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Viewing cable 01ABUJA2989, NIGERDOCK: STORY OF A PRIVATIZATION

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
01ABUJA2989 2001-11-27 13:37 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Abuja
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 002989 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
 
COMMERCE< PLEASE PASS TO ADVOCACY CENTER 
 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: BEXP ECON EFIN ETRD NI
SUBJECT: NIGERDOCK: STORY OF A PRIVATIZATION 
 
 
1. (SBU)  Summary: The case history of Niger Dock, the first 
such privatization to feature an American firm, highlights 
the internal GON rivalries and other obstacles that 
privatization faces in Nigeria.   Just when the issue seemed 
settled, and  J. Raymond McDermott, Inc. (JRM),  had won the 
Niger Dock bid with Global Electric Corporation, a new fly 
flew into the ointment as JRM withdrew its promise to become 
an equity partner.  The latest developments of that situation 
will be dealt with in detail in a separate cable.  End 
Summary. 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
Privatization Gameplan for Niger Dock 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
 
2.  (U)  When the GON rolled out its initial privatization 
plan in 1998, the government's sole shipbuilding company 
Niger Dock Nigeria, Ltd. was among the companies slated for 
privatization during Phase II of the Bureau of Public 
Enterprise's anticipated privatization program.  Established 
in 1986 by the GON as Nigeria's preeminent shipbuilding and 
ship repair facility, Niger Dock had become a leading West 
African shipbuilder.  However, its fortunes degenerated 
dramatically as a result of chronic mismanagement.  Still, 
many observers believe a privatized Niger Dock can return to 
form. 
 
 
3.  (SBU) Despite numerous hiccups, Phase II remains on 
track.  Yet Niger Dock's own privatization has not failed to 
generate extensive internal divisions within the GON, which 
in turn has transmitted diverse and confusing signals to 
potential investors. 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
High Drama Trails the Privatization Bid 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
 
4.  (U)  Niger Dock's privatization has been dogged by high 
drama among the various GON agencies involved in its 
privatization.  On October 25, 2001 the BPE published the Bid 
Evaluation Criteria on approval by the National Council on 
Privatization (NCP.) According to the BPE privatization plan, 
the tender winner will own 51 percent of the company, the GON 
will retain 20 percent, while the remaining 29 percent would 
be sold to the general public. 
 
 
5.  (SBU)  On October 31, just days before the final winner 
was to be announced, Nigerdock management -- also a bid 
contender as part of the Navimor International/Stolt Offshore 
joint venture -- withdrew its 2000 audited accounts already 
submitted to the BPE, claiming errors had been spotted in the 
audited accounts. Some observers viewed this  development as 
a ploy to delay the bid opening since Navimor International 
had privately indicated its intention to withdraw from the 
bid. The National Council for Privatization (NCP) authorized 
the BPE to go ahead with the bid awards. 
 
 
6.  (SBU) Undeterred, BPE went ahead with the bid round since 
Global Energy Company/J. Ray McDermott, as well as Stolt 
Offshore, expressed willingness to continue with the bid.  In 
support, the NCP ruled in favor of BPE and gave its nod to 
commence the bidding. Six serious contenders, including West 
African Shipyards Limited/Spring Fountain (a Niger Dock 
Management Buyout); Navimor International/Stolt offshore; and 
Global Energy Company(GEC)/J. Ray McDermott, submitted 
financial bids. 
 
 
7.  (SBU)  When bids were opened November 9, the Global 
Energy Company (a Nigerian oil and gas firm)/J. Ray 
MacDermott partnership was the winner with a bid of N3.4 
billion (USD 32 million).  According to BPE advisors, the 
only other serious contender was Stolt/Navimor who had 
virtually withdrawn its bid between the first and second 
rounds.  The only reason Stolt maintained its bid, according 
to the BPE advisor, was because McDermott's bid remained 
higher than its own.  The reasons behind Stolt's disinterest 
are not known. 
 
 
8.  (SBU)  Almost immediately after the award was announced, 
Transport Minister Ojo Maduekwe sought to reverse the bid 
process.  Under his name, advertisements were placed in the 
local press claiming that since Niger Dock was under probe by 
a judicial commission, privatization of the company could not 
proceed. (In 2000, President Obasanjo had set up a judicial 
commission to look into the affairs of the company since 
2000.  This led to the dissolution of its previous board and 
the suspension of Niger Dock's previous Chief Executive.) 
BPE challenged the Minister's assertion.  BPE's helmsman 
Nasir El-Rufai postulated that since the Judicial Commission 
was looking only into past activities, their findings in no 
way could corrupt the privatization process. 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
McDermott Stands Down on Niger Dock, at Least for Now 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
 
9.  (SBU) Enter another fly into the Niger Dock ointment. On 
November 20, el-Rufai briefed Ambassador Jeter on the 
decision of J. Ray McDermott not to commit equity 
participation with GEC at this time, a message crafted on 
November 8 but undelivered to the BPE until after the bid 
award had been announced.  In its message to GEC, McDermott 
indicated it agreed to remain a technical partner and provide 
capital equipment for Niger Dock capacity improvements. 
McDermott also kept the door open for increasing its 
participation in the near future. The BPE chief believed the 
complexion of the GEC/McDermott bid had been altered 
substantially by the McDermott decision.  He feared this late 
change in the partnership arrangement jeopardized the entire 
Niger Dock bid process, and would give the upper hand to 
those who did not want Niger Dock privatization to proceed. 
(For more detail on the Ambassador's meeting with el-Rufai, 
see septel.) 
 
 
10. (SBU)  McDermott management confirmed to USDOC that 
although the company still had a strong interest in Nigerdock 
and was committed to provide significant technical and 
infrastructure support, corporate approvals for providing a 
50/50 equity split with GEC for the project had not yet been 
forthcoming. Such technical participation, McDermott 
believed, was allowed under the draft sales and purchase 
agreement between GEC and the GON. GEC had already secured 
bank financing. And corporate buy-in at some level up to 50 
percent could be obtained as early as the first quarter of 
2002. 
Jeter