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### Viewing cable 09TBILISI2025, GEORGIA: MISTRAL SALE COULD DESTABILIZE BLACK SEA

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09TBILISI2025 | 2009-11-19 12:12 | 2010-12-06 21:09 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tbilisi

`

    VZCZCXRO2568
    OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
    DE RUEHSI #2025/01 3231235
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O 191235Z NOV 09
    FM AMEMBASSY TBILISI
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2433
    INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0324
    RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 4944
    RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECRITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TBILISI 002025

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/19/2019
    TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MOPS RS GG
    SUBJECT: GEORGIA: MISTRAL SALE COULD DESTABILIZE BLACK SEA

    REF: PARIS 1529

    Classified By: Ambassador John R. Bass for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

    ¶1. (C)  Summary and comment.  On November 13 and 16 Foreign
    Minister Grigol Vashadze voiced serious concerns about the
    potentially destabilizing influence of France's possible sale
    of Mistral-class helicopter carrier ships to Russia (reftel)
    to DAS Tina Kaidanow and the Ambassador.  As the broker of
    the August 2008 ceasefire agreement with which Russia has
    still not complied, France would not only provide Russia with
    arms that its own officers admit would have helped them in
    the war against Georgia, but would send a powerful signal
    that NATO and the west are no longer concerned about Russia's
    intentions.  At a time when Georgia faces a "silent embargo"
    on arms shipments, other countries -- notably Spain and the
    Netherlands -- await such a signal to begin their own sales
    to Russia.  Such an opening of the floodgates could render an
    already out-of-balance military confrontation even more
    lopsided, allowing the Russians to assert themselves with
    impunity -- and delivering the implicit message that the west
    will not interfere.  Vashadze requested that the United
    States push back against this sale and said President
    Saakashvili would make the same request at more senior
    levels.  We recommend doing so, in both Paris and Brussels --
    or at the very least seeking a commitment from Russia that
    these ships will not be deployed in the Black Sea.  End
    summary and comment.

    VASHADZE'S CONCERNS

    ¶2. (C) Foreign Minister Vashadze raised his concerns with us
    about the sale twice, during a November 16 meeting with
    Deputy Assistant Secretary Kaidanow and in a November 13
    dinner with the Ambassador.  He registered several specific
    objections.  First, the fact that it is France considering
    the sale carries significant symbolic weight.  President
    Sarkozy, representing the French presidency of the EU,
    brokered the August 12, 2008 ceasefire agreement between
    Georgia and Russia and effectively pledged the EU as the
    guarantor of that agreement.  Point 5 of the agreement
    requires Russia to withdraw its forces to those positions
    held previous to the war -- a provision that Russia has not
    complied with.  In fact, Russia has done the opposite,
    increasing its military presence in both Abkhazia and South
    Ossetia, and expanding its positions beyond their August 6,
    2008 positions.  Thus, if France were to approve the sale of
    any significant military equipment to Russia, it would
    implicitly intimate that the broker of the ceasefire
    agreement was satisfied either that Russia had complied with
    those commitments, or that the commitments were no longer
    binding.

    ¶3. (C) Second, Vashadze noted that the specific ship in
    question represents a direct threat not only to Georgia, but
    to the entire Black Sea region.  Third, the sale is being
    contemplated in the context of what Vashadze called a "silent
    embargo" against Georgia, making Georgia's attempts to
    rethink its physical security even more difficult.   Russia
    would improve substantially its ability to project military
    power across the Black Sea littoral.  Finally, Vashadze said
    that other countries -- notably Spain and the Netherlands --
    were waiting for just such a sale from a major NATO ally to
    open the door to their own arms sales to Russia.  A Mistral
    sale would thereby open the floodgates to new procurements
    Qsale would thereby open the floodgates to new procurements
    for Russia -- procurements that could lead to even more
    destabilizing steps in the Black Sea region.

    PUBLIC DISCUSSION

    ¶4. (U) The newspaper 24 Saati (24 Hours) published a
    front-page article November 18, written by a American analyst
    based in Tbilisi, that registers strong protest against the
    proposed sale.  Calling the sale potentially the "biggest
    ever NATO country military supply to Russia," the article
    notes that quotes Russian Navy Commander Admiral Vladimir
    Vysotskiy as saying in September that "In the conflict in
    August last year a ship like that would have allowed the
    Black Sea Fleet to accomplish its mission in 40 minutes, not
    26 hours, which is how long it took us."

    COMMENT:  THE WRONG SHIP FROM THE WRONG COUNTRY AT THE WRONG
    TIME

    ¶5. (C) Despite reassuring its people that Russia is not
    likely to undertake further military action in the near
    future, the Georgian Government privately is concerned by the
    steady stream of aggressive Russian rhetoric.  The symbolism
    of France, the broker of the ceasefire and a major NATO ally,

    TBILISI 00002025  002 OF 002

    taking this particular opportunity to make one of NATO's
    biggest sales ever to Russia will not be missed in Moscow or
    in Tbilisi.  Not only on the symbolic level is the sale
    problematic; this type of ship will give Russia a new
    capability to enforce, or threaten to enforce, its will in
    the Black Sea.  This sale would render the already difficult
    task of getting Russia to comply with its ceasefire
    commitments nearly impossible, and it would potentially
    increase the militarization of, and instability in, the Black
    Sea region.  Although Georgia, despite the introduction of
    vastly increased Russian military forces into its territory,
    has so far refrained from actively rearming itself, the
    acquisition by Russia of such a ship could exacerbate public
    fears and virtually force Georgia to seek ways to prepare to
    respond.  The United States should take steps to discourage
    this sale, i Paris and Brussels, or at the very least impose
    appropriate conditions on the sale -- such as firm
    commitments from Russia that the ships will not be deployed
    in the Black Sea -- that would put any Russian assertions
    about overall capabilities, versus their intentions in this
    region, to the test.
    BASS

`