QUY CLAIMED THAT CPV 
LEADERS ARE LOOKING CLOSELY AT THIS "EVOLUTION" OF THE CCP 
AND "WILL NO DOUBT STUDY" ITS APPLICABILITY TO VIETNAM. 
                       UNCLASSIFIED 
 
PAGE 03        HANOI  02871  01 OF 02  020948Z 
WITH THE PRC'S "FAST-GROWING MARKET ECONOMY," "ADJUSTMENTS" 
BY THE CCP ARE "INEVITABLE," HE ADDED.  DR. QUY SUGGESTED 
THIS WILL ALSO APPLY TO THE CPV, ALBEIT AT A "MORE 
DELIBERATE PACE, SINCE CHINA IS SO FAR AHEAD OF VIETNAM 
ECONOMICALLY."  DR QUY OPINED THAT SUCH ADJUSTMENTS ARE 
"HEALTHY AND SHOULD LEAD TO MORE DEMOCRATIC POLICIES." 
 
3.  (SBU)  SEPARATELY, COLONEL TRAN NHUNG, INTERNATIONAL 
DEPARTMENT DIRECTOR OF THE "PEOPLE'S ARMY" NEWSPAPER, 
PREDICTED THAT CPV LEADERS "WILL STUDY CLOSELY" THE RESULTS 
OF THE CCP CONGRESS, ESPECIALLY CONCERNING 
"INDUSTRIALIZATION AND PRIVATE ENTERPRISE" AS WELL AS 
"BUILDING A WELL-OFF SOCIETY."  HE OPINED THAT THE CCP 
CONGRESS COULD SERVE AS SOMETHING OF A "ROAD MAP" FOR THE 
CPV'S NEXT PARTY CONGRESS IN 2006.  COLONEL NHUNG SAID THAT, 
"PERSONALLY," HE "LIKED THE TRENDS" EVIDENCED DURING THE CCP 
CONGRESS AND THAT THERE WAS MUCH THAT WAS "USEFUL" FOR THE 
CPV TO CONSIDER.  HOWEVER, HE CAUTIONED, CPV POLICIES WOULD 
NECESSARILY "REFLECT THE DIFFERENT CONDITIONS IN VIETNAM," 
NOT MERELY COPY THE CCP'S DECISIONS. 
 
4.  (SBU)  DR. QUY ALSO PREDICTED THAT, BY THE NEXT CPV 
PARTY CONGRESS IN 2006, "IT IS LIKELY" THAT THE CPV WOULD 
ADOPT LANGUAGE "SIMILAR TO THE CCP" CONCERNING THE INCLUSION 
OF PRIVATE ENTREPRENEURS AS PARTY MEMBERS.  SIMILARLY, 
COLONEL NHUNG NOTED THAT THE "TREND IN THAT DIRECTION IS 
ALREADY CLEAR, AS DEMONSTRATED IN THE FIFTH PARTY PLENUM" 
EARLIER IN 2002. 
 
------------------------------------- 
MINIMAL IMPACT ON BILATERAL RELATIONS 
                       UNCLASSIFIED 
 
PAGE 04        HANOI  02871  01 OF 02  020948Z 
------------------------------------- 
 
5.  (U)  DR. QUY OPINED THAT THE CCP CONGRESS AND THE 
RESULTING CHANGE OF LEADERSHIP "SHOULD NOT HAVE MUCH, IF 
ANY, IMPACT ON THE PRC-VIETNAM RELATIONSHIP" BECAUSE "THESE 
DAYS THE RELATIONSHIP IS VERY STABLE" (REFTELS).  HE 
CLAIMED, HOWEVER, THAT WHILE THE PRC STILL "INFLUENCES 
VIETNAM HEAVILY," VIETNAM WILL CONTINUE TO "LOOK MORE TO THE 
WEST IN THIS ERA OF GLOBALIZATION."  COLONEL NHUNG COMMENTED 
THAT "RELATIONS HAVE DEVELOPED WELL SINCE 1991" AND THAT 
"THE NEW CCP LEADERSHIP IS VERY FAMILIAR WITH VIETNAM." 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
6.  (U)  AS THE PRC'S OVERALL INFLUENCE HAS CONTINUED TO 
GROW STEADILY SINCE NORMALIZATION RESUMED IN 1991, VIETNAM 
WATCHES EVERYTHING THE PRC DOES VERY CLOSELY, INCLUDING -- 
OR PERHAPS ESPECIALLY -- REGARDING PARTY AFFAIRS.  NOT TO 
OUR GREAT SURPRISE BUT DISAPPOINTINGLY, CPV EXTERNAL 
 
                       UNCLASSIFIED 
 
                           UNCLASSIFIED     PTQ5253 
 
PAGE 01        HANOI  02871  02 OF 02  020948Z 
ACTION EAP-00 
 
INFO  LOG-00   NP-00    AIT-03   CIAE-00  DS-00    FBIE-00  UTED-00 
      VC-00    TEDE-00  INR-00   LAB-01   VCE-00   M-00     NSAE-00 
      PER-00   TEST-00  DSCC-00  PRM-00   DRL-02   NFAT-00  SAS-00 
        /006W 
                  ------------------111AF9  020948Z /38 
R 020921Z DEC 02 
FM AMEMBASSY HANOI 
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8230 
INFO AMCONSUL HO CHI MINH CITY 
AMEMBASSY BEIJING 
AMCONSUL CHENGDU 
AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU 
AMCONSUL HONG KONG 
AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 
AMCONSUL SHENYANG 
AIT TAIPEI 0712 
ASEAN COLLECTIVE 
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI 
SECDEF WASHDC//ISA/ACHAO// 
 
UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 HANOI 002871 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV, EAP/CM 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
                       UNCLASSIFIED 
 
PAGE 02        HANOI  02871  02 OF 02  020948Z 
 
 
COMMISSION OFFICIALS DECLINED TO MEET WITH POLOFFS TO 
DISCUSS THE CCP CONGRESS AND THE LARGER ISSUE OF VIETNAM/PRC 
TIES.  EVER CAUTIOUS, CPV OFFICIALS MAY BELIEVE BOTH THAT 
THEIR VIEWS OF THE CONGRESS AND THE CCP ARE NONE OF THE 
USG'S BUSINESS, AND/OR THAT THE VIETNAM-PRC RELATIONSHIP IS 
STILL TOO SENSITIVE TO DISCUSS OPENLY WITH US. 
BURGHARDT 
 
                       UNCLASSIFIED