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### Viewing cable 06MEXICO2460, WHAT AILS THE PRI?

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
06MEXICO2460 | 2006-05-09 14:02 | 2011-04-05 01:01 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Mexico
Appears in these articles: http://wikileaks.jornada.com.mx/notas/alianzas-perversas/

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    VZCZCXRO8385
    RR RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
    DE RUEHME #2460/01 1291447
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    R 091447Z MAY 06
    FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0713
    INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
    RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 1175
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

` `

    63335
    2006-05-09 14:47:00
    06MEXICO2460
    Embassy Mexico
    CONFIDENTIAL
    06MEXICO1963|06MEXICO2240|06MEXICO2409
    VZCZCXRO8385
    RR RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
    DE RUEHME #2460/01 1291447
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    R 091447Z MAY 06
    FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0713
    INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
    RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 1175
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
    TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR MX
    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MEXICO 002460

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/08/2016
    TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR MX
    SUBJECT: WHAT AILS THE PRI?
     REF: A. A) MEXICO 1963
         ¶B. B) MEXICO 2409
         ¶C. C) MEXICO 2240

    Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER-COUNSELOR LESLIE A. BASSETT, REASONS:
     1.4(B/D).

    ¶1.  (C) Summary:  After its considerable successes in the
    2003 midterm elections and in state and local races since
    then, many in the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI)
    expected that 2006 would be the year of its restoration,
    particularly given the public's disappointment with the Fox
    Administration.  Yet despite the party's high expectations
    going into this electoral cycle, polls taken since January
    have consistently shown PRI candidate Roberto Madrazo in an
    often distant third place, and a Madrazo victory appears
    increasingly out of reach.  What accounts for this dramatic
    reversal of fortunes?  First among the factors is the
    candidate himself; even many PRI insiders now privately
    concede that Roberto Madrazo is a deeply flawed candidate.
    By all accounts, his campaign has been chaotic, based on a
    strategy more suited to the days of PRI hegemony than to
    Mexico's current multiparty democracy.  The party's
    relationship with the mass media has been less than smooth,
    possibly because it continues to owe major media outlets
    considerable debts from past campaigns.  To compound
    problems, the PRI never fully adapted to its status as an
    opposition party; lacking an all-powerful arbitrator in Los
    Pinos, party discipline has broken down, and routine disputes
    quickly devolve into feuds and even defections.  In the face
    of these fault lines, unless the PRI's electoral fortunes
    reverse before July 2, it is difficult to see how it can
    avoid a major post-election bloodletting, which may well
    determine its future.  End summary.

    A Flawed Candidate...
    ---------------------

    ¶2.  (C) Outside observers -- and an increasing number of PRI
    loyalists -- concur that the greatest disadvantage the party
    faces in this campaign is the candidate himself.  Polls
    consistently show that Roberto Madrazo has far higher
    negative ratings than either of his main rivals; the most
    recent Mitofsky poll revealed that 43% of Mexicans held an
    unfavorable impression of Madrazo, as opposed to 26% for PRD
    candidate Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador (AMLO) and only 19% for
    PAN candidate Felipe Calderon.  As a national figure for over
    10 years, Madrazo's reputation for authoritarianism and
    treachery have proven difficult to shake, and indeed, his
    conduct during the campaign has only reinforced it.

    ¶3.  (C) In fact, Madrazo seems congenitally incapable of
    projecting an image of principle and probity, missing every
    opportunity to take a principled stand.  For example, when
    former PRI presidential candidate and Mexico state Governor
    Arturo Montiel was battling allegations of having illicitly
    enriched himself while in office, Madrazo was quick to rush
    to his defense.  When the scandal broke over the alleged
    abuse of power by Puebla Governor Mario Marin, Madrazo again
    rushed to the defense of the alleged wrongdoer, focusing not
    on the Governor's role in the illegal detention (and
    threatened rape) of a journalist, but rather on the
    possibility that the recordings incriminating the Governor
    may have been illegally obtained.  Only when public outrage
    over the scandal persisted did he back away from his support.
     More recently, when New Alliance presidential candidate
    Roberto Campa alleged that Madrazo had not paid federal taxes
    in recent years (ref C), Madrazo's first response was not to
    seek to disprove the allegation, but rather to accuse Campa
    of illegally releasing privileged information, reinforcing
    the impression that he had something to hide.

    ...Running a Campaign in Disarray...
    ------------------------------------

    ¶4.  (C) Aside from Madrazo's weakness as a candidate,
    contacts tell us that his campaign is in deep disarray,
    reflecting a poor structure and the candidate's own
    managerial failings.  At the root of the problem may be that
    the campaign lacks a formal manager, with too many of the
    decisions falling to Madrazo himself.  According to party
    insider Simon Vargas, Madrazo's inability to say "no" to his
    subordinates and allies compounds the problem.  For example,
    Madrazo initially tasked his closest political operative,
    Chamber of Deputies leader Manlio Fabio Beltrones, with
    organizing a committee to produce campaign policy papers;
    party president Mariano Palacios later offered to set up a
    policy committee of his own, an offer which Madrazo accepted.
     The PRI whip in the Chamber of Deputies, Emilio Chuayfett,
    later offered to set up yet a third policy committee, an
    offer which Madrazo again accepted.  To a large extent, these

    MEXICO 00002460  002 OF 003

    committees drew on many of the same experts, leading many to
    believe that their service on the committees was little more
    than a political exercise benefiting the committee head.  We
    also understand that key campaign staffers occupy redundant
    positions; there are, for example, several different
    spokespersons with indistinct lines of authority and a
    tendency to issue conflicting statements.  Although Madrazo
    has attempted on several occasions to restructure the
    campaign, the internal flaws appear to remain and the
    operational problems clearly persist.

    ...While Pursuing a Dubious Strategy...
    ---------------------------------------

    ¶5.  (C) Party contacts have shared with us their criticism of
    Madrazo's campaign strategy, which appears more suited to the
    old days of PRI hegemony than to Mexico's current multiparty
    democracy.  PRI insider Simon Vargas notes that a
    disproportionate number of Madrazo's campaign events have
    been small, private events targeting the elite; until
    recently, he has eschewed the mass gatherings favored by AMLO
    and, increasingly, Calderon.  Vargas concluded that Madrazo
    does not seem to understand that in Mexico's new, multiparty
    political system, presidents are no longer annointed.

    ...at the Head of a Dysfunctional Party...
    ------------------------------------------

    ¶6.  (C) One of the most significant problems faced by the PRI
    is its inability to adapt to its status as an opposition
    party.  Having lost the presidency, it lacks a single
    authoritative figure to impose his or her will on, and
    mediate disputes between, rival factions and strongmen.  In
    the absence of such a supreme arbitrator, internal party
    rivalries have flourished, as faction leaders freely pursue
    their own agendas without regard for broader party interests.
     PRI Deputies Angel Buendia and Jose Alberto Aquilar told
    poloff that without the check of an authoritative figure such
    as the President, PRI state governors have wrested
    considerable power from the party hierarchy.  Buendia notes
    that PRI governors -- whom he calls "little emperors" -- have
    felt free to challenge party leaders for the right to select
    legislative candidates from their states, a privilege
    formerly reserved to the party hierarchy.  Given the
    increased autonomy PRI governors now enjoy, Buendia asserts
    that many see a Madrazo victory as undesirable, fearing that
    a PRI President would seek to rein them in (ref B).

    ...that Remains at Odds with the Press
    --------------------------------------

    ¶7.  (C) To top off the PRI's troubles, the party appears to
    have had difficult relations with some national media
    outlets.  Arturo de las Fuentes, a protege of PRI President
    Mariano Palacios, complained to us that the national press
    accords Madrazo campaign events considerably less coverage
    than equivalent events held by the AMLO or Calderon
    campaigns, while taking pleasure in giving front page
    coverage to the first hint of scandal within the PRI.  De las
    Fuentes attributes this allegedly unfair treatment -- not
    necessarily convincingly -- to the large debts that the PRI
    still owes major media outlets from past campaigns.  It has
    had difficulty paying these debts due to the $100 million
    fine levied against it for campaign finance violations in
    ¶2000.  De las Fuentes noted that while the party is
    attempting to pay down the debts, doing so leaves less cash
    on hand for the current campaign.

    ¶8.  (C) Senate Vice President Carlos Chaurand concurred that
    the press is according Madrazo less favorable coverage,
    although he attributed it to a somewhat different monetary
    motive:  he noted that the Fox Administration spends vast
    sums of money on public service advertising and publicity for
    its programs and achievements.  He argued that Reforma and
    other major outlets accord Calderon more favorable treatment
    than Madrazo because they do not want to jeopardize their
    richest source of advertising revenue.

    Comment: Can the PRI Survive a Third Place Finish?
    --------------------------------------------- -----

    ¶9.  (C) Madrazo's biggest problem may simply be that he
    reminds Mexicans of all that they disliked most about the PRI
    during the days of its hegemony.  Having diagnosed several of
    the PRI's most serious ailments, the question remains whether
    these ailments may prove terminal.  The present campaign has
    revealed the party in its current state to be an artificial
    construct, serving largely as a vehicle for the personal
    ambitions of its members, rather than to unite ideological
    fellow travelers.  As the party confronts the possibility of
    a third place finish, its internal fault lines appear ever

    MEXICO 00002460  003 OF 003

    more apparent.  These fault lines divide rival cliques; they
    also divide party reformers from party dinosaurs.  Unless the
    PRI's electoral fortunes quickly reverse, these internal
    conflicts are liable to intensify after the election.  The
    outcome of the resulting bloodletting may well determine
    whether the PRI can adapt and survive as a modern, centrist
    party or whether it will wither as a vestige of Mexico's
    authoritarian past.

    Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at
    http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity

    GARZA

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