Cable Viewer

Currently released so far... 6868 / 251,287

### Browse latest releases

2010/11 2010/12 2011/01 2011/02 2011/03 2011/04
2010/11/28 2010/11/29 2010/11/30
2010/12/01 2010/12/02 2010/12/03 2010/12/04 2010/12/05 2010/12/06 2010/12/07 2010/12/08 2010/12/09 2010/12/10 2010/12/11 2010/12/12 2010/12/13 2010/12/14 2010/12/15 2010/12/16 2010/12/17 2010/12/18 2010/12/19 2010/12/20 2010/12/21 2010/12/22 2010/12/23 2010/12/24 2010/12/25 2010/12/26 2010/12/27 2010/12/28 2010/12/29 2010/12/30
2011/01/01 2011/01/02 2011/01/04 2011/01/05 2011/01/07 2011/01/09 2011/01/10 2011/01/11 2011/01/12 2011/01/13 2011/01/14 2011/01/15 2011/01/16 2011/01/17 2011/01/18 2011/01/19 2011/01/20 2011/01/21 2011/01/22 2011/01/23 2011/01/24 2011/01/25 2011/01/26 2011/01/27 2011/01/28 2011/01/29 2011/01/30 2011/01/31
2011/02/01 2011/02/02 2011/02/03 2011/02/04 2011/02/05 2011/02/06 2011/02/07 2011/02/08 2011/02/09 2011/02/10 2011/02/11 2011/02/12 2011/02/13 2011/02/14 2011/02/15 2011/02/16 2011/02/17 2011/02/18 2011/02/19 2011/02/20 2011/02/21 2011/02/22 2011/02/23 2011/02/24 2011/02/25 2011/02/26 2011/02/27 2011/02/28
2011/03/01 2011/03/02 2011/03/03 2011/03/04 2011/03/05 2011/03/06 2011/03/07 2011/03/08 2011/03/09 2011/03/10 2011/03/11 2011/03/13 2011/03/14 2011/03/15 2011/03/16 2011/03/17 2011/03/18 2011/03/19 2011/03/20 2011/03/21 2011/03/22 2011/03/23 2011/03/24 2011/03/25 2011/03/26 2011/03/27 2011/03/28 2011/03/29 2011/03/30 2011/03/31
2011/04/01 2011/04/02 2011/04/03 2011/04/04 2011/04/05 2011/04/06 2011/04/07 2011/04/08 2011/04/09 2011/04/10 2011/04/11 2011/04/12 2011/04/13 2011/04/14 2011/04/15 2011/04/16 2011/04/17 2011/04/18

### Browse by creation date

66 72 73 75 79 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 96 97 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
1966/12
1972/02 1972/08
1973/04
1975/03
1979/08
1985/03
1986/05
1987/06
1988/01
1989/12
1990/01 1990/07 1990/08 1990/10
1991/05
1996/11
1997/12
2000/06 2000/09 2000/11
2001/02 2001/03 2001/07 2001/10 2001/11
2002/02 2002/03 2002/04 2002/07 2002/11 2002/12
2003/02 2003/03 2003/04 2003/05 2003/06 2003/07 2003/08 2003/09 2003/10 2003/11 2003/12
2004/01 2004/02 2004/03 2004/04 2004/05 2004/06 2004/07 2004/08 2004/09 2004/10 2004/11 2004/12
2005/01 2005/02 2005/03 2005/04 2005/05 2005/06 2005/07 2005/08 2005/09 2005/10 2005/11 2005/12
2006/01 2006/02 2006/03 2006/04 2006/05 2006/06 2006/07 2006/08 2006/09 2006/10 2006/11 2006/12
2007/01 2007/02 2007/03 2007/04 2007/05 2007/06 2007/07 2007/08 2007/09 2007/10 2007/11 2007/12
2008/01 2008/02 2008/03 2008/04 2008/05 2008/06 2008/07 2008/08 2008/09 2008/10 2008/11 2008/12
2009/01 2009/02 2009/03 2009/04 2009/05 2009/06 2009/07 2009/08 2009/09 2009/10 2009/11 2009/12
2010/01 2010/02

### Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z
Embassy Athens Embassy Asuncion Embassy Astana Embassy Asmara Embassy Ashgabat Embassy Ankara Embassy Amman Embassy Algiers Embassy Addis Ababa Embassy Accra Embassy Abuja Embassy Abu Dhabi Embassy Abidjan Consulate Amsterdam Consulate Adana American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura Embassy Buenos Aires Embassy Budapest Embassy Bucharest Embassy Brussels Embassy Bridgetown Embassy Bratislava Embassy Brasilia Embassy Bogota Embassy Bishkek Embassy Bern Embassy Berlin Embassy Belgrade Embassy Beirut Embassy Beijing Embassy Banjul Embassy Bangkok Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan Embassy Bamako Embassy Baku Embassy Baghdad Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen Embassy Conakry Embassy Colombo Embassy Chisinau Embassy Caracas Embassy Canberra Embassy Cairo Consulate Curacao Consulate Ciudad Juarez Consulate Chennai Consulate Casablanca Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe Embassy Dublin Embassy Doha Embassy Djibouti Embassy Dhaka Embassy Dar Es Salaam Embassy Damascus Embassy Dakar Consulate Dubai
Embassy Freetown
Embassy Guatemala Embassy Gaborone Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki Embassy Harare Embassy Hanoi Consulate Hermosillo Consulate Hamburg
Iran RPO Dubai Embassy Islamabad Consulate Istanbul
Embassy Jakarta Consulate Jerusalem Consulate Jeddah
Embassy Kyiv Embassy Kuwait Embassy Kuala Lumpur Embassy Kinshasa Embassy Kigali Embassy Khartoum Embassy Kathmandu Embassy Kampala Embassy Kabul Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg Embassy Luanda Embassy London Embassy Ljubljana Embassy Lisbon Embassy Lima Embassy Lilongwe Embassy La Paz Consulate Lahore Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO Mission UNESCO Embassy Muscat Embassy Moscow Embassy Montevideo Embassy Monrovia Embassy Minsk Embassy Mexico Embassy Mbabane Embassy Maputo Embassy Manama Embassy Managua Embassy Malabo Embassy Madrid Consulate Munich Consulate Mumbai Consulate Montreal Consulate Monterrey Consulate Milan Consulate Melbourne
Embassy New Delhi Embassy Nassau Embassy Nairobi Consulate Naples
Embassy Ouagadougou Embassy Ottawa Embassy Oslo
Embassy Pristina Embassy Pretoria Embassy Prague Embassy Port Of Spain Embassy Port Louis Embassy Port Au Prince Embassy Phnom Penh Embassy Paris Embassy Paramaribo Embassy Panama Consulate Peshawar
Embassy Quito
REO Basrah Embassy Rome Embassy Riyadh Embassy Riga Embassy Reykjavik Embassy Rangoon Embassy Rabat Consulate Rio De Janeiro Consulate Recife
Secretary of State Embassy Stockholm Embassy Sofia Embassy Skopje Embassy Singapore Embassy Seoul Embassy Sarajevo Embassy Santo Domingo Embassy Santiago Embassy Sanaa Embassy San Salvador Embassy San Jose Consulate Strasbourg Consulate Shenyang Consulate Shanghai Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis Embassy Tripoli Embassy Tokyo Embassy The Hague Embassy Tel Aviv Embassy Tehran Embassy Tegucigalpa Embassy Tbilisi Embassy Tashkent Embassy Tallinn Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York USEU Brussels US Office Almaty US Mission Geneva US Interests Section Havana US Delegation, Secretary UNVIE Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius Embassy Vienna Embassy Vatican Embassy Valletta Consulate Vladivostok
Embassy Windhoek Embassy Wellington Embassy Warsaw
Embassy Yerevan Embassy Yaounde
Embassy Zagreb

### Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AF AE AMGT ACOA ASEC AORC AG AU AR AS AFIN AL APER AA AEMR AMED ABLD AM ATFN AROC AJ AFFAIRS AO AFGHANISTAN AFU AER ALOW AODE ABUD ATRN APECO ASUP AC AZ AVERY APCS ADCO ASIG AGMT AMBASSADOR ASEAN AX AID AUC ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG ADANA AND
BR BIDEN BO BK BU BY BEXP BL BTIO BF BBSR BA BM BH BE BB BILAT BG BRUSSELS BT BC BX BMGT BTIU
CU CH CJAN CO CA CASC CY CD CM COE COUNTRY CLEARANCE CVIS CPAS CMGT CACS CWC CBW CI CG CF CS CN CT CL CIA CDG CE CIS CTM CB CLINTON CR COM CONS CV CJUS COUNTER CKGR COUNTERTERRORISM CODEL CONDOLEEZZA CARSON CW CACM CDB CAN
DA DOE DJ DK DHS DR DEA DS DOMESTIC DAO DCM DEPT DTRA DPRK DISENGAGEMENT DOD DEAX
ETRD ETTC ECON EFIN ES EFIS EWWT EAID ENRG ELAB EINV EU EAIR EI EIND EUN EG EAGR EPET ER EMIN EC ECIN ENVR ECA ELN ET ENERG ECPS EINT ENGY ELECTIONS EN EZ ELTN EK ECONCS EINVETC ECONEFIN ENIV ESA ENGR ETC EFTA ETRDECONWTOCS EXTERNAL ENVI EUNCH EINVECONSENVCSJA ECONOMICS EINN EFINECONCS ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS ECUN ENNP EUR EAP EEPET ETRDEINVTINTCS ETRO ESENV ECINECONCS ECONOMY ECONOMIC EINVEFIN ECIP EINDETRD EUC EREL
FR FAO FARC FREEDOM FI FBI FTAA FJ FINR FMLN FOR FTA FOREIGN FINANCE
GM GG GR GE GV GA GH GT GCC GOV GZ GOI GTIP GY GANGS GAZA GTMO
HO HA HR HU HSTC HURI HILLARY HK HYMPSK HUMAN
IC IO IV IR IZ IS IN IT IAEA IWC IIP IA ID ITALIAN ITALY ICAO INRB IRAQI ILC ISRAELI IQ IMO ICTY INRA INRO IRAJ IF ICRC IPR ILO IBRD IMF IZPREL ITPHUM ITPGOV INTERPOL INTELSAT IEFIN INR IRC IACI ITRA IL ICJ INTERNAL
JOSEPH JO JA JP JAMES JOHNNIE JM JUS
KACT KNNP KDEM KGIC KRAD KISL KIPR KTIA KWBG KTFN KPAL KCIP KN KHLS KCRM KSCA KPKO KFRD KMCA KJUS KIRF KWMN KCOR KPAO KU KV KAWC KUNR KPRP KOMC KSTC KTIP KSUM KMDR KFLU KPRV KBTR KZ KS KVPR KE KERG KTDB KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KSTH KGHG KIRC KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KG KWAC KSEP KMPI KDRG KBCT KNUP KTER KCFE KPLS KVIR KAWK KDDG KOLY KMRS KHDP KPAK KNAR KREL KBTS KNPP KCOM KGIT KNNPMNUC KO KPOA KRFD KHUM KDEV KICC KCFC KREC KSPR KHIV KWWMN KLIG KBIO KTBT KOCI KFLO KWMNCS KIDE KSAF KNEI KR KTEX KNSD KOMS KCRS KGCC KWMM KRVC KPAI KHSA KTLA KFSC KX KFTFN KPWR KMIG KSEC KIFR KDEMAF KFIN KNUC KPIN
LY LE LI LH LOG LG LO LT LTTE LU LAB
MNUC MARR MCAP MASS MOPS MP MO MIL MX MY MTCRE MT ML MASC MR MK MI MAPS MEPN MU MCC MZ MA MD MASSMNUC MQADHAFI MTCR MTRE MG MEPI MDC MPOS MEETINGS MUCN MRCRE MEPP MAR MAPP MAS MTS MLS MERCOSUR MC MV MEDIA MILI MOPPS
NATO NO NL NSG NA NU NPT NS NI NZ NATIONAL NP NAR NE NASA NK NG NT NIPP NSF NPG NGO NSSP NRR
OVIP OAS OREP OPRC OPDC OEXC OPCW OSCI ODIP OSCE OTRA OPIC OIIP OFFICIALS OFDP OECD OSAC OIE OVP OPAD OFDA OIC OTR
PREL PGOV PINR PARM PHUM PTER PK PINS PO PROP PHSA PBTS PREF PE PMIL PM POL PY PFOR PHALANAGE PARTY PAK PAO PRAM PA PMAR POLITICS PHUMPREL PALESTINIAN PHUS PRL PGOC PNR PL PGGV PNAT PROV PTERE PGOF PHUMBA PINT PEL PLN POV PSOE PF PARMS PBIO PSI POLINT POLITICAL PARTIES PGOVLO PORG PGOVE PINF PRELP PAS PPA PRGOV PUNE PG POLICY PROG PEPR PU PECON POGOV PINL PKFK
QA
RS RU RF RW ROBERT RFE RO REGION RP RIGHTS RICE RSP REACTION REPORT
SENV SNAR SP SOCI SA SY SW SU SF SMIG SCUL SZ SO SH SG SR SL SOFA SANC SK ST SC SN SEVN STEINBERG SAN SHUM SYR SAARC SI SNARCS SIPRS
TU TX TH TBIO TZ TRGY TK TW TSPA TSPL TPHY TNGD TI TC TS TR TD TT TIP TRSY TO TP TERRORISM TURKEY TFIN TINT
UK UY UNESCO UNO UNSC UNEP UN UNGA US UNDP UNCHS UP UG UNMIK UNAUS USTR UNVIE UNHRC UZ UV UE USAID UNHCR USUN USEU UNDC UAE UNDESCO UNCHC
VE VT VZ VM VTPREL VN
WWARD WHA WI WHO WA WMO WEU WTRO WZ WITH WTRQ WBG WTO WB
XZ XF XR XG XW XY XA XM XL XE XK XT XC XH XS XD XV
YI YM YE YMCS
ZI ZB ZU ZA ZOELLICK ZK ZP ZR ZF ZJ ZANU ZO

### Browse by classification

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

### Community resources

Follow us on Twitter Check our Reddit Twitter this Digg this page Contact us on IRC

courage is contagious

### Viewing cable 09NAIROBI656, PROPELLING THE REFORM PROCESS IN KENYA: MEETINGS

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09NAIROBI656.

Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09NAIROBI656 | 2009-04-02 13:01 | 2011-03-02 22:10 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Nairobi

`

    VZCZCXYZ0000
    PP RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHNR #0656/01 0921355
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    P 021355Z APR 09
    FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9054
    INFO RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 0503
    RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM 6458
    RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 3232
    RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 3165
    RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3025
    RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 5448

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L NAIROBI 000656

    SIPDIS

    DEPARTMENT FOR AF/E
    LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHERS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/02/2039
    TAGS: KDEM KE PGOV PHUM PREL
    SUBJECT: PROPELLING THE REFORM PROCESS IN KENYA: MEETINGS
    WITH KEY GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

    Classified By: Ambassador Michael E. Ranneberger for
    reasons 1.4 (b) an d (d)

    FROM THE AMBASSADOR

    ¶1. (C) Summary.  On March 23 I met separately with the
    National Intelligence Chief, the Foreign Minister, and the
    President,s permanent secretary to press on implementation
    of the reform agenda.  I called attention to growing concerns
    at senior levels in Washington regarding insufficient
    progress.  I emphasized our support for Kofi Annan's
    continued engagement and made clear that, while we recognize
    that the culture of impunity will not be reversed overnight,
    we expect to see results on key reform issues.  These three
    interlocutors will undoubtedly brief President Kibaki.  I am
    also meeting with key officials close to PM Odinga to convey
    the same message.  These meetings are part of our continuing
    efforts to propel the reform agenda, which also include
    vigorous public diplomacy and outreach to civil society, the
    private sector, religious groups, and the media, among other
    steps. End summary.

    ¶2. (C) On March 23 I met separately with three key senior
    officials to make clear U.S. concern regarding insufficient
    action to advance implementation of the reform agenda to
    which the coalition government committed itself.  The three,
    the head of the National Intelligence Service Michael
    Gichangi, Foreign Minister Moses Wetangula, and Presidential
    Permanent Secretary and head of the civil service Francis
    Muthaura, are to one degree or another close to President
    Kibaki and will undoubtedly brief him on my message.  (I am
    reaching out separately to officials linked to Prime Minister
    Odinga, and I will follow up by seeing the President and PM
    directly.)

    ¶3. (C) My message was essentially the same for all three.  I
    emphasized, among other points, growing concerns at senior
    levels in Washington regarding the slowing of implementation
    of the reform agenda.  I told them that we strongly support
    Kofi Annan,s continued involvement. I recognized that
    significant progress was made during the first eight months
    of the coalition government, but noted that progress has
    slowed now that the government is up against the hard issues
    related to tackling the culture of impunity:  holding
    accountable perpetrators of post-election violence and taking
    actions against corruption.  I highlighted particularly the
    need to move forward on the following key issues:
    constitutional revision, the setting up of the independent
    electoral commission, the establishment of the local Special
    Tribunal on post-election violence, specific actions against
    corruption, and movement on police and judicial reforms.  The
    U.S, I made clear, shares the expectations of the Kenyan
    people that the coalition government must follow through on
    its commitment to the reform agenda. I noted that I have
    written to both President Kibaki and Prime Minister Odinga on
    the reform process issues.  I emphasized to them the need to
    reach out to civil society, the private sector, religious
    groups, and the media to work in an inclusive way to advance
    reforms. I pointed out that the partnership between the U.S.
    and Kenya is based to a substantial degree on shared
    democratic values.  The coalition government should not take
    this partnership for granted. The U.S. and others who
    supported the coalition agreement were not supporting the
    status quo, but rather a commitment to launch a process of
    fundamental change to address the underlying causes of the
    crisis and to help Kenya build stronger, more inclusive, and
    more transparent democratic institutions. We understand that
    the culture of impunity will not be reversed overnight, but
    the reform agenda will begin the process of fundamental
    change.  I noted increased concerns about extra-judicial
    killings and increased threats to human rights activists.  In
    that regard, I expressed concern that the government has not
    accepted our offer to have the FBI help in investigating the
    murders of the two human rights activists. (PM Odinga
    accepted the offer, but the police have refused to sit down
    with the FBI, and the Foreign Minister subsequently wrote us
    declining the offer.)  I pointed out that the AGOA forum
    planned for August is a big opportunity, but noted that it
    will not be fully successfully for Kenya unless progress has
    been made on political and economic reforms before then.
    I also made clear to all three that the U.S. ) despite the
    way that some seek to distort the picture ) is neither
    pro-Odinga nor pro-Kibaki.  We are pro-coalition government.

    In order for the coalition government to work, the Prime
    Minister needs to be able to do his job effectively, and
    there needs to be good cooperation between Kibaki and Odinga.

    ¶4. (C) Gichangi (who briefs the President regularly)
    acknowledged that the reform process has not moved as quickly
    as Kenyans expected.   However, he said, politics &is about
    realpolitik and the art of the doable.8  Much time has been
    wasted in sorting out politics within the coalition
    government, he admitted.  Politicians are prematurely focused
    on the 2012 elections.  All of this has generated a lot of
    &negativity8 among the Kenyan people, who perhaps had
    unrealistic expectations about what the coalition government
    would achieve.  Meanwhile, the global economic crisis has had
    a major impact on Kenya, and this has fueled unhappiness and
    unrest, particularly among the youth (two-thirds of the
    population).  Kenya also suffers, Gichangi said, from "the
    Moi hangover of high-handed leadership."  Gichangi
    recognized the need for the coalition government to do more
    on the reform process but, though I pressed, he avoided
    specifics. (We know that Gichangi is a bitter rival of Police
    Commissioner Ali, and would like to see Ali removed, which
    would, we believe, pave the way for police reform.)

    ¶5. (C) The Foreign Minister,s points were similar to those
    made by Gichangi.  He acknowledged that the coalition
    government is at a moment of truth and must &get its act
    together.8  He said that Kibaki and Odinga planned to bring
    ministers together in April for a retreat focused mainly on
    the issue of how to proceed with respect to the reform
    agenda.  Our lengthy discussion produced nothing new.

    ¶6. (C) Among knowledgeable Kenyan observers, Muthaura is
    considered to be virtually a &shadow president,8 so much
    power does he wield.  Muthaura argued that the reform agenda
    is in fact moving forward and was defensive on the specific
    issue of corruption.  He maintained that the coalition system
    of each ministry having a minister from one party of the
    coalition and an assistant minister from the other party in
    effect introduced a &checks and balances8 system that
    contributes to greater transparency and accountability. He
    noted that the budgeting process is done by professional
    civil servants and not open to a lot of manipulation
    (conveniently overlooking the fact that much corruption is
    alleged to take place in the ample "off budget" budget). He
    alluded to a couple of additional anti-corruption steps the
    government may take, such as out-sourcing audits of state
    corporations.  He stressed that President Kibaki is fully
    committed to "fast tracking" implementation of the reform
    agenda, in concert with PM Odinga. (While the fast-tracking
    part is not credible, Odinga has repeatedly told me that he
    has a good working relationship with Kibaki.)

    ¶7. (C) During the course of a long and candid discussion,
    I challenged Muthaura on most of these points with the
    bottom-line being that ) if things are going on in the
    reform process as Muthaura alleges ) then this needs to be
    explained to the Kenyan people.  That was a point that
    Muthaura took, admitting that the coalition government has
    done a terrible job of presenting its accomplishments, and
    the challenges it faces, to the Kenyan people.  (Interesting
    ) and probably coincidentally -- Kibaki subsequently began a
    systematic tour of the entire country intended to lay out
    what the coalition government is doing, including how it is
    addressing the impact of the global economic crisis.)
    Muthaura also agreed with me that both the President and
    Prime Minister "need to send the right signals."  In that
    regard, he said that President Kibaki will set a clear agenda
    to move ahead on reform when he addresses Parliament when it
    reconvenes the latter part of April.  I told Muthaura that
    one "right signal" would be reaching out to civil society
    to hear and take into account their concerns about the need
    to strengthen the proposed legislation to establish the
    Special Tribunal in order to make it more independent and
    credible.  Having civil society on board would increase
    pressure on Parliamentarians to support the legislation.
    Muthaura agreed on the utility of doing this.

    ¶8. (C) Muthaura said that he would brief the President
    regarding U.S. concerns that the reform process is not moving
    quickly enough.  Kibaki will hear the same message through
    Gichangi and Wetangula as well.

    ¶9. (C) These meetings are part of our continuing efforts to
    propel the reform agenda, which  also include vigorous public
    diplomacy and outreach to civil society, the private sector,
    religious groups, and the media, among other steps.
    RANNEBERGER

`