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### Viewing cable 10CAIRO257, DASD Kahl Meeting with Egyptian Military Officials

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
10CAIRO257 | 2010-02-28 13:01 | 2011-02-16 21:09 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Cairo

`

    VZCZCXYZ0000
    OO RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHEG #0257/01 0591345
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O R 281345Z FEB 10
    FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0433
    INFO RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
    RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
    RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
    RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L CAIRO 000257

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/28
    TAGS: PREL MASS MARR IS IR IZ EG LY SU
    SUBJECT: DASD Kahl Meeting with Egyptian Military Officials

    CLASSIFIED BY: Donald A. Blome, Minister Counselor, DOS, ECPO;
    REASON: 1.4(B), (D)

    ¶1. (C) Key Points:

    -- On January 31, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the
    Middle East Dr. Colin Kahl met with Major General Mohammad
    al-Assar, Assistant to the Minister of Defense, Major General Ahmad
    Moataz, Chief of the American Relations Branch, and Major General
    Fouad Arafa, Consultant to the Military Intelligence Department.

    -- During the meeting, Kahl discussed the need to incorporate a
    military strategy that included symmetrical and asymmetrical
    capabilities, pursuing a capabilities-based approach to security
    assistance, FMF issues, balance of power in the region, nuclear
    weapons in the Middle East, current U.S. policy towards Iran,
    Egyptian efforts to counter-smuggling and interdict illicit weapons
    destined for Gaza, and the release of advanced weapons systems.

    -- The Egyptian defense officials continued to stress that the
    threats facing the United States were different from Egypt's, and
    Egypt needs to maintain a strong conventional military to counter
    other armies in the region.

    --------------------------------------------- ----------------------
    --------------

    Egypt's Current Security Concerns and National Defense Policy

    --------------------------------------------- ----------------------
    ---------------

    ¶2. (C) During the 31 January 2010 meeting, al-Assar
    constantly referred to the numerous unstable security situations in
    the Middle East that influenced Egyptian military doctrine to
    include: Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon/Hezbollah,
    Palestine/HAMAS, Yemen, Sudan/Darfur, Somalia, Eritrea, Piracy
    issues, Algeria, and al-Qaida. Al-Assar emphasized that ethnic
    conflict throughout the region and border issues could have a
    negative impact on Egyptian sovereignty at any time. al-Assar
    commented that he did not expect any of these security situations
    to resolve in the near future; instead, he believed the list would
    grow even larger.

    ¶3. (C) al-Assar outlined Egypt's National Defense Policy
    which he stated was based on a defensive, capabilities-based
    strategy instead of threat-based. The number one priority is the
    defense of Egyptian land and the Suez Canal. Other goals include:
    preparedness for unexpected threats such as terrorism; the
    achievement of regional stability; interoperability with Egypt's
    military partners; and a leading role for Egypt in the region.
    Al-Assar provided the Egyptian military's list of regional
    threats/concerns such as Nile Basin water rights and the conflicts
    in Darfur and southern Sudan. He commented that one never knows
    what Libya might do and that it was essential that Egypt maintain
    the balance of power on its eastern border. He reiterated the fact
    that Israel possesses unconventional weapons and sophisticated
    conventional weapons, which creates a regional imbalance and
    contributes to instability. He noted that stability in the region
    cannot be attained without balance of power. He stated that the
    Egyptian military doctrine did not intend to gain an edge on any
    other country in the region or cause offense to anyone.

    ¶4. (C) Al-Assar complained that the Egyptian military
    sometimes felt pressured by the United States to reform its
    doctrine and capabilities to counter asymmetric threats. He
    emphasized that the threats faced by the United States were
    different from Egypt's. He commented that tanks and aircraft were
    necessary to fight asymmetrical threats as well. He referred to
    General Patreaus' Sadr City battle plan against extremists and
    noted that this plan depended on the use of tanks and aircraft in
    Iraq. He called on Dr. Kahl to educate Congress about Egypt's
    military needs and not put limits on the numbers of aircraft and
    tanks. He noted that the Egyptian military preferred to purchase

    its weapons and armaments from the United States, but that Egypt's
    national security was a red line and they could go elsewhere if
    they had to.

    --------------------------------------------- ----

    Security Assistance and Modernization

    --------------------------------------------- ----

    ¶5. (C) Dr. Kahl commented that the U.S. military had learned
    some hard lessons about the promises and limits of technology
    during the first years of the war in Iraq. Kahl stated that there
    are no longer any purely conventional military conflicts in the
    world and the last large conventional war was the First Gulf War.
    The current challenge for modern armies is to find the right
    balance between conventional and irregular forces and doctrines to
    fight what Secretary Gates refers to as "hybrid wars." Kahl
    commented that the U.S. lost more tanks in Iraq to roadside bombs
    than in battles with Iraqi tanks. He also noted that information
    technology in the modern war was just as valuable as military
    equipment in order to have the ability to rapidly communicate and
    assess the environment.

    ¶6. (C) Dr. Kahl reiterated that a modern military should rely
    on quality equipment rather than a large quantity of outdated
    armaments, and should place a greater emphasis on the scope of its
    aggregate capabilities vice number of high-end weapons platforms.

    ¶7. (C) Major General Fouad Arafa interjected during the
    discussion to note that the spirit of the Camp David accord was
    that there would be a 2:3 balance between Egypt and Israel's
    security assistance. Egypt's role was to keep a certain balance of
    power in the region that would not allow other parties to go to
    war. Egypt had fulfilled this role faithfully for the last 30
    years. al-Assar added that the current ratio of 2:5 was a
    violation of the Camp David ratio.

    --------------------------------------------- --------

    Yemen, Iran, and the Weapons Free Zone

    --------------------------------------------- ---------

    ¶8. (C) al-Assar noted that Iran effectively interfered in
    the internal affairs of Lebanon, Palestine, and Iraq. He commented
    that Iran's nuclear ambitions would significantly change the
    balance of power in the region and was contributing to further
    regional instability and intensifying the conflicts. Al-Assar
    stated that Egypt views Iran as a threat to the region and its
    conventional and unconventional weapons would only increase the
    instability in the region. Al-Assar commented that if Iran was
    successful in obtaining nuclear weapons, it would only encourage
    other countries in the Middle East to pursue the same path.

    ¶9. (C) Al-Assar brought up President Obama's pledge to
    pursue a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East. He
    called on the United States to not ignore the Israeli nuclear
    program. He stated that Israel's nuclear program only gave Iran
    justification for creating its own nuclear weapons. If Iran
    obtained nuclear weapons, it would only embolden Iran to use
    Hezbollah and HAMAS with impunity.

    ¶10. (C) Dr. Kahl stated that ultimate goal for the United States
    was the creation of a NWFZ in the Middle East. However, it was not
    possible to draw strict parallels between Iran's acquisition of
    nuclear weapons and other Middle Eastern countries. Iran is the

    only country in the world that was currently threatening to wipe an
    entire country off the map, and Tehran reinforced this message
    through destabilizing activities pursued by its proxies in the
    region. The goal of a NWFZ in the Middle East could take 10-20
    years to achieve; however, the international community could not
    wait 20 years to address Iran's nuclear program and needed to
    figure out ways to slow down the clock on the Iran's nuclear
    ambitions.

    ¶11. (C) Major General Fouad Arafa joined the conversation stating
    that Iran was using the various Middle East conflicts for its own
    ambitions and was gaining power because of its interference in the
    internal affairs of the Middle Eastern countries. It was essential
    to cut Iran's connections and influence in the regional conflicts
    in Lebanon, Israel, and Palestine in order to decrease the level of
    influence Iran enjoyed in the region. Iran was effectively using
    Arab public opinion to advance its goals. Dr. Kahl agreed and
    reinforced the need for continued Arab engagement on this issue to
    ensure a "unified front" on the part of the international
    community.

    ¶12. (C) Kahl stated that the United States had reached out to
    Iran in 2009 through unconditional talks and that this was meant as
    a test of Iran's willingness to prove that its nuclear program was
    for peaceful civilian use. Iran, however, had not seized this
    opportunity to resolve international concerns. Kahl speculated
    that European countries and even Russia, which would not have
    supported the sanctions in the past, were now ready to increase
    pressure on Iran.

    -------------------------

    Counter-smuggling

    -------------------------

    ¶13. (C) Dr. Kahl extended his appreciation for Egypt's enhanced
    counter-smuggling efforts in the past year, but expressed concern
    over recent increases in smuggling activity into the Gaza strip and
    HAMAS' efforts to rearm. Dr. Kahl emphasized that the United
    States understands that this is an especially sensitive political
    issue internally in Egypt, as well as in the region. Dr. Kahl
    noted that the United States was looking forward to the positive
    completion of the BTADs project and thanked the Egyptian Military
    for its agreement-in-principle to sign a follow -on statement for
    future BTADs support as this provided an opportunity for further
    cooperation on counter-smuggling and border security. He also
    underscored the importance of targeting smuggling networks and
    their financiers in Sudan and the Sinai-not just their activities.

    ¶14. (C) Dr. Kahl renewed Secretary of Defense Gate's offer to
    assist the Egyptian military in expanding its counter-smuggling
    efforts on the Sudanese border and the Red Sea region.

    ¶15. (C) Al-Assar stated that the smuggling tunnels threatened the
    national security of Egypt (highlighting HAMAS specifically) and
    that "terror" could come to Egypt via these tunnels. Egypt has
    spent approximately $40 million to purchase the steel for the
    underground wall on the Gaza border, and Egypt was paying the cost
    of this wall in terms of public opinion both within Egypt and the
    region. He noted that once the wall was in place, the time would
    come to pressure Israel to take responsibility for the humanitarian
    situation in Gaza. Dr. Kahl reaffirmed that in all of engagements
    with Israel, the U.S. officials strongly encourage Israel to open
    crossings into Gaza to allow humanitarian goods to cross, and that
    Egypt's focus must be affixed on thwarting the movement of illicit
    weapons into the strip.

    -------------

    Homework

    -------------

    ¶16. (C) Dr. Kahl encouraged Egypt to sign a Communications
    Electronics Security Agreement (CESA aka CISMOA) with the Unites
    States, which would pave the way for the transfer of advanced
    technology to Egypt and greatly increase interoperability.
    Al-Assar stated that Egypt had "its reasons to delay a decision on
    a CISMOA." He noted that thousands of Egyptian military officers
    have participated in training and education programs in the United
    States and learned about U.S. technology and strategy. He
    commented that the younger officers are frustrated with the delay
    in obtaining political release for more advanced U.S. technology.
    Specifically, al-Assar referred to TOW2B and JAVELIN, which he
    commented had already been released to other countries. Al-Assar
    noted that a CISMOA was not a condition for obtaining these
    systems, but instead they were held up due to a "third party".

    ¶17. (C) Al-Assar commented that Egypt was in negotiations with
    Iraq to supply the Iraqi military with approximately 140 tanks,
    which are manufactured at the FMF tank facility. He noted that the
    Egyptian Ministry of Defense was awaiting the United States
    positive response to its request for approval of the transfer. Dr.
    Kahl noted that the U.S. was considering this request and would
    provide a response soon.

    ¶18. (C) Al-Assar encouraged Dr. Kahl to convince the U.S.
    Congress that Egypt was worth more than $1.3 billion a year. Dr.
    Kahl mentioned that Egypt receives the second largest amount of
    assistance in the world, and that during these difficult financial
    times in the United States, it was unlikely that annual flow of FMF
    would increase. He did however reassure the Egyptian officials
    that the USG would continue to advocate for current levels of FMF
    and push back on any attempts to condition those funds.
    SCOBEY

`