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### Viewing cable 09STATE81957, REPORT OF U.S.- RUSSIA MANPADS EXPERTS MEETING

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09STATE81957 | 2009-08-06 16:04 | 2010-12-08 21:09 | SECRET | Secretary of State

`

    VZCZCXYZ0003
    OO RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHC #1957 2230144
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH ZDS
    O 061630Z AUG 09
    FM SECSTATE WASHDC
    TO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 2593-2599
    INFO RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA IMMEDIATE 3806-3812
    RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI IMMEDIATE 1072-1078
    RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS IMMEDIATE 1216-1222

` `

    S E C R E T STATE 081957

    NOFORN

    SIPDIS

    C O R R E C T E D COPY CAPTION AND REMOVING CLASSIFICATION
    SENSITIVE

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/04/2019
    TAGS: PARM PREL RS
    SUBJECT: REPORT OF U.S.- RUSSIA MANPADS EXPERTS MEETING
    JULY 9-10, WASHINGTON, D.C.

    REF: A. A. STATE 152989 B. STATE 100646 C. STATE 112304
    ¶B. D. STATE 32213 E. STATE 33076 F. STATE 27306

    Classified By: EUR/PRA Acting Director Kathleen Morenski
    for reasons 1.4 (a,b,c,d)

    Summary

    ¶1. (S/NF) On the same week as the successful U.S.-Russia
    Presidential Summit in Moscow, the United States and Russia
    held their sixth Experts Meeting under their bilateral
    Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS) Arrangement July
    9-10 in Washington. Several items of interest were covered,
    including: 1. a framework for the exchange of information on
    domestic MANPADS destruction; 2. the risk of diversion of
    MANPADS from Venezuela to the FARC; 3. illicit MANPADS
    proliferation from Eritrea; 4. potential cooperation on
    MANPADS destruction projects with other states; and 5. next
    steps to facilitate the transfer of Russian-made Finnish
    MANPADS to the U.S. for countermeasures testing. The Russian
    side again requested U.S. help preventing the spread of
    MANPADS in the Caucasus, in particular information on
    Polish-supplied MANPADS to Georgia that were discovered in
    Chechnya following the August 2008 conflict. In response to
    our non-paper on the subject, the Russian MFA informed us it
    had begun a dialogue with the Polish government. The next
    Experts Meeting was tentatively scheduled for fall 2010 in
    Moscow, at the earliest. The U.S. delegation was co-chaired
    by Steven Costner (Deputy Director of PM/WRA) and Anita
    Friedt (Director of EUR/PRA). The Russian delegation was
    chaired by Col. Oleg Skabara from the MOD. See para 31 for a
    full delegation list. End Summary.

    Information Exchanges

    ¶2. (S) Both sides provided the details of their quarterly
    MANPADS transfers. The U.S. submitted its first quarter
    report, which reported no transfers from January 1-March 31,
    prior to the meeting. The U.S. provided its second quarter
    report (due by September 30), which covered April 1 through
    June 30, during the meeting, which also reported no
    transfers. The Russians provided their first quarter
    exchange prior to the meeting, which reported the transfer of
    100 IGLA-S missiles and 90 associated gripstocks to
    Venezuela. (see below para for more details on the Venezuela
    discussion).

    Destruction Information Exchange

    ¶3. (S) The U.S. side raised the issue of the exchange of
    information on the destruction of obsolete MANPADS,
    referencing the U.S. non-paper which detailed our proposal
    for the exchange that was provided to the GOR in advance of
    the meeting. The Russian delegation acknowledged receiving
    the U.S. non-paper and expressed gratitude for starting a
    dialogue on this topic. The sides agreed in principle that
    the exchange should take place on an annual basis, that both
    sides would consider reporting information starting with
    2005, and that information on the quantity and type of
    missiles and gripstocks destroyed should be included. The
    sides also agreed that the quantities - but not types - of
    batteries should be reported in this exchange.

    ¶4. (S) The Russian delegation expressed a willingness to
    discuss the issue further, but insisted that they needed more
    time to clear the U.S. proposal with other executive agencies
    within the Russian government. The Russians recognized the
    U.S. has taken serious steps on this issue and suggested that
    the sides continue this dialogue through diplomatic channels.

    Venezuela MANPADS transfers

    ¶5. (S) In response to the U.S. paper outlining U.S. concerns
    about the possibility of diversion to non state actors of
    IGLA-S systems being delivered to the Government of Venezuela
    (GOV), the Russian delegation stated that they understood the
    concerns raised at high levels between our Secretary of State
    and the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs as well as
    between Russian Ambassador Kislyak and WHA A/S Shannon.
    Skabara assured the U.S. delegation that Russian law provides
    specific measures to prevent illegal transfers to third
    parties. He then stated that the issues raised in the paper
    were reflected in end user checks as well as in the contract
    between the GOR and GOV, and that the GOR has required an
    end-user regime that guarantees that transfers to third
    parties will not take place. Skabara said that the U.S.
    delegation had seen how well the Russians secure their
    stockpiles and assured the U.S. that these same controls were
    written into the contract with Venezuela. Along with this,
    the GOR has had dialogue with the GOV evaluating the GOV's
    physical security of the systems, which specifically featured
    a discussion about the FARC. GOR assured the U.S. side that
    transfers from Venezuela to the FARC cannot take place.

    ¶6. (S) Questions and comparisons were raised by the U.S.
    side about Russian ammunition, sold to Venezuela, and found
    in possession of the FARC. Skabara first suggested that the
    ammunition did not come from Russia, but was probably a sale
    from "unlicensed production" a suggestion that it was
    manufactured in a third country without appropriate permits
    from Russia. When the U.S. side pointed out that the
    ammunition carried factory stamps, and that we provided this
    information, the Russians responded that the meeting was to
    discuss MANPADS, not ammunition, and that these are different
    weapons and the approach, scale, and control applied to them
    are different. He said the U.S. did not provide enough
    information to the Russians on the confiscated ammunition for
    them to fully investigate the discovery; however Russia is
    carrying out an investigation. He added that it would be
    "impossible" for a similar scenario to take place with
    MANPADS, as they have an ongoing dialogue with Venezuela that
    allows them to evaluate the security and use of these
    MANPADS, and thus none of these MANPADS can be transferred to
    the FARC.

    ¶7. (S) Giovanni Snidle from WHA/FO said that he was pleased
    to be able to report to Ambassador Shannon that an
    investigation is ongoing into the Russian cartridges found
    with the FARC and that the U.S. would appreciate if the
    Russians shared the findings. Snidle expressed that the
    concerns were not Venezuela-specific, but a concern with the
    Western Hemisphere as a whole, noting that when new MANPADS
    were provided to the Venezuelans, it was possible that the
    older, excess MANPADS could be transferred to others in the
    region. He asked the Russians to consider the following
    parameters (also outlined in a non-paper provided in advance
    of the meeting) when signing MANPADS contracts with western
    hemisphere countries:

    --Vehicle-mounted variants as opposed to shoulder-fired.
    --Limited numbers.
    --One-for-one replacement of old/outdated MANPADS.
    --Destruction of old stockpiles.

    He stated that he was pleased to hear of the level of
    accountability and encouraged them to continue end-use
    assurances in future transfers.

    The Russians noted that Venezuela didn't want vehicle mounted
    systems, it only requested shoulder-fired systems, and that
    the two systems are not interchangeable. Skabara agreed to
    take the suggestions on one-for-one replacement and stockpile
    destruction back to Moscow for consideration.

    ¶8. (S) ISN's Ann Ganzer asked about the "surprise
    inspections," mentioned to Secretary Clinton by Minister
    Lavrov. Skabara stated that these were not exactly surprise
    inspections. He explained that an inspection would be
    triggered if the GOR believed the contract had been violated
    or had information that indicated an inspection was
    necessary. (Comment: This is consistent with what the
    Russians have told us in previous MANPADS meetings. End
    Comment) He added that, to date, no inspections have been
    conducted and that no future inspections are scheduled. He
    did not consider the ammunition transferred to the FARC to be
    an indication that an inspection was warranted, as ammunition
    is not the same as MANPADS. He assured the U.S. side that
    the contract endowed the GOR with the right to perform a
    spontaneous inspection at any time. Costner noted that, if
    fully implemented, the surprise inspections would lessen the
    likelihood of a diversion and urged the GOR to perform these
    inspections regardless of the presence of a "triggering
    event."

    ¶9. (S) Skabara was receptive to U.S. inquiries on the
    exchange and its end-user controls and stated that if
    provided with specific questions, through diplomatic
    channels, they will be able to respond. The U.S. pointed out
    that it had already provided detailed questions in the
    non-paper, passed to the GOR in advance of the meeting, and
    that a written response to these inquiries would be
    appreciated. Skabara said that there had not been enough
    time to prepare a response to the paper, but that the answers
    could be provided in written form once they get back to
    Moscow. He sought a U.S. briefing on end-user controls in
    response. Skabara said that every state has a right to self
    defense under the United Nations Charter; however, the GOR is
    aware of the strategic, practical, and technical norms. He
    added that there is a line that should not be crossed, but
    that the MANPADS provided to Venezuela would not destabilize
    the region. He finished by stating that he could not get into
    details about any future shipments and highlighted that
    Russia is willing to engage in an open dialogue on this
    issue.

    Horn Of Africa/Eritrea

    ¶10. (S) The U.S. delegation then raised the issue of
    Russian-made Eritrean MANPADS discovered in Somalia which was
    discussed at the Experts Meeting in 2008 (ref F). The
    Russian delegation confirmed that the MFA raised this issue
    with the Government of Eritrea (GOE), and had not revealed
    the U.S. as the source of the allegation. According to the
    Russian MFA representative the GOE denied that the transfer
    took place, accusing "enemies," namely Ethiopia, of
    fabricating the accusation. The GOE demanded further
    information on the transfer including the source and other
    supporting information (i.e. photographs). The U.S.
    delegation offered to discuss the question of photographs
    with relevant U.S. agencies and report back to the GOR
    through diplomatic channels. The Russian side then stated
    that its relationship with Eritrea is not strong, thus Russia
    cannot guarantee any further useful information on this
    issue.

    ¶11. (S) The U.S. delegation then reiterated a request from
    the 2008 Meeting for a detailed list of all Soviet and
    Russian MANPADS transfers to Eritrea and the HOA in general.
    The Russian delegation responded that this was impossible, as
    all records of MANPADS transfers prior to the year 2000 were
    destroyed in accordance with Russian laws governing
    classified information. Further questioning by the U.S.
    delegation on this issue raised a series of translation
    problems. The Russian side did not understand requests from
    the U.S. delegation for "records" of these transfers. The
    Russian delegation stated that records of MANPADS transfers
    (but not serial numbers) after 2000 (possibly from 2003) may
    be available and offered to investigate the issue and report
    back via diplomatic channels. The Russians asked for a
    formal, written request on this issue. (Comment:
    Misunderstandings related to translation errors during this
    discussion may warrant a follow up with the GOR to confirm
    Skabara's statements. End Comment.)

    Georgia

    ¶12. (S) The Russian delegation then raised the question of
    Georgian MANPADS proliferation. Skabara first outlined the
    GOR's concerns about the build-up of weapons in Georgia and
    potential "Georgian aggression" in the Caucasus. Skabara
    continued by invoking Section 5 of the Bilateral Arrangement
    where Russia and the U.S. are bound to the obligation of
    preventing the transfer of Polish MANPADS to Georgia. The
    Russian delegation acknowledged receipt of our non-paper in
    response to Russia's concerns and confirmed that the Russian
    MFA had begun a dialogue with the Polish government on this
    issue.

    ¶13. (S) Costner acknowledged the mutual interests the U.S.
    and Russian sides have, and the connection that exists
    between stemming MANPADS proliferation in Venezuela/Horn of
    Africa and the Caucasus, respectively. He noted the U.S. has
    raised concerns with the Georgian government on stockpile
    security and controls of excess munitions. He emphasized
    that the key difference lies in the fact that the U.S. has
    never transferred MANPADS to Georgia.

    ¶14. (S) Following Costner's remarks, EUR/PRA Office Director
    Anita Friedt added that the U.S. deeply regrets the loss of
    life on both the Georgian and Russian sides resulting from
    the August conflict. She underscored that the U.S. has not
    transferred MANPADS systems to Georgia and affirmed the USG
    policy of non-lethal weapon assistance to Georgia. She said
    the U.S. and Georgia had a strong nonproliferation
    partnership and expressed appreciation for Russian efforts to
    reach out to Poland on this issue. The Russian delegation
    reiterated its concerns on this issue, the importance of not
    blaming each other by continuing this dialogue, and requested
    that the U.S continue to work with both Georgia and Poland.

    ¶15. (S) Skabara thanked the U.S. side for working with
    Poland and Georgia on this issue and stated that the GOR has
    had a pragmatic and active dialogue with Poland and hopes
    that in the future this dialogue will generate specific
    results on this question. Russia would continue to share
    the outcome of this dialogue with the U.S. in the future.

    Black Markets in Latin America

    ¶16. (S/NF) The U.S. side then gave a briefing on the MANPADS
    black market in Latin America. The MANPADS black market in
    the region is small, the number of potential users is low,
    and prices are high compared to other regions such as the
    Middle East, South Asia, and Africa. Central American
    countries historically have posed the largest proliferation
    risk because of the availability of systems unrecovered after
    civil conflicts in the 1980s. The U.S. side stated concerns
    about the FARC's apparent desire to obtain MANPADS, but said
    that the likelihood that they have already is very low.
    Specific instances where there would be heightened risk of
    proliferation could include when MANPADS are deployed to
    forward operating bases (as in the case of Venezuela).
    MANPADS are generally secure when they are in central
    stockpiles; however, when they are deployed they may be lost
    in combat, corruption, or to the black market. The U.S. side
    reiterated that any proliferation to the FARC is important
    and is likely to lead to a significant increase in the air
    defense threat to Colombian and US aircraft operating in the
    region.

    ¶17. (S/NF) The U.S. briefing laid out possible steps to
    limiting illicit proliferation of MANPADS, including:
    inventory of existing stockpiles, avoidance of
    destabilizing-sized sales, destruction of old stockpiles, and
    limitations to the portability of systems. This complemented
    directly the U.S. requests for curbing the threat posed by
    sales to Venezuela, including offering vehicle- or pedestal-
    mounted variants rather than shoulder-fired systems.

    ¶18. (S/REL RUSSIA) The Russian side responded positively to
    the brief and asked if the U.S. exports MANPADS to South
    America. The U.S. side responded that the U.S. exports very
    few MANPADS anywhere and since at least 2005 (i.e., when the
    Arrangement was signed and quarterly transfer exchanges
    began) there has not been a single MANPADS transferred to
    South America. There are no STINGER MANPADS in South America
    and that obsolete, U.S. REDEYE MANPADS would have been pulled
    out years ago.

    Regional Cooperation Efforts

    ¶19. (S) Snidle then gave a brief presentation on U.S.
    efforts with the OAS to provide for the security of MANPADS
    in Latin America. Snidle explained that the International
    Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) had urged the region in
    2004 to take concrete steps to protect themselves against
    MANPADS threats. The OAS states have since signed Resolution
    2145 which urged them to adopt strict national MANPADS
    controls, ban transfers to non-state actors, destroy excess
    and unsecured weapons, and recommended physical security and
    stockpile management guidelines. The OAS produced a set of
    MANPADS regulations, originally written in four languages, to
    adhere to the resolution. Snidle urged the Russians to
    adhere to these guidelines when selling/transferring MANPADS
    to the region.

    ¶20. (S) For the final item of the first day, the Russian
    delegation responded by outlining its cooperation with CIS
    member states. According to the Russian delegation, the GOR
    has recently concluded frameworks for information exchange on
    MANPADS stockpile security measures in Uzbekistan and
    Ukraine, and is working to establish similar agreements in
    Moldova and Azerbaijan. The agreement with the Uzbeks has
    entered into force; the agreement with the Ukrainians was
    signed in May 2009 and is expected to enter into force this
    year. The GOR sought a similar arrangement with Georgia, but
    has not received a Georgian reply on this question since
    April 2008.

    ¶21. (SBU) On the second day of talks, Louis Ganem from
    ISN/CATR briefed on regional security seminars hosted by the
    U.S. for several regional partners. He provided information
    on how the United States coordinates and implements
    multinational conferences and seminars on small arms and
    light weapons, with a focus on MANPADS proliferation. Ganem
    explained that the seminars are designed to identify regional
    threats, common security goals, exchange information on
    security programs and training, identify requirements, and
    provide program assistance. He added that regional partners,
    sharing the same security goals, are invited to discuss how
    to improve existing and implement new regional security
    capabilities. The focus of such seminars is on identifying
    preventive security measures, such as export controls and
    border security programs and training to eliminate the risks
    of illicit proliferation. The intent is to improve regional
    security capabilities by promoting partnership and
    cooperation among partner nations. Ganem concluded
    contemplating the possibility of future events in South and
    Central Asia and Latin America, and asked the Russians to
    consider participation.

    ¶22. (S) The Russian delegation responded to this
    presentation positively, stating that they had sent
    representatives, including Col. Kuts, to similar multilateral
    seminars in the CIS region. The Russians also agreed in
    principle that the U.S. and the GOR could potentially
    collaborate on future regional seminars. Skabara invited the
    U.S. to send proposals for future MANPADS seminars or similar
    events to the GOR for consideration.

    Destruction Cooperation

    ¶23. (S) Costner then provided an update about U.S.
    destruction cooperation efforts with other states. Since
    2003, the U.S. has helped destroy over 30,000 MANPADS
    missiles in 27 states, with approximately 4,000 destroyed
    since the last update provided at the 2008 meeting. The
    Russian delegation praised these efforts, and proposed that
    the U.S. and Russia collaborate on joint destruction projects
    in the future under the auspices of the Arrangement. The
    U.S. agreed that such efforts would be worthwhile, and
    expressed a willingness to look for opportunities for
    collaboration.

    FINNPADS

    ¶24. (S) The U.S. delegation then followed-up with the
    Russian delegation about the transfer of Russian-made Finnish
    MANPADS to the U.S. for countermeasures testing. The Russian
    delegation stated that the GOR would agree to the transfer
    under two conditions: 1. that Russian experts be present for
    the tests, and 2. that the results of the tests be shared in
    writing with the GOR. This offer, and its decision to allow
    the transfer, had not yet been presented to the Finnish
    Government, as it represents a change in Russian policy on
    this question. Skabara highlighted the fact that the "new
    relationship" between the U.S. and Russia had inspired this
    change in policy. The Russian delegation was unable to
    provide further detail about the specifics of this proposal,
    such as how many Russian visits would be required or how
    thorough the report to the GOR would need to be. The U.S.
    requested that the GOR formally submit its decision,
    including its two conditions in writing. Both sides agreed
    to discuss further the details of the conditions and then
    inform the Finnish Government about the decision. (Comment:
    The Finns have almost 2,000 SA-16s and SA-18s to dispose of
    because of shelf life issues. This dialogue has been going
    on sporadically for almost two years; the first Russian
    response cited almost the same conditions as Skabara
    presented on July 10. End Comment.)

    VERBA MANPADS

    ¶25. (S) The U.S. side provided the Russians with an
    open-source (2007) article that described a new Russian
    MANPADS system called the VERBA. Costner read key passages
    in the article to the Russian side, pointing out that the
    article suggests the VERBA would enter into service in 2008.
    The article also states that the VERBA will replace the
    STRELA and IGLA family of systems and have a payload twenty
    percent larger than either of its predecessors. Costner
    asked the Russian delegation to provide additional
    information on the VERBA, including if it was operational,
    and if it would be marketed.

    ¶26. (S) The Russian side responded that they had no further
    information. Skabara questioned the legitimacy of the
    article saying that scientists can "write whatever they want"
    and stated that there was no official position on the system.
    Skabara stated that if the U.S. wanted more information on
    this system, it would have to forward a written request
    through diplomatic channels with its questions. The U.S.
    agreed to do this.

    Legislative updates

    ¶27. (S) Neither side had anything to report. Skabara
    stated that the GOR is on track to implement all of its legal
    mechanisms and before it develops new ones, wants to make
    sure they implement those they have.

    Conclusion

    ¶28. (S) Costner summarized the meeting and noted the
    following action items and "due-outs" by both sides ahead of
    the next meeting:

    U.S. side:

    ¶1. On Eritrea/Somalia, the U.S. will seek authorization to
    release photographic evidence of Russian MANPADS diversion to
    Somalia for the purpose of Russia following up with the
    Eritrean government.
    ¶2. On Finland, the U.S. will respond to Russia's
    conditions on participating in MANPADS destruction and
    countermeasure testing.
    ¶3. The U.S. will follow up on the open source article
    handed over and produce an official request for information
    regarding the VERBA MANPADS system.

    Russian side:
    ¶1. Official comments regarding U.S. proposal in the
    non-paper passed regarding exchange of destruction
    information, in particular our clarification on quantity and
    types of items to be reported.
    ¶2. On Venezuela, the Russian side promised to provide a
    written response to questions and recommendations made in our
    non-paper handed over prior to the meeting.
    ¶3. On VERBA MANPADS, written response to our official
    request for additional information, once it is received by
    the Russian side.
    ¶4. The Russian side will detail in writing its conditions,
    as described by the MFA during the meeting, regarding
    authorization for Finland to transfer Russian-origin MANPADS
    to the U.S. for countermeasure testing.
    ¶5. The transfer notice by the end of September covering
    the time period of April through June.

    Both sides:
    ¶1. The U.S. side will look into the possibility of having
    both sides brief each other on the conduct of our respective
    inspection regimes (derived from our discussion on Venezuela).
    ¶2. The delegations agreed that more work and dialogue
    needs to take place between the annual meetings and proposed
    a date of September 30, 2009 as a target date for having the
    due outs complete.
    ¶3. Propose dates for the next MANPADS Experts meeting,
    possibly to be held in Moscow in the fall of 2010.

    The Russian side did not have anything to add regarding these
    due-outs. Skabara promised the Russian side would look into
    the matter of diverted ammunition to the FARC. He then
    requested that the U.S. provide pictures and cartridges found
    for technical analysis.

    Comment:

    ¶29. (S/NF) Both sides agreed the July 9-10 meeting was a
    success; the tone of the meeting was more positive than in
    previous years, consistent with the "reset" of U.S.-Russia
    relations. Two potentially unsettling differences from years
    past was the reduced size of the Russian delegation (only 2
    from MOD, 1 from MFA) and a desire on the Russian side to
    extend the time before the next meeting to eighteen months or
    even two years. Both sides have settled on the routine and
    relatively less controversial elements of the Arrangement
    (such as information exchanges), but challenges remain on
    transparency over the more controversial issues we discussed,
    such as on Venezuela.

    ¶30. (S/NF) Comment continued: Both sides recognized the
    utility of holding a continuous dialogue on MANPADS issues
    through diplomatic channels and along the sidelines of other
    SA/LW meetings, such as the UN Biennial Meetings of States on
    SA/LW in New York in June of 2010. The Counter Terrorism
    Working Group (CTWG) would also present another opportunity
    for follow-up. Additionally, both sides indicated a
    willingness to deepen cooperation on MANPADS issues to
    include potential joint destruction programs, regional
    seminars, and other bilateral efforts. These more robust
    programs would likely increase the utility of the
    Arrangement, as the sides broaden their MANPADS cooperation
    beyond the scope of info exchanges and an annual meeting.
    Yet, as Costner summed up in response to the Russian proposal
    to hold these meetings less frequently, it is much harder to
    play a game of chess by mail than in person. End comment.

    ¶31. (S/NF) Delegation List

    U.S. Delegation:
    DOS
    Steven Costner (Deputy Director, PM/WRA), Co-Head of U.S.
    Delegation
    Anita Friedt (Office Director, EUR/PRA), Co-Head of U.S.
    Delegation
    Ann Ganzer (Acting DAS, ISN)
    Stephanie Pico (PM/WRA)
    Nate Young (EUR/PRA)
    Louis Ganem (ISN/CATR)
    Lindsay Gardner (PM/WRA)
    Luke Champlin (EUR/PRA)
    Giovanni Snidle (WHA/FO)

    CIA/CTC
    Eric Arnett
    Nils Talbot

    DOD
    Kimberly Crusey
    Trish Johnson
    Rodney Ratledge

    Russian Delegation:
    MOD
    Col. Oleg Skabara, Head of Delegation
    Col. Andreiy Kuts

    MFA
    Denis Davydov

    Russian Embassy
    Alexei Markov
    Maxim Elovik
    CLINTON

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