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### Viewing cable 07LAPAZ3262, MILITARY STANDDOWN MORE LIKELY THAN HEAVY HAND

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
07LAPAZ3262 | 2007-12-14 23:11 | 2010-12-03 21:09 | SECRET | Embassy La Paz

`

    VZCZCXYZ0002
    OO RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHLP #3262/01 3482321
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    O 142321Z DEC 07
    FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5974
    INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 7435
    RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 4800
    RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 8713
    RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 5939
    RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 3153
    RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 3355
    RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 5138
    RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 5790
    RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 0399
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
    RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL
    RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA 0818
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
    RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL

` `

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/15/2027
    TAGS: ASEC PREL PGOV PINL VN CU BL
    SUBJECT: MILITARY STANDDOWN MORE LIKELY THAN HEAVY HAND

    REF: A. LA PAZ 3261
         ¶B. LA PAZ 3119

    Classified By: EcoPol Chief Mike Hammer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

    ¶1. (S) Summary:  Over the past couple of days statements from
    military leaders have taken a conciliatory tone and moved
    away from the confrontational rhetoric from Armed Forces
    Commander General Wilfredo Vargas.  Vargas relayed a message
    to the Ambassador that his troops would only intervene in
    "Media Luna" opposition states if leaders clearly break with
    the constitution, for example by declaring independence.  The
    Vice President echoed a similar message in a December 14
    meeting when he told the Ambassador that the government is
    not planning a state of siege or military action unless it is
    required to defend government offices or protect the people.
    Although the military is making plans to deploy 70 additional
    companies to opposition-led departments (states), military
    planners have told us that President Evo Morales has given
    them instructions not to incur civilian casualties.  Field
    commanders continue to tell us they will require a written
    order from President Morales if asked to commit violence
    against opposition demonstrators.  Even with such an order,
    commanders are prepared to stand down and confine their
    troops to barracks.  Imposing a police state on rebel
    departments presents several difficulties: the military views
    this as strictly a police function; the military does not
    presently have the supplies or logistics in place to conduct
    such an operation; many key officers have ties with the
    opposition departments in the Media Luna; and the military
    knows based on past history that they will be held
    accountable.  An influential senator told us the opposition
    is not nearly as concerned with military heavy handedness as
    they are with altiplano police and mysterious "foreign"
    fighters.  End Summary.

    Vargas: With Evo or Against Evo?
    --------------------------------

    ¶2. (S)xxxxxxxxxxxx asked Military
    Group Commander on December 13 to tell the Ambassador that in
    case of confrontations in opposition-led "Media Luna"
    departments (states), troops would be deployed in the same
    manner as during the violent November 23-24 Sucre
    demonstrations: troops would protect military and government
    property, but would not enforce a crackdown on civilians.
    This contradicted xxxxxxxxxxxx' December 7 public statement that
    "the true cowards are in the (opposition-controlled) Media
    Luna"  and that the military would "defend the homeland" in
    Santa Cruz to ensure "the security of all."  Although he
    called for increased political dialogue, xxxxxxxxxxxx laid the
    blame for any conflict in the future squarely with the
    opposition for provoking and misinforming Bolivians, without
    offering "any substantive solutions."  But now xxxxxxxxxxxx has
    changed his tune, saying he would only use the military to
    quell civil disorder if the opposition acted in a clearly
    unconstitutional way, for example by declaring independence.
    He did not consider the proposal of autonomy statutes to be a
    clear violation of the constitution. xxxxxxxxxxxx did stress,
    however, that he would not tolerate insubordination or coup
    plotting within his ranks.  The Ambassador was also assured
    by Vice President Garcia Linera on December 14 that the
    government would not declare a state of siege or use the
    military unless it needed to defend government offices or
    protect people.

    ¶3. (S) That xxxxxxxxxxxx made his highly-political comments xxxxxxxxxxx angered many
    commanders.  Many commanders were also critical of xxxxxxxxxxx, as they feared it
    opened the military to charges of taking political sides
    beyond its institutional role.xxxxxxxxxxxx

    ¶4. (C) xxxxxxxxxxxx had been,xxxxxxxxxxx a supporter
    of U.S.-Bolivian military relations.  Although he continues
    to cooperate enthusiastically with us at a working level,
    xxxxxxxxxxx his
    public comments in the last few months have irritated
    Bolivian military officers and raised eyebrows within the
    Embassy.  When given an opening to defend us regarding
    conspiracy charges, he only said the charges should be
    investigated.  When given a chance to opine on Morales'
    celebration of Che Guevara,s 1967 rebellion and criticism of
    Bolivian troops, he said everyone has the right to their own
    opinion.

    Setting the Groundwork for Possible Military Action
    --------------------------------------------- ------

    ¶5. (C) Government rhetoric calmed somewhat this week, with
    officials including Morales making empty overtures about
    dialogue and stressing that the opposition, not the
    government, is pushing the country to conflict.  But
    government officials also warned that if dialogue failed and
    opposition "sedition" continued, the government would have no
    choice but to use force.  "The state is disposed to use
    institutions of force to preserve internal order and
    democratic stability," said Government Minister Alfredo Rada.
     Rada's Vice-Minister Ruben Gamarra said the government would
    not allow department or civic officials to "threaten the
    unity of the country" as a matter of constitutional
    obligation.  Gamarra said the military also supports this
    position.  The Vice President also told the Ambassador that
    "the president and I must guarantee the country's integrity
    and stability."  The Ambassador made clear that the United
    States supports a united and democratic Bolivia.

    Military Leaders Stress Calm and Police Role
    --------------------------------------------

    ¶6. (C) On December 12, the military spoke for itself, backing
    away from confrontational remarks.  Minister of Defense
    Walker San Miguel confirmed that the armed forces were on
    alert, but said the motive was to protect public and private
    property, not to quell unrest.  San Miguel told the press the
    police are responsible for maintaining civil order, not the
    military.  San Miguel discounted any possibility of declaring
    a state of emergency in opposition departments and criticized
    "paranoid" opposition leaders for asserting that President
    Morales had ordered an imminent "militarization." (Note:
    Opposition rumors include appointing military officers
    temporarily to state and city civilian leadership positions.
    End Note.)  San Miguel explained although there had been no
    troop mobilizations, the military remains "concerned."  Army
    Commander Freddy Bersatti said he hoped God would guide
    opposition leaders to make good decisions "for the peace and
    coexistence of all Bolivians."

    Military to Retreat from Civilian Confrontations
    --------------------------------------------- ---

    ¶7. (C) Planning of troop deployments to opposition
    departments was conducted December 7 and 8 and continued to
    be refined this week.  Participating commanders told us the
    deployment would involve 70 companies.  Army Chief of Staff
    Gen. Freddy Mackay, Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Daniel
    Salazar, and Navy Chief of Staff Admiral Ernesto Roca are the
    chief planners.

    ¶8. (S) A senior military planner told DAO December 13 that
    President Morales wants the military to be careful to avoid
    violent confrontations with demonstrators if called upon to
    support Bolivian police.  Despite public bravado, the planner
    said Morales understands deaths will erode political support.
     He confirmed some units have already deployed to key
    locations throughout the Media Luna to secure gas lines,
    public utilities, and government buildings.  The planner said
    the units would not be armed and would incorporate local
    indigenous to minimize the potential for conflict.  If the
    opposition attempts to take these strategic locations by
    force, the military would retreat.

    Santa Chavez to Fund Bolivian Deployments
    -----------------------------------------

    ¶9. (S) Until recently, it was unclear how such a deployment
    would be funded.  However, military contacts said December 13
    that $5 million became available this week to fund an
    increased military presence in opposition-led departments and
    another $1.3 million had been allocated for non-lethal
    supplies, such as riot-control gas.  The money was supposedly
    freed up from Venezuelan sources, but this is not confirmed.
    It will take time, at least two weeks, before the new funding
    results in equipped troops on the ground in opposition
    departments.

    ¶10. (C) Supply and logistics issues continue to be an
    operational impediment to any proposed military crackdown,
    and it may take months before the new funding resolves these
    shortcomings at remote posts.  Bolivia has not spent any
    money on ammunition in two years, and the capacity to quickly
    move troops remains in doubt.  xxxxxxxxxxx told xxxxxxxxxxx he had
    only two trucks and enough fuel to send his single plane on
    one reconnaissance mission.

    Venezuelan Cash and Foreign Fighters
    ------------------------------------

    ¶11. (S) xxxxxxxxxxx said Morales understands he risks
    losing the military if he pushes them into a police force
    role.  Because of this, he felt Morales would rely on the
    police from the altiplano and "volunteers from other
    countries" to combat opposition forces should an open
    conflict develop.  xxxxxxxxxxxx said Cuban hospitals could easily
    be "converted to barracks," but had no idea how many
    Venezuelan and Cubans would be willing or available to fight
    for Evo's government.

    ¶12. (S) Military contacts are concerned a few rogue
    commanders might obey orders to enforce a police state, their
    loyalty greased with Venezuelan pay-offs.  They asserted
    Venezuelan money would also make it difficult for the
    high-command to refuse such orders.  Although Venezuelan
    "bonuses" have cemented some loyalty, it has also created
    much resentment in the mid- and lower-ranks and cost the high
    command significant legitimacy.  According xxxxxxxxxxx and field
    commanders, there is also a high degree of frustration with
    the perceived meddling of Venezuelan advisors in the internal
    functions of the military and of overtly political statements
    and actions of the high command (such as Army Commander
    Bersatti's decision to wear a red poncho in solidarity with
    the violent, pro-government Red Ponchos group a year ago).

    Mixed Signals on Holiday Troop Strength
    ---------------------------------------

    ¶13. (C) Although planning and funding appear to be in place,
    the military was sending out mixed signals as to its
    intentions.  There has been no order to extend assignments or
    cancel leave, as would be expected prior to a major military
    undertaking.  About 70 percent of the army's conscript force
    will be rotating during the first two weeks of January.
    Allowing inexperienced troops to transfer into the bulk of
    Media Luna enlisted positions, rather than keeping its
    existing troops in place, might signal that the government
    does not anticipate a major conflict in the near-future.
    However, a senior military planner told DATT that keeping the
    conscripts from rotating would be "more trouble than it is
    worth" and that new troops would be more motivated.  He also
    anticipated an order canceling leave before December 19.
    Another potential tripwire: graduations at the military
    academy in Cochabamba Department were moved up four days to
    December 12.

    Field Commanders Set to Stand Down
    ----------------------------------

    ¶14. (S) Although xxxxxxxxxxx and others in the high command may be
    coy, many field commanders continue to tell us they will not
    participate in violence against opposition demonstrations.
    xxxxxxxxxxx was on hand when a high-ranking civil defense
    officer told the commander in Tarija Department to demand a
    written order from President Morales if asked to take action
    against opposition leaders or demonstrators.  If they
    received such an order, the officer advised non-compliance
    and a post lock down to commanders from Cochabamba, Santa
    Cruz, and Tarija.  The civil defense officer told MILGP
    Commander he expects commanders will not use force.

    ¶15. (C) xxxxxxxxxxx told Emboff that
    Minister of Government Rada contacted the Navy leadership
    when violent protests broke out in Cobija, Pando on November
    30 and asked the Navy to step in and enforce order (Note:
    the Navy is the strongest military branch in the department
    of Pando).  Navy commanders said they would comply when
    provided a signed order from Morales.  Rada never called
    back.  xxxxxxxxxxxx told PolOffs the air force in
    Cobija was similarly requested to take control of the
    civilian airport, requested a written order, and never got
    one.

    X-Factors: Institutionalism, Regionalism, and Wives
    --------------------------------------------- ------

    ¶16. (C) xxxxxxxxxxx told us despite government and high-command
    rhetoric about the military's "constitutional role," most
    commanders thought the government violated the law and the
    constitution by excluding the opposition from key sessions of
    Congress and the Constituent Assembly and, therefore, "have
    no right to invoke the constitution."  A strong commitment to
    institutionalism would require a rock-solid constitutional
    argument before commanders would participate in any action
    that could be considered "political."

    ¶17. (C) xxxxxxxxxxx said commanders ultimately place loyalty to
    their region above all other considerations.  Although most
    commanders are originally from the altiplano, they have spent
    most of their careers stationed in the Media Luna.  He said
    many officers worked with the same opposition leaders the
    government might call on them to unseat, a prospect he found
    "very unlikely."  Many altiplano officers marry in the Media
    Luna and have family there.  As for the large minority of
    officers from the Media Luna, including himself, Suarez said
    there is "no way any of us are going to attack our own
    people."  Rather, he said, they would side with the
    opposition if forced to take sides.

    xxxxxxxxxxx "Divided" Military Won,t Intervene
    --------------------------------------------- ----

    ¶18. (C) xxxxxxxxxxx told PolOff
    December 14 the opposition did not believe the "divided"
    military would repress them, but were more concerned about
    irregular pro-government militias organized and financed by
    Venezuelans and Cubans.  xxxxxxxxxxx, however, provided no details
    on the supposed paramilitary organizations.  xxxxxxxxxxxx said, in
    any event, he expected no violent stand-off with the
    government before January as both sides are "disorganized."

    Comment:
    --------

    ¶19. (C) The best the government can hope for if it gives the
    order to bust opposition heads is sporadic and half-hearted
    compliance from a minority of commanders.  Although they can
    be expected to protect government infrastructure and
    transportation, most commanders are likely to sit out any
    violent confrontation with opposition forces.  Consistent
    with out November assessment (Reftel B), we continue to
    believe the military will choose to ignore orders that are
    not solidly linked to their constitutional role, in writing,
    or that requires them to spill Bolivian blood.

    ¶20. (C) Despite bravado from field commanders, DAO expects
    them to frame any potential insubordination as "selective
    non-compliance" to their superiors.  Although field
    commanders may be anxious about day after scenarios if they
    disobey orders, it would be difficult for the government to
    replace "insubordinate" officers, particularly if officers
    refused such orders en masse.  It is unlikely the government
    would find more loyal commanders in the lower ranks,
    uncertain if rank and file troops would recognize them, and
    unclear if such an overly political reorganization would be
    tolerated by the high command.  Unlike his erstwhile ally
    Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, Evo does not have a network
    of personal friends within the military (although his
    Presidency Minister Juan Quintana does), and the military is
    leery of taking on any role considered remotely political.
    The military fears above all a repeat of the bloody
    military-civilian conflicts in El Alto in 2003, which brought
    down the Goni government.  Many commanders are still bitter
    about the fallout from those events and believe the military
    took the risks and the blame for political decisions.

    ¶21. (C) xxxxxxxxxxx remains an enigma.  Some commanders suspected,
    at least xxxxxxxxxxxxxx, that he might be
    sympathetic to a coup.  He is widely characterized as an
    "opportunist" xxxxxxxxxxx.  Under intense pressure from both political sides,
    he plays both sides.  We cannot expect him to stand behind
    his assurances.  End Comment.

    GOLDBERG

`