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Viewing cable 02JAKARTA685, EAST TIMOR: XANANA GUSMAO -- FINALLY -- DECLARES

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
02JAKARTA685 2002-02-27 10:34 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Jakarta
P 271034Z FEB 02
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6106
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 
AMEMBASSY LISBON 
USMISSION GENEVA 
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 
SECDEF WASHDC//USDP/ISA/AP//
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA//
CG III MEF
NSC WASHDC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 000685 
 
2002 DILI REPORT 8 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV UN
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR: XANANA GUSMAO -- FINALLY -- DECLARES 
CANDIDACY FOR PRESIDENT 
 
1.  SUMMARY.  NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE HERO XANANA GUSMAO DECLARED 
HIS INTENT TO BECOME THE FIRST-EVER ELECTED PRESIDENT OF 
EAST TIMOR.  WITH LESS THAN 90 MINUTES TO GO BEFORE THE 
FILING DEADLINE EXPIRED, GUSMAO ACCEPTED THE NOMINATION OF 
MINOR OPPOSITION PARTIES TO THE CHAGRIN OF THE MAJORITY 
PARTY FRETILIN.  FRETILIN WANTED GUSMAO TO RUN AS AN 
CANDIDATE INDEPENDENTLY NOMINATED BY 5,000 CITIZENS. 
XANANA NOW PITS HIS POPULARITY AGAINST THE FRETILIN'S 
INSTITUTIONAL STRENGTH AND DEEPENS THE PERSONAL WITH 
FRETILIN.  HOWEVER, HE DID OFFER AN OLIVE BRANCH OF SORTS 
BY UNDERLINING THAT HE WOULD CONTINUE HIS STATUS 
INDEPENDENT OF PARTY AFFILIATION AND NOT CAMPAIGN OR 
ENDORSE POLITICIANS FROM AMONG THE PARTIES WHO NOMINATED 
HIM.  XANANA SHOULD CRUISE TO EASY VICTORY AGAINST THE ONLY 
OTHER CANDIDATE IN THE RACE -- THE VENERABLE XAVIER DO 
AMARAL, CURRENTLY THE DEPUTY OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND 
FORMERLY THE FIRST PRESIDENT OF EAST TIMOR IN 1975.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
XANANA OFFICIALLY ENTERS RACE 
----------------------------- 
 
2.  NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE HERO "XANANA" GUSMAO OFFICIALLY 
DECLARED HIMSELF A CANDIDATE FOR PRESIDENT ON FEBRUARY 23. 
ONLY MINUTES BEFORE THE FILING DEADLINE WAS TO EXPIRE, 
XANANA LET TEN MINORITY POLITICAL PARTIES FORMALLY REGISTER 
HIS CANDIDACY.  THESE PARTIES INCLUDE THE PSD AND PD, THE 
MOST PROMINENT OPPOSITION.  THE TEN SUPPORTING PARTIES SPAN 
THE POLITICAL SPECTRUM FROM THE CONSERVATIVE UDT THROUGH 
THE SOCIALIST PARTY. 
 
3.  NOTABLY ABSENT WAS FRETILIN, THE MAJORITY PARTY. 
FRETILIN HAD WANTED GUSMAO TO ESCHEW ALL PARTY NOMINATIONS 
AND RUN BY ACCEPTING A NON-PARTISAN PETITION OF 5,000 
CITIZEN SIGNATURES.  XANANA'S SUPPORTERS HAD ACTUALLY 
COMPLETED SUCH A PETITION IN TIME FOR GUSMAO'S USE, BUT HE 
OPTED DIFFERENTLY.  (ONLY ONE OTHER CANDIDATE IS 
REGISTERED, THE ASDT PARTY'S XAVIER DO AMARAL, THE DEPUTY 
SPEAKER OF THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY -- AND NO THREAT TO 
GUSMAO'S CHANCES.) 
 
4.  GUSMAO HAS STEADFASTLY REFUSED THE INDIVIDUAL PETITION 
ROUTE BECAUSE, HE ASSERTS, THAT WOULD MEAN HE WAS HARBORING 
A PERSONAL ASPIRATION  TO BE PRESIDENT.  ALL ALONG, HE HAS 
CLAIMED NO PERSONAL AMBITION.  THUS HE WOULD ONLY ACCEPT 
THE IMPORTUNING OF OTHERS TO FILL THE OFFICE OF CHIEF 
EXECUTIVE.  AT A MORE STRATEGIC LEVEL, XANANA WANTS TO RUN 
AND WIN WITHOUT FRETILIN'S SUPPORT TO DEMONSTRATE HE IS THE 
ONE WHO ENJOYS THE PEOPLE'S MANDATE.  WITH SUCH A MANDATE, 
GUSMAO WOULD INCREASE HIS LEVERAGE IN THE POLICY MAKING 
PROCESS, EVEN THOUGH THE PRESIDENT WILL HAVE FEW ENUMERATED 
POWERS UNDER THE NEW CONSTITUTION. 
 
XANANA:  "NOT AN OPPOSITION CANDIDATE" 
-------------------------------------- 
 
5.  XANANA DID EXTEND AN OLIVE BRANCH, OF SORTS, TO 
FRETILIN.  HE SAID THAT, IN SPITE OF THE MINOR PARTY 
NOMINATIONS, HE WOULD MAINTAIN A TOTALLY "INDEPENDENT" 
POLITICAL POSTURE.  HE WOULD NOT BECOME THE "OPPOSITION'S 
PRESIDENT", NOR JOIN THOSE PARTIES.  XANANA HAS CREATED AN 
UMBRELLA ORGANIZATION TO RAISE FUNDS AND MANAGE HIS 
CAMPAIGN.  SUPPORTERS WILL HAVE TO FORSWEAR FORMAL 
POLITICAL AFFILIATION -- AT LEAST TEMPORARILY -- WHILE 
WORKING FOR HIM. 
 
6.  FRETILIN DOES NOT WANT TO ACTIVELY COUNTER XANANA. THEY 
WANTED TO ENDORSE HIM UNDER THE PETITION SCHEME.  FRETILIN 
IS NOT MONOLITHIC.  THERE IS A LARGE PRO-XANANA FACTION 
WITHIN THE PARTY WHO LIKE HIM AND BELIEVE HE IS THE RIGHT 
CANDIDATE FOR PRESIDENT.   ACCORDING TO A MID-LEVEL 
FRETILIN OFFICIAL, FRETILIN WILL SOLVE ITS DILEMMA BY NOT 
OPPOSING XANANA AND OFFICIALLY REMAINING "NEUTRAL."  THIS 
WOULD FREE PARTY MEMBERS TO GO OUT AND "VOTE THEIR 
CONSCIENCE." 
 
RAMOS HORTA CANNOT BROKER DEAL 
------------------------------ 
 
7.  FOREIGN MINISTER JOSE RAMOS HORTA, THE NOBEL PEACE 
PRIZE WINNER, HAD BEEN WORKING BEHIND THE SCENES TO RESOLVE 
MONTHS OF XANANA'S INDECISION.  RAMOS HORTA HAD WORKED TO 
ARRANGE THE 5,000 SIGNATURES TO DENY XANANA THE EXCUSE THAT 
TIME HAD RUN OUT FOR THAT CANDIDATE OPTION. 
 
8.  FORTY-EIGHT HOURS BEFORE THE REGISTRATION EXPIRY, RAMOS 
HORTA ADVISED SENIOR UNTAET (UNITED NATIONS TRANSITIONAL 
ADMINISTRATION FOR EAST TIMOR) OFFICIALS THAT XANANA HAD 
FINALLY AGREED TO GO THE PETITION ROUTE, ONLY HOURS AFTER 
XANANA HAD INFORMED THE U.S. AMBASSADOR HE WAS LEANING 
TOWARD ACCEPTING THE MINOR PARTY NOMINATIONS -- IF HE 
DECIDED TO RUN. 
 
9.  RAMOS HORTA HAD EVEN WORKED OUT A PLAN IF XANANA DID 
THE UNTHINKABLE AND DECIDED NOT TO RUN.  RAMOS HORTA, 
HIGHLY RESPECTED DOMESTICALLY AND INTERNATIONALLY, WOULD 
HAVE ACCEPTED A FRETILIN NOMINATION AND RUN AS NATIONAL 
UNITY CANDIDATE.  ALTHOUGH HE WAS HAPPY ABOUT XANANA'S 
FINAL DECISION TO STAND AS A CANDIDATE, XANANA'S LATE 
REVERSAL CONFOUNDED EVEN HORTA. 
 
XANANA AND FRETILIN: A WIDENING GULF? 
------------------------------------- 
 
10.   XANANA GUSMAO'S REFUSAL TO GO THE PETITION ROUTE WILL 
INCREASE FRICTION BETWEEN HIM AND THE FRETILIN PARTY. 
THERE IS A CURRENTLY A SHARP PERSONAL RIFT BETWEEN GUSMAO 
AND FRETILIN'S MOST DOMINANT FIGURE, MARI ALKATIRI, WHO IS 
CHIEF MINISTER OF EAST TIMOR'S SECOND TRANSITIONAL 
GOVERNMENT AND WILL ASCEND TO THE POWERFUL OFFICE OF PRIME 
MINISTER AFTER INDEPENDENCE. 
 
11.  SENIOR OFFICIALS WITHIN UNTAET, WHICH GOVERNS EAST 
TIMOR UNTIL MAY 20, WOULD HAVE PREFERRED XANANA'S 
ACCEPTANCE OF THE PETITION ROUTE TO AVOID A WIDENING OF THE 
XANANA/FRETILIN BREACH.  FRETILIN WILL DOMINATE THE NEW 
PARLIAMENT AND CABINET.  THE PRESIDENT WILL HAVE FEW 
ENUMERATED POWERS AND WILL HAVE TO WORK CLOSELY WITH 
FRETILIN  FOR GOVERNMENT TO OPERATE HARMONIOUSLY. 
OFFICIALS WITHIN GOVERNMENT AND FRETILIN REPORT THAT 
ALKATIRI HAS SOUGHT TO MEET WITH GUSMAO IN RECENT WEEKS 
ONLY TO BE REBUFFED. 
 
12.  COMMENT:  GUSMAO KNOWS HE IS MORE POPULAR THAN 
FRETILIN OR ALKATIRI PERSONALLY.  THIS MAY HAVE LED HIM TO 
IGNORE FRETILIN -- RATHER THAN NEGOTIATE WITH THEM -- ABOUT 
THE TERMS OF HIS CANDIDACY.  ALTHOUGH THIS WILL WORK FOR 
HIM DURING THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION, IT IS THE WRONG 
PRESCRIPTION FOR ENACTING LEGISLATION OR IMPLEMENTING 
NATIONAL POLICIES POST-MAY 20.  XANANA'S WAVERING ABOUT HIS 
CANDIDACY HAS BEEN WORTHY OF A PERFORMANCE OF SHAKESPEARE'S 
"HAMLET," BUT THE UNCERTAINTY INVITES QUESTIONS ABOUT HIS 
ROLE AS A DECISIVE OFFICE-HOLDER AFTER AN ELECTION HE IS 
SURE TO WIN. 

 
BOYCE