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### Viewing cable 08NAIROBI312, KENYA: A/S FRAZER,S MEETINGS WITH PRESIDENT KIBAKI

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
08NAIROBI312 | 2008-01-29 14:02 | 2011-04-06 00:12 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Nairobi

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    VZCZCXRO4019
    PP RUEHROV
    DE RUEHNR #0312/01 0291447
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    P 291447Z JAN 08
    FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4470
    INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
    RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 9855
    RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM 5751
    RUEHDJ/AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI 5074
    RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 2589
    RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 1858
    RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 2619
    RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 2553
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
    RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
    RUCQSOC/USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NAIROBI 000312

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/29/2018
    TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM KE
    SUBJECT: KENYA: A/S FRAZER,S MEETINGS WITH PRESIDENT KIBAKI
    JANUARY 5 AND 7

    Classified By: Ambassador Ranneberger, reasons 1.4 (b,d)

    ¶1. (C) Summary:  Assistant Secretary Frazer, joined by
    Ambassador Ranneberger, met with President Mwai Kibaki on
    January 5 and January 7 to seek a path towards ending the
    political crisis stemming from the disputed December 27
    presidential election results.  She carried with her
    Secretary Rice's message of an end to the violence and an

    SIPDIS
    agreement to dialogue among the principals in the electoral
    dispute for a political resolution.  In both meetings, Kibaki
    was fully engaged and in control of his meeting, though
    members of his team comfortably voiced divergent viewpoints.
    In the January 5 meeting, Kibaki and his team focused on the
    need to end the post-election violence and their fear that
    Kikuyus were specifically being targeted.  In the January 7
    meeting, Kibaki was put on the defensive by A/S Frazer who
    sought an explanation and remedy for his naming of a partial
    cabinet on the eve of the African Union Chairman and Ghanaian
    President John Kufuor's arrival to facilitate talks between
    he and Raila Odinga of the Orange Democratic Party (ODM).

    ¶2. (C) During both meetings, Kibaki said the right things in
    condemning violence and being open to dialogue to end the
    political crisis.  Furthermore, Kibaki agreed in principle to
    forming a government of national unity and reconstituting his
    cabinet following talks with Odinga.  However, his subsequent
    actions clearly suggested that he and his team were also
    moving towards consolidating power and that dialogue with
    Odinga was perhaps a fallback plan in whatever political
    strategy they had to end the political crisis.  End Summary.

    ¶3. (C) During A/S Frazer,s mission to Kenya from January
    4-11, she met with President Kibaki twice, on January 5 and
    7, to reinforce the message from Washington:  entering into
    dialogue with Odinga to find a political resolution to the
    current crisis is the way forward and an end to all violence
    on all sides is paramount.  A/S Frazer pointed out that
    Kenyans had come out en masse to vote and largely did so
    peacefully in a process that appeared to be clean, up to the
    point of vote tallying.  She emphasized that there were
    clearly problems with the vote count and this should be
    acknowledged and addressed by Kibaki in the interest of
    helping to heal divisions in the country.  She reminded
    Kibaki of the more conciliatory tone he struck during his
    first address to the nation, which acknowledged that Kenyans
    had voted across the spectrum and which was a basis from
    which reconciliation could be built upon.  A/S Frazer argued
    that political dialogue is the most viable way out of the
    current crisis as Kenyan courts are not considered impartial
    by ODM.

    ¶4. (C) While Kibaki repeatedly said in both meetings he was
    open to political dialogue, his position was quite clear:  he
    won the election fairly; if ODM has concerns about the
    outcome they should take their complaints to court because
    once the Electoral Commission of Kenya makes a call on
    elections the courts are the sole constitutional remedy (and
    his government would obey their ruling, Kibaki said); and ODM
    is to blame for post-election fighting and it is
    orchestrating an organized campaign of violence.

    ¶5. (C) Kibaki emphasized that the real problem at hand from
    his government's perspective is not the controversial
    presidential election result but the violence that has
    ensued, and he said ending it was their primary focus.
    Kibaki pushed the point that Odinga and other ODM leaders
    need to come out and call for an end to the violence.

    ¶6. (C) Martha Karua, the Minister of Justice and
    Constitutional Affairs and clearly one of the hardliners in
    Kibaki's inner circle, attended the January 5 meeting (joined
    by then Foreign Minister Raphael Tuju, Foreign Ministry
    Permanent Secretary Thuita Mwangi, and Advisor Stanley
    Murage) during which she conceded that while some of the
    post-election violence may have been spontaneous, for the
    most part it has been pre-planned, she said. Kibaki echoed
    this point arguing that the youth are being paid to commit
    such acts.  Tuju, a Luo, contended that ODM supporters were
    specifically targeting the Kikuyu, whom he said have
    exercised a lot of restraint up to now, suggesting that they
    could retaliate especially in areas like Nairobi where they

    NAIROBI 00000312  002 OF 003

    are a majority, as Karua pointed out.  Kibaki and his team
    emphasized they would not kowtow to the violence, which they
    consider ODM is using as "blackmail." Mwangi recounted how he
    had to send a vehicle to Eldoret to rescue members of his
    family from the violence in that area.  He claimed the
    post-electoral violence had been instigated by ODM and that
    it would have "unleashed" such violence even if it had won
    the election because of its desire for "majimbo" -- the idea
    of decentralized governance with the connotation that major
    ethnic groups will govern autonomously over their own
    regions.

    ¶7. (C) A/S Frazer stressed that the USG condemned all
    violence and promised to continue to push the issue with ODM
    to call an end to it.  She, however, asked Kibaki to
    demonstrate leadership by engaging with Raila in dialogue
    even in these difficult times; if former Presidents Nelson
    Mandela and F.W. de Klerk of South Africa could do it after
    years of violence, distrust, and political struggle in South
    Africa, surely he and Raila could do the same to move Kenya
    forward.  After all, they have worked together in the past
    and they do know each other, perhaps too well, she added.
    A/S Frazer noted there were failures in leadership on both
    sides -- that Raila should reign in those committing violence
    and that Kibaki should come out with a statement
    acknowledging electoral problems.

    ¶8. (C) A/S Frazer asked that Kibaki and Raila issue separate
    statements condemning violence, acknowledging there were real
    problems with the elections, and agreeing to dialogue
    (initially a joint statement was proposed and Kibaki was
    unopposed to it, but Karua and Tuju nixed the idea arguing
    that it would give the appearance of a "co-presidency."); the
    statements would help heal and normalize the country*the
    most immediate need*and are exclusive of the issue of how
    the parties will actually come to a political arrangement on
    governance, A/S Frazer explained.  While Kibaki expressed
    doubt that Raila truly wanted peace and said he was a man who
    spoke in "two languages" -- something he saw as a significant
    obstacle to dialogue -- he agreed to issue a statement, but
    never did.  However, almost immediately after the January 5
    meeting, the Presidential Press Service issued a statement
    that said the government was open to dialogue and forming a
    government of national unity.

    ¶9. (C) On the eve of President Kufuor's arrival in Kenya to
    help facilitate talks between Kibaki and Odinga, Kibaki
    announced on January 7 the appointment of eight key cabinet
    members.  A/S Frazer met with him that evening to express
    great disappointment and surprise at such action,
    particularly on the day before expected talks between ODM and
    PNU.  She said the cabinet appointments were preemptive, that
    it seemed like Kibaki was taking the issue of cabinet
    positions off the negotiating table and was prepared to
    exclude ODM from any kind of coalition government, and that
    the USG was seriously considering denouncing the government
    should Kibaki not take remedial action.  A/S Frazer also took
    Kibaki to task for not issuing the statement on vote tallying
    irregularities while noting that Odinga had honored his
    commitment to condemn violence and call off rallies given
    current political tensions.

    ¶10. (C) Kibaki argued that he was not preempting talks and
    that he only announced the partial cabinet to keep the
    government running -- that it was only "logical" to do so, he
    said. Logical as it may be, the timing in naming a cabinet
    was bad faith, A/S Frazer told Kibaki.  In the end, Kibaki
    said that he was open to changing cabinet positions if this
    was decided during talks with ODM, along with having the
    talks deal with a broader range of issues such as electoral
    and institutional reform.  After intense negotiations with
    Kibaki and his team, it was agreed that Kibaki would issue a
    statement explaining why he appointed a cabinet when he did,
    clarifying that the cabinet was subject to change pending
    outcome of talks with ODM, and noting that nothing would be
    ruled out in these discussions.  Francis Muthaura, Secretary
    to the Cabinet, and the newly appointed Foreign Minister
    Wetengula fought the idea of issuing a public statement
    clarifying the cabinet position appointment, but Kibaki was
    decisive in wanting it done; the statement was issued the
    following day.

    NAIROBI 00000312  003 OF 003

    ¶11. (C) Comment:  Kibaki and his team are fixated on the
    post-election violence and fail to truly own up to the fact
    that the flawed election results were the impetus to the
    crisis.  They seem almost oblivious to the vote tallying
    problems, treating it as a minor detail that can be brushed
    aside and dealt with through legal means.  Kibaki seemed
    reasonable and could be influenced with a well-argued point;
    members of his team, like Martha Karua, were clearly more
    hardline in their positions and do not seem truly interested
    in dialogue with ODM.  Distrust of ODM was very evident in
    statements by both Kibaki and members of his team during
    these conversations. While Kibaki and his team are quite
    dismissive of ODM protests about the problems with the
    elections, the fact that Kibaki is open to dialogue with
    Raila suggests he has not completely bought into PNU's
    narrative that they won the presidential elections fair and
    square; there may be hope yet that Kibaki will assert
    leadership to pursue a political solution with ODM.  End
    Comment.

    ¶12. (U) This cable has been cleared by Assistant Secretary
    Frazer.
    RANNEBERGER

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