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### Viewing cable 06TELAVIV2961, RES POL AMB DCM

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
06TELAVIV2961 | 2006-07-30 17:05 | 2011-03-15 18:06 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tel Aviv
Appears in these articles: not yet set

`

    null
    Carol X Weakley  08/01/2006 02:37:21 PM  From  DB/Inbox:  Carol X Weakley

    Cable
    Text:

    C O N F I D E N T I A L        TEL AVIV 02961

    SIPDIS
    CXTelA:
        ACTION: DAO
        INFO:   RES POL AMB DCM

    DISSEMINATION: DAO
    CHARGE: DAO

    APPROVED: DAO: WCLARK
    DRAFTED: DAO: WCLARK
    CLEARED: NONE

    VZCZCTVI713
    RR RUEHC RHEFDIA
    DE RUEHTV #2961/01 2111733
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    R 301733Z JUL 06
    FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5272
    INFO RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC//DHO-6//

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L TEL AVIV 02961

    SIPDIS
    CXTelA:
    ACTION: DAO
    INFO: RES POL AMB DCM

    DISSEMINATION: DAO
    CHARGE: DAO

    APPROVED: DAO: WCLARK
    DRAFTED: DAO: WCLARK
    CLEARED: NONE

    VZCZCTVI713
    RR RUEHC RHEFDIA
    DE RUEHTV #2961/01 2111733
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    R 301733Z JUL 06
    FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5272
    INFO RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC//DHO-6//

    ----------------- header ends ----------------

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 002961

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/30/2016
    TAGS: PREL PINR PTER KPAL KWBG IS LE

    SUBJECT: ZELIKOW AND GILAD DISCUSS TRAITS OF INTERNATIONAL
    FORCE FOR SOUTHERN LEBANON, IDF PROGRESS, WAY AHEAD

    CLASSIFIED BY: AMBASSADOR RICHARD H. JONES; REASONS: 1.4 (B
    AND D).

    ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: MG (RES) AMOS GILAD, ISRAELI MOD ADVISOR
    FOR POLITICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS, TOLD COUNSELOR ZELIKOW
    29 JUL 06 THAT INTERNATIONAL FORCE MUST BE EMPOWERED TO
    ENFORCE CEASEFIRE AS NECESSARY, TO DEPLOY FROM BLUE LINE
    NORTH TO NAHR AL LITANI, IF NOT NAHR AL AWALLI, AND TO
    TRAIN THE LEBANESE ARMY. NOTED PROGRESS SHOWN TO DATE
    AGAINST HIZBALLAH, MADE CASE FOR OPERATIONS SEVEN TO TEN
    MORE DAYS TO HIGHLIGHT HIZBALLAH AS SERIOUSLY WEAKENED AND
    TO DEAL WITH KATYUSHA THREAT. END SUMMARY.

    -----------------------------------------
    EUROPEAN FEEDBACK ON INTERNATIONAL FORCE;
    NOW ISRAEL'S TURN
    -----------------------------------------

    ¶2. (C) COUNSELOR AND SENIOR POLICY ADVISOR TO SECSTATE
    ZELIKOW EXPRESSED TO MG (RES) AMOS GILAD, ISRAELI MOD
    ADVISOR FOR POLITICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS, HIS DESIRE TO
    COMMUNICATE TO GOI CURRENT STATUS RE INTERNATIONAL FORCE
    FOR SOUTHERN LEBANON FOLLOWING HIS DISCUSSIONS IN ROME,
    BRUSSELS, LONDON, PARIS, AND ANKARA, AND TO FIND OUT WHAT
    ISRAEL HAS ACHIEVED THUS FAR IN THIS CAMPAIGN, WHAT HER
    FURTHER GOALS ARE, AND WHAT SHE NEEDS TO ACHIEVE THEM. IN
    ISRAEL'S OPINION, WHAT ARE THE MILITARY REQUIREMENTS FOR
    THE INTERNATIONAL FORCE, AND WHAT SHOULD THIS FORCE BE
    EXPECTED TO DO? ZELIKOW REQUESTED A GRANULAR SENSE OF THE
    SITUATION SO AS TO ENSURE THAT THE INTERNATIONAL FORCE IS
    AS USEFUL AS IT CAN POSSIBLY BE.

    ---------------------------------
    WHAT ISRAEL HAS ACHIEVED TO DATE;
    WHAT REMAINS TO BE DONE
    ---------------------------------

    ¶3. (C) GILAD RESPONDED THAT THERE IS A GAP BETWEEN THE
    IMAGE OF ISRAEL'S SUCCESS (I.E., LACK OF) AND THE REALITY
    ON THE GROUND (MORE SUCCESSFUL THAN IS REALIZED). FOR
    EXAMPLE, GILAD CLAIMED, HAIFA WAS NOT ATTACKED TODAY
    BECAUSE HIZBALLAH NO LONGER POSSESSES THE CAPABILITY TO DO
    SO. 220 MM ROCKETS HAVE NOT BEEN FIRED FOR FOUR DAYS. TOO,
    ISRAEL DEALT HIZBALLAH'S STRATEGIC (LONG RANGE) ROCKETS
    CAPABILITY A BIG BLOW THROUGH THE USE OF SENSITIVE
    INTELLIGENCE TO LOCATE LAUNCHERS HIDDEN IN HOUSES AND HIT
    THEM (PART OF THE PRE-PLANNED TARGET SETS) IMMEDIATELY ON
    THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES. CURRENTLY, 50 PERCENT OF 220
    MM AND FAJR 3 LAUNCHERS ARE DESTROYED FOLLOWING LAUNCHES.
    THUS, THE PERSONNEL WHO ARE EXECUTING THE LAUNCH HAVE COME
    TO REALIZE THEY HAVE A ONE IN TWO CHANCE OF NOT LIVING TO
    LAUNCH AGAIN. IDI PERSONNEL ESTIMATE NOW THAT THEY HAVE
    DESTROYED MOST OF THE ZILZAL LAUNCHERS (THIS ESTIMATE
    QUOTED AS BASED ON VERY SENSITIVE INFORMATION), 80 PERCENT
    OF THE 220 MM LAUNCHERS, AND 60-70 PERCENT OF THE FAJR 3
    LAUNCHERS.

    ¶4. (C) CONDUCT OF GROUND OPERATIONS IS MUCH EASIER GOING
    THAN JUST THREE DAYS AGO (A REFERENCE TO THE LOSS OF NINE
    SOLDIERS, EIGHT OF THEM AT BINT JUBAYL) AND CERTAINLY TWO
    WEEKS AGO. IN THE LAST 24 HOURS, 26 HIZBALLAH HAVE BEEN
    KILLED IN BINT JUBAYL, 70 TOTAL IN THIS TOWN OVER THE
    COURSE OF THE CAMPAIGN. ESTIMATES ARE THAT JUST 30
    HIZBALLAH REMAIN THERE. THESE 100 TOTAL HIZBALLAH (70
    KILLED OVER THE COURSE OF THE CAMPAIGN PLUS THE 30 THAT
    REMAIN ALIVE) ARE/WERE SPECIAL FORCES, HARD TO REPLACE, AND
    RESPONSIBLE FOR THE KIDNAPPING OF THE TWO SOLDIERS. ACROSS
    THE AOR, IDF HAS KILLED 50-80 HIZBALLAH IN THE LAST THREE
    DAYS. HIZBALLAH COMMAND AND CONTROL CAPABILITIES HAVE BEEN
    DEALT SOME BLOWS, BUT ARE STILL FUNCTIONING. IDF ASSESSES
    THAT NASRALLAH IS FULLY BRIEFED AND CURRENT.

    -------------------------------
    WHAT THE SHOOTING IS ALL ABOUT:
    HIGH STAKES
    -------------------------------

    ¶5. (C) GILAD COMMENTED THAT THIS IS NOT A WAR BETWEEN
    HIZBALLAH AND ISRAEL, BUT RATHER BETWEEN ISRAEL AND AN
    EXTENSION OF IRAN. AT THIS MOMENT, SYRIA AND IRAN ARE
    ENCOURAGED. IF ISRAEL DOES NOT CONVINCINGLY DEMONSTRATE TO
    THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, INCLUDING THE ARAB WORLD, THAT
    SHE HAS SUBSTANTIALLY WEAKENED HIZBALLAH MILITARILY (HE
    CONSIDERED THIS WOULD TAKE SEVEN TO TEN MORE DAYS),
    NASRALLAH WOULD EMERGE A HERO AND UNDERWRITE HAMASSTAN AND
    HIZBALLAHSTAN. SPECIFICALLY, SEVEN TO TEN DAYS WOULD ALLOW
    ISRAEL TO DEAL WITH THE KATYUSHAS. CONTRARILY, A CEASEFIRE
    TOO EARLY WOULD PRESERVE THE ACHIEVEMENT AND IMAGE OF
    HIZBALLAH AS HAVING STOOD UP TO ISRAEL. GILAD SAID THIS
    SCENARIO REMINDED HIM OF THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR. "WE CANNOT
    END WITH THIS IMAGE. WE MUST FINISH." GILAD DID NOT CONFIRM
    THAT FUTURE LARGE SCALE GROUND OPERATIONS WOULD BE
    CONDUCTED TO "TAKE OVER THE LITANI", BUT HE SAID SUCH
    OPERATIONS WOULD TAKE NO MORE THAN FOUR DAYS IN HIS
    OPINION. HE OBSERVED THAT LARGE SCALE GROUND OPERATIONS
    AND OPERATIONS OF SPECIAL FORCES (SMALL UNITS) ACROSS
    VARIOUS LOCATIONS IN THE SOUTH COULD BE SEEN AS ONE IN THE
    SAME.

    -------------
    THE CHALLENGE
    -------------

    ¶6. (C) ZELIKOW STATED THAT HIZBALLAH, POST HOSTILITIES,
    MUST BE PERSUADED THAT IT SHOULD HENCEFORTH SHUN MILITARY
    ACTION AND EMBRACE POLITICAL ACTION AS THE WAY AHEAD. GILAD
    RESPONDED THAT HIZBALLAH KNOWS IT IS WEAKENED MILITARILY,
    BUT IT IS MAINTAINING A BRAVE FACE. THE CHALLENGE IS TO
    INSURE THE LEBANESE PEOPLE AND THE WORLD COME TO KNOW IT.
    HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT NO ONE WILL BELIEVE IT AS LONG AS 90
    ROCKETS PER DAY LAND IN ISRAEL. ZELIKOW REMARKED THAT
    ISRAEL MUST POSITION ITSELF TO TELL A GOOD STORY PRIOR TO
    THE UN RESOLUTION - ISRAEL HAS DEALT THE AGGRESSOR,
    HIZBALLAH, A CRIPPLING BLOW. BUT, THERE IS A FINE LINE TO
    BE STRADDLED HERE. IF HIZBALLAH IS BEATEN UP TOO MUCH,
    THIS EFFORT WILL HAVE AN OPPOSITE, UNDESIRED EFFECT, I.E.,
    SWING THE SYMPATHY VOTE, PARTICULARLY THAT OF THE ARAB
    WORLD, IN THEIR DIRECTION.

    -------------------------------
    THE INTERNATIONAL FORCE CONCEPT
    -------------------------------

    ¶7. (C) ZELIKOW POINTED TO CORE REQUIREMENTS THAT MUST BE
    MET TO SUCCESSFULLY EXIT THIS CONFLICT - A POLITICAL
    FRAMEWORK, CESSATION OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS, RAPID
    INTRODUCTION OF LEAD ELEMENTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL FORCE
    (THE REMAINDER OF WHICH MUST FOLLOW QUICKLY), AND FINALLY,
    A VIABLE CEASEFIRE. THE INTERNATIONAL FORCE MUST BE ONE
    THAT HIZBALLAH AGREES NOT TO ATTACK (OR IT WILL NOT COME),
    AND IT MUST HAVE ROBUST RULES AND BACKING WHICH DERIVES
    FROM A UN RESOLUTION THAT MANDATES DISARMAMENT AND NO
    ATTACKS ACROSS THE BLUE LINE. ALSO, GOL MUST UNDERSTAND THE
    ROLE THEY PLAY IN DISARMAMENT.

    ¶8. (C) GILAD RESPONDED THAT THE NEW MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE
    ABSOLUTELY MUST BE CHAPTER SEVEN OPERATIONS ELIGIBLE,
    RESEMBLE THE INTERVENTION FORCE OF NATO, AND MUST ESTABLISH
    A PRESENCE AT NINE DIFFERENT SYRIA-LEBANON BORDER CROSSINGS
    (SPECIFIC CROSSINGS TO BE PASSED AS FOLLOWUP) TO PRECLUDE
    IRAN AND SYRIA'S RESTORATION OF HIZBALLAH'S WEAPONS
    INVENTORY FOLLOWING CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES (OR ALL WILL
    HAVE BEEN FOR NOUGHT), AND MUST TRAIN THE LEBANESE ARMY.
    HE COMMENTED THAT THE LEBANESE ARMY COULD CLAIM TWO
    RELATIVE SUCCESSES - SUCCESSFUL OPERATIONS AGAINST AL QAIDA
    IN LEBANON AND AGAINST PFLP-GC. THESE PAST AREAS OF SUCCESS
    MIGHT PROVE CRITICAL IN FUTURE IF HIZBALLAH, IN THIS NEW
    ENVIRONMENT AND WITH NEW RULES OF THE GAME, LOOKS TO THE
    PALESTINIANS TO TERRORIZE IN THEIR STEAD. GILAD EXPRESSED A
    DESIRE THAT THIS FORCE, REGARDLESS OF BEDDOWN LOCATION, BE
    EMPOWERED TO ACT ACROSS ALL OF LEBANON IN ORDER TO DEAL
    PROPERLY WITH THE STRATEGIC LONG RANGE ROCKET THREAT.
    TURNING TO PERSONNEL MAKEUP, HE ENCOURAGED ARAB OR MUSLIM
    PARTICIPATION, PERHAPS TURKISH OR JORDANIAN, TO HELP
    LEGITIMIZE THE FORCE.

    ¶9. (C) ZELIKOW DESCRIBED THIS PROPOSED FORCE AS LESS
    RESEMBLANT OF AN INTERVENTION FORCE AND MORE A MULTI-
    NATIONAL FORCE WITHOUT A LEAD COUNTRY OR LEAD ORGANIZATION,
    SOMEWHAT BLURRY IN THIS REGARD, BUT WITH A REAL COMMANDER
    AND A REAL HEADQUARTERS. THE EU AND NATO MIGHT PROVIDE
    PLANNING ELEMENTS, THE BRITISH, FRENCH, ITALIANS, AND
    SPANISH MIGHT PLAY ROLES, AND THE U.S. MIGHT SERVE AS
    ENABLERS (LOGISTICS, INTELLIGENCE, AND AIR SUPPORT) FROM
    OFF SHORE. REGARDLESS OF END COMPOSITION, THIS FORCE MUST
    BE HIGHLY COMPETENT AND HIGHLY PROFESSIONAL. IF GOL, GOI,
    U.S., EVERYBODY BUT HIZBALLAH AGREES TO THE LAYING ON OF AN
    INTERNATIONAL FORCE IN SOUTHERN LEBANON, THEN HIZBALLAH
    WILL REVEAL ITSELF VERY PUBLICLY AS THE PARTY STANDING IN
    THE WAY OF PEACE. ZELIKOW COMMENTED THAT SINIORA HAS
    REVIEWED THE DOCUMENTS AND HAS A STRATEGY - TO TAKE AWAY
    HIZBALLAH'S EXCUSE IN LEBANESE POLITICS AND TO POLITICALLY
    ISOLATE THEM. SHAABA FARMS, HOWEVER, IS A NETTLESOME ISSUE.

    ¶10. (C) GILAD WORRIED THAT THE MONEY (IRAN WOULD PUT AN
    UNLIMITED BUDGET AGAINST THIS) THAT WOULD FLOOD INTO
    LEBANON POST CONFLICT WOULD NOT BE CONTROLLED PROPERLY AND
    THAT APPROPRIATE APPARATUSES SHOULD BE PUT IN PLACE TO DO
    SO. OTHERWISE, THE DAWA WOULD REBUILD THE SOUTH AND IRAN'S
    INFLUENCE WOULD PENETRATE EVEN MORE DEEPLY.

    ¶11. (U) COUNSELOR ZELIKOW DID NOT CLEAR ON THIS MESSAGE.

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