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### Viewing cable 09THEHAGUE543, AMBASSADOR DAALDER PRESSES DUTCH TO STAY THE

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09THEHAGUE543 | 2009-09-10 14:02 | 2011-01-17 00:12 | SECRET | Embassy The Hague

`

    VZCZCXRO2469
    PP RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
    DE RUEHTC #0543/01 2531435
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    P 101435Z SEP 09
    FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3229
    INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 2833
    RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0416
    RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 5256
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC PRIORITY
    RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
    RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
    RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 THE HAGUE 000543

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/9/2019
    TAGS: PREL PGOV NATO NL AF
    SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR DAALDER PRESSES DUTCH TO STAY THE
    COURSE IN AFGHANISTAN

    REF: A. THE HAGUE 514
         ¶B. THE HAGUE 419

    Cl...

    224468,9/10/2009 14:35,09THEHAGUE543,"Embassy The
    Hague",SECRET,09THEHAGUE419|09THEHAGUE514,"VZCZCXRO2469
    PP RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
    DE RUEHTC #0543/01 2531435
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    P 101435Z SEP 09
    FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3229
    INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 2833
    RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0416
    RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 5256
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC PRIORITY
    RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
    RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
    RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY","S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 THE
    HAGUE 000543
    SIPDIS
    E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/9/2019
    TAGS: PREL PGOV NATO NL AF
    SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR DAALDER PRESSES DUTCH TO STAY THE
    COURSE IN AFGHANISTAN
    REF: A. THE HAGUE 514
    ¶B. THE HAGUE 419
    Classified By: Ambassador Daalder for reasons 1.5(b,d)
    ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO,
    Ambassador Ivo Daalder, argued for the extension of the
    Netherlands, military deployment and aid to Afghanistan
    beyond 2010 during high-level meetings, a speech, press
    interviews, and a reception in The Hague on September 3,
    ¶2009. This cable covers conversations with Development
    Minister Koenders (paragraphs 2 - 8), FM Verhagen (paragraphs
    9 - 13), and senior foreign policy officials (paragraphs 14 -
    24). Dutch officials uniformly responded that selling an
    extended military deployment to the Dutch parliament will be
    difficult, but that some Dutch involvement in Afghanistan
    past 2010 is almost certain. Daalder also exchanged views
    with the Dutch on the NATO strategic concept (paragraphs 13,
    24). Paragraph 25 summarizes Dutch participation and
    reactions at the speech and reception. END SUMMARY.
    -----------------------------
    Development Minister Koenders
    -----------------------------
    ¶2. (U) September 3, 2009; Dutch Foreign Ministry; The Hague,
    Netherlands.
    ¶3. (U) Participants:
    United States
    -------------
    Ambassador Hartog Levin
    Ambassador Daalder
    Jennifer Davis, U.S. Mission to NATO
    Eric Falls, Embassy The Hague
    Netherlands
    -----------
    Bert Koenders, Minister for Development Cooperation
    Ms. Joke Brandt, MFA DG for Development Cooperation
    Ms. Godie van de Paal, MFA Task Force Uruzgan
    ¶4. (SBU) Ambassador Daalder emphasized President Obama,s
    commitment to success in Afghanistan through cooperative
    effort with Allies. The new U.S. strategy has two key
    themes, he said. First, it is more narrowly defined to
    ensure it is tied to our core interests and to ensure it is
    achievable. Second, the U.S. is boosting support for the
    strategy through regional cooperation, the &3D8 approach of
    defense, diplomacy, and development, and through rapid
    build-up of Afghan security forces. Daalder also emphasized
    our mission in Afghanistan is a combined effort -- forty
    percent of the troops in ISAF, as well as forty percent of
    our casualties, are from our non-U.S. Allies.
    ¶5. (C) Ambassador Daalder explained that we hope the Dutch
    will stay in Afghanistan as we value their expertise. He
    added that we understand that the number of Dutch troops may
    decline after 2010. Nonetheless, he said we believe there
    are two key messages that may help convince the Dutch public
    and parliament to support an extension of the Dutch mission.
    First, the new U.S. president is extremely popular in Europe
    and that popularity might result in deeper support for the
    mission in Afghanistan. Second, the United States depends on
    cooperation of important Allies like the Netherlands, which
    has taken a real leadership role in development efforts and
    relationship-building in Afghanistan.
    ¶6. (C) Koenders responded with a review of previous Dutch
    decisions on Afghanistan and an explanation of the current
    political situation. The first Dutch deployment was a
    Qpolitical situation. The first Dutch deployment was a
    &sensitive8 decision for the Labor party four years ago.
    (Background: Koenders is from the Labor party. The
    Netherlands, current governing coalition includes the
    Christian Democrats, the Christian Union, and the Labor
    party, which is the most skeptical member of the coalition
    regarding Afghanistan. See reftel A, B. End Background.)
    &I supported the decision, but it was difficult,8 he said.
    THE HAGUE 00000543 002 OF 005
    The Labor party required a development component to the
    mission, the &soft approach,8 though he &didn,t think it
    was soft,8 and he knew troops &would be killed.8 After
    intensive parliamentary discussions, the party agreed to a
    two-year deployment, until 2008. The decision to extend the
    deployment until 2010 was also difficult, with Labor and
    other parties expressing significant concerns about
    burden-sharing. The Labor Party was &unhappy8 with the
    final decision.
    ¶7. (C) Looking ahead, Koenders said the Dutch would continue
    development efforts in Uruzgan -- the Dutch leadership is
    civilian and the Dutch have been successful. However, the
    government,s credibility is at stake with any military
    redeployment. The government will decide whether the
    military will &leave completely8 or &just leave Uruzgan.8
    To make the case to the Labor party, the Dutch parliament,
    and the Dutch people, Koenders said it would be helpful to
    show greater burden sharing and more collaboration on
    development aid. President Obama and the new U.S.
    Afghanistan strategy are also helpful elements, he added.
    &The picture has changed completely.8 In addition, there
    should be &no mission creep for ISAF8 and UNAMA needs a
    larger role. On selling the new strategy, Koenders said the
    Dutch people would need to see some element of success and a
    realistic strategy with a final goal that we can achieve.
    Koenders wondered whether it made sense for the Netherlands
    to lead on aid coordination, given its &small8
    contributions relative to the United States. However, he
    said it would be worthwhile to follow up on his good
    discussions with the previous USAID director, particularly on
    the disorganized effort in Pakistan.
    ¶8. (C) Daalder said that President Obama agrees we need to
    establish a realistic exit goal by shifting security to
    Afghanistan itself and show some real progress on the ground
    within 12-18 months in order to sustain political support.
    He added we will work on follow-on meetings about development
    cooperation.
    -----------
    FM Verhagen
    -----------
    ¶9. (U) September 3, 2009; Dutch Foreign Ministry; The Hague,
    Netherlands.
    ¶10. (U) Participants:
    United States
    -------------
    Ambassador Hartog Levin
    Ambassador Daalder
    Jennifer Davis, U.S. Mission to NATO
    Eric Falls, Embassy The Hague
    Netherlands
    -----------
    Maxime Verhagen, Foreign Minister
    Mr. Marcel De Vink, Private Secretary to the Minister
    Mr. Maarten Boef, Head of MFA Task Force Uruzgan
    ¶11. (C) Daalder emphasized the importance of the
    Netherlands, decision on Afghanistan: if the Netherlands
    pulls out, he said, we will not be able to convince Canada to
    reverse its withdrawal decision and we could then lose the UK
    in a &domino effect.8 The USG wants to help the Dutch
    government support an extension of Dutch troops, although
    Daalder said &we won,t tell you what to do,8 knowing that
    public pressure from the U.S. would be self-defeating.
    Daalder added we understand the Dutch must withdraw as &lead
    nation8 in Uruzgan, although with the new ISAF command
    Qnation8 in Uruzgan, although with the new ISAF command
    structure that is less relevant. He said the United States
    hopes the Dutch will maintain troops in the &four figure8
    level, including enablers, F-16s, and medical units, adding
    that lower profile deployments might be helpful in making the
    case to the public. In addition, he said we are making the
    shift from a direct security role to partnering with the
    Afghan National Army (ANA). President Obama,s popularity
    THE HAGUE 00000543 003 OF 005
    and our new strategy are also key arguments.
    ¶12. (C) Verhagen responded, &I am ready to defend a new
    decision8 on the Netherlands, troop deployment, given the
    new situation in Afghanistan, the new U.S. president, the new
    U.S. strategy in Afghanistan, broader participation by
    Allies, and the Netherlands, involvement at the G20.
    However, he said, these arguments are not sufficient.
    Verhagen said the Dutch government won the vote in parliament
    by setting a 2010 timetable for pull-out, and needed to show
    reduced corruption in Afghanistan, better coordination of
    aid, and a greater role for German and French troops.
    Greater contributions from Allies like France and Germany are
    key for winning votes from the Liberal party (VVD), he
    explained. Verhagen emphasized that the United States should
    &invest in the VVD8 and VVD leaders such as Mark Rutte.
    The most recent meeting with VVD leaders regarding Uruzgan
    &was not positive.8 (Background: The VVD, or Liberal party,
    is in the opposition but nonetheless considered essential in
    supporting an extension, as Dutch governments need to win
    support of a broad coalition for military deployments. End
    background.)
    ¶13. (S) Daalder concluded with a review of upcoming
    discussions on NATO,s &strategic concept,8 being headed by
    former Secretary of State Albright. The group of experts
    should discuss all issues responsibly, he said; in the past
    some Allies have hesitated to work on difficult issues.
    Verhagen welcomed Daalder,s suggestion, noting that a
    discussion of Article 5 and &out of area8 initiatives would
    be key. Verhagen said he supports the German proposal to
    include disarmament efforts as part of the discussion and
    said he has blocked internal Dutch discussions on the
    presence of nuclear weapons in the Netherlands because that
    is a matter for NATO to consider. However, Verhagen said the
    Netherlands is open to frank NATO discussions and is sending
    a delegation to Washington to discuss nuclear posture (Note:
    MOD Policy Director General Lo Casteleijn will lead the
    delegation on September 9. End note.) Daalder thanked
    Verhagen and emphasized that Allied agreements on nuclear
    weapons in Europe would be indispensable to good
    transatlantic relations and should include the &Quad,8
    weapons-basing countries, and Lithuania, amongst others.
    ---------------------------------
    Lunch with Senior Dutch Officials
    ---------------------------------
    ¶14. (U) September 3, 2009; Societeit de Witte; The Hague,
    Netherlands.
    ¶15. (U) Participants:
    United States
    -------------
    Ambassador Hartog Levin
    Ambassador Daalder
    Captain Daniel Braswell, Defense Attache, Embassy The Hague
    Jennifer Davis, U.S. Mission to NATO
    Eric Falls, Embassy The Hague
    Netherlands
    -----------
    Mr. Karel van Oosterom, PM,s National Security Adviser
    Mr. Pieter de Gooijer, MFA DG for Political Affairs
    (Political Director)
    Mr. Lo Casteleijn, MOD DG for Policy
    Lt. Gen. F. Meulman, Deputy Chief of Defense
    Mr. Robert de Groot, MFA Deputy Political Director
    Mr. Henk Swarttow, MFA Director of Security Affairs
    QMr. Henk Swarttow, MFA Director of Security Affairs
    Ms. Erica Schouten, MFA Head of NATO Affairs
    Mr. Maarten Boef, MFA Head of Uruzgan Task Force
    ¶16. (C) Over lunch, Daalder met with the &Triad8 -- the
    leading Dutch civilian advisers to the Prime Minister,
    Foreign Minister, and Minister of Defense -- to emphasize the
    importance of Dutch contributions in Afghanistan. Daalder
    emphasized key points from his discussions with Verhagen and
    Koenders (paras 4, 5, and 11 above).
    THE HAGUE 00000543 004 OF 005
    ¶17. (C) MFA Political Director De Gooijer said Afghanistan is
    the &most pressing issue8 for the Triad and added &our job
    is to help our bosses8 -- six ministers -- make a decision.
    (Note: The six key ministers are PM Balkenende, Deputy PM and
    Finance Minister Bos, Deputy PM and Minister of Youth and
    Family Affairs Rouvoet, Foreign Minister Verhagen, Defense
    Minister Van Middelkoop, and Development Minister Koenders.
    End note.) De Gooijer explained that Dutch leaders are
    heavily influenced by a clear Afghanistan strategy as well as
    prospects for success, as well as Dutch domestic politics.
    He said the Dutch appreciated U.S. sensitivity in letting the
    Dutch make its &own decision.8 In addition, he noted the
    Dutch were in a different stage of the decision-making
    process than the United States: &You have rolled out a new
    strategy, while we are considering a redeployment; you are
    engaging in a surge, while we are looking to pull back.
    We need to bridge this concept. The Dutch press will also
    want to know how these results benefit the Netherlands,8 he
    said.
    ¶18. (C) Mr. Van Oosterom, the National Security Adviser
    equivalent, welcomed President Obama,s remarks on
    Afghanistan and emphasized that the United States should
    avoid public pressure on the Dutch. He said while Dutch
    government officials would like to see a quick decision on a
    new Dutch deployment, the decision process would be complex.
    ¶19. (C) MOD Policy Director Casteleijn noted there is
    tremendous Dutch enthusiasm for President Obama. He
    encouraged continued emphasis on development aid and a
    &broad concept8 for the Afghanistan strategy. He suggested
    avoiding &NATO-ization8 of the Afghanistan mission through
    greater involvement by the EU, UN, and other international
    organizations. Waiting 18 months for good results will be
    risky for the Dutch, he added, given that some Dutch
    government officials are trying now to extend the deployment
    for two years. He also noted there is a perception in the
    Netherlands that the Dutch have done &their fair share.8
    He said promoting greater contributions from some Allies who
    haven,t &punched in their weight class8 would be important
    to demonstrate.
    ¶20. (C) Lt. General Meulman said the Dutch military had the
    capacity to support an extension beyond 2010, although it
    would be difficult to continue at the same level -- 1,800
    troops in Afghanistan -- and it would be difficult to leave
    some elements like several helicopters for much longer.
    Meulman also urged better coordination among ISAF, the UN,
    and the GOA.
    ¶21. (C) MFA Deputy Political Director De Groot added there is
    significant mixing of strategies, such as counterinsurgency
    and development. At the same time, he said we have seen
    disappointing results in state-building and need an
    overarching development strategy as well as a new Afghanistan
    Compact in 2010.
    ¶22. (C) Daalder noted President Obama,s strong support for
    metrics to show results on the ground. He added that
    McChrystal,s forthcoming assessment of troops-to-task in
    QMcChrystal,s forthcoming assessment of troops-to-task in
    Afghanistan may provide the Dutch government with a clearer
    picture of the way forward and improve civilian and military
    coordination. He said the Netherlands and Canada have been
    the most thoughtful of the Allies on a comprehensive approach
    in Afghanistan, so it would be particularly damaging if they
    leave the coalition.
    ¶23. (C) (Note: In a private discussion after lunch, De
    Gooijer encouraged Daalder to ask Secretary Geithner to tell
    Finance Minister Bos that the Netherlands would not have a
    seat in G20 discussions but for its contributions in
    Afghanistan. Bos is head of the Labor party and key to the
    Dutch cabinet,s decision on Afghanistan (reftel A, B). End
    Note.)
    ¶24. (C) On NATO generally, Daalder thanked De Gooijer for the
    choice of former Dutch Shell CEO Jeroen van der Veer as Vice
    THE HAGUE 00000543 005 OF 005
    Chair of Secretary Albright,s NATO Strategic Concept group
    of experts. Van der Veer will bring &a breath of fresh
    air,8 he said, to the discussion. Daalder added the group
    should address everything, including points of strong
    disagreement like nuclear weapons, Articles 4, 5, and 10 of
    the NATO Treaty, and Russia. On NATO-EU cooperation, Daalder
    said it was likely not productive to castigate Turkey and
    Greece as the new SYG had recently done. He suggested that
    to improve cooperation, NATO and the EU should consider
    regular, informal meetings to focus the &transatlantic8
    discussion and that Sweden,s FM Bildt could help in this
    role. De Gooijer said FM Bildt could certainly help bring
    Sweden into NATO, and any successor to Solana should commit
    to addressing NATO-EU cooperation. Daalder flagged
    Finland,s joining NATO as a future point of contention with
    Russia.
    -----------------
    Speech, Reception
    -----------------
    ¶25. (C) Ambassador Daalder spoke to a full house at the
    Societeit De Witte on the afternoon of September 3. More
    than 150 members of parliament, journalists, diplomats,
    academics, and students attended. Responding to questions
    for a half hour, Daalder explained the new U.S. strategy and
    priorities in Afghanistan. In one question, former Dutch
    Chief of Defense Berlijn urged the United States to pressure
    the government of Afghanistan to improve its performance and
    reduce corruption. The new Dutch representative to NATO,
    Ambassador Majoor, urged a more integrated approach by NATO
    to support development and diplomacy. On the evening of
    September 3, at a well-attended reception hosted by
    Ambassador Levin, Daalder also engaged a similar audience,
    including the leading foreign policy or defense spokespersons
    for the major political parties in parliament.
    GALLAGHER
    "

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