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### Viewing cable 09KABUL1767, KARZAI ON THE STATE OF US-AFGHAN RELATIONS

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09KABUL1767 | 2009-07-07 13:01 | 2010-12-02 21:09 | SECRET | Embassy Kabul

`

    VZCZCXRO6511
    OO RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
    DE RUEHBUL #1767/01 1881329
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    O 071329Z JUL 09
    FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0009
    INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 001767

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/03/2019
    TAGS: PGOV PREL AF
    SUBJECT: KARZAI ON THE STATE OF US-AFGHAN RELATIONS

    Classified By: Ambassador Karl W. Eikenberry for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
    ).

    ¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY. In a series of meetings this week, I
    discussed with President Karzai a number of issues, including
    Karzai's concerns with the future of US policy on
    Afghanistan, and his opinions on where US policy here had
    failed. The meetings were cordial, but raised certain
    concerns for me about the status of the US-Afghan
    relationship, both in the lead up to the election and over
    the long term, should Karzai win reelection. Karzai's
    comments reinforce my belief that our relationship must be a
    two-way partnership of obligations and responsibilities. We
    must also convince Karzai to put his backing behind
    democratic institutions and professionalized security forces
    are better equipped to lead Afghanistan into the future,
    rather than Karzai's preference for tribal structures and
    informal power networks. This cable summarizes the content
    of these four recent meetings, as well as a subsequent
    conversation with Interior Minister Atmar. End Summary.

    ¶2. (S/NF) I met with Karzai on four occasions this week: on
    June 30 with COMISAF Gen. McChrystal and most of Karzai's
    national security team, and three times on July 1, xxxxxxxxxxxx, and
    finally with CODEL Ellsworth. Karzai maintained a calm
    demeanor throughout, but at several times displayed views
    that troubled me with their potential implications for
    US-Afghan relations. I also called on Atmar on July 2.

    Kandahar Incident
    ----------

    ¶3. (S/NF) At the June 30 meeting with Karzai and his
    national security advisors, Gen. McChrystal and I briefed
    Karzai on a June 29 incident in which a USG-funded, equipped,
    and mentored paramilitary force attacked a Kandahar
    courthouse. The incident resulted in the deaths of several
    Afghan National Police officers. Karzai had earlier received
    phone calls from high-level US officials regretting the
    incident, so was calm and did not display the type of emotive
    anger he has shown following civilian casualty incidents. In
    the later one-on-one meeting with me, I reminded Karzai that
    he had selected and introduced this paramilitary unit's
    recruits to the USG in 2002, a fact that he had conveniently
    omitted in larger group settings.

    ¶4. (S/NF) Karzai insisted that units operating outside of
    the Afghan armed forces must be brought under the legitimate
    control of the Afghan government. Gen. McChrystal and I
    agreed that both counterterrorism paramilitary units and
    private security companies (PSCs) require more rigorous
    oversight and be brought under the eventual control of the
    Afghan government. PSCs required stronger regulations, yet
    the government should also adopt more transparent licensing
    procedures.

    US Policy on Afghanistan
    ----------

    ¶5. (S/NF) Karzai declared in all four meetings that he
    believed the US was not speaking clearly to Afghans on its
    goals in Afghanistan. Karzai contended that in 2002 the US
    had stated a clear purpose for being involved in Afghanistan
    but had lost its purpose over the past six years. As he has
    in past meetings with us, Karzai either stated his belief in
    or repeated rumors questioning the US commitment to a strong
    partnership with Afghanistan.

    ¶6. (S/NF) Karzai reported Pakistani intelligence officials
    had alleged to Afghan officials that the US intended to
    divide Pakistan and weaken Afghanistan in order to pursue its
    fight against terrorist groups. At the same time, Karzai
    accused Iran of trying to weaken Afghanistan by supporting
    the presidential campaign of Abdullah Abdullah in order to
    promote a decentralization agenda that would strip power from
    the central government to give to sub-national actors over
    whom Iran believed it would have more control.
    Incredulously, Karzai appeared to accept so-called rumors
    that the US and Iran were working together to support
    Abdullah against him.

    ¶7. (S/NF) I pushed back strongly on this misinformation in
    the June 30 meeting with Karzai's national security team,
    reiterating to Karzai that there was no overt or covert US
    program to support any presidential candidate. I then asked
    Karzai if he took me at my word on this issue. Karzai,
    perhaps not wanting to back down in front of his advisors,
    said that he did not. Karzai said the US had actively
    encouraged Abdullah, Ashraf Ghani, and Zalmay Khalilzad to
    run for the presidency. At one point Karzai joked that I
    should "consult my (above) buddies" on national security
    issues. I repeated that the US had no favored candidates in

    Kabul 00001767 002 of 003

    the race and the formal setting of the meeting was not a
    proper forum to make such inappropriate comments. He was
    embarrassed and helpfully shifted the conversation to another
    topic. I also urged Karzai to move away from conspiratorial
    thinking and instead focus on bringing ideas for the future
    into his campaign. Introducing a clear platform now will put
    him in a better position to move forward if he wins
    reelection.

    US Mistakes in Afghanistan
    ----------

    ¶8. (S/NF) Karzai and I held a one-on-one meeting shortly
    before meeting CODEL Ellsworth. Karzai agreed with my
    suggestion to make a better effort to present the case for
    continued and productive US engagement in his meetings with
    USG visitors from Washington. However, as the CODEL meeting
    began, Karzai reverted to old form and launched into a
    familiar review of the many instances where he believed the
    US had miscalculated its policies in the region. In summary:
    The US had failed to formulate an effective post-2001 policy
    on Pakistan, had pulled out of southern Afghanistan
    (particularly Helmand) too soon and given too much
    responsibility to ill-equipped and casualty-averse NATO
    allies, had failed to effectively engage with and pay respect
    to the importance of tribal leaders in Afghan society, and
    had allowed tribal leader networks to be decimated by
    insurgent attacks. I spoke up then, observing that I had
    visited Helmand several years ago before other NATO forces
    took over military operations there and witnessed signs that
    governance and security were declining under then-Gov. Sher
    Mohammed Akhundzada.

    Atmar on Karzai's Paranoia
    ----------

    ¶9. (S/NF) I told Interior Minister Atmar at our July 2
    meeting that with his conspiratorial behavior, Karzai would
    run the risk of leaving USG interlocutors with the impression
    that we have accomplished very little here and that the
    Afghan government believed most of the failures lay with us.
    This is not a dialogue that will lead to an effective
    partnership. The US has been clear in its past shortcomings
    in Afghanistan, but we have yet to see Karzai admit to the
    serious shortcomings in his administration.

    ¶10. (S/NF) Atmar agreed with the importance of Karzai
    presenting himself as a better international partner. He
    also detailed three existing paranoias that affected Karzai's
    worldview: (1) Karzai did not understand US policy in the
    region and suspected ulterior motives in our relationship
    with neighboring countries; (2) he suspected the US was
    contemplating a short-term strategy in Afghanistan that would
    result in our disengagement within the next two years; and
    (3) the US was intent on dumping Karzai and supporting
    another candidate. A fourth emerging paranoia was of a US
    plot to divide and weaken Pashtuns on both sides of the
    Afghan-Pakistani border. Despite these paranoias, Atmar
    assured me that Karzai had confidence in his personal
    relationship with me and recognized the need to meet more
    frequently to work through his misperceptions of US policy
    and intentions.

    Our Relationship with Karzai
    ----------

    ¶11. (S/NF) In these meetings and other recent encounters
    with Karzai, two contrasting portraits emerge. The first is
    of a paranoid and weak individual unfamiliar with the basics
    of nation building and overly self-conscious that his time in
    the spotlight of glowing reviews from the international
    community has passed. The other is that of an ever-shrewd
    politician who sees himself as a nationalist hero who can
    save the country from being divided by the
    decentralization-focused agenda of Abdullah, other political
    rivals, neighboring countries, and the US. In order to
    recalibrate our relationship with Karzai, we must deal with
    and challenge both of these personalities.

    ¶12. (S/NF) The danger of long-term damage to our
    relationship with and thus our influence over Karzai ) who
    for now is the clear favorite to win the election ) is real,
    but not irreversible. We need to carefully ensure that the
    distance between us and Karzai does not grow over the
    remaining weeks before the election. Karzai has invited me
    for a series of one-on-one meetings in the near future.
    According to Atmar, Karzai recognizes the importance of a
    closer dialogue. I will use this opportunity and others to
    re-focus our dialogue on several points that can improve our
    mutual understanding, including:

    ¶13. (S/NF) We need to seriously examine the issue of armed
    groups that currently operate outside of the purview of

    Kabul 00001767 003 of 003

    official Afghan government control. The activities of
    paramilitary units and PSCs, combined with civilian
    casualties, night searches, and others issues related to the
    presence of foreign forces, play into the manifestation of
    Afghans' anger that they are not in control of their own
    country. Karzai claims only to be a vessel for his peoples'
    anger. All hubris aside, he is expressing a legitimate
    concern of his constituents. These problems will be a
    barrier to moving forward in other areas of our relationship
    until we have properly addressed them.

    ¶14. (S/NF) At the same time, we must convince Karzai that
    the US-Afghan relationship is a two-way street of obligations
    and responsibilities. While we accept our own
    responsibilities, Karzai must accept and act on our
    expectation that he elucidate a clear vision for how he
    intends to lead Afghanistan over the next five years in a way
    that encourages democratization, promotes economic
    development, and recognizes the poisonous effects corruption
    has had on his government's ability to win the trust and
    respect of its people. If reelected, it is my hope that a
    Karzai who no longer needs to run for reelection will be
    better positioned and in a healthier frame of mind to pursue
    this agenda, as well as a meaningful national reconciliation.

    ¶15. (S/NF) I will work now to lay the foundation for
    improved trust and advances on the two key themes outlined
    above. I will work in tandem with Gen. McChrystal on both of
    these fronts. On the discussion of shared responsibilities,
    I will begin a frank, collaborative (and perhaps, at times,
    confrontational) dialogue with Karzai. No alternative
    approach is now evident. Karzai's current vision for
    Afghanistan's future relies too strongly on warlords, tribal
    chiefs, and other personalities of the past who would be
    difficult to reconcile with our commitments to build strong
    government institutions and professional security forces.
    Eikenberry

`