Cable Viewer

Currently released so far... 4039 / 251,287

### Articles

Brazil Sri Lanka United Kingdom Sweden Editorial United States Latin America Egypt Yemen Jordan

### Browse latest releases

2010/11 2010/12 2011/01 2011/02
2010/11/28 2010/11/29 2010/11/30
2010/12/01 2010/12/02 2010/12/03 2010/12/04 2010/12/05 2010/12/06 2010/12/07 2010/12/08 2010/12/09 2010/12/10 2010/12/11 2010/12/12 2010/12/13 2010/12/14 2010/12/15 2010/12/16 2010/12/17 2010/12/18 2010/12/19 2010/12/20 2010/12/21 2010/12/22 2010/12/23 2010/12/24 2010/12/25 2010/12/26 2010/12/27 2010/12/28 2010/12/29 2010/12/30
2011/01/01 2011/01/02 2011/01/04 2011/01/05 2011/01/07 2011/01/09 2011/01/10 2011/01/11 2011/01/12 2011/01/13 2011/01/14 2011/01/15 2011/01/16 2011/01/17 2011/01/18 2011/01/19 2011/01/20 2011/01/21 2011/01/22 2011/01/23 2011/01/24 2011/01/25 2011/01/26 2011/01/27 2011/01/28 2011/01/29 2011/01/30 2011/01/31
2011/02/01 2011/02/02 2011/02/03 2011/02/04 2011/02/05 2011/02/06 2011/02/07 2011/02/08 2011/02/09 2011/02/10 2011/02/11 2011/02/12 2011/02/13

### Browse by creation date

66 72 73 75 79 86 88 89 90 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
1966/12
1972/02 1972/08
1973/04
1975/03
1979/08
1986/05
1988/01
1989/12
1990/01 1990/07 1990/08
2000/06 2000/09 2000/11
2001/02 2001/03 2001/07 2001/10
2002/02 2002/03 2002/11
2003/03 2003/04 2003/05 2003/06 2003/07 2003/08 2003/09 2003/10 2003/11 2003/12
2004/01 2004/02 2004/03 2004/04 2004/05 2004/06 2004/07 2004/08 2004/09 2004/10 2004/11 2004/12
2005/01 2005/02 2005/03 2005/04 2005/05 2005/06 2005/07 2005/08 2005/09 2005/10 2005/11 2005/12
2006/01 2006/02 2006/03 2006/04 2006/05 2006/06 2006/07 2006/08 2006/09 2006/10 2006/11 2006/12
2007/01 2007/02 2007/03 2007/04 2007/05 2007/06 2007/07 2007/08 2007/09 2007/10 2007/11 2007/12
2008/01 2008/02 2008/03 2008/04 2008/05 2008/06 2008/07 2008/08 2008/09 2008/10 2008/11 2008/12
2009/01 2009/02 2009/03 2009/04 2009/05 2009/06 2009/07 2009/08 2009/09 2009/10 2009/11 2009/12
2010/01 2010/02

### Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z
Embassy Athens Embassy Asuncion Embassy Astana Embassy Asmara Embassy Ashgabat Embassy Ankara Embassy Amman Embassy Algiers Embassy Addis Ababa Embassy Accra Embassy Abuja Embassy Abu Dhabi Embassy Abidjan Consulate Amsterdam American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura Embassy Buenos Aires Embassy Budapest Embassy Bucharest Embassy Brussels Embassy Bridgetown Embassy Bratislava Embassy Brasilia Embassy Bogota Embassy Bishkek Embassy Bern Embassy Berlin Embassy Belgrade Embassy Beirut Embassy Beijing Embassy Banjul Embassy Bangkok Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan Embassy Bamako Embassy Baku Embassy Baghdad Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen Embassy Conakry Embassy Colombo Embassy Chisinau Embassy Caracas Embassy Canberra Embassy Cairo Consulate Curacao Consulate Casablanca Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe Embassy Dublin Embassy Doha Embassy Djibouti Embassy Dhaka Embassy Dar Es Salaam Embassy Damascus Embassy Dakar Consulate Dubai
Embassy Freetown
Embassy Guatemala Embassy Gaborone
Embassy Harare Embassy Hanoi Consulate Hamburg
Iran RPO Dubai Embassy Islamabad Consulate Istanbul
Embassy Jakarta Consulate Jerusalem Consulate Jeddah
Embassy Kyiv Embassy Kuwait Embassy Kuala Lumpur Embassy Kinshasa Embassy Kigali Embassy Khartoum Embassy Kampala Embassy Kabul
Embassy Luxembourg Embassy Luanda Embassy London Embassy Lisbon Embassy Lima Embassy Lilongwe Embassy La Paz Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO Embassy Muscat Embassy Moscow Embassy Montevideo Embassy Monrovia Embassy Minsk Embassy Mexico Embassy Maputo Embassy Manama Embassy Managua Embassy Malabo Embassy Madrid Consulate Munich Consulate Montreal Consulate Monterrey
Embassy New Delhi Embassy Nassau Embassy Nairobi Consulate Naples
Embassy Ouagadougou Embassy Ottawa Embassy Oslo
Embassy Pristina Embassy Pretoria Embassy Prague Embassy Port Au Prince Embassy Phnom Penh Embassy Paris Embassy Paramaribo Embassy Panama Consulate Peshawar
Embassy Quito
REO Basrah Embassy Rome Embassy Riyadh Embassy Riga Embassy Reykjavik Embassy Rangoon Embassy Rabat Consulate Rio De Janeiro Consulate Recife
Secretary of State Embassy Stockholm Embassy Sofia Embassy Skopje Embassy Singapore Embassy Seoul Embassy Sarajevo Embassy Santo Domingo Embassy Santiago Embassy Sanaa Embassy San Salvador Embassy San Jose Consulate Strasbourg Consulate Shenyang Consulate Shanghai Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis Embassy Tripoli Embassy Tokyo Embassy The Hague Embassy Tel Aviv Embassy Tehran Embassy Tegucigalpa Embassy Tbilisi Embassy Tashkent Embassy Tallinn
USUN New York USEU Brussels US Mission Geneva US Interests Section Havana US Delegation, Secretary UNVIE Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius Embassy Vienna Embassy Vatican Consulate Vladivostok
Embassy Windhoek Embassy Wellington Embassy Warsaw
Embassy Yerevan Embassy Yaounde
Embassy Zagreb

### Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AF AR ASEC AEMR AORC AJ AMGT ACOA AEC AO AE AU AFIN AX AMED ADCO AG AODE APER AFFAIRS AC AS AM AL ASIG ABLD ABUD AA AFU ASUP AROC ATFN AVERY AGMT ATRN
BE BR BL BO BH BTIO BEXP BU BIDEN BM BK BY BA BG BF BB BC BBSR BRUSSELS BILAT BX
CO CH COUNTER CDG CI CU CVIS CIS CA CBW CF CLINTON CM CASC CMGT CN CE CJAN CONDOLEEZZA COE CR CY CG CS CD CTM COUNTRY CLEARANCE CPAS CWC CT CKGR CB CACS COM CJUS CARSON COUNTERTERRORISM CIA CACM CDB CV CAN
DR DA DHS DOE DEA DK DJ DISENGAGEMENT DS DOD DEAX
ECON ETTC ELN EPET ENRG EFIN EAID EINV EG EWWT ELAB EUN EU EAIR ETRD ECPS ER EINT EIND EAGR EMIN ELTN EFIS EI EN ES EC EXTERNAL ECIN EINVETC ENVR ENIV EZ EINN ENGR EUR ECA ET ESA ENERG EK ELECTIONS ECUN EINVEFIN ECIP EINDETRD EUC EREL
FR FAO FTAA FREEDOM FI FARC FBI FJ FMLN FINR
GM GG GH GE GR GTIP GV GT GOI GCC GAZA GZ GA GTMO
HUMAN HILLARY HO HA HYMPSK HR HU HURI HK
IC IR IS IAEA IZ IT ITPHUM IV IPR IWC IQ IN IO ID ICTY ISRAELI IRAQI IIP ICRC ICAO IMO IF ILC IEFIN INRB INTELSAT IL IA IBRD IMF ITALY ITALIAN INTERPOL IRAJ INRA INRO
JOSEPH JA JO JP JOHNNIE JUS JAMES
KNNP KDEM KIRF KWMN KPAL KPAO KGHG KN KS KJUS KDRG KSCA KIPR KHLS KGIC KRAD KCRM KCOR KE KSPR KG KZ KTFN KISL KTIA KHIV KWBG KACT KPRP KU KAWC KOLY KCIP KCFE KOCI KV KMDR KPKO KTDB KMRS KFRD KTIP KLIG KBCT KICC KMCA KGIT KSTC KUNR KPAK KNEI KSEP KPOA KFLU KNUP KNNPMNUC KVPR KOMC KAWK KO KTER KSUM KHUM KRFD KBIO KBTR KDDG KWWMN KFLO KSAF KBTS KPRV KMPI KHDP KNPP KNAR KWMM KERG KFIN KTBT KCRS KRVC KR KPWR KWAC KMIG KSEC KIFR KDEMAF KGCC KPIN KNUC KPLS KIRC KCOM KDEV
LY LG LE LH LI LU LO LOG LT
MOPS MX MNUC MEPP MARR MTCRE MK MTRE MASS MU MCAP ML MO MP MA MY MIL MDC MTCR MAR MEPI MRCRE MI MT MR MQADHAFI MD MAPS MUCN MASC MASSMNUC MPOS MZ MOPPS MAPP MG MCC
NATO NPT NL NI NE NS NAR NO NIPP NZ NU NPG NK NSG NA NT NASA NG NGO NP NSF NATIONAL
OREP ODIP OTRA OVIP OSCE OPRC OAS OFDP OIIP OPIC OPDC OEXC OECD OPCW OSCI OIE OTR OVP OFFICIALS OSAC
PGOV PREL PTER PINR PINS PARM PHUM PARMS PREF PBTS PK PHSA PROP PE PO PA PM PMIL PL PTERE POL PF PALESTINIAN PY PGGV PNR POV PAK PAO PFOR PHALANAGE PARTY PNAT PROV PEL PGOVE POLINT PRAM POLITICS PEPR PSI PINT PSOE PU POLITICAL PARTIES PBIO PECON POGOV PINL PKFK PGOF
QA
RS RU RO RIGHTS RW RICE ROBERT RF RFE REGION RP
SMIG SNAR SOCI SENV SO SP SW SHUM SR SCUL SY SA SF SZ SU SL SYR ST SANC SC SAN SIPRS SK SH SI STEINBERG SN SG
TU TERRORISM TSPA TH TO TBIO TW TX TFIN TD TRGY TSPL TZ TIP TPHY TS TK TNGD TI TC TR TT
UK UNGA UP UNSC UZ UN UY UE UNESCO UAE UNO UNEP UG US USTR UNHCR UNMIK UNDP UNHRC USAID UNCHS UNAUS USUN USEU UV
VE VT VM VZ VTPREL VN
WMO WI WTRO WTRQ WHO WWARD WB WBG WTO WA
XM XA XL XF XZ XW XR XH XG XT XC XY XD XS XK
YM YI YE
ZI ZP ZK ZF ZB ZANU ZOELLICK ZR ZU ZA

### Browse by classification

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

### Community resources

Follow us on Twitter Check our Reddit Twitter this Digg this page Contact us on IRC

courage is contagious

### Viewing cable 06PARIS4247, SOCIALIST PARTY LEADER ON HOW PS-LED FRANCE WOULD

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06PARIS4247.

Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
06PARIS4247 | 2006-06-21 08:08 | 2010-12-01 12:12 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Paris

`

    This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 004247

    SIPDIS

    DEPT ALSO FOR EUR/WE, DRL/IL, INR/EUC, EUR/ERA, EUR/PPD,
    AND EB
    DEPT OF COMMERCE FOR ITA
    DEPT OF LABOR FOR ILAB

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2015
    TAGS: PGOV ELAB EU FR PINR SOCI ECON
    SUBJECT: SOCIALIST PARTY LEADER ON HOW PS-LED FRANCE WOULD
    APPROACH U.S.: "NEITHER BLAIR NOR CHIRAC"

    REF: PARIS 3725

    Classified By: Ambassador Craig Stapleton for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

    SUMMARY
    -------
    ¶1. (C) Socialist Party (PS) First Secretary Francois
    Hollande and PS National Secretary for International Affairs
    Pierre Moscovici briefed the Ambassador June 8 on the
    turbulent race for the presidential nomination within the PS
    and the hurdles facing the party as it looks to next year's
    presidential and legislative elections. Hollande underlined
    that, notwithstanding Poitou-Charentes Region President
    Segolene Royal's commanding lead today in polls, both among
    the public at large and among PS members, PS members'
    convictions as to which PS leader "is best placed to beat
    Sarkozy" could well change between now and the PS's
    presidential primary in November. Hollande nonetheless
    believed the primary would produce a clear cut result,
    "probably in just one round." Asked what might be expected
    from French foreign policy under a socialist government,
    Hollande used the phrase "neither Blair and Chirac" to
    characterize an overall stance towards the U.S. that would
    not be uncritically supportive, but also not be gratuitously
    obstructionist. On Europe, Moscovici stressed that a
    Socialist president and government would be much more
    pro-Europe than President Chirac and the government of Prime
    Minister Dominique de Villepin. END SUMMARY.

    ATMOSPHERICS
    -------------
    ¶2. (C) Over breakfast with the Ambassador at the residence
    on June 8, Socialist Party (PS) First Secretary Francois
    Hollande and PS National Secretary for International Affairs
    Pierre Moscovici were confident, optimistic and dismissive of
    the drumbeat of media reports that insist that frictions and
    divisions within the PS will make it difficult for the party
    to close ranks behind a single candidate for the 2007
    presidential race even after the party primary next November.

    UPCOMING ELECTIONS WILL BE HARD FOUGHT
    --------------------------------------
    ¶3. (C) Hollande and Moscovici predicted that the 2007
    presidential and legislative elections would be particularly
    hard fought because neither of the two major parties "can
    count on more than 30 percent of the electorate." (Note: The
    center-left PS and the center-right Union for a Popular
    Movement (UMP) are the preponderant parties in a political
    spectrum that includes the small, centrist Union for French
    Democracy (UDF) party along with a range of micro parties.
    Indeed, if the pattern of past presidential elections holds
    in 2007, there will be over a dozen candidates competing in
    the first round of the election. End note.) Hollande
    suggested that, since neither of the major parties can aspire
    to majority status, the UDF might well find itself with
    leverage beyond its size, particularly if in the legislative
    elections that follow the presidential election, neither the
    PS nor the UMP win a near majority of seats. Hollande added
    that, in both the presidential and legislative elections, the
    Communist Party (PC) and other far-left parties "would vote
    against the right," but not join in any socialist government
    in the event of a PS-led legislature.

    ¶4. (C) Hollande expressed his firm conviction that the PS
    was well-positioned to win both the presidential and
    legislative contests, but that both elections will be
    extremely close. Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy, barring
    an unexpected reverse, would be the center-right's candidate,
    and -- according to Hollande -- will benefit from the active
    support of President Chirac, "if Sarkozy is nice to him."
    That is, according to Hollande, if Sarkozy agrees to look
    after Chirac loyalists and, by implication, Chirac himself.
    (Note: Chirac will lose his immunity from prosecution upon
    leaving office; corruption charges for political financing
    activities dating from before he became president remain
    pending against him. End note.) Hollande said that he did
    not believe that Chirac would prefer to see the PS candidate
    take the presidency rather than see Sarkozy become his
    successor. Even so, Hollande also spoke of the bitterly
    personal, "fratricidal" rivalries on the center-right,
    comparing them to the less personal, more ideological
    rivalries in his center-left, PS.

    THE CHALLENGE OF REFORM WITHOUT A MANDATE
    -----------------------------------------
    ¶5. (C) Hollande said that whoever wins the presidency in
    2007, the electoral system and divisions in the electorate
    are such that the victor will not have a "mandate for
    reform," and certainly not a mandate in the majority
    rule/winner-takes-all "American" sense of the term. This
    meant that reforms would come slowly, if at all. However,
    Hollande also ruled out the possibility of a president from
    one party and a parliamentary majority from another, saying
    that he believed the back-to-back presidential and
    legislative elections would both reflect the voters' decision
    for change. This would help, Hollande said, to bring about
    some significant reforms, albeit slowly.

    UPBEAT ABOUT THE STATE OF THE PS
    --------------------------------
    ¶6. (C) Hollande was bullish and buoyant about the state of
    the PS. He pointed to the party's recent consensus on its
    "project for 2007" -- a platform statement that all the
    party's presidential hopefuls agreed to with little argument
    -- as evidence of the party's stability and unity, even as he
    allowed that it would not be binding on the various
    candidates. Hollande and Moscovici agreed that recent
    meetings to hammer out the platform were, by PS standards,
    rather non-eventful, and the press coverage of rejection of
    proposals by Royal and others "highly exaggerated."

    ¶7. (C) Hollande proudly underlined the policy statement's
    call for enhanced social programs, while admitting, when
    pressed, that implementing everything it calls for might
    prove a little "expensive." (Comment: Indeed, differences
    over the likely cost of the PS's electoral program (Hollande
    cites the figure of 30 billion Euros, whereas Strauss-Kahn
    has said the price tag is closer to 50 billion) are sure to
    fuel controversy over the proposal and PS candidate's
    commitment to implementing it if elected. End Comment.)
    Hollande added that the electoral program's "social
    dimension" could help the PS attract center-right "Gaullist
    voters" disaffected with the UMP's free-market liberalism.

    PREDICTS A ONE-ROUND PRIMARY
    ----------------------------
    ¶8. (C) Hollande confidently predicted that the PS would
    unify behind whoever wins the primary in the interest of
    victory -- though he conceded that primaries can sometimes
    weaken rather than strengthen a candidate. He defended the
    November date for party's choosing of a candidate, saying
    that, had the candidate been chosen now, he/she would have
    been subjected to a potentially crippling drumbeat of
    criticism from the right. Hollande also confidently
    predicted that the PS's November primary would produce a
    clear cut winner, "probably in just one round." Hollande
    said that, above all, party members "want a winner" and will
    therefore support the candidate most likely to beat Sarkozy
    in a putative, second round run-off.

    ROYAL
    -----
    ¶9. (C) Hollande strongly implied that that candidate could
    easily be Royal, saying that if the primary were held today,
    "she will win and be the candidate," barring a sharp downturn
    in her popularity in the pitiless triage of an intensifying
    presidential campaign.
    Hollande noted that Royal is not part of the traditional
    party establishment, and commented that the attacks against
    her have only served to make her all the more popular.
    Referring to her opponents among the socialists, Hollande
    said that those who resented her sudden success, and took
    cheap shots at her, were as a practical matter, "acting as
    her allies." Hollande wondered out loud if her popularity
    would last, accurately identifying that as the key question
    about her candidacy. Several times he mentioned the
    unpredictability of politics, making clear that he believed
    much could happen between now and next May's first round of
    the presidential election that could turn upside down "the
    givens of today." In particular, Hollande evoked how a major
    international crisis -- he gave Iran as an example -- might
    completely change the dynamics of the upcoming elections.

    CAREFUL NOT TO RULE OUT HIS OWN CANDIDACY
    -----------------------------------------
    ¶10. (C) Hollande was careful to make clear that he too was
    prepared to run as a unifying candidate, but only if it
    seemed to him he would be likely to win the party primary --
    hands down in the first round. He was categorical in ruling
    out that that he would not/not run "out of pride" or "to get
    10 percent of the vote." (Comment: Clearly, the only
    circumstances under which Hollande would be likely to win big
    in the primary, is if Royal for some reason drops out. End
    Comment.)

    FABIUS
    ------
    ¶11. (C) Hollande contrasted his "team player" attitude with
    what he dismissively called former prime minister Laurent
    Fabius' "accountant" mentality, saying, "just because 20
    percent of the party supports him, he thinks that entitles
    him to 20 percent of whatever the party does." Almost as an
    afterthought, Hollande added "no matter what, Fabius will
    run."

    EUROPE
    ------
    ¶12. (C) Moscovici said that a PS administration would be much
    more pro-Europe than President Chirac and Prime Minister de
    Villepin (see also reftel). Both Hollande and Moscovici saw
    a need to use Europe to consolidate defense industries and
    reduce defense expenditures through economies of scale.
    Hollande noted sardonically that France was unable to sell
    its fighters and tanks to anyone. Moscovici saw a need for
    an increased parliamentary role in policy-making related to
    Europe, complaining that there was currently too much power
    concentrated in the presidency. Hollande described the
    absurd situation where the prime minister, who does not
    participate in European Council meetings, represents the
    government during the question-and-answer sessions in the
    National Assembly to defend policies set by the President.
    Hollande did not disagree with timeline set by Chirac and
    German Chancellor Merkel for getting Europe back on its feet
    in 2007-2008, noting the importance of the Franco-German
    tandem and saying that, if the effort failed, it would take
    another 4-5 years to come up with something new.

    ¶13. (C) Both Hollande and Moscovici made clear they that they
    believed Chirac had no credibility for proposing anything now
    to advance the European project, and both dismissed the idea
    that the rejected constitution could be subjected to a second
    referendum or, worse in their view, passed through
    parliament. Holland and Moscovici agreed something new would
    be required "to get Europe moving again," but they had
    nothing specific to suggest. In the interim, Moscovici
    suggested, it might be possible to use Croatian accession to
    introduce a few institutional reforms that could be approved
    by the parliaments of member states. Hollande dismissed
    Sarkozy's ideas for having the six largest EU members states
    play a leading role in setting policy, saying they were based
    on outmoded ideas of "great powers" setting policy for
    "little powers.".

    FRANCE ) U.S. RELATIONS
    -----------------------
    ¶14. (C) Hollande gave a slightly different version of the
    argument we usually hear that, while the French at a large
    disagree with the U.S. intervention in Iraq, Chirac and
    Villepin should nonetheless not have confronted the U.S. so
    openly. Hollande argued that Chirac erred by not making it
    clear from the beginning how far he was prepared to go to
    oppose the U.S. If Chirac had communicated more clearly how
    strongly he felt about the matter, it would not have led to
    the false impression that France might come along in the end.
    Moscovici repeated his calls for dialogue aimed at
    attempting to find agreement when the U.S. and France should
    differ, adding that differences should be the exception and
    not the rule. Hollande said he wanted a French foreign
    policy more firmly rooted in universal values, such as
    support for democracy, rather than the highly personalized
    approach which characterized the Chirac years.

    COMMENT
    -------
    ¶15. (C) The are those among the PS's heavyweights, --
    Strauss-Kahn, Fabius and their supporters -- who believe that
    Hollande is subtly, successfully shaping developments so that
    the PS candidate will wind up being either Royal or himself.
    Commentators and party insiders refer to this pair of
    possible outcomes as the "popularity" and "institutional"
    options. In the case of the first, Royal successfully uses
    her popularity with the public to impose herself on the party
    as its candidate. If, however, Royal and her popularity
    should for some reason falter, revealing a deeply splintered
    party with no attractive candidates (the situation before her
    emergence as the clear front-runner), then the
    "institutional" option -- turning to the party leader to lead
    the party in the election -- could become a viable one.
    Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
    http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
    STAPLETON

`