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### Viewing cable 09SANJOSE107, WHA/CEN DEPUTY DIRECTOR'S VISIT TO COST RICA:

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09SANJOSE107 | 2009-02-21 00:12 | 2011-03-08 16:04 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy San Jose

Appears in these articles:
http://www.nacion.com/2011-03-07/Investigacion/NotasDestacadas/Investigacion2704388.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-03-07/Investigacion/NotaPrincipal/Investigacion2704402.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-03-07/Investigacion/NotasSecundarias/Investigacion2704436.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-03-07/Investigacion/NotasSecundarias/Investigacion2705536.aspx

`

    VZCZCXYZ0000
    PP RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHSJ #0107/01 0520027
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    P 210027Z FEB 09
    FM AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0508
    INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA PRIORITY 4429
    RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 1147
    RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO PRIORITY 5028
    RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA PRIORITY 0054

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SAN JOSE 000107

    SIPDIS

    DEPT FOR WHA/CEN, WHA/CCA, WHA/PPC, WHA/AND, WHA/EPSC, AND
    INL/LP

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/20/2019
    TAGS: CS EFTA KSUM PGOV PINR PREL SNAR
    SUBJECT: WHA/CEN DEPUTY DIRECTOR'S VISIT TO COST RICA:
    REGIONAL ISSUES

    REF: A. A) SAN JOSE 0018 AND PREVIOUS
         ¶B. B) SAN JOSE 0098

    Classified By: Pol/Econ Counselor David E. Henifin per reason 1.4 (d)

    ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: A senior MFA official candidly discussed a
    wide range of regional issues with WHA/CEN Deputy Director
    David Wolfe during the latter's February 9-11 visit to Costa
    Rica.  Wolfe's interlocutor contrasted Costa Rica's frosty
    Nicaraguan relations with a warming trend with Panama, and
    signaled that Costa Rica did not want to be "the last
    country" in Cental America to establish full relations with
    Cuba (under the assumption that El Salvador would do so
    quickly after an FMLN election victory next month).  The MFA
    official also noted that the full regional summit and
    ministerial schedule in April (Pathways, SoA) and May (EU-Rio
    Group) complicated GOCR attendance plans.  (The Casa
    Presidencial later announced that President Arias will attend
    the Summit of the Americas.)  Overall, Wolfe heard the same
    concerns and arguments Post has heard in recent months, but
    direct and unfiltered.  (Separately, FM Stagno echoed a
    number of these views in a meeting with the Ambassador and
    DCM on February 19.) Additional Merida and CAFTA-related
    issues are reported in Ref B.  Wolfe did not clear this cable
    in advance.  END SUMMARY.

    ¶2.  (U) On February 11, Wolfe met with new Director of
    Foreign Policy (P-equivalent) Alejandro Solano, who was
    joined by Carlos Cordero, in charge of counternarcotics,
    counter-terrrorisn and Merida issues for the Ministry.  Wolfe
    was accompanied by Pol/Econ Counselor and Poloff.

    ¶3. (SBU) MERIDA: The GOCR welcomed Merida assistance, Solano
    stressed, but believed that Central America was on the short
    end. Concentrating CN efforts on Mexico in the north and
    Colombia in the south would further "squeeze" drug
    traffickers into Costa Rica and its neighboring countries,
    concentrating the problem there.  The "small" share of the
    Merida pie for Central America needed to be expanded, in the
    GOCR's view.  Solano understood that Washington might be
    reviewing overall Merida funding levels now.  If so, Central
    America (and Costa Rica) should receive a larger share.
    Stagno made the same argument to the Ambassador and DCM on
    February 19, and both suggested that a coordinated Cental
    American regional for additional Merida funding might yield
    more success than ad hoc bilateral efforts.

    ¶4. (C) NICARAGUA AND PANAMA:  Solano reviewed GOCR concerns
    about Nicaragua, especially as the global economic crisis
    deepened.  The Costa Rican embassy and consulates issued over
    300,000 visas in Nicaragua in 2008, in a good year.  How much
    more immigration -- legal and illegal -- could Costa Rica
    expect to see in a bad year?  Solano described Costa Rica as
    a "receptor" nation which did not want to close the door to
    immigrants on the one hand, but could not afford to be
    overwhelmed by a new flood from the north, on the other.
    Nicaragua should take "co-responsibility" for regulating
    migration to Costa Rica.  In addition, as international
    assistance was suspended or dried up because of President
    Ortega's increasingly undemocratic behavior, Solano noted
    GOCR worries that Venezuelan assistance might take up more of
    the slack.  He added that Costa Rican consuls had been
    "direct witnesses" to the election fraud and ensuing violence
    during the municipal elections.

    ¶5. (C) Mentioning the long-running Rio San Juan dispute
    (which is to be decided by the ICJ in March) and the
    nearly-dysfunctional Costa Rican-Nicaraguan bi-national
    commission (which is unlikely to meet again until 2010),
    Solano said that "99.9 percent" of his government's regional
    foreign policy problems were caused by Nicaragua.  In
    contrast, he pointed to a distinct warming trend with Panama,
    a country and people with whom Costa Rica shared many
    "affinities."  The border with Panama, although essentially
    open in many areas, was the "safest" of Costa Rica's national
    boundaries, he maintained, featuring extensive cooperation on
    security and immigration issues.

    ¶6. (C) On a potentially related border issue, Stagno told the
    Ambassador and DCM that there had been eight fishing boat
    seizures by Nicaraguan authorities off Costa Rica's northern
    Pacific coast since November 2008; four of these in January
    alone.  Although he acknowledged that Costa Rican fishermen
    may have drifted into Nicaraguan waters, Stagno speculated
    that the increase in seizures may be a move by the GON to

    continue to stir up trouble along the border, in advance (and
    regardless) of the ICJ ruling.

    ¶7. (C) CUBA: The GOCR had seen little real change (and did
    not expect much) under Raul Castro, Solano explained, and
    expected Fidel's influence, and those of hard-liners such as
    FM Perez-Roque, to continue.  He added that Costa Rica tried
    to work with Cuba on select issues in multilateral fora,
    including in the UN Human Rights Council, but this was often
    difficult.  Solano said the GOCR "shared USG doubts" about
    the Council, but still hoped its operations could be
    improved.  Hinting at a future change in policy (Ref A), he
    acknowledged that Costa Rica did not want to be "the last
    country" in Central America to establish full relations with
    Cuba.  This is based on the MFA's judgment that if FMLN won
    the March-April elections in El Salvador, the GOES would and
    establish ties to Cuba shortly thereafter.

    ¶8. (C) Stagno also reprised this argument to the Ambassador
    and DCM on February 19, and questioned them intently for any
    authoritative indication of a change (i.e., a softening) of
    USG policy vis-a-vis Cuba.  Stagno added that Cuba at least
    behaved predictably in multilateral fora, and sometimes more
    so than Costa Rica's Central American neighbors.  Although
    skeptical of significant collaboration with Havana, Stagno
    explained that Costa Rica had worked with Cuba on select
    multilateral issues in the past, and hoped to continue to do
    so in the Rio Group.  "Better to have Cuba in, than out," he
    stressed.

    ¶9. (C) VENEZUELA (PETROCARIBE): Solano confirmed that Costa
    Rica still intended to join Petrocaribe during the
    organization's next ministerial, although the urgency had
    diminished with the drop in oil prices. Given the cyclical
    nature of petroleum price fluctuations, however, it is better
    in the GOCR's view to lock in the low-interest Petrocaribe
    arrangement now, than to have to scramble for it later,
    according to Solano.  (He and key legislators who also met
    with Wolfe confirmed that the National Assembly would have to
    approve the Petrocaribe deal.  This could further slow
    accession.)

    ¶10.  (SBU) SUMMITS AND MINISTERIALS: On Pathways, Costa Rica
    "shares the USG's vision" of "expanding the frontiers of
    trade," Solano told Wolfe.  CAFTA is just one of the tools to
    do this.  The Arias administration retained its deep interest
    in Asia-Pacific relations, he added, hoping to join APEC.
    The crowded international meeting calendar in April-May
    complicated GOCR attendance plans, but Solano said that Trade
    Minister Ruiz would likely attend the Pathways Ministerial;
    FM Stagno's plans had not been confirmed.  Solano thought
    that President Arias probably would attend the Summit of the
    Americas (and this was confirmed by an official announcement
    on February 16).

    ¶11.  (SBU) With the Ambassador and DCM on February 19, FM
    Stagno noted President Arias' planned attendance at the SoA,
    and wryly asked how the White House would handle "32 requests
    for bilaterals" with POTUS.  Stagno also evinced surprise
    that the new US Administration was continuing the Pathways
    process.  The Ambassador and DCM stressed the continued USG
    commitment to Pathways, and encouraged Stagno and Ruiz to
    attend.

    ¶12. (C) OTHER HEADLINES: Solano also made the following brief
    observations to Deputy Director Wolfe:

    -- The UNSC: Important enough to Costa Rican foreign policy
    objectives, even beyond the Arias administration, that the
    GOCR was considering running again for a non-permanent seat
    in 2012;

    -- Colombia:  Costa Rica enjoyed outstanding relations with
    Colombia, but President Uribe would generate a serious
    "credibility" problem for his country if he pressed to remain
    in office another term.  Latin America needed not only
    positive examples of democratic governance, but also of
    democratic transition;

    -- El Salvador:  The GOCR was less concerned about "centrist"
    FMLN presidential candidate Mauricio Funes than about his
    party, which might push him far to the left, once in office.
    This could upset the current political "equilibrium" in
    Central America;

    -- Honduras:  The Zelaya administration may have started off
    with the right intentions, but had now become unpredictable
    political "jello"; and

    -- Central America Overall:  The GOCR's main worries (in rank
    order) were thus Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras and
    Guatemala (because of the deteriorating security situation
    there).  Panama, "a complete partner," remains the bright
    spot in the region, and Belize is Costa Rica's best ally in
    SICA.

    ¶10.  (C) COMMENT: Solano's tour d'horizon gave Wolfe an
    unvarnished review of some of the concerns and arguments we
    have heard in recent months. Solano was obviously reflecting
    his Minister's views, since Stagno covered so much of the
    same ground eight days later with the Ambassador.  The "more
    Merida" refrain has been echoed consistently from President
    Arias on down; we continue to believe, however, that Costa
    Rica is in line to receive about as much assistance as it can
    absorb effectively.  The continuing warming with Panama may
    provide additional opportunities for CN and other law
    enforcement-related cooperation.  Neither Costa Ricans nor
    Panamanians consider themselves fully part of Central
    America, and that self-styled sense of "uniqueness" may
    actually draw the two countries closer together on some
    issues.  For the record, however, we have to differ with
    Solano on border cooperation.  The border with Panama may be
    friendlier, but the only "hard" border crossing in the region
    is at Penas Blancas, with Nicaragua, where law enforcement
    units cooperate fairly well together, even if the two
    governments do not.
    CIANCHETTE

`