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Viewing cable 02COLOMBO1767, OFFICIAL INFORMAL NUMBER 132 (09-23-02)

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
02COLOMBO1767 2002-09-23 11:02 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Colombo
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 001767 
 
SIPDIS 
 
OFFICIAL INFORMAL 
 
DEPT FOR SA/INS FROM THE CHARGE 
 
E.O. 12958:   N/A 
TAGS: AMGT CE LTTE ECONOMICS
SUBJECT:  OFFICIAL INFORMAL NUMBER 132 (09-23-02) 
 
 
CONTENTS:  DEMINING/ESF IDEAS 
 
DEMINING/ESF IDEAS 
------------------ 
1.  (SBU) We have the following demining and ESF ideas 
for your review: 
 
Demining: 
 
2. (SBU) PM/HDP knows the demining situation in Sri Lanka 
from A through Z.  As you know, Murph McCloy and company 
ran an assessment of the situation over the summer, which 
came up with a number of conclusions.  The end result was 
a decision that the QRDF would be extended until late 
October and that a DoD-run military-to-military training 
program would start up shortly thereafter.   We 
understand that State Department funding would be 
involved in the mil-to-mil program.  While we take a bow 
to PM/HDP based on its clear expertise in this issue, we 
have the following ideas on other possible demining add- 
ons after discussions with experts in Colombo: 
 
-- Sri Lanka In-Country Projects:  These projects would 
be similar to the QRDF project in all but name. 
Essentially, the USG would fund contractors to demine and 
remove UXO at sites in the north and east.  In the north, 
the team would continue the work that the QRDF is now 
doing in Jaffna.  In the east, the team could set up at a 
site near Batticaloa or Trincomalee where mines and UXO 
were present.  (Note:  We think the east is an important 
area for the U.S. to show the flag in, given the inter- 
ethnic friction present there that could potentially 
disrupt the peace process.)  We would estimate that the 
Jaffna project would cost 2 million USD a year and the 
smaller eastern project about 1 million USD a year. 
 
-- Civilian-to-civilian training:  As noted, the USG 
already has a plan to begin mil-to-mil demining training. 
This proposal would provide civilians with demining 
training.  The training could be routed through local 
foundations in Sri Lanka, including those with 
involvement in the Tamil and Muslim communities.  The 
training could also involve dogs or manual demining, 
geared as necessary to the level of the trainees.  We 
estimate that this project would cost 1.5 million USD per 
year. 
 
ESF Proposals: 
 
3. (SBU) The most pressing, immediate needs for 
assistance in the conflict-affected northern and eastern 
regions of Sri Lanka are related to the spontaneous 
return of internally displaced persons and refugees 
(160,000+ since the beginning of the year, according to 
UN figures). Employment-generating, basic-needs resources 
are required as quickly as possible not only for 
returnees but also for other conflict-affected persons, 
including members of the host communities into which 
returnees are attempting to reintegrate. Unsustainable 
return would destabilize the fragile peace process now 
well underway; for that reason, the primary focus of 
donor assistance on the North and East in the short term 
is likely to be acceptable even to the majority of Sri 
Lankans elsewhere on the island. 
 
4. (SBU) In the medium to longer-term, if not sooner, 
however, assistance efforts ideally will offer clear 
benefits for the South. This is particularly vital for 
communities in the drought-prone southeastern districts, 
where diversion of major portions of the GoSL's budget to 
the conflict has deepened the region's traditional 
poverty, and as de-mobilization of combatants 
accelerates. In purely economic terms, the war has buoyed 
the rural southern economy for years; assisting ex- 
combatants in making the transition to peace will be a 
key element to a sustainable process. 
 
5. (SBU) Possible targets for short-term assistance that 
we envision the USAID's Office of Transitions Initiatives 
taking the lead on include the following items with the 
exception of micro-enterprise financing and the "e-peace 
bridge". 
 
A.Drinking water and sanitation: Rain-water catchment 
pans and construction/restoration of sanitary latrines. 
These activities generate local employment and prevent 
the spread of water-borne diseases.  Notional costs: 
Catchment for 100,000 families, US$2.5 Million, latrines 
for 50,000 familes: $US $1million  (in north, east & 
south) 
 
B.Mine-risk education: Economic pressures continue to 
force people into areas that are not safe due to presence 
of mines and unexploded ordinance. US Government support 
to RONCO, through 10/30, covers de-mining activities only 
and not mine-risk education, an essential component of an 
overall mine-action program.  Notional cost: US$200,000 
(in north and east) 
C.Employment-generating restoration of small-scale 
irrigation facilities, i.e. reservoirs.  Construction of 
50 of these would generate jobs and have lasting "down- 
stream" benefits for restoring small-scale agricultural 
production.  Notional cost including cash for work and 
locally-available equipment: US$1 Million.(north, east 
and south) 
 
D."E Peace Bridge": Establishment of information- 
technology education centers: 
This initiative will provide through world link and 
worldview International for the provision of ICT 
equipment, training, online collaborative projects and 
discussion on social cohesion in 100 secondary schools 
and community centers. This program will result in 
increased dialogue, linkages, and understanding between 
Sri Lankan youth from different parts of the country, 
provide training and employment opportunities in the IT 
sector and provide access to technology. This will cost 
US$ 1 Million.(Island-wide in targeted schools). 
 
E.Construction/restoration of dwellings: Ties in with 
the GoSL's efforts to relocate IDPs, particularly those 
living in welfare centers. Some 20 percent of the 
estimated 800,000 Sri Lankans who were displaced at the 
start of 2002 lived in welfare centers, some for as long 
as 10 years. For many, the decision on whether to return 
to their places of origin, or settle somewhere else on 
state-provided land, hinges on the availability of 
housing.  Possible opportunities for employment 
generation, cash for work.  Notional figure: 25,000 
families at $1,000 per dwelling: US$2.5 Million. (north 
and east). 
 
F.Micro-enterprise financing: The overwhelming 
majority of IDP/refugee returnees, as well as families in 
host communities, support themselves through agriculture 
and fisheries. Sustainable livelihoods will require 
getting funds into the hands of NGOs for micro-lending to 
small farmers and fisherfolk to purchase agricultural 
inputs such as seeds, fertilizer; no pesticides with 
USAID funds), and fisherfolk to purchase nets, or to 
repair boats. Funds should be on-lent at interest rates 
prevailing at banks in the locality. Ideally packaged 
with business development skills, and paired with 
capacity building for local Farmer Organizations (FOs). 
Notional cost US$1 Million 
(north, east and south) 
 
Total Notional Figure: US $9.2 million. 
 
Prospective partners: The following USPVOs or their 
international affiliates are represented in Sri Lanka: 
CARE/International, Save the Children Fund (UK), and 
World Vision.  Each however needs to be asked about 
contacts and/or partnerships with Sri Lankan PVOs or 
self-help societies in the northeast and the southwest. 
UNICEF would also be a potentially excellent partner, as 
would WFP for food-for-work. 
 
AMSELEM