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Viewing cable 02COLOMBO2137, SRI LANKAN/MALDIVES: 2002 ANNUAL TERRORISM

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
02COLOMBO2137 2002-11-15 06:13 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Colombo
R 150613Z NOV 02
FM AMEMBASSY COLOMBO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3990
INFO AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU 
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 
AMEMBASSY DHAKA 
AMCONSUL CHENNAI 
AMCONSUL MUMBAI 
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
DIA WASHDC
NSC WASHDC
AMEMBASSY PORT LOUIS
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 002137 
 
FOR SA/INS; S/CT FOR REAP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: N/A 
TAGS: PTER CE MV
SUBJECT:  SRI LANKAN/MALDIVES:  2002 ANNUAL TERRORISM 
REPORTS 
 
REF:  STATE 201772 
 
1. MISSION'S RESPONSE TO REFTEL REQUESTING INPUT FOR THE 
DEPARTMENT'S 2002 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT FOLLOWS.  DATA 
ON SRI LANKA IS CONTAINED IN PARA TWO AND DATA ON THE 
MALDIVES IN PARA THREE.  PARA 2 IS KEYED TO QUESTIONS A 
THROUGH K IN PARA TWO OF REFTEL.  PARA 3 CONTAINS A 
REVIEW OF THE SITUATION IN THE MALDIVES. 
 
SRI LANKA 
--------- 
2.  (U) DATA ON SRI LANKA: 
 
A -- IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 TERROR 
ATTACKS, THE SRI LANKAN GOVERNMENT IMMEDIATELY DECLARED 
ITS WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE WITH THE U.S. IN THE GLOBAL 
CAMPAIGN AGAINST TERRORISM AND THE GOVERNMENT HAS 
MAINTAINED THAT POLICY THROUGHOUT 2002. SRI LANKA HAS 
ACCEDED TO 10 OF THE 12 INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS (SEE 
SECTION F FOR MORE DETAILS) THAT DEAL WITH COMBATING 
TERRORISM AND TOOK STEPS TO IMPLEMENT UNSCR 1333 AND 
1373, WHICH BLOCKED THE ASSETS OF TERRORIST ENTITIES. 
 
B -- THERE HAVE BEEN NO CASES IN SRI LANKA DURING THE 
PAST YEAR OF ACTS OF TERRORISM AGAINST OR AFFECTING U.S. 
CITIZENS OR FACILITIES.  ALL INDICATIONS ARE THAT THE 
SRI LANKAN GOVERNMENT WOULD EXTEND EVERY EFFORT TO 
PROTECT U.S. CITIZENS OR PROSECUTE THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR 
ACTS OF TERRORISM.  IN REGARDS TO DOMESTIC TERRORISM, 
THE GOVERNMENT AND THE LIBERATION TIGERS OF TAMIL EELAM 
(LTTE) HAVE OBSERVED A CEASEFIRE SINCE DECEMBER 2001. 
THE TWO SIDES HAVE ALSO BEGUN PEACE TALKS.  IN NOVEMBER 
2002, A COLOMBO COURT CONVICTED LTTE LEADER VELUPILLAI 
PRABHAKARAN AND THREE OTHER LTTE MEMBERS IN ABSENTIA FOR 
PLANNING A JANUARY 31, 1996, BOMBING IN COLOMBO THAT 
KILLED 76 AND INJURED HUNDREDS.  THEY WERE SENTENCED TO 
LONG-TERM PRISON SENTENCES.  THE LTTE HAS CATEGORICALLY 
REJECTED THE VALIDITY OF THE COURT'S RULING. 
 
C -- THE ISSUE OF EXTRADITION IN RELATION TO TERRORIST 
ACTS DID NOT ARISE IN SRI LANKA.  THE UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT HAS ASKED FOR ASSISTANCE FROM THE SRI LANKAN 
GOVERNMENT TO LOCATE AND EXTRADITE INDIVIDUALS IN THREE 
CRIMINAL CASES.  ALTHOUGH THE INDIVIDUALS IN QUESTION 
HAVE NOT BEEN LOCATED AND MAY BE IN LTTE-CONTROLLED 
AREAS, THE GOVERNMENT OF SRI LANKAN WAS RESPONSIVE TO 
USG CONCERNS AND REQUESTS.  THERE IS NO INFORMATION THAT 
INDICATES THE SRI LANKAN GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT EXTEND THE 
SAME COOPERATION IN CASES INVOLVING TERRORIST-RELATED 
ACTIVITIES. 
 
D -- MISSION HAS NO KNOWLEDGE OF SIGNIFICANT IMPEDIMENTS 
TO GSL PROSECUTION AND/OR EXTRADITION OF SUSPECTED 
TERRORISTS.  IN FACT, THE SEPTEMBER 1999 SIGNING OF A 
GENERAL EXTRADITION TREATY BETWEEN THE U.S. AND SRI 
LANKA (RATIFIED BY THE U.S. SENATE IN OCTOBER AND SIGNED 
BY THE PRESIDENT IN NOVEMBER 1999), FACILITATED 
EXTRADITION BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.  SRI LANKA HAS 
ALSO SIGNED THE 1988 SAARC REGIONAL CONVENTION ON THE 
SUPPRESSION OF TERRORISM, WHICH DESIGNATES CERTAIN ACTS 
SPECIFICALLY AS TERRORIST ACTS AND NOT AS POLITICAL 
ACTS, THEREBY NULLIFYING ATTEMPTS BY TERRORIST 
ORGANIZATIONS TO CLAIM POLITICAL MOTIVATIONS FOR 
VIOLENCE.  THE SRI LANKAN GOVERNMENT IS ALSO WORKING 
WITH THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE TO DRAFT A MUTUAL 
LEGAL ASSISTANCE TREATY. 
 
E -- SRI LANKAN GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES HAVE MADE 
NUMEROUS PUBLIC STATEMENTS IN SUPPORT OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL WAR ON TERRORISM AND HAVE CONDEMNED 
TERRORIST INCIDENTS, SUCH AS THE TERRORIST BOMBING IN 
BALI.  THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOT BEEN INVOLVED IN 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTIGATIONS OF TERRORISM.  IT IS 
CURRENTLY FOCUSING ON THE DOMESTIC PEACE PROCESS TO 
BRING TO AN END AN ALMOST 20 YEAR CONFLICT WITH THE LTTE 
(SEE SECTION I FOR MORE DETAILS). 
 
F -- DURING 2002, THE GSL HAS FOCUSED ON STABILIZING THE 
PEACE PROCESS WITH THE LTTE.  SRI LANKA HAS ACTIVELY 
PARTICIPATED IN COUNTERTERRORISM LEGISLATION SEMINARS 
ORGANIZED BY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT.  SRI LANKA IS 
PARTY TO 10 OF THE 12 INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS THAT 
FOCUS ON COMBATING TERRORISM, INCLUDING THE TOKYO, HAGUE 
AND MONTREAL CONVENTIONS AGAINST TERRORISM.  THE GSL HAS 
REQUESTED ADDITIONAL TRAINING FROM THE UNITES STATES 
GEARED TOWARDS PREPARING THE SRI LANKAN MILITARY TO 
ASSIST IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM. 
 
G -- NOT APPLICABLE - THE SRI LANKAN GOVERNMENT DOES NOT 
SUPPORT TERRORISM. 
 
H -- THE GSL HAS MADE NO PUBLIC STATEMENTS IN SUPPORT OF 
A TERRORIST-SUPPORTING COUNTRY ON A TERRORISM ISSUE. 
THAT SAID, LARGELY BECAUSE OF ITS "NON-ALIGNED" STATUS, 
SRI LANKA HAS NOT PARTICIPATED ACTIVELY IN INTERNATIONAL 
CONDEMNATION OF THE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES OF CUBA, IRAN, 
IRAQ, LIBYA, NORTH KOREA, SYRIA, AND SUDAN.  FOR THE 
SAME REASONS, ITS CRITICISM OF ANTI-ISRAELI TERRORISM 
HAS BEEN MUTED. 
 
I -- THERE WAS NO DISCERNIBLE CHANGE IN THE GOVERNMENT'S 
STRONG INTERNATIONAL ANTI-TERRORISM POSITION IN 2002. 
DOMESTICALLY THERE WAS A DRAMATIC SHIFT IN THE POLICY OF 
THE GOVERNMENT TOWARDS THE LTTE, WHICH IS DESIGNATED AS 
A FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATION (FTO) BY THE UNITED 
STATES.  THE GSL IS ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN A PEACE PROCESS 
WITH THE LTTE TO BRING AN END TO A 19-YEAR-OLD CONFLICT 
AND IS ESTIMATED TO HAVE KILLED OVER 64,000 PEOPLE.  ON 
DECEMBER 24, 2001, THE LTTE AND GSL ANNOUNCED UNILATERAL 
CEASEFIRES.  ON FEBRUARY 22, 2002, THE TWO SIDES SIGNED 
A CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT THAT INCLUDED STEPS TO DEESCALATE 
THE CONFLICT, ON SEPTEMBER 4 THE GSL LEGALIZED THE LTTE, 
AND ON SEPTEMBER 16 THE TWO SIDES BEGAN PEACE TALKS.  IN 
ADDITION TO THE RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED ON THE LTTE BY 
OTHER STATES, THE SRI LANKAN GOVERNMENT CONTINUES TO 
VIEW THE USG'S DESIGNATION OF THE LTTE AS A TERRORIST 
ORGANIZATION AS A POSITIVE MEASURE.  IT SITES THE 
DESIGNATION, ALONG WITH THE POST-SEPTEMBER 11 GLOBAL WAR 
ON TERRORISM, AS ONE OF THE REASONS THE LTTE HAS COME TO 
THE NEGOTIATING TABLE. 
 
J -- THE GSL HAS DIRECTED FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS TO 
FREEZE ASSETS OF TERRORIST GROUPS COVERED UNDER UNSCR 
1333 AND 1373.  WHERE THE U.S. HAS REQUESTED THE GSL TO 
FREEZE ASSETS OF GROUPS NOT COVERED UNDER THE UNSCRS, 
THE GSL HAS DIRECTED FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS TO NOTIFY 
THE CENTRAL BANK OF ANY TRANSACTIONS BY THESE GROUPS. 
THE USG CODUCTS MILITARY-TO-MILITARY ANTI-TERRORISM 
TRAINING WITH GSL TROOPS. 
 
K-I -- THE ISSUE OF COOPERATING WITH THE USG IN 
APPREHENDING, CONVICTING, AND PUNISHING INDIVIDUAL 
RESPONSIBLE FOR ACTS OF TERRORISM HAS NOT ARISEN. 
MISSION HAS NO REASON TO BELIEVE THE GSL WOULD NOT 
COOPERATE IN THE EVENT THAT SUCH COOPERATION WAS 
REQUESTED. 
 
K-II -- THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAS MADE SEVERAL REQUESTS TO 
THE GSL FOR ADDITIONAL SECURITY MEASURES FOR U.S. 
PERSONNEL AND FACILITIES IN SRI LANKA.  THE GSL HAS MET 
ALL REQUESTS EXPEDITIOUSLY.  THESE REQUESTS WERE MADE TO 
ENHANCE SECURITY IN GENERAL AND NOT IN RESPONSE TO ANY 
IDENTIFIABLE THREAT. 
 
MALDIVES 
-------- 
3. (U)  CONSISTING OF ALMOST 1,200 ISLANDS STRETCHED 
OVER APPROXIMATELY 500 MILES NORTH TO SOUTH IN THE 
INDIAN OCEAN WITH A POPULATION OF APPROXIMATELY 270,000, 
THE REPUBLIC OF THE MALDIVES HAS NO KNOWN INDIGENOUS 
TERRORISM PROBLEM.  THE MALDIVIAN GOVERNMENT, HOWEVER, 
HAS EXPRESSED CONCERNS ABOUT THE POSSIBLE TRANSIT OF 
TERRORISTS THROUGH THE COUNTRY AND ALSO OVER THE 
ACTIVITIES, INCLUDING SERMONS, OF SOME HARD-LINE 
RELIGIOUS ELEMENTS IN THE COUNTRY.  SOME OF THESE 
ALLEGED HARD-LINERS HAVE BEEN DETAINED AND TRIED ON 
VARIOUS CHARGES.  MALDIVIANS ALSO REMAIN FOCUSED ON 
PREVENTING A REPEAT OF THE EVENTS OF 1988 WHEN A FORMER 
MALDIVIAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL LAUNCHED A COUP ATTEMPT 
WITH THE HELP OF SRI LANKAN TERRORIST ELEMENTS.  THE 
COUP FAILED DUE TO THE INTERVENTION OF THE INDIAN ARMED 
FORCES.  DESPITE THESE CONCERNS, THE MALDIVES HAS 
EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE THAT IT CAN DEAL WITH POTENTIAL 
PROBLEMS.  DURING AN ATTEMPTED HIJACKING OF A FLIGHT 
TRANSITING THROUGH THE MALDIVES FROM BOMBAY IN EARLY 
SEPTEMBER 2002, THE NATIONAL SECURITY SERVICE RESPONDED 
IN A PROFESSIONAL MANNER AND WAS FORTHCOMING AND 
COOPERATIVE WITH USG OFFICIALS REQUESTING INFORMATION 
ABOUT THE INCIDENT.  IN TERMS OF LAWS AND REGULATIONS, 
THE MALDIVES HAS TAKEN STEPS TO IMPLEMENT UNSCR 1333 AND 
1337, WHICH BLOCK THE ASSETS OF TERRORIST ENTITIES.  THE 
MALDIVES HAS ALSO BECOME A PARTY TO THE MAJORITY OF THE 
12 INTERNATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CONVENTIONS. 
 
 
WILLS