Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 01HANOI2817, VIETNAM AND THE MIDDLE EAST, AND BEYOND:

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #01HANOI2817.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
01HANOI2817 2001-10-29 04:39 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Hanoi
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.


2001HANOI02817 - UNCLASSIFIED
 
 
 
                           UNCLASSIFIED     PTO9412

PAGE 01        HANOI  02817  01 OF 03  290455Z 
ACTION EAP-00   

INFO  LOG-00   NP-00    AID-00   ACQ-00   CEA-01   CIAE-00  COME-00  
      CTME-00  INL-00   USNW-00  DOEE-00  ITCE-00  SRPP-00  DS-00    
      EB-00    EXME-00  OIGO-00  E-00     FBIE-00  UTED-00  VC-00    
      FRB-00   H-01     TEDE-00  INR-00   IO-00    ITC-01   L-00     
      VCE-00   MOFM-05  MOF-03   AC-01    NEA-00   DCP-01   NSAE-00  
      NSCE-00  OES-01   OMB-01   OPIC-01  PA-00    PC-01    PM-00    
      PRS-00   ACE-00   P-00     SP-00    SSO-00   SS-00    STR-00   
      TEST-00  TRSE-00  T-00     USIE-00  SA-00    FMP-00   EPAE-00  
      PMB-00   DSCC-00  PRM-00   DRL-02   G-00     NFAT-00  SAS-00   
      SWCI-00    /019W
                  ------------------3691DF  290455Z /38    
FM AMEMBASSY HANOI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4519
INFO AMCONSUL HO CHI MINH CITY 
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 
SECDEF WASHDC//ISA/ABLAGG//
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA//
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 HANOI 002817 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV; NEA/IAI; NEA/ENA; NEA/NGA; SA/PAB 
 
                       UNCLASSIFIED 
 
PAGE 02        HANOI  02817  01 OF 03  290455Z 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL ETRD KPAL VM IZ IS PK SY TU AF LY
SUBJECT:  VIETNAM AND THE MIDDLE EAST, AND BEYOND: 
--         TRANSFORMING TRADITIONAL FRIENDSHIPS 
 
REF: A.  HANOI 2139     B.  HANOI 2658 
 
1.  (SBU)  SUMMARY.  DESPITE A DESIRE TO PRESERVE 
"TRADITIONAL FRIENDSHIPS" IN THE MIDDLE EAST, THE LARGER 
THRUST OF THE GVN'S REGIONAL AND GLOBAL FOREIGN POLICY OVER 
THE PAST DECADE HAS BEEN TO BROADEN ITS BASE OF DIPLOMATIC 
PARTNERS AND TO PUT A GREATER EMPHASIS ON BUSINESS TIES. 
FOR EXAMPLE, VIETNAM SUPPORTS PALESTINIAN ASPIRATIONS FOR 
STATEHOOD, BUT ALSO MAINTAINS "NORMAL RELATIONS" WITH 
ISRAEL, ALBEIT WITHOUT AN EMBASSY THERE.  THE GVN HAS NO 
DIPLOMATIC TIES WITH THE TALIBAN AND WORRIES ABOUT CIVILIAN 
CASUALTIES IN THE CURRENT US-LED MILITARY OPERATIONS.  ITS 
MAJOR COMMERCIAL RELATIONSHIP IN THE REGION REMAINS WITH 
IRAQ.  RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN ARE GROWING INCREMENTALLY. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
PALESTINE/ISRAEL: WE CAN DEAL WITH BOTH 
--------------------------------------- 
 
2.  (SBU) DOAN NGOC BOI, DEPUTY DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE 
MFA'S WEST ASIA AND AFRICA DEPARTMENT, DESCRIBED THE 
PALESTINE AUTHORITY AS AN IMPORTANT "TRADITIONAL FRIEND" OF 
VIETNAM, WHICH STRONGLY SUPPORTS PALESTINIAN STATEHOOD.  IN 
HIS VIEW, AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE "WOULD SOLVE MANY 
                       UNCLASSIFIED 
 
PAGE 03        HANOI  02817  01 OF 03  290455Z 
PROBLEMS" IN THE AREA.  BOI NOTED THAT PRESIDENT ARAFAT 
VISITS VIETNAM REGULARLY (REF A) AND WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE 
TO DO SO FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. 
 
3. (SBU)  BOI SAID THAT, IN LINE WITH VIETNAM'S EFFORTS "TO 
BE FRIENDS WITH ALL NATIONS," IT HAD EXPANDED ITS TIES WITH 
ISRAEL TO A MORE "NORMAL RELATIONSHIP," ADDING THAT "THERE 
IS NO REASON" THAT ECONOMIC TIES COULD NOT INCREASE.  THE 
MFA'S TU NOTED THAT THERE HAVE BEEN NUMEROUS OFFICIAL VISITS 
(BUT NOT VERY HIGH LEVEL) SINCE ISRAEL OPENED ITS EMBASSY IN 
HANOI IN 1993, INCLUDING THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE ISRAELI 
MFA ASIA AND PACIFIC IN JANUARY 2001, AND A DELEGATION FROM 
THE ISRAEL MANUFACTURERS' ASSOCIATION IN APRIL 2001.  THE 
GVN DEPUTY MINISTER OF SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND ENVIRONMENT 
VISITED ISRAEL IN 2000.  TU CLAIMED THAT VIETNAM'S "NORMAL" 
RELATIONSHIP WITH ISRAEL "HAS NOT AFFECTED" ITS FRIENDSHIPS 
WITH ARAB STATES, BECAUSE "THEY UNDERSTAND WE SEEK GOOD 
RELATIONS WITH ALL COUNTRIES."  TU ADDED THAT DESPITE GVN 
WISHES TO OPEN AN EMBASSY IN ISRAEL SINCE 1993, THERE ARE 
STILL NO CONCRETE PLANS TO DO SO.  VIETNAM'S AMBASSADOR TO 
CAIRO IS ACCREDITED TO ISRAEL. 
 
4. (SBU)  ACCORDING TO ISRAELI EMBASSY SECOND SECRETARY EYAL 
BUVILSKI, ISRAEL IS CURRENTLY FOCUSED ON EXPANDING BILATERAL 
TRADE WITH VIETNAM, NOW ONLY ABOUT USD 25 MILLION ANNUALLY. 
HE SAID THAT WHILE THERE HAS BEEN A GENERAL INCREASE IN 
INTEREST FROM ISRAELI BUSINESSMEN, LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS, SUCH 
AS WORKING WITH LOCAL BANKS AND OBTAINING VISAS, REMAIN 
OBSTACLES.  ISRAEL HAS EXPRESSED A HOPE THAT THE GVN SOON 
ESTABLISH SOME SORT OF OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION IN ISRAEL, 
SUCH AS A TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, TO FACILITATE SUCH TIES. 
                       UNCLASSIFIED 
 
PAGE 04        HANOI  02817  01 OF 03  290455Z 
BUVILSKI NOTED THAT ISRAEL IS ALSO INTERESTED IN EXPANDING 
ITS ONGOING AGRICULTURAL ASSISTANCE TO VIETNAM AND IN 
PROVIDING TRAINING FOR ADDITIONAL VIETNAMESE STUDENTS IN 
ISRAEL. 
 
------------------------------------ 
AFGHANISTAN:  WORRIES ABOUT CIVILIANS 
----------------------------------- 
5.  (SBU)  NGUYEN HUY DZUNG, SENIOR EXPERT IN THE MFA'S ASIA 
II DEPARTMENT, CHARACTERIZED VIETNAM'S RELATIONSHIP WITH 
AFGHANISTAN AS "NONEXISTENT," BOTH POLITICALLY AND 
ECONOMICALLY.  VIETNAM MAINTAINED AN EMBASSY IN KABUL FROM 
1982-1992 BUT THEN CLOSED IT DUE TO THE CIVIL WAR AND 
VIETNAM'S OWN DIFFICULT FINANCIAL SITUATION.  DZUNG 
REAFFIRMED VIETNAM'S OPPOSITION TO "TERRORISM OF ANY KIND" 
BUT EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE ONGOING US-LED MILITARY 
ATTACKS IN AFGHANISTAN DUE TO THE LIKELY IMPACT ON CIVILIAN 
POPULATIONS, A LINE REPEATED IN OFFICIAL MEDIA REPEATEDLY IN 
RECENT DAYS. 
 
6.  (SBU)  THE MFA'S BOI SEPARATELY NOTED THAT THE GVN IS 
KEEPING A CLOSE EYE ON FIVE AFGHAN NATIONALS APPARENTLY 
TEACHING AT AN ARABIC-LANGUAGE SCHOOL LOCATED ON THE LIBYAN 
EMBASSY COMPOUND. (NOTE:  REF B REPORTED ONLY FOUR AFGHANS 
AT THIS SCHOOL WHO WORSHIP AT HANOI'S SOLE MOSQUE.)  HE 
CLAIMED THAT THREE SHOULD BE LEAVING THE COUNTRY "SOON," 
SINCE THEIR VISAS HAVE EXPIRED. 
 
 
----------------------- 
PAKISTAN:  LITTLE STEPS 
----------------------- 
 
7. (SBU) DR. FAZAL-UR-RAHMAN KAZI, THE PAKISTAN EMBASSY'S 
FIRST SECRETARY, TOLD POLOFF ON OCTOBER 16 THAT PAKISTAN IS 
ANXIOUS TO IMPROVE ITS POLITICAL AND COMMERCIAL RELATIONSHIP 
WITH VIETNAM AS PART OF ITS OWN EFFORT "TO BECOME MORE 
ENGAGED IN SOUTHEAST ASIA."  PAKISTAN ESTABLISHED RELATIONS 
WITH VIETNAM IN 1973, BUT CLOSED ITS EMBASSY IN 1985, DUE TO 
"FINANCIAL REASONS."  DR. FAZI DESCRIBED THIS MOVE AS A 
"MISTAKE" THAT WAS NOT RECTIFIED UNTIL OCTOBER 2000. 
HOWEVER, VIETNAM STILL DOES NOT HAVE AN EMBASSY IN 
ISLAMABAD, ALTHOUGH IT HAS AGREED "IN PRINCIPLE" TO OPEN 
ONE, ACCORDING TO DR. KAZI. 
 
8. (SBU)  PAKISTANI LEADER GENERAL MUSHARRAF VISITED VIETNAM 
FOR THREE DAYS IN MAY 2001, DURING WHICH THE TWO COUNTRIES 
SIGNED A TRADE AGREEMENT, A DRAFT SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 
AGREEMENT, AND AN AGREEMENT TO FORM A JOINT MINISTERIAL 
COMMISSION.  THE GVN DURING THE VISIT ALSO PLEDGED SUPPORT 
FOR PAKISTAN'S GOAL OF BECOMING A MEMBER OF THE ASEAN 
REGIONAL FORUM AND THE ASIA-EUROPE FORUM.  DEPUTY PRIME 
MINISTER NGUYEN CONG TAN HAS NOW POSTPONED HIS VISIT TO 
PAKISTAN SCHEDULED FOR NOVEMBER, CITING THE ONGOING MILITARY 
                       UNCLASSIFIED 
 
PAGE 03        HANOI  02817  02 OF 03  290455Z 
ACTIVITIES IN THE REGION, DR. KAZI ADDED. 
 
9. (SBU)  DR. KAZI ADMITTED THAT THE BILATERAL ECONOMIC 
RELATIONSHIP IS "LIMITED," WITH BILATERAL TRADE ONLY WORTH 
ABOUT USD 25 MILLION IN 2000.  PAKISTAN IMPORTED 
APPROXIMATELY USD 16 MILLION WORTH OF GOODS FROM VIETNAM, 
PRIMARILY TEA, BLACK PEPPER AND FOOTWEAR, WHILE VIETNAM 
IMPORTED ABOUT USD 9 MILLION WORTH OF FERTILIZER, YARN, 
COTTON, AND OTHER GOODS.  BOTH COUNTRIES HAVE PLEDGED TO 
INCREASE THE TRADE VOLUME TO USD 100 MILLION, BUT DR. KAZI 
SAID THAT THERE ARE NO FIRM TARGETS ON WHEN TO ACHIEVE THIS 
GOAL.  DR. KAZI ADDED THAT ONE SIGNIFICANT LOGISTICAL 
PROBLEM FOR PAKISTANI BUSINESSMEN IS THEY CANNOT OBTAIN 
VIETNAMESE VISAS IN PAKISTAN. 
 
10. (SBU)  THE MFA'S DZUNG SEPARATELY CONFIRMED THAT VIETNAM 
WOULD LIKE TO INCREASE BILATERAL TRADE WITH PAKISTAN, 
CLAIMING THAT THIS IS NOW VIETNAM'S "PRIMARY INTEREST" IN 
THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP.  ACCORDINGLY, VIETNAM IS 
"EXPLORING VARIOUS OPPORTUNITIES," HE ADDED WITHOUT OFFERING 
ANY SPECIFICS.  DZUNG NOTED THAT THE IMPROVING POLITICAL AND 
COMMERCIAL TIES WITH PAKISTAN ARE IN LINE WITH THE 9TH PARTY 
CONGRESS' POLICY STATEMENT TO INCREASE VIETNAM'S PRESENCE IN 
"ALL SOUTH ASIAN COUNTRIES."  HE ALSO NOTED THAT VIETNAM 
WOULD LIKE TO OPEN AN EMBASSY IN PAKISTAN, BUT ADMITTED HE 
NOT KNOW WHEN IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO DO SO.  HE AND DR. 
KAZI MADE PARALLEL STATEMENTS ABOUT HOW THE BILATERAL 
ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP COULD IMPROVE QUICKLY ONCE THE 
SITUATION IN THE REGION "STABILIZES." 
 
--------------------- 
                       UNCLASSIFIED 
 
PAGE 04        HANOI  02817  02 OF 03  290455Z 
"TRADITIONAL FRIENDS" 
--------------------- 
 
11.  (SBU)  THE MFA'S BOI, DESCRIBED IRAQ (ALONG WITH LIBYA) 
AS VIETNAM'S MOST IMPORTANT "TRADITIONAL FRIENDS" IN THE 
MIDDLE EAST DURING A MEETING WITH POLOFF ON OCTOBER 12.  HE 
NOTED IN PARTICULAR THAT IRAQ HAD PROVIDED SIGNIFICANT 
ASSISTANCE TO VIETNAM DURING THE WAR WITH THE US. 
SEPARATELY, COLONEL TRAN NHUNG, DIRECTOR OF THE PEOPLES' 
ARMY NEWSPAPER INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT, CLAIMED THAT 
VIETNAM COULD NEVER FORGET IRAQ'S "INVALUABLE SUPPORT" 
DURING THAT PERIOD, WHILE ADMITTING THAT VIETNAM STILL 
"OWES" IRAQ APPROXIMATELY USD 100 MILLION.  BOI NOTED THAT 
VIETNAM HAD, HOWEVER, NOT SUPPORTED THE IRAQ'S INVASION OF 
KUWAIT.  COLONEL NHUNG STATED THAT VIETNAM HAD NONETHELESS 
"PROTESTED" UN SANCTIONS BECAUSE THEY "ESSENTIALLY HURT 
CIVILIANS." 
 
12.  (SBU)  BOI STRESSED THAT THE IRAQ-VIETNAM COMMERCIAL 
RELATIONSHIP IS "COMPLETELY WITHIN THE UN FRAMEWORK." 
VIETNAMESE EXPORTS TO IRAQ IN 2000 WERE WORTH APPROXIMATELY 
USD319 MILLION, PRIMARILY RICE, RUBBER, TEXTILES, AND 
GARMENTS.  VIETNAM IMPORTS MAINLY OIL FROM IRAQ, PARTLY FOR 
RE-SALE ON THE INTERNATIONAL MARKET.   BUT BOI PREDICTED 
THAT VIETNAM'S TRADE WITH IRAQ WOULD DECLINE AS IRAQ 
INCREASINGLY LOOKS TOWARD MORE TRADE WITH SYRIA, TUNISIA, 
AND TURKEY. 
 
13.  (SBU)  ACCORDING TO SENIOR EXPERT TRAN VIET TU OF THE 
MFA'S WEST ASIA DEPARTMENT, ABOUT 2,000 VIETNAMESE NATIONALS 
ARE CURRENTLY WORKING IN LIBYA, ANOTHER "TRADITIONAL 
FRIEND."  "A FEW" OTHERS ARE WORKING IN LEBANON AND THE 
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES (UAE), HE ADDED.  IN LIBYA, MOST ARE IN 
THE CONSTRUCTION FIELD, WORKING FOR SOUTH KOREAN 
CONTRACTORS.  TU STATED THAT THE WORKERS DO NOT APPEAR TO BE 
IN ANY DANGER, BUT IF THE SITUATION DETERIORATED, VIETNAM 
WOULD TAKE ACTION TO REPATRIATE THEM.  HE NOTED THAT VIETNAM 
HAD SUCCESSFULLY REPATRIATED 16,000 WORKERS FROM IRAQ DURING 
THE GULF WAR; BRINGING BACK THOSE IN LIBYA, LEBANON, AND THE 
UAE "WOULD NOT PRESENT A PROBLEM" SHOULD IT BE NECESSARY TO 
DO SO. 
 
14. (SBU)  COMMENT:  MUCH AS VIETNAM WOULD LIKE TO ENHANCE 
ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH NEWER PARTNERS AS WELL AS 
"TRADITIONAL" FRIENDS IN AND NEAR THE MIDDLE EAST, DISTANCE, 
BUREAUCRATIC OBSTACLES AND WEAK MARKETS WILL REMAIN 
UNAVOIDABLE CONSTRAINTS.  VIETNAM'S OWN FINANCIAL 
LIMITATIONS HAMPER ITS ABILITY TO OPEN NEW DIPLOMATIC 
MISSIONS, A FURTHER DISINCENTIVE FOR THE KINDS OF 
IMPROVEMENTS IN BILATERAL AND REGIONAL RELATIONS IT SEEKS. 
PORTER 
 
                       UNCLASSIFIED 
 
PAGE 03        HANOI  02817  03 OF 03  290455Z 
 
                       UNCLASSIFIED