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### Viewing cable 08BEIRUT687, LEBANON: WITH CENTCOM ACTING COMMANDER, DEFMIN

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
08BEIRUT687 | 2008-05-14 21:23 | 2011-05-06 00:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Beirut

Appears in these articles:
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11352
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11351
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11627
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11626
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11712
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11713

`

    VZCZCXRO4566
    OO RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
    DE RUEHLB #0687/01 1352123
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O 142123Z MAY 08
    FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1870
    INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
    RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
    RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2284
    RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2588
    RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 000687

    SIPDIS

    DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA
    ALSO FOR IO A/S SILVERBERG AND PDAS WARLICK
    USUN FOR KHALILZAD/WOLFF/KUMAR/PHEE
    NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/YERGER/GAVITO

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/13/2018
    TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR ASEC UNSC EAIR SA IR LE
    SUBJECT: LEBANON: WITH CENTCOM ACTING COMMANDER, DEFMIN
    MURR ARGUES FOR LAF SUPPORT

    REF: A. BEIRUT 618
         ¶B. BEIRUT 681

    Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4
    (b) and (d).

    SUMMARY
    --------

    ¶1. (C) Acting CENTCOM Commander and CENTCOM J5 Policy and
    Planning Director Major General Allardice, in a May 13 visit
    to Beirut, met with Deputy Prime Minister and Defense
    Minister Elias Murr to discuss support for the LAF.  There
    has been a shift in Murr's thinking since we last saw him
    three days ago on May 11:  he now insists that the current
    majority must maintain control of the Ministry of Defense in
    any new government, regardless of whether it retains the
    majority.  Earlier this week we had assessed that control of
    the Ministry of Interior was essential to Murr and to his
    father, wily political leader Michel Murr (since the Ministry
    of Interior oversees electoral law, voter registration, and
    the Internal Security Forces).  However, Murr was clear that
    Hizballah could not put a Hizballah-sympathizer at the head
    of the Ministry of Defense.

    ¶2. (C) Murr's priority now is to have a "friendly" Defense
    Minister who will influence the Lebanese Armed Forces' (LAF)
    strategy, and ideally, control over the LAF and LAF G-2
    (military intelligence), and then work towards summer 2009
    parliamentary election victories.  This message was conveyed
    to visiting Central Command Acting Commander Dempsey so that
    the U.S. will be willing to provide up-armored humvees, night
    vision goggles, body armor, and upgrading the Huey UH-I to
    Huey UH-II.

    ¶3. (C) Murr outlined three scenarios for the region in which
    Hizballah is weakened and the LAF must be strengthened in
    order to assume Hizballah's weapons.  First, an international
    military strike against Iranian nuclear facilities; second, a
    new round of fighting between Israel and Hizballah in which
    Hizballah is defeated; third, a longer-term proposition
    whereby the LAF is gradually strengthened in the hopes that
    it will stand up to Hizballah "in better days."  Regardless
    of the scenario, Murr concluded, the stronger the LAF is, the
    weaker Hizballah will be.  End summary.

    VISIT IS A DEFIANCE
    TO HIZBALLAH
    -------------------

    ¶4. (C) Acting Commander for Central Command Lieutenant
    General Martin Dempsey, CENTCOM J5 Policy and Planning
    Director Major General Allardice, LTC Paddock, and POLAD
    Ensher, in Beirut for the day, and the Charge visited Defense
    Minister Elias Murr on May 14.  A defiant Murr started the
    meeting with a photo op, telling Dempsey that the pictures
    will be Murr's response to al-Manar's (Hizballah's TV
    station) accusation that Murr is a "puppet of the U.S."  Murr
    thanked Dempsey for incurring risks to visit him.  (Note:
    Approximately 200 Hizballah members have stationed themselves
    around Free Patriotic Movement Michel Aoun's residence, a few
    hundred meters down the street.  End note.)

    EXPLAINING HIZBALLAH'S
    AIRPORT CAMERA STRATEGY
    -----------------------

    ¶5. (C) There is not an army in the world that can conduct a
    coup d'etat in 12 hours without significant preparation, Murr
    began.  The surveillance cameras that were placed at the
    airport by Hizballah (Ref A), used in conjunction with
    radios, were part of a larger plan by Hizballah to shift the
    balance of power in the government, he said.  For previous
    political assassinations, he explained, Hizballah has
    typically spent two to three months monitoring its target,
    and then the last few weeks in closer scrutiny before
    attacking.

    ¶6. (C) Murr noted that the airport cameras, stolen in
    September 2007 from Transportation Minister Safadi's private
    aviation business office and installed on April 23, 2008,

    BEIRUT 00000687  002 OF 004

    were positioned to watch private jet traffic.  They were
    providing intelligence for an imminent assassination attempt.
     He believes that March 14 Sunni leader Saad Hariri (whose
    name is often mentioned as the next prime minister) and
    current Prime Minister Fouad Siniora (also Sunni) were the
    top targets, and he himself was next on Hizballah's list.  He
    noted that all three had been likely to travel in the next
    few weeks.

    ¶7. (C) The coup indicates that Hizballah wanted to do
    something to bring down the Sunnis, Murr said.  If Saad were
    killed, the Hariri dynasty would be over, and Sunni fighters
    would take to the street.  He continued, Hizballah would have
    a reason to use arms to defend itself because it will have
    pointed to Al Qaeda as the mastermind of the assassination.
    Murr supported this hypothesis by revealing that he had
    received reports that Al Qaeda was preparing an attack on a
    plane over Beirut International Airport.  Murr highlighted
    that these intelligence reports were coming from the LAF G-2
    (military intelligence) office in Dahiyeh, the southern,
    predominately-Shia suburb of Beirut.  Murr concluded that
    someone was feeding false information to the G-2 to prepare
    the atmosphere.

    ¶8. (C) An alibi was further established when Al Qaeda's
    second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri, who is purportedly
    financed by Iran, announced last month that Lebanon "will
    play a pivotal role in the Islamists' fight," Murr posited.
    Then, when the Cabinet responded to the cameras on May 5 by
    transferring the head of airport security, Hizballah seized
    the opportunity to launch its coup.

    ASSESSING THE
    LAF'S PERFORMANCE
    -----------------

    ¶9. (C) "The LAF did not do the job like it needed to," Murr
    assessed.  He said that the army cannot enter into a civil
    war because it would be split.  Another weak point, according
    to Murr, is that the LAF's current commander, General Michel
    Sleiman, is also the only presidential candidate.  Once a
    general has his eye on becoming the president, Murr said, he
    can no longer take a stand against any single group.  "He
    will play the hero o the end," Murr continued.  Sleiman was
    playingtwo roles, Murr relayed, he was first trying to make
    a balance between the victorious Shia and the defeated
    Sunnis, while also serving as an army commander afraid of
    Hizballah and of splitting the army.

    ¶10. (C) He qualified his assessment of the LAF by recounting
    past LAF achievements, most notably Nahr al-Barid, and
    concluded that the LAF can be counted on again, if the
    internal political process is functional.  He added that its
    future success is further guaranteed if the next LAF G-2
    Intelligence Director, LAF commander, and Defense Minister
    are allies.

    ¶11. (C) "I can't say I am disappointed (with the LAF's
    performance) because I always knew what I could expect.
    Besides, every army goes through a turbulent period," Murr
    said.  "I could take one of two approaches now.  I could
    criticize the LAF and explain its faults to the world.  Or, I
    could acknowledge that the LAF had a difficult moment, and
    now it is time to equip, train, and develop a forward-looking
    program."

    DISAPPOINTMENT WITH THE U.S.
    ----------------------------

    ¶12. (C) Murr relayed that he had heard from politicians, LAF
    officers, and ordinary citizens that they are disappointed in
    what they see as a lack of support from the U.S.  Some
    believe they have "been left in Saigon," Murr added.  He said
    that he himself had not been expecting more because he
    understands how the "U.S. agenda can't move according to Saad
    and Walid Jumblatt's agendas."  Nevertheless, I am realistic
    and with my feet on the ground -- it is time to move forward,
    he declared.

    GIVE THE LAF HOPE,
    MORALE, TIME

    BEIRUT 00000687  003 OF 004

    ------------------

    ¶13. (C) Murr urged Dempsey (whose next meeting was with
    Sleiman) to give the impression to Sleiman that the U.S. is
    very serious about Lebanon and will continue to train and
    equip the LAF.  Tell him that this "incident" will not change
    U.S. policy towards the LAF, Murr encouraged.  If the LAF
    doesn't have hope, it will go to Hizballah, he warned.  Right
    now, we need to have hope, a positive morale, and more time
    in order to survive and ultimately win, Murr rallied.

    DRUZE STOOD THEIR
    GROUND AGAINST
    HIZBALLAH
    -----------------

    ¶14. (C) He remarked on the solid performance of the Druze
    fighting Hizballah in the Chouf, saying that "lightly-armed
    boys" were able to defeat the fighters who held off Israel in
    ¶2006.  Adding that the leader of Hizballah's troops in the
    south (which specifically fought Israel) was killed by the
    Druze, Murr concluded that Hizballah is less than what it
    appears, though still strong.

    SCENARIOS IN WHICH THE LAF
    STANDS UP TO HIZBALLAH
    --------------------------

    ¶15. (C) In response to Dempsey's interest in what would
    prompt the LAF to stand up to Hizballah, Murr outlined three
    possible regional scenarios which would result in a weakened
    Hizballah, and consequently enable the LAF to take control.
    First, he described, Iran announces it has nuclear weapons
    and the international community conducts military strikes
    taking out its nuclear facilities.  Additionally, the U.S.
    (or international community) threatens or attacks Syria.
    Hizballah is consequently weakened without its power and
    funding sources, and the GOL will feel emboldened to discuss
    Hizballah's arms.

    ¶16. (C) Second, Murr continued, war could break out again
    between Israel and Hizballah, and Hizballah is defeated.  The
    LAF takes over in the south and the GOL is again ready to
    discuss disarming Hizballah.  Murr commented that he did not
    see the likelihood of this scenario.

    ¶17. (C) The third scenario takes a long-term approach during
    which the LAF is strengthened step-by-step while "waiting for
    better days."  Murr cautioned that Hizballah is also
    brainstorming now about its strategy, and this long-term
    approach could be a reinforcement race.  "The best day for
    Lebanon will be when we move Hizballah from a resistance
    movement to a group of gangsters."  The goal of this scenario
    is to wait until the dynamics have changed to favor the GOL
    and the LAF, and then the empowered GOL and LAF would take on
    Hizballah.  However, Murr warned, this strategy would take a
    long time.

    ¶18. (C) In these three scenarios, the premise is for
    Hizballah to be weakened by external events while at the same
    time, the LAF has been strengthened.  With GOL resolve, the
    LAF can then take on Hizballah.  When asked whether the LAF
    would use attack helicopters, if we provided them, against
    Hizballah, Murr responded, "The stronger the LAF is, the
    weaker Hizballah is."

    MINISTRY OF DEFENSE
    MOST IMPORTANT
    -------------------

    ¶19. (C) Having argued that a strong LAF could ultimately
    stand up to Hizballah, Murr continued laying out his
    strategy, focusing on the GOL's role.  Murr said that Saad,
    who could be the next PM, is inexperienced and would need
    strong ministers in key positions in the new government, "or
    else he will fail."  (He took himself out of the running,
    claiming, "I'm tired!")  (Comment:  We don't believe this for
    a minute.  End comment.)

    ¶20. (C) Murr seemed to accept the ten-ten-ten formula for
    dividing the cabinet, if ten seats are for "strong" majority

    BEIRUT 00000687  004 OF 004

    candidates and the president's ten are for "respectable,
    strong" individuals.  According to Murr, the opposition is
    determined to install its own people as the ministers of
    defense and interior so "there's no one who can say 'no' to
    any strategy to strengthen the LAF."  He explained that the
    defense strategy is proposed to the Ministry of Defense,
    which then has the final word.  Therefore, he deduced, it is
    less dangerous to give the opposition the Ministry of
    Interior than Defense.

    ¶21. (C) While acknowledging that both positions were
    considered essential and it would be a "catastrophe" if the
    opposition held both, Murr downplayed the Interior Ministry
    (which oversees many of the politicized issues including
    electoral law, voter registration, and the Internal Security
    Forces).  He told us that when he was previously the Minister
    of Interior, his sister lost an election by one vote,
    concluding, "Trust me!  The Minister can't change election
    results!  It's heard to cheat, I know!"

    ¶22. (C) Moreover, he said, there should be international
    observers for the summer 2009 parliamentary elections.
    "Ideally, we win the parliamentary elections, and have a
    strong LAF Commander and G-2," he hoped.  He concluded by
    stressing that it is an investment in the future to
    strengthen the LAF, regardless of what is happening on the
    ground.

    ¶23. (C) This strategy requires teamwork, Murr stated.  He
    voiced our thinking, "You don't want to invest in the LAF if
    it is between the hands of Hizballah."  While a
    Hizballah-controlled Defense Ministry is a red line for Murr,
    he said he is unsure if he is willing to trade the Interior
    Ministry for Defense because the Interior Minister could
    impose conditions on the LAF.

    MURR'S OWN ATTEMPTS
    AT COUNTERING HIZBALLAH
    -----------------------

    ¶24. (C) Murr told us that 58 percent of the LAF was Shia when
    he assumed his position as the Defense Minister.  Now, the
    Shia make up 23 percent, he said, because of his efforts.  He
    explained that after UN Security Council Resolution 1701 was
    passed, the LAF went on a hiring spree to deploy troops to
    the south, and the bulk of the new hires was intentionally
    Sunni, Druze, and Christians.  "Hizballah does not need to
    turn its arms against the Lebanese people if it controls the
    LAF," he continued, reasoning, "Today, if the Shia resign
    from the LAF, I still have almost 80 percent of the army."

    COMMENT
    -------

    ¶25. (C) As Murr told us, his family has been a part of the
    government since Lebanon's independence.  His grandfather had
    served as the Minister of Interior, his father, who is
    currently an MP, held positions in 17 governments, and he has
    served for 19 years in public service.  Clearly, the Murrs
    are seasoned politicians and tacticians.  Elias Murr
    anticipated and addressed CENTCOM's key concerns about the
    LAF's standing.  He tactically criticized the LAF's
    performance, chalked it up to a "storm cloud that has
    passed," and focused on why the U.S. should not give up.  In
    what was certainly a prepared 90-minute speech, Murr argued
    why a strong LAF is the best defense against Hizballah.  We
    agree with his assessment.

    ¶26. (C) Murr's focus on the Ministry of Defense is a marked
    changed from his previous position, which was his strong
    desire to become the Minister of Interior.  His fear of
    losing U.S. support for the LAF, an institution he values,
    could explain his shift.  End comment.

    ¶27. (U) Lieutenant General Dempsey departed Beirut before
    clearing this cable.
    SISON

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