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Viewing cable 01ABUJA1950, MEETING WITH NIGERIAN POLICE OFFICIALS TO DISCUSS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
01ABUJA1950 2001-08-06 15:15 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Abuja
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 ABUJA 001950 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DEPT FOR: DS/DSS, DS/OP/AF, DS/DSS/ATA 
 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC NI
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH NIGERIAN POLICE OFFICIALS TO DISCUSS 
TRAINING REQUIREMENTS. 
 
1. (U) On Friday, July 20, the Abuja RSO met with several 
senior level Nigeria Police Force (NPF) officials.  The 
purpose of this meeting was to obtain information requested 
by the Department in preparation for providing the NPF 
training under the Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) program. 
The following information is in response to information 
requested by DS/DSS/ATA. 
 
 
2. (U) A. LAW ENFORCEMENT ORGANIZATION AND 
RESPONSIBILITIES: 
 
 
A) What police organizations exist and operate in Nigeria? 
Please provide the organizational structure(s), missions 
and chains of command, and, if possible, an organizational 
chart(s) (National/local Civil Police, Military police or 
units, if applicable other law enforcement entities). 
 
 
Nigeria is a Federal Republic.  The Nigeria Police Force is 
a centralized police force, serving the entire country. 
There are 36 states in Nigeria (plus the Federal Capital 
Territory); each state has its own police command, but all 
police commands report to the Inspector General of Police 
(IGP), who is the senior police official in Nigeria.  The 
IGP is based in Abuja.  A Commissioner of Police leads each 
of the state police commands.  The state police commands 
are aggregated into 7 zones.  An Assistant Inspector 
General of Police is responsible for supervising all police 
commands in his/her zone. 
 
 
The NPF is a civilian law enforcement agency.  The Nigerian 
military has decreasing responsibilities for law 
enforcement and security in the civilian sector. The NPF 
includes the following agencies: 
 
 
-The Nigeria Police Force (NPF): The primary agency 
responsible for law enforcement in Nigeria. 
 
 
-The Federal Highway Patrol (FHP): Responsible for 
patrolling inter-state highways and some VIP/dignitary 
security (escort of motorcades). 
 
 
-The Federal Road Safety Commission (FRSC): Responsible for 
enforcement of motor vehicle safety regulations, vehicle 
inspections and taxation. 
 
 
-Police Mobile Force (PMF): Responsible for responding to 
incidents requiring crowd/riot control and the protection 
of Nigerian government facilities. 
 
 
-There are several specialized units within the NPF, to 
include the Bomb Squad, Diplomatic Protection Unit 
(responsible for providing security to foreign missions), 
Central Intelligence Bureau (CIB) and Criminal 
Investigations Division (CID). 
 
 
3. (U) HOW DO THE VARIOUS POLICE FORCES AND MILITARY 
COMPLEMENT ONE ANOTHER? 
 
 
The NPF is responsible to enforce the law in the civilian 
sector, to include traditional law enforcement in cities, 
towns and rural areas.  The NPF also has special units 
dedicated to protecting GON civilian facilities, to include 
the Presidential Villa, federal offices, airports and 
seaports. 
 
 
The NPF works with the Nigerian military to patrol land 
borders and provide oil pipeline security. Military law 
enforcement organizations are primarily responsible for 
policing on military bases, and ensuring the security of 
military officials and facilities.  Joint patrols are 
occasionally established to confront special threats. 
 
 
Senior level police officials, to include the IGP, are 
selected from NPF career officers.  Most senior level NPF 
officials have completed advanced degrees, to include law 
school. 
 
 
4. (U) CRISIS MANAGEMENT: 
 
 
The IGP is in charge of all NPF operational efforts in 
response to crises with national impact.  The NPF will 
typically deploy large numbers of officers assigned to the 
Police Mobile Force (PMF) to respond to a crisis.  The NPF 
officials on the panel advised they have experienced the 
following problems in responding to a crisis situation: 
 
 
-Logistics (transportation); 
-Inadequate equipment; 
-Communications; 
-Training. 
 
 
5. (U) INVESTIGATIONS 
 
 
The NPF Central Intelligence Bureau (CIB) is responsible 
for gathering intelligence used by the police.  The NPF 
Criminal Investigative Division (CID) is responsible for 
conducting all criminal investigations.  CIB and CID are 
led by Assistant Inspector Generals of Police (AIGP), who 
report directly to the IGP.  Each of Nigeria's 36 states 
and the FCT has its own separate CIB and CID commands, 
which report directly to the Commissioner of Police for the 
State.  Overall supervision is provided by the NPF CIB and 
CID located at NPF Head Quarters in Abuja. 
 
 
The NPF relays on the use of both evidence and 
interrogation in the prosecution of cases.  NPF regulations 
prohibit the use of force during interrogations. 
 
 
The CIB is the NPF entity responsible for detecting and 
identifying any potential terrorist groups or activities. 
This responsibility is also shared by two other GON 
agencies that are not part of the NPF, the State Security 
Service (SSS) and Nigerian Intelligence Agency (NIA).  The 
NPF CID is responsible for investigating and prosecuting 
any terrorist acts. 
 
 
6. (U) TERRORIST CASE MANAGEMENT: 
 
 
The NPF was involved in responding to an aircraft-hijacking 
incident in the Republic of Niger in 1995.  The NPF sent 
several officers to Niger to assist local authorities in 
response to the incident, and conducted the investigation 
after the incident was resolved. 
 
 
The NPF officials on the panel advised their agency does 
not possess adequate forensic capabilities, equipment and 
training required to conduct an investigation of a major 
terrorist incident.  The NPF officials expressed a strong 
interest to receive assistance in this area. 
 
 
7. (U) EXPLOSIVE INCIDENTS: 
 
 
The NPF has several late model Mercedes Benz bomb squad 
trucks equipped with bomb handling robots and bomb 
containment trailers.  However, the NPF officials on the 
panel advised they are in dire need of bomb suits, 
explosive detectors and portable x-ray devices.  The NPF 
bomb squad also lacks trained bomb dogs. 
 
 
The NPF bomb squad has received previous bomb handling 
training from the Federal Republic of Germany, and post- 
blast investigation from the United States. 
 
 
The NPF bomb squad does not have significant experience 
responding to actual bomb threats requiring them to "render 
safe."  However, the NPF bomb squad has responded to 
numerous industrial accidents involving explosive 
chemicals. 
 
 
The Nigerian military does not typically provide the NPF 
with assistance in response to explosive incidents. 
 
 
8. (U) POST BLAST INVESTIGATION: 
 
 
The Post Blast Investigations (PBI) unit is a part of the 
Nigeria Police Bomb Squad and CID units.  Bomb Squad units 
are strategically located throughout Nigeria, to include 
Lagos and Abuja. 
 
 
The NPF Bomb Squad PBI unit has not conducted any 
significant investigations in the past 36 months. 
 
 
9. (U) URBAN PATROL AND POLICING: 
 
 
The sizes of NPF police jurisdictions varies.  There are 37 
NPF state police commands.  A Commissioner of Police 
supervises each police command.  Each command has several 
different zones (supervised by a Deputy Commissioner of 
Police), usually defined by the geographic boundaries of 
cities or local area governments. Each zone has several 
areas, further broken into districts.  Districts are 
supervised by District Police Officers (DPO).  The officers 
serving in a district are assigned to a post or beat. 
 
 
The Nigerian Police lacks adequate resources (vehicles, 
communications, etc.) to effectively respond to an 
overwhelming crime situation.  Many local area, city and 
state governments seek to reduce these inadequacies by 
providing the NPF with additional patrol cars, boats, etc. 
 
 
The NPF has not received any outside training in hostage 
negotiation, roadblocks and response to high threat crimes 
in progress.  The NPF officials on the panel expressed a 
strong interest to receive additional training in these 
areas. 
 
 
10. (U) LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING AND EDUCATION SYSTEMS: 
 
 
All NPF recruits are required to have completed secondary 
school (the equivalent of U.S. High School) before 
acceptance into the service.  The recruitment process 
included a written examination and medical examination 
before initial training.  The NPF does not conduct any 
physical fitness examination on potential recruits. All NPF 
recruits must be able to speak and read English. 
 
 
The major NPF training academies are located in Ikeja 
(Lagos), Jos, Kano, Kaduna and Enugu. 
 
 
The NPF does not receive regular training from foreign law 
enforcement agencies.  The NPF has received training in the 
past, to include bomb handling training from the Federal 
Republic of Germany and post blast investigation from the 
United States.  Several senior level NPF officers have 
attended training in the United States hosted by the FBI. 
 
 
The NPF officials on the panel admitted there are serious 
inadequacies in their training program, especially in the 
area of firearms training.  Most recruits are lucky if they 
have the opportunity to fire more than a dozen rounds while 
in training.  There is no requirement to pass with a 
minimum score, and targets are hardly every evaluated. 
 
 
11. (U) CRISIS REACTION TEAMS (SWAT): 
 
 
The NPF does not have a dedicated Crisis Reaction Team.  In 
the event of a crisis situation, the NPF draws officers 
from regular police units.  These NPF officers do not 
receive any special Crises Reaction training or equipment. 
 
 
The NPF officials on the panel expressed a strong interest 
in receiving assistance in this area. 
 
 
12. (U) CONTROL OF INTERNATIONAL BORDERS: 
 
 
Nigeria's borders are protected by joint patrols of the NPF 
and Nigerian Military.  The NPF has dedicated units 
assigned to protecting seaports and airports.  Special NPF 
marine units patrol waterways, and enforce maritime law in 
cooperation with the Nigerian Navy and Coast Guard.  Like 
most other NPF units, these units are ill prepared, 
equipped and trained to adequately perform their duties. 
 
 
13. (U) PERSONAL PROTECTION OPERATIONS: 
 
 
The NPF has a large number of officers assigned to VIP and 
dignitary protection.  Most of these officers are assigned 
to CIB or PMF.  The NPF only protects persons inside 
Nigeria.  NPF officers are assigned to current and former 
high-level GON officials.  The NPF also provides security 
for any foreign government official upon request.  The 
protection services provided by the NPF includes crowd 
control, motorcade escort and the manning of security 
posts. 
 
 
The NPF regularly provides security for high-level official 
USG visits.  This support has been invaluable. 
 
 
The NPF officers on the panel expressed a strong interest 
in learning proper motorcade procedures, site advance work 
and close quarters protection operations. 
 
 
14. (U) INSTALLATION SECURITY: 
 
 
The NPF Police Mobile Force is responsible for manning 
security posts at GON facilities.  The NPF does not conduct 
any threat/risk analysis of these facilities. 
 
 
The NPF officials on the panel expressed a strong interest 
in receiving training in these areas. 
 
 
15. (U) ASSISTANCE: 
 
 
The NPF has not received any significant hands on training 
or assistance from other countries. 
 
 
16. (U) WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD): 
 
 
The NPF does not have the capability to respond to a WMD 
scenario.  The NPF does not have an emergency plan, 
equipment, logistics or training to respond to a WMD 
incident. 
 
 
The NPF officials expressed a strong interest in receiving 
training and assistance in this area. 
 
 
17. (U) MEDICAL SERVICES: 
 
 
The NPF officials on the panel characterized their medical 
emergency disaster plan as inadequate.  Nigeria lacks 
adequate medical facilities and response services. 
 
 
The NPF officials on the panel expressed a strong interest 
in receiving additional training and assistance in this 
area. 
 
 
18. (U) RSO COMMENTS: 
 
 
The Abuja RSO has worked with the Nigerian Police Force and 
other security agencies for the past two and a half years. 
The level of support provided by the host country law 
enforcement and security services has been phenomenal. 
Although the NPF seriously lacks adequate resources to 
effectively respond to an overwhelming responsibility, they 
consistently provide the U.S. Diplomatic Mission in Nigeria 
everything they have to ensure the security of Mission 
personnel, facilities and high-level USG visits. 
 
 
After two decades of neglect under military rule, Nigeria's 
civilian law enforcement and security services are in dire 
need of training assistance in all areas. 
 
 
Jeter