Cable Viewer

Currently released so far... 7627 / 251,287

### Browse latest releases

2010/11 2010/12 2011/01 2011/02 2011/03 2011/04
2010/11/28 2010/11/29 2010/11/30
2010/12/01 2010/12/02 2010/12/03 2010/12/04 2010/12/05 2010/12/06 2010/12/07 2010/12/08 2010/12/09 2010/12/10 2010/12/11 2010/12/12 2010/12/13 2010/12/14 2010/12/15 2010/12/16 2010/12/17 2010/12/18 2010/12/19 2010/12/20 2010/12/21 2010/12/22 2010/12/23 2010/12/24 2010/12/25 2010/12/26 2010/12/27 2010/12/28 2010/12/29 2010/12/30
2011/01/01 2011/01/02 2011/01/04 2011/01/05 2011/01/07 2011/01/09 2011/01/10 2011/01/11 2011/01/12 2011/01/13 2011/01/14 2011/01/15 2011/01/16 2011/01/17 2011/01/18 2011/01/19 2011/01/20 2011/01/21 2011/01/22 2011/01/23 2011/01/24 2011/01/25 2011/01/26 2011/01/27 2011/01/28 2011/01/29 2011/01/30 2011/01/31
2011/02/01 2011/02/02 2011/02/03 2011/02/04 2011/02/05 2011/02/06 2011/02/07 2011/02/08 2011/02/09 2011/02/10 2011/02/11 2011/02/12 2011/02/13 2011/02/14 2011/02/15 2011/02/16 2011/02/17 2011/02/18 2011/02/19 2011/02/20 2011/02/21 2011/02/22 2011/02/23 2011/02/24 2011/02/25 2011/02/26 2011/02/27 2011/02/28
2011/03/01 2011/03/02 2011/03/03 2011/03/04 2011/03/05 2011/03/06 2011/03/07 2011/03/08 2011/03/09 2011/03/10 2011/03/11 2011/03/13 2011/03/14 2011/03/15 2011/03/16 2011/03/17 2011/03/18 2011/03/19 2011/03/20 2011/03/21 2011/03/22 2011/03/23 2011/03/24 2011/03/25 2011/03/26 2011/03/27 2011/03/28 2011/03/29 2011/03/30 2011/03/31
2011/04/01 2011/04/02 2011/04/03 2011/04/04 2011/04/05 2011/04/06 2011/04/07 2011/04/08 2011/04/09 2011/04/10 2011/04/11 2011/04/12 2011/04/13 2011/04/14 2011/04/15 2011/04/16 2011/04/17 2011/04/18 2011/04/19 2011/04/20 2011/04/21 2011/04/22 2011/04/23 2011/04/24 2011/04/25 2011/04/26

### Browse by creation date

66 72 73 75 79 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 96 97 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
1966/12
1972/02 1972/08
1973/04
1975/03
1979/08
1985/03
1986/05
1987/06
1988/01
1989/12
1990/01 1990/07 1990/08 1990/10
1991/05
1996/11
1997/12
2000/06 2000/09 2000/11
2001/02 2001/03 2001/06 2001/07 2001/10 2001/11
2002/02 2002/03 2002/04 2002/07 2002/11 2002/12
2003/01 2003/02 2003/03 2003/04 2003/05 2003/06 2003/07 2003/08 2003/09 2003/10 2003/11 2003/12
2004/01 2004/02 2004/03 2004/04 2004/05 2004/06 2004/07 2004/08 2004/09 2004/10 2004/11 2004/12
2005/01 2005/02 2005/03 2005/04 2005/05 2005/06 2005/07 2005/08 2005/09 2005/10 2005/11 2005/12
2006/01 2006/02 2006/03 2006/04 2006/05 2006/06 2006/07 2006/08 2006/09 2006/10 2006/11 2006/12
2007/01 2007/02 2007/03 2007/04 2007/05 2007/06 2007/07 2007/08 2007/09 2007/10 2007/11 2007/12
2008/01 2008/02 2008/03 2008/04 2008/05 2008/06 2008/07 2008/08 2008/09 2008/10 2008/11 2008/12
2009/01 2009/02 2009/03 2009/04 2009/05 2009/06 2009/07 2009/08 2009/09 2009/10 2009/11 2009/12
2010/01 2010/02

### Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z
Embassy Athens Embassy Asuncion Embassy Astana Embassy Asmara Embassy Ashgabat Embassy Ankara Embassy Amman Embassy Algiers Embassy Addis Ababa Embassy Accra Embassy Abuja Embassy Abu Dhabi Embassy Abidjan Consulate Amsterdam Consulate Adana American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura Embassy Buenos Aires Embassy Budapest Embassy Bucharest Embassy Brussels Embassy Bridgetown Embassy Bratislava Embassy Brasilia Embassy Bogota Embassy Bishkek Embassy Bern Embassy Berlin Embassy Belgrade Embassy Beirut Embassy Beijing Embassy Banjul Embassy Bangkok Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan Embassy Bamako Embassy Baku Embassy Baghdad Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen Embassy Conakry Embassy Colombo Embassy Chisinau Embassy Caracas Embassy Canberra Embassy Cairo Consulate Curacao Consulate Ciudad Juarez Consulate Chennai Consulate Casablanca Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe Embassy Dublin Embassy Doha Embassy Djibouti Embassy Dhaka Embassy Dar Es Salaam Embassy Damascus Embassy Dakar Consulate Dubai
Embassy Freetown
Embassy Guatemala Embassy Gaborone Consulate Guayaquil Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki Embassy Harare Embassy Hanoi Consulate Hermosillo Consulate Hamburg
Iran RPO Dubai Embassy Islamabad Consulate Istanbul
Embassy Jakarta Consulate Jerusalem Consulate Jeddah
Embassy Kyiv Embassy Kuwait Embassy Kuala Lumpur Embassy Kinshasa Embassy Kigali Embassy Khartoum Embassy Kathmandu Embassy Kampala Embassy Kabul Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg Embassy Luanda Embassy London Embassy Ljubljana Embassy Lisbon Embassy Lima Embassy Lilongwe Embassy La Paz Consulate Lahore Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE Mission USNATO Mission UNESCO Embassy Muscat Embassy Moscow Embassy Montevideo Embassy Monrovia Embassy Minsk Embassy Mexico Embassy Mbabane Embassy Maputo Embassy Manila Embassy Manama Embassy Managua Embassy Malabo Embassy Madrid Consulate Munich Consulate Mumbai Consulate Montreal Consulate Monterrey Consulate Milan Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia Embassy New Delhi Embassy Nassau Embassy Nairobi Consulate Naples
Embassy Ouagadougou Embassy Ottawa Embassy Oslo
Embassy Pristina Embassy Pretoria Embassy Prague Embassy Port Of Spain Embassy Port Louis Embassy Port Au Prince Embassy Phnom Penh Embassy Paris Embassy Paramaribo Embassy Panama Consulate Peshawar
Embassy Quito
REO Basrah Embassy Rome Embassy Riyadh Embassy Riga Embassy Reykjavik Embassy Rangoon Embassy Rabat Consulate Rio De Janeiro Consulate Recife
Secretary of State Embassy Stockholm Embassy Sofia Embassy Skopje Embassy Singapore Embassy Seoul Embassy Sarajevo Embassy Santo Domingo Embassy Santiago Embassy Sanaa Embassy San Salvador Embassy San Jose Consulate Strasbourg Consulate St Petersburg Consulate Shenyang Consulate Shanghai Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis Embassy Tripoli Embassy Tokyo Embassy The Hague Embassy Tel Aviv Embassy Tehran Embassy Tegucigalpa Embassy Tbilisi Embassy Tashkent Embassy Tallinn Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York USEU Brussels US Office Almaty US Mission Geneva US Interests Section Havana US Delegation, Secretary UNVIE Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius Embassy Vienna Embassy Vatican Embassy Valletta Consulate Vladivostok
Embassy Windhoek Embassy Wellington Embassy Warsaw
Embassy Yerevan Embassy Yaounde
Embassy Zagreb

### Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AF AE AMGT ACOA ASEC AORC AG AU AR AS AFIN AL APER AA AEMR AMED ABLD AM ATFN AROC AJ AFFAIRS AO AFGHANISTAN AFU AER ALOW AODE ABUD ATRN APECO ASUP AC AZ AVERY APCS ADCO ASIG AGMT AMBASSADOR ASEAN AX AID AUC ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG ADANA AND AN ARM AY
BR BIDEN BO BK BU BY BEXP BL BTIO BF BBSR BA BM BH BE BB BILAT BG BRUSSELS BT BC BX BMGT BTIU
CU CH CJAN CO CA CASC CY CD CM COE COUNTRY CLEARANCE CVIS CPAS CMGT CACS CWC CBW CI CG CF CS CN CT CL CIA CDG CE CIS CTM CB CLINTON CR COM CONS CV CJUS COUNTER CKGR COUNTERTERRORISM CODEL CONDOLEEZZA CARSON CW CFED CLMT CROS CACM CDB CAN
DA DOE DJ DK DHS DR DEA DS DOMESTIC DAO DCM DEPT DTRA DPRK DEFENSE DISENGAGEMENT DOD DEAX
ETRD ETTC ECON EFIN ES EFIS EWWT EAID ENRG ELAB EINV EU EAIR EI EIND EUN EG EAGR EPET ER EMIN EC ECIN ENVR ECA ELN ET ENERG ECPS EINT ENGY ELECTIONS EN EZ ELTN EK ECONCS EINVETC ECONEFIN ENIV ESA ENGR ETC EFTA ETRDECONWTOCS EXTERNAL ENVI EUNCH EINVECONSENVCSJA ECONOMICS EINN EFINECONCS ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS ECUN ENNP EUR EAP EEPET ETRDEINVTINTCS ETRO ESENV ECINECONCS ECONOMY ECONOMIC EUMEM EAIDS EINVEFIN ECIP EINDETRD EUC EREL
FR FAO FARC FREEDOM FI FBI FTAA FJ FINR FMLN FOR FTA FOREIGN FINANCE FO FISO
GM GG GR GE GV GA GH GT GCC GOV GZ GOI GTIP GAERC GY GANGS GL GLOBAL GERARD GAZA GTMO
HO HA HR HU HSTC HURI HILLARY HK HYMPSK HUMAN HUMOR
IC IO IV IR IZ IS IN IT IAEA IWC IIP IA ID ITALIAN ITALY ICAO INRB IRAQI ILC ISRAELI IQ IMO ICTY INRA INRO IRAJ IF ICRC IPR ILO IBRD IMF IZPREL ITPHUM ITPGOV INTERPOL INTELSAT IEFIN INR IRC IACI ITRA IL ICJ INTERNAL INMARSAT ITU IDP
JOSEPH JO JA JP JAMES JOHNNIE JM JUS
KACT KNNP KDEM KGIC KRAD KISL KIPR KTIA KWBG KTFN KPAL KCIP KN KHLS KCRM KSCA KPKO KFRD KMCA KJUS KIRF KWMN KCOR KPAO KU KV KAWC KUNR KPRP KOMC KSTC KTIP KSUM KMDR KFLU KPRV KBTR KZ KS KVPR KE KERG KTDB KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KSTH KGHG KIRC KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KG KWAC KSEP KMPI KDRG KBCT KNUP KTER KCFE KPLS KVIR KAWK KDDG KOLY KMRS KHDP KPAK KNAR KREL KBTS KNPP KCOM KGIT KNNPMNUC KO KPOA KRFD KHUM KDEV KICC KCFC KREC KSPR KHIV KWWMN KLIG KBIO KTBT KOCI KFLO KWMNCS KIDE KSAF KNEI KR KTEX KNSD KOMS KCRS KGCC KWMM KRVC KPAI KHSA KTLA KFSC KX KFTFN KMFO KRCM KPWR KMIG KSEC KIFR KDEMAF KFIN KNUC KPIN
LY LE LI LH LOG LG LO LT LTTE LU LAB
MNUC MARR MCAP MASS MOPS MP MO MIL MX MY MTCRE MT ML MASC MR MK MI MAPS MEPN MU MCC MZ MA MD MASSMNUC MQADHAFI MTCR MTRE MG MEPI MDC MPOS MEETINGS MUCN MRCRE MEPP MAR MAPP MAS MTS MLS MERCOSUR MC MV MEDIA MILI MW MIK MOPPS
NATO NO NL NSG NA NU NPT NS NI NZ NATIONAL NP NAR NE NASA NK NG NT NIPP NSF NPG NGO NSSP NRR NSC
OVIP OAS OREP OPRC OPDC OEXC OPCW OSCI ODIP OSCE OTRA OPIC OIIP OFFICIALS OFDP OECD OSAC OIE OVP OPAD OFDA OIC OTR
PREL PGOV PINR PARM PHUM PTER PK PINS PO PROP PHSA PBTS PREF PE PMIL PM POL PY PFOR PHALANAGE PARTY PAK PAO PRAM PA PMAR POLITICS PHUMPREL PALESTINIAN PHUS PRL PGOC PNR PL PGGV PNAT PROV PTERE PGOF PHUMBA PINT PEL PLN POV PSOE PF PARMS PBIO PSI POLINT POLITICAL PARTIES PGOVLO PORG PGOVE PINF PRELP PAS PPA PRGOV PUNE PG POLICY PROG PDEM PREFA PDOV PCI PEPR PU PECON POGOV PINL PKFK
QA
RS RU RF RW ROBERT RFE RO REGION RP RUPREL RIGHTS RICE RSP REACTION REPORT
SENV SNAR SP SOCI SA SY SW SU SF SMIG SCUL SZ SO SH SG SR SL SOFA SANC SK ST SC SN SEVN STEINBERG SAN SHUM SYR SAARC SI SNARCS SWE SPCE SNARIZ SIPRS
TU TX TH TBIO TZ TRGY TK TW TSPA TSPL TPHY TNGD TI TC TS TR TD TT TIP TRSY TO TP TERRORISM TURKEY TFIN TINT THPY
UK UY UNESCO UNO UNSC UNEP UN UNGA US UNDP UNCHS UP UG UNMIK UNAUS USTR UNVIE UNHRC UZ UV UE USAID UNHCR USUN USEU UNDC UAE UNDESCO UNCHC UNFICYP UNCHR USNC
VE VT VZ VM VTPREL VN
WWARD WHA WI WHO WA WMO WEU WTRO WZ WITH WTRQ WBG WTO WMD WB
XZ XR XF XG XW XY XA XM XL XE XK XT XC XH XS XD XV XX
YI YM YE YMCS
ZI ZB ZU ZA ZOELLICK ZK ZP ZR ZF ZJ ZANU ZO ZL

### Browse by classification

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

### Community resources

Follow us on Twitter Check our Reddit Twitter this Digg this page Contact us on IRC

courage is contagious

### Viewing cable 07HELSINKI639, FINLAND'S LIKELY NEXT STEPS IN AFGHANISTAN

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07HELSINKI639.

Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
07HELSINKI639 | 2007-08-20 11:11 | 2011-04-24 00:12 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Helsinki

`

    VZCZCXYZ0010
    RR RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHHE #0639/01 2321125
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    R 201125Z AUG 07
    FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3682
    INFO RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0056
    RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0946

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L HELSINKI 000639

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/17/2017
    TAGS: PREL MOPS MARR SNAR EAID PGOV NATO AF FI
    SUBJECT: FINLAND'S LIKELY NEXT STEPS IN AFGHANISTAN

    Classified By: POLITICAL CHIEF GREGORY THOME FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D
    )

    ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Budgetary realities and political
    discomfort amongst a few at the highest levels have
    currently put the brakes on the GOF's plan to increase
    its military commitments to NATO/ISAF in 2008.
    Meaningful increases in Finnish development and
    counternarcotics assistance to Afghanistan are probable
    -- and the idea of PRT leadership in 2009 remains very
    much on the table.  However, the 2008 national budget
    contains no funds for new or stepped-up peacekeeping
    operations (PKO).  The Ambassador has made the case to
    senior leadership that Finland ought to send more troops
    to Afghanistan sooner rather than later -- culminating
    in several additional senior-level meetings the week of
    Aug. 13.  However, it appears that Conservative
    politicians who committed early to contributing more
    troops to ISAF underestimated how strongly their own
    coalition partner, the Center Party -- as well as
    President Halonen -- would not support increases in
    ¶2008.  END SUMMARY.

    EARLY MOMENTUM FADES
    --------------------
    ¶2. (C) A mere two months ago, enthusiasm in the
    Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs was high
    regarding an increased Finnish role in Afghanistan.  In
    the wake of FM Ilkka Kanerva's June meeting with the
    Secretary and MOD Jyri Hakamies's trip to Afghanistan,

    SIPDIS
    both signaled their intentions to seek more Finnish
    troops for NATO/ISAF as well as increased funding for
    development, counternarcotics and rule of law programs.
    The MFA was instructed to prepare a wide ranging report
    to Parliament examining Finland's role in Afghanistan
    and the best ways to apply any additional resources.
    The report will be delivered to Parliament members in
    mid-September and publicly discussed in parliamentary
    session.  Contacts responsible for drafting it have told
    us privately that increases for 2008 appeared likely
    (Reftel A).

    ¶3. (C) Since then, however, significant political
    opposition has emerged.  Much of the most vociferous
    opposition came in response to Hakamies's public
    suggestion that the GOF should re-open the previous
    government's decision to deny a US/Afghan request that
    sought a donation of excess Finnish weapons to the
    Afghan National Police (ANP).  (Comment: The lethal
    equipment issue has been politically sensitive all along
    (Ref A), having been characterized both as legally
    permissible and legally prohibited.  End Comment.)  In
    addition, more measured opposition also came from those
    who argued that Finland's current level of participation
    in NATO/ISAF (about 104 troops at two Nordic-led PRTs)
    was sufficient.  Some Parliamentarians have argued that
    2008 budget realities do not permit troop increases,
    given Finland's numerous other ongoing PKO obligations
    and its very generous contribution of 240 troops to the
    UN's Southern Lebanon mission.  (NOTE: No other Nordic
    country sent ground troops to Lebanon following the
    Hezbollah-Israeli war last summer, and the GOF needed to
    pass a special budgetary supplemental in order to fund
    its 240-troop contribution.)  Leading Conservative
    politicians (led by Hakamies and Kanerva) and ministry
    officials expressed confidence that the report to
    Parliament would satisfy the nay-sayers.  However, in
    early August leading figures from the Center Party --
    the Conservatives' major coalition partner -- also began
    to voice misgivings.

    MONEY BUT NO NEW TROOPS
    -----------------------
    ¶4. (C) Senior officials and working level contacts in
    the MOD, MFA and Ministry of Finance now say that at the
    moment troop increases in Afghanistan appear unlikely in
    2008, although other forms of assistance are likely.  In
    an Aug. 14 meeting, a disappointed Kanerva told the
    Ambassador that he expected to win approval for Finnish
    contributions to a new EU-funded police training/rule of
    law mission, and quite probably additional development
    assistance.  However, he added, "I do not exclude the
    military side, but getting increases to our military
    contribution in Afghanistan will be very hard."  He
    noted that while many in government truly believed that
    sending more troops to Afghanistan was in Finland's
    national security interest, the Prime Minister and the
    President saw things differently.  In an Aug. 16
    meeting, PM Vanhanen confirmed this.  "Discussions
    within government are ongoing; nothing is final," he
    told us.  "But overall the atmosphere is such that we
    want to help (in Afghanistan), but changes in our
    military posture will not be significant."

    ¶5. (C) Separately, a Finance Ministry contact told
    PolChief that there simply is no money programmed into
    the 2008 budget for troop increases anywhere.  (NOTE:
    Finland currently supports Afghanistan with 10 million
    euros annually.)  The four parties in government are
    divided in their thinking about budgetary priorities,
    she said; in fact, political pressure within the cabinet
    to send troops to Darfur might currently outweigh the
    sentiment in favor of more forces for Afghanistan.  In
    either case, there is no budget supplemental in the
    works; without one ISAF commitments would have to remain
    level, and there can be no major contributions to
    Darfur.

    PLANS FOR PRT LEADERSHIP IN 2009 CONTINUE APACE
    --------------------------------------------- --
    ¶6. (U) Echoing what we had heard privately, Admiral
    Juhani Koskeala, the armed forces chief of staff, told
    the press Aug. 14 that budgetary constraints would
    prevent significant crisis management increases in 2008.
    However, he emphasized that taking leadership of a PRT
    in 2009 -- which would require troop increases --
    remains very much on the table.  In his view, the
    current level of Finnish participation at Meymenah and
    Mazar was sufficient until the 2009 ramp-up for PRT
    leadership began.

    ¶7. (C) The Ambassador spent the week of Aug. 13
    emphasizing to a range of senior officials that
    Afghanistan is a top priority.  In separate meetings,
    she underscored to the PM, to the FM, and to
    Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman how
    important it is for Finland to make new ISAF
    contributions sooner, rather than later.  Each
    interlocutor understood that the USG would be
    disappointed if the GOF could not do more in 2008.
    However, they also assured us that development and other
    assistance increases would be forthcoming and that
    planning for PRT leadership in 2009 would continue
    apace.  Kanerva, in particular, noted that plans for a
    "rotation" of leadership with the Swedes at the Mazar-
    al-Shariff PRT in 2009 remained quite active.

    COMMENT: CONSERVATIVES UNDERESTIMATE THEIR OPPONENTS
    --------------------------------------------- -------
    ¶8. (C) It may be that the Conservatives' ambitious plans
    were a classic case of early over-exuberance, which has
    been tempered over time in the face of political
    realities.  Indeed, Conservative politicians rode the
    wave of their election landslide holding two beliefs on
    Afghanistan:  first, that increasing the GOF's already
    significant PKO contributions was truly important for
    Finland's own national security; and second, that they
    could convince a skeptical PM and even more skeptical
    President of this fact.  However, President Halonen
    simply feels that Finland is currently doing enough in
    Afghanistan.  PM Vanhanen, meanwhile, keenly values his
    working relationship with Halonen, and faces staunch
    opposition within his own Center Party to increasing
    Finland's PKO profile; he therefore has absolutely no
    domestic political incentive to tangle with Halonen on
    the ISAF issue.

    NEXT STEPS
    ----------
    ¶9. (C) Finland's overall role in Afghanistan is still
    being hammered out.  The GOF's current troop commitment
    to ISAF remains solid, and we can continue to count on
    the Finns to do good work at the Meymenah and Mazar
    PRTs.  We also expect other significant assistance,
    including more development aid; counterdrug efforts; and
    Finnish police and judicial trainers as part of the EU's
    rule of law mission.  And as noted, PRT leadership
    remains very much in the planning cards for 2009; we
    will continue to work hard with the Finns to make this a
    reality.
    HYATT

`