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### Viewing cable 09ROME558, G8 ENERGY MINISTERIAL: SCENESETTE...

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09ROME558 | 2009-05-20 08:08 | 2011-03-18 11:11 | CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN | Embassy Rome

`

    VZCZCXRO9669
    OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK RUEHRN RUEHTRO
    DE RUEHRO #0558/01 1400819
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O 200819Z MAY 09 ZFD
    FM AMEMBASSY ROME
    TO RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC IMMEDIATE
    RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2090
    INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUEHSS/OECD POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 4560
    RUEHFL/AMCONSUL FLORENCE PRIORITY 3631
    RUEHMIL/AMCONSUL MILAN PRIORITY 0043
    RUEHNP/AMCONSUL NAPLES PRIORITY 3820
    RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY 4822

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ROME 000558

    NOFORN
    SIPDIS

    FOR ENERGY SECRETARY CHU
    DOE ALSO FOR A/S DAVID SANDALOW

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/20/2019
    TAGS: ENRG EPET OVIP PREL IR RU IT
    SUBJECT: G8 ENERGY MINISTERIAL: SCENESETTE...

    Classified By: CHARGE ELIZABETH DIBBLE FOR REASONS 1.4 B AND D

    ¶1. (C/NF) Summary:  Your 23-25 May visit to Rome will provide
    opportunities to interact with senior Italian officials on
    priority USG energy issues.  On European energy security,
    Italy's very close relationship with Russia often causes it
    to resist efforts to reduce dependence on Russian energy
    sources.  We hope you can urge a broader reevaluation of
    energy sources and technologies.  In particular, Italy's
    decision to return to nuclear power will -- if carried out --
    reduce this dependence; you should raise worrisome
    indications that U.S. firms will be unfairly denied the
    opportunity to participate in this multi-billion dollar
    project.  Italy is a laggard in the EU on the use of
    renewable energy, but its market may grow the most in the
    near future.  You can support the use of U.S. technology in
    this area.  Italy's parastatal energy company Eni is active
    in Iran and wants to expand its operation in that country;
    the USG is strongly opposed to this expansion of ""business as
    usual"" at a time when Iran is continuing its own nuclear
    program in defiance of UN and IAEA requirements that it
    sustpend enrichment activities.

    ¶2.  (C/NF) Because of the strong influence of organized
    crime, Italian seaports are vulnerable to use for the
    shipment of illicit nuclear materials.  DOE's Megaports
    program could significantly reduce this threat, but at least
    two USG efforts to launch Megaports in Italy have faltered
    owing to Italian red tape.  We would like to make another big
    push on this high USG priority, and your intervention could
    be critical in getting high-level Italian support for this
    effort.  End Summary.

    INTERACTION WITH ITALIAN POLICY MAKERS
    -------------------------------------

    ¶3.  (C/NF)  During the 23-25 May 2009 G8 Energy Ministerial
    in Rome,  you will have at least one bilateral meeting with
    Claudio Scajola, the Italian cabinet minister with
    responsibility for energy affairs.   This meeting, and other
    potential side meetings with Italian officials during the
    Ministerial are key opportunities to press a number of top
    USG energy concerns with the Berlusconi government.

    EUROPEAN ENERGY SECURITY
    -----------------------

    ¶4. (C/NF) Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi's close personal
    ties with Vladimir Putin and the very strong corporate ties
    between Italian energy parastatal ENI and Russia's Gazprom
    often put Italy squarely at odds with USG efforts to reduce
    Europe's  dependence on Russian energy.  That dependence has
    been reflected in Italian policy vis--vis Russia. The
    Italian government has been overtly apologetic for Russian
    power projection in its so-called Near Abroad - notably
    against Georgia last August. Italy opposes further expansion
    of NATO, and, finally,  Italy's energy policy too often
    reflects Russian, rather than European, priorities.  For
    example, the Italian government is deeply ambivalent about
    the EU's Nabucco Caspian pipeline, while ENI is poised to
    help GAZPROM construct Black Sea and Baltic Sea pipelines
    that will deepen EU's dependence on Russia. ENI, 30 percent
    owned by the Italian Government, often dictates GOI energy
    policy and uses its influence, through the GOI, to block EU
    energy market liberalization plans. Italy is taking some
    steps in the right direction: the Turkey-Greece-Italy
    pipeline project could bring Europe gas from the Caspian, and
    Liquid Natural Gas projects promise further diversification.
    It would be helpful if you could raise with Italian officials
    long-standing USG concerns about European energy security,
    emphasizing that increasing the flow of Russian gas around
    Ukraine is not the same as a policy seeking a true diversity
    of energy sources, routes and technologies.

    NUCLEAR ENERGY
    --------------

    ¶5. (C) Minister Scajola announced in May 2008 that Italy
    would pursue the start of construction of new nuclear power

    ROME 00000558  002.4 OF 003

    plants by the end of the current legislature (2013). The
    uncertain cost of fossil fuels, the need to meet emission
    targets, and a desire for greater energy security appear to
    be the motives behind this return to nuclear power (Note:
    Italy's previous nuclear power plants were decommissioned
    after the Chernobyl accident led to a series of three
    referenda in 1987 that had the practical effect of banning
    nuclear power generation. End Note) Solid government
    majorities in both chambers of parliament should facilitate
    the passage of legislation to address the issues of nuclear
    waste and plant siting. These issues, however, are likely to
    remain thorny problems for the GOI.  U.S.-based companies
    Westinghouse and GE are interested in selling their nuclear
    power plant technology to Italy, but they face stiff
    competition from foreign rivals whose governments are heavily
    lobbying the GOI. For example, intense French pressure,
    possibly involving corrupt payments to GOI officials, led the
    way for the February agreement by Italian and French
    electricity parastatals ENEL and EdF to form a 50-50
    consortium to build nuclear power plants in Italy and
    elsewhere. The agreement foresees the construction of four
    French Areva design nuclear plants in Italy by 2020 and,
    more disturbingly for U.S. firms, may establish French
    nuclear technology as the standard for Italy's return to
    nuclear power.  The GOI has assured us that GE and
    Westinghouse can still compete for nuclear business, as Italy
    intends to build up to 10 plants as part of its energy
    security plan.  Post continues to work for a level-playing
    field for U.S. companies (see ref A).  You could usefully
    underline to Italian officials that we expect U.S. firms to
    be given a fair opportunity to bid for contracts in Italy's
    nuclear power program.  You might also note that Italian
    behavior since February has produced the impression that
    other bidders -- including U.S. firms --  ""need not apply.""

    LIMITED BUT GROWING USE OF RENEWABLES
    -----------------------------

    ¶6. (SBU) Although Italy has some of the most generous
    subsidies for renewable energy in Europe, more solar energy
    is produced in gloomy Germany than in sunny Italy.  Experts
    attribute this to NIMBYism and difficulties in dealing with
    Italian bureaucracy, noting that the premium that Italians
    pay for renewable energy subsidies compared to Germans can
    even be considered a quantitative measure of the cost of
    Italian red tape.  That said, Italy is now attracting
    attention as a growing renewables market, as Germany and
    Spain rein in their subsidies, and Italy's remain in place$wQz!4k2Q)CQgIQj'Qthe Laboratory to the Market.""

    TRYING AGAIN ON DOE's MEGAPORTS
    ----------------------------

    ¶7. (C) With seaports, particularly those in southern Italy
    under the influence of organized crime,  it is especially
    important that Italy be included in DOE's Megaports project.
    Italian ports send large numbers of containers to the United
    States, and some Italian ports are major transhipment
    centers.  In 2007 about 3 million containers were shipped
    from or through Gioia Tauro, probably the port of most
    concern owing to organized crime influence.  Among these were
    40,000 shipments to the U.S.  (See Reftels C and D.)
    Megaports would provide a critically important safeguard that
    might prevent the shipment to the United States of nuclear
    materials by terrorists. The USG has tried twice before to
    launch Megaports in Italy -- on both occasions our efforts
    were thwarted by the Italian bureaucracy.  The GOI showed
    little enthusiasm for the project, and consistently failed to
    name a senior ""point person"" for implementation.  As a
    result, Megaports-Italy was crushed by Italian interagency
    squabbling and red tape.  We
    are set to make another major push on this critical USG
    priority.  In order to avoid the pitfalls that killed our

    ROME 00000558  003.10 OF 003

    earlier efforts, we are seeking early, high-level GOI buy-in.
     We want the GOI, at very senior level, to commit to
    Megaports implementation, and to formally designate an
    Italian cabinet minister who will be responsible for
    implementation.

    ¶8. (C) Your meeting with Minister Scajola represents an
    important opportunity to move Megaports forward in Italy.
    Scajola is one of the GOI's most powerful Ministers, and is
    considered personally close to Prime Minister Berlusconi. We
    recommend that you tell Minister Scajola that nuclear
    materials security is a top priority of the Obama
    administration, and that Megaports represents an important
    opportunity for Italy to do something tangible in support of
    President Obama's efforts to protect the world from nuclear
    terrorism.  You may also wish to point out that Megaports
    will help Italian ports meet the requirement for 100 percent
    radiation screening (by 2012) of all U.S.-bound containers;
    without Megaports, Italian ports could lose business to
    competing European ports that are currently implementing
    Megaports.  For the Berlusconi government to take this issue
    seriously, key Italian officials must hear this directly from
    Washington, particularly from yourself.

    IRAN
    ----

    ¶9. (C) You should be aware that Italian parastatal energy
    company Eni is active in Iran, and is currently considering
    an expansion of its operations in that country.  On May 18,
    Eni officials broached the possibility of this expansion with
    USG officials in Washington and were told that the USG
    strongly opposes any such expansion.

    POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC BACKDROP
    ----------------------------

    ¶10. (C) Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi continues to enjoy
    record popularity numbers; he possesses a commanding
    parliamentary majority that gives him a degree of political
    security unprecedented in post-war Italy. Berlusconi's
    standing has been bolstered by positive public perceptions of
    his response to the devastating April 2009 earthquake in the
    Abruzzo region.  We expect him to stay in power at least
    until the next scheduled national election in 2013.

    ¶11. (C) Prudent (some would say stodgy) banking practices
    allowed Italy's banks to avoid the global financial sector
    melt down. Italy's banks simply did not engage in sub-prime
    lending, and they did not buy the toxic assets that caused so
    much trouble in the U.S. and elsewhere.  But Italy has not
    been able to avoid the pain of the worldwide recession that
    has followed the financial crisis. Italy's economic growth
    rate -- which was relatively low even before the crisis --
    has dropped precipitously owing to sharp contractions in its
    export markets and falling domestic demand.  Unemployment is
    expected to exceed 8 percent this year and to rise further in
    ¶2010.  Government tax revenues are, not unexpectedly, off
    sharply.  Moreover, according to the IMF, an already large
    government debt is expected to hit 121 percent of GDP this
    year.  Both factors reduce the government's ability to
    provide for stimulus measures.

    COMMENT
    -------

    ¶12. (C) On a variety of important issues, your interactions
    with Italian officials provide an opportunity to advance
    important U.S. interests.  Because Megaports is a DOE
    project, it is especially important for you to ask Minister
    Scajola for GOI support.  Absent such a request it will be
    very difficult for Embassy Rome to push Megaports forward in
    Italy.  It is also very important for you to remind the GOI
    that we expect U.S. firms to be given a fair opportunity to
    bid on nuclear power projects in Italy, given what we have
    seen to date on the selection process.
    DIBBLE

`