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### Viewing cable 09MOSCOW2749, SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF FBI DIRECTOR MUELLER TO

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09MOSCOW2749 | 2009-11-09 05:05 | 2010-12-01 21:09 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Moscow

`

    VZCZCXYZ0000
    OO RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHMO #2749/01 3130518
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O 090518Z NOV 09
    FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
    TO RHMFISS/FBI WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
    RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5334
    INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 002749

    SIPDIS

    FBI FOR DIRECTOR MUELLER FROM AMBASSADOR BEYRLE

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/05/2019
    TAGS: KJUS PINS PREL PTER SOCI RS
    SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF FBI DIRECTOR MUELLER TO
    MOSCOW, NOVEMBER 15-17, 2009

    Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN BEYRLE, REASONS 1.4 (B), (C), (D), AND (
    F)

    ¶1. (C) Summary. Director Mueller: Your engagement with
    Russia's top law enforcement and security service officials
    is a tangible sign that U.S.-Russian relations are improving
    markedly after hitting bottom in the summer of 2008. Recent
    visits by President Obama and Secretary Clinton have
    demonstrated to the Russians that we take their concerns
    seriously and have produced more positive momentum in our
    bilateral ties than I have seen in over a decade. The
    Bilateral Presidential Commission (BPC) will play a key role
    in building confidence and giving us regular contact with key
    elements of the GOR bureaucracy, including the often
    obstructionist law-enforcement organs. The BPC can
    strengthen joint efforts to combat terrorism, organized crime
    and other shared concerns.

    ¶2. (C) Summary continued. You should harbor no illusions
    about your counterparts: FSB Director Aleksandr Bortnikov,
    SVR Director Mikhail Fradkov, and Internal Affairs Minister
    Rashid Nurgaliyev represent institutions that feel threatened
    -- ideologically and materially -- by the "reset" in our
    relations. At the same time, they appreciate the benefits
    that cooperation with the U.S. provides, not only in
    achieving their assigned missions, but also in enhancing
    their country's position internationally. End Summary.

    Domestic Political Context
    --------------------------

    ¶3. (C) After almost two years of tandem leadership, President
    Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin govern based on a
    still-evolving division of labor. Medvedev, the junior
    partner, has been a steady advocate of modernization --
    economic, political and technological. Constitutionally, he
    has the lead in foreign policy, but makes no major decisions
    without some form of consultation with Putin, most of which
    is obscure to the outside world. In addition to governing
    behind the scenes, Putin has been visible in tackling recent
    crises such as the conflict with Georgia, gas supply
    negotiations with Ukraine, and localized unrest due to the
    economic crisis. Although there is evidence that their
    closest advisors spar privately over policies and personnel
    matters, the two leaders appear united and project complete
    ease with one another in the media. Medvedev has yet to make
    major changes to the senior staff he inherited from Putin.
    Putin remains more popular than Medvedev.

    Three Skeptics
    --------------

    ¶4. (C) Russia's recent economic problems and uncertainty
    about the future of the Medvedev-Putin "tandem" have
    reinforced long-standing elite divisions between the
    "siloviki" (officials from the security and intelligence
    services) and the modernizers. Your interlocutors are leading
    representatives of the siloviki; they are Putin proteges who
    believe a strong state exercising effective political and
    economic control is the answer to most problems. They
    advocate tightening the screws against domestic opposition
    and their alleged external supporters -- principally the U.S.
    and its Western allies. The modernizers recognize that
    Russia's future depends on integration with the world economy
    and that confronting some of the country's most stubborn
    problems -- such as corruption -- requires transparency and
    the impartial application of the law.

    ¶5. (C) The security services are skeptical about the West's
    motivations and are the most influential opponents of the
    engagement agenda. Bortnikov, Fradkov, and Nurgaliyev tend
    toward a Cold War mentality, which sees the U.S. and its
    allies intent on undermining Russia -- and they have made
    public accusations to that effect. None of them is within the
    "inner circle" of Kremlin decision-making, but instead enjoy
    the reflected power of their sponsors and allies. According
    to one expert, Fradkov and Bortnikov share a background in
    dealing with economic issues -- working behind the scenes to
    check the influence of Russia's powerful business magnates
    and advance the interests of their allies. Fradkov, a former
    prime minister under Putin who allegedly worked for Soviet
    intelligence in the 1970s in brokering arms sales to India,
    has a mandate to protect the interests of Russian companies
    abroad. Fradkov works closely with the powerful state
    corporations and has ties to the influential First Deputy
    Prime Minister Igor Sechin. Bortnikov spent his entire career
    in the FSB working on economic issues, including a stint as
    head of the FSB Economic Security Service. In that role

    Bortnikov worked on the government's campaign against the
    oligarchs. Many consider Bortnikov as the protege of his
    predecessor, Nikolay Patrushev, now the Secretary of the
    Security Council, and also indirectly allied with Sechin. Of
    the three, only Fradkov has any real experience in foreign
    relations gained during his tenure as Russian Ambassador to
    the EU from 2003-2004 and his work in the Ministry of Foreign
    Trade during the 1990s.

    ¶6. (C) Nevertheless, there are indications that they value
    work with other services on specific issues of mutual
    interest. Perhaps most telling, Nurgaliyev has supported
    cooperative relationships with his counterparts around the
    globe, demonstrated by his personal efforts to secure an
    INTERPOL training center in Moscow, and he has been a good
    partner for the U.S. in its efforts to protect intellectual
    property rights. Moreover, Nurgaliyev has openly lamented the
    culture of corruption with Russia's law enforcement system
    and has been a strong supporter of Medvedev's well-publicized
    campaign against corruption.

    State Security
    --------------

    ¶7. (C) Despite the changes since the collapse of the Soviet
    Union, Russia's security services more closely resemble the
    model of the Czarist-era Okhrana (secret police) than Western
    law-enforcement institutions. State security remains the
    services' primary responsibility and all three organizations
    devote considerable attention and resources to
    counter-intelligence and domestic intelligence work. While
    the FSB and MVD nominally share the FBI's responsibilities --
    criminal prosecution, organized crime, and counter-terrorism
    -- they are also fully immersed in Russia's political
    battles. Political factors determine the services'
    enthusiasm for pursuing investigations and independent
    analysts believe individuals within the security services are
    linked with organized crime.

    ¶8. (C) Russian security service leaders play a far more open
    political role than their counterparts in the West. Your
    three interlocutors accrue political power in the Russian
    system by using the legal system against political enemies --
    turning the courts into weapons of political warfare rather
    than independent arbiters. They control large numbers of men
    and resources -- the MVD alone has more than 190,000 soldiers
    in its internal security divisions. Despite their similar
    outlook and background, they are often competitors for
    influence against each other -- with shadowy conflicts
    occasionally bubbling to the surface.

    Regional Unrest
    ---------------

    ¶9. (C) After the "color" revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine,
    Russian security services stepped up their efforts against
    the U.S. and other Western powers, whom they blame for
    inciting the protests and overthrowing the governments in
    Tbilisi and Kyiv. Their officers maintain constant vigilance
    against the U.S. government representatives through active
    surveillance and they have sought to stifle U.S. humanitarian
    programs in the North Caucasus. MVD forces harass and
    intimidate political opposition protests while
    "investigations" against Western-supported NGOs for trumped
    up charges (like using pirated software) have hindered the
    work that those organizations seek to accomplish.

    ¶10. (C) Concern about potential social unrest associated with
    the recent economic crisis provided justification for the
    security services' push earlier this year to eliminate jury
    trials and to broaden the definition of "treason" to include
    the organization of protests against the government; the
    former became a law, while Medvedev withdrew the treason law
    for revision. In December, the MVD deployed special "OMON"
    forces in Vladivostok against demonstrators protesting new
    taxes on imported automobiles, key economic sector in that
    region. They have shelved plans to reduce the number of MVD
    internal troops, ostensibly to retain a security force for
    the 2014 Olympic Games in Sochi.

    ¶11. (C) The marked deterioration of security in the North
    Caucasus over the past three months has alarmed regional and
    national leaders. The car bomb that nearly killed Yunus-bek
    Yevkurov, President of the Republic of Ingushetia, has
    dampened the initial optimism that Yevkurov could bring
    ethnic and religious groups together. The continued threat of
    separatism, extremism, and terrorism -- particularly in the
    North Caucasus -- is a priority issue for the security

    services. Ethnic conflict and social unrest continue to
    simmer in Ingushetia, Dagestan, and other republics in the
    troubled Caucasus region. The MVD has more than 15,000
    soldiers stationed in Chechnya, an additional regiment in
    Ingushetia, and has created three "special forces" (spetznaz)
    counter-terrorism units in Moscow, Smolensk, and Chelyabinsk.

    A Challenging Relationship
    --------------------------

    ¶12. (C) While portions of the FSB are working cooperatively
    with US law enforcement, some sections, particularly those
    dealing with counterintelligence, are not. Harassing
    activity against all embassy personnel has spiked in the past
    several months to a level not seen in many years. Embassy
    personnel have suffered personally slanderous and falsely
    prurient attacks in the media. Family members have been the
    victims of psychologically terrifying assertions that their
    USG employee spouses had met accidental deaths. Home
    intrusions have become far more commonplace and bold, and
    activity against our locally engaged Russian staff continues
    at a record pace. We have no doubt that this activity
    originates in the FSB. Counterintelligence challenges remain
    a hallmark of service at Embassy Moscow. This fact is
    unlikely to change in the medium term.

    ¶13. (C) Despite the challenges of working with our Russian
    counterparts, your visit takes place in the context of strong
    Kremlin backing and a climate of renewed opportunity. Since
    your 2004 trip to Russia, the success of joint investigation
    programs with the MVD and FSB on organized crime,
    counter-terrorism, and cybercrime has demonstrated the
    potential gains that a cooperative relationship can provide.
    It is premature to say we have reached a turning point in
    overcoming security service suspicions about U.S. intentions,
    but the vigor in which the FSB has pursued your visit
    (including covering the cost of the over flight and airport
    landing fees) shows a definite thaw after last year's war in
    Georgia. At a minimum, we can expect the Russian side to
    welcome your continued advocacy for the Joint FBI-MVD working
    group on organized crime, efforts to work together to fight
    cybercrime, and other cooperative projects. We also expect
    them to be receptive to a renewed invitation for a law
    enforcement officer to attend the FBI's National Academy at
    Quantico.

    Beyrle

`