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### Viewing cable 09BRASILIA1113, AUGUST 4-5 VISIT OF U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09BRASILIA1113 | 2009-09-04 21:09 | 2011-01-04 00:12 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Brasilia

`

    VZCZCXRO9330
    RR RUEHAO RUEHCD RUEHGA RUEHGD RUEHHA RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHMT RUEHNG
    RUEHNL RUEHQU RUEHRD RUEHRG RUEHRS RUEHTM RUEHVC
    DE RUEHBR #1113/01 2472103
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    R 042103Z SEP 09
    FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5017
    INFO RUEHWH/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS
    RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 9890
    RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 8151
    RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 4501
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
    RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BRASILIA 001113

    SIPDIS

    DEPARTMENT FOR D, P, T, WHA, PM, ISN, NEA, EEB

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/03/2019
    TAGS: PREL MARR ETRD EFIN KNNP XM XF IR BR
    SUBJECT: AUGUST 4-5 VISIT OF U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR
    TO BRAZIL

    REF: A. BRASILIA 1038
    ¶B. BRASILIA 1092
    ¶C. BRASILIA 1094

    BRASILIA 00001113 001.2 OF 004

    Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, A.I. LISA KUBISKE, REASON 1.4(B) and
    (D)

    ¶1. (C) Summary: In an August 4-5 visit to Brasilia dominated
    by Brazilian concerns over USG intentions and the regional
    implications of expanded U.S. access to Colombian military
    bases, National Security Advisor General James L. Jones
    assured senior GOB officials that President Obama desires a
    transparent relationship with Brazil and wants to expand our
    bilateral cooperation. The GOB encouraged greater U.S.
    dialogue and engagement with Venezuela, Bolivia, and Cuba,
    and more forceful U.S. action against the de facto government
    in Honduras. In discussions concerning the Middle East peace
    process, Iran, and non-proliferation, General Jones made
    clear to Brazilian officials that Brazil,s growing
    international role implied taking greater responsibility.
    GOB officials described a Brazil that is seeking ways to
    expand its global economic reach: ready to become an IMF
    creditor, to finalize a global trade agreement, to engage in
    bilateral and regional cooperation on energy, and to tackle
    the difficult issues surrounding climate change. Although
    the Colombia bases issue caused longstanding regional
    security concerns to resurface, GOB officials were
    complimentary of the new Administration,s initial approach
    to Latin America and expressed interest in looking for new
    ways to cooperate. End summary.

    - - - Colombia Bases Dominate, with Venezuela Sub-Text - - -

    ¶2. (SBU) General Jones, joined by State U/S for Arms Control
    and International Security Ellen Tauscher, Defense U/S for
    Acquisitions, Technology and Logistics Ashton Carter, and NSC
    Director for South America Luis Rosello, met with Foreign
    Minister Celso Amorim, Presidential Foreign Policy Marco
    Aurelio Garcia, Defense Minister Nelson Jobim, Casa Civil
    Minister (Chief of Staff) Dilma Rousseff, Mines and Energy
    Minister Edison Lobao, Petrobras CEO Sergio Gabrielli,
    Central Bank President Henrique Meirelles, and a number of
    other MRE, Defense, Energy, and Presidency officials, as well
    as senior opposition and business figures. Ref B addressed
    energy issues discussed during the visit.

    ¶3. (C) The Amorim, Garcia, Rousseff, and Jobim meetings all
    included lengthy discussions of the Colombia bases issue.
    Amorim ran through a series of questions that the news of the
    bases had raised, recalling alleged statements in the past by
    (unnamed) U.S. military officers suggesting that the
    Argentina-Brazil-Paraguay tri-border area might be a
    "legitimate U.S. target" if terrorist activity were
    discovered there, and that "U.S. Congressional reports"
    accusing Venezuela of supporting drug trafficking (a
    reference to a recent GAO report), combined with the stated
    counternarcotics mission of the bases, raised concern that
    they might be used to launch actions against Venezuela.
    Amorim said that what for the United States was "business as
    usual" was exacerbating tensions in a sensitive (and in
    Chavez's case, hypersensitive) region.

    ¶4. (C) Garcia said he appreciated the frankness of the
    dialogue and expected that we would overcome the current
    "malaise." He noted that President Lula would meet Colombian
    President Uribe later that week, and that Garcia had spoken
    with Venezuelan President Chavez about the issue; in his
    view, Chavez did not see it as a big problem, but the issue
    "smelled of Cold War" and was surprising to the GOB after the
    "very positive" overtures by the Administration and
    considering that, in his view, the FARC had never been so
    weak and the only security threat to the United States in
    Latin America comes from Mexico. Garcia dismissed the
    discovery in FARC hands of Swedish anti-tank weapons that had
    been sold to the Venezuelan government as overblown noting
    that the weapons were old and that, in any case, they would
    be of limited value since "there are no tanks in insurgency
    conflicts." Garcia added that he did not believe the GOV was
    supporting the FARC because "the FARC is involved in drug
    trafficking, and everyone knows that involvement with the
    drug trade is destructive." He noted that the current crisis
    is the continuation of a longstanding love-hate relationship
    between Colombia and Venezuela, and that this was the third

    BRASILIA 00001113 002.2 OF 004

    Colombia-Venezuela crisis that he had had to deal with.
    Garcia stressed that Brazil's overriding interest is in
    ensuring a peaceful region that can live with the differences
    among countries, and cited this as the reason Brazil supports
    the Colombia-U.S. Free Trade Agreement.

    ¶5. (C) Dilma Rousseff told Gen. Jones that the GOB finds it
    disconcerting to be faced with questions from the press
    regarding why the United States needs such bases. According
    to Rousseff, issues such as this open the door for radicals
    who want to create problems in the region. Gen. Jones
    emphasized Colombia's need for assistance in maintaining its
    security against drug traffickers and the FARC, and then
    recounted Uribe's concerns that his fight against the FARC
    was made more difficult because of FARC positions in other
    countries. In all three meetings, Gen. Jones explained the
    nature of the agreement as largely formalizing the current
    relationship. He said he was willing to send a team of USG
    civilian and military officials to provide additional
    information, but stressed that it was unfortunate that others
    were playing up this issue in the press since USG officials
    including himself were available to talk whenever GOB
    officials had concerns about USG actions.

    ¶6. (C) Jobim told Gen. Jones that Brazil has great
    expectations of the Obama Administration, noting that
    transparency was a very important component of the U.S.
    relationship with South America. He noted that issues like
    the Colombia bases become more difficult when the GOB learns
    of them through the press, but added that Brazil, too, is
    often surprised by the sensitivities of "Spanish America"
    regarding issues that would be considered innocuous
    elsewhere. Gen. Jones encouraged Jobim to call if there were
    further doubts about U.S. intentions.

    ¶7. (C) While insisting they did not want to engage in
    mediation between the USG and GOV, both Garcia and Amorim
    used the opportunity to encourage the United States to
    establish "a direct channel of communication with President
    Chavez." Amorim suggested that a good USG-GOV dialogue would
    have an impact on the domestic situation in Venezuela, as
    well, because much of the opposition to Chavez has ties to
    the United States.

    - - - Other Regional Issues on Brazil,s Mind - - -

    ¶8. (C) With regard to Honduras, Amorim said that Chavez had
    wanted to make President Zelaya "a martyr," but the GOB had
    convinced him that "only the United States can influence what
    happens in Honduras" and needed to be consulted. Amorim said
    he had declined OAS SYG Insulza's request to participate in a
    foreign ministers' group, saying that the prospects had
    "slipped" since the Arias initiative had begun. He felt that
    the possibility of the de facto government rejecting yet
    another initiative made it too risky. Amorim described USG
    actions against the de facto government as "surface
    scratches" that were not deep enough to do damage. There had
    been enough concessions to Micheletti, he said. The United
    States needs to tell him in clear terms that he must allow
    Zelaya back. The situation in Honduras needs a resolution
    that is "both quick and peaceful," Amorim said, although he
    recognized the difficulty of achieving both. For his part,
    Garcia noted that President Zelaya would be coming to Brazil
    shortly, and encouraged the USG to apply stronger pressure on
    the de facto government to allow Zelaya to be restored to
    power quickly*he suggested revoking more visas. Garcia
    stressed that Zelaya "is not a dangerous revolutionary," that
    returning him to power to run the elections "will not lead to
    significant changes," and that the de facto government cannot
    be allowed to run elections.

    ¶9. (C) Garcia said that Brazil is seeking to increase its
    investment in Bolivia, and particularly to compensate for
    Bolivia's lost ATPDEA benefits. Amorim called removal of
    ATPDEA benefits "a mistake." Garcia said that there no
    longer appeared to be grave problems in Bolivia, but stressed
    that it was important for the USG to build a positive agenda
    with Bolivia.

    ¶10. (C) Garcia said that the USG "embargo" (sic) on
    Brazilian sales of Super Tucano aircraft in the region was
    "very negative" and raised serious questions in Brazil
    regarding defense cooperation with the United States. If the

    BRASILIA 00001113 003.2 OF 004

    United States is going to place limits on what Brazil can do,
    then partnership "is no good" for Brazil. Tauscher and
    Carter explained to Garcia, as well as to Amorim and
    Rousseff, that the Administration recognized the need to
    overhaul the procedure for protecting technology. Tauscher
    stressed that there is no embargo and that, going forward,
    such decisions will be made on a case-by-case basis taking
    into account the impact they might have on Brazil.

    ¶11. (C) Jobim stressed the importance of regional stability
    for Brazil, but cautioned that Brazil resists being labeled
    the regional leader because they do not see it as helpful in
    resolving problems. Brazil's concessions to Paraguay on the
    Itaipu dam were an example of Brazil putting stability
    interests over commercial interests, an approach that many in
    Brazil criticized.

    ¶12. (C) Discussing Cuba, Garcia and his deputy, Amb. Marcel
    Biato, laid out their view that Raul Castro is more pragmatic
    and less ideological than Fidel, with a focus on getting
    short-term economic results. They see Cuba as taking a path
    similar to that of Vietnam under Raul, whom they acknowledged
    was a transitional leader. Given that the United States has
    a relationship with Vietnam, Garcia said, there is no reason
    the United States can't have a similar relationship with
    Cuba. In their view, Brazilian support for Cuba and efforts
    to "create a new niche" for Cuba in the hemisphere open
    additional space that Raul needs to engage the United States.
    They noted that their plans to help Cuba construct a
    deep-water port at Mariel only make sense on the assumption
    that Cuba and the United States will eventually develop a
    trading relationship.

    - - - Middle East, Iran, Non-Proliferation - - -

    ¶13. (C) FM Amorim and MRE Under Secretary for the Political
    Affairs II Roberto Jaguaribe told Gen. Jones that they had
    heard from the Palestinians how pleased they were with his
    appointment and listened keenly to his assessment of the
    situation following his trip to the region the previous week.
    Jaguaribe said it is the GOB's view that the
    Israel-Palestine conflict is the key to resolving most
    questions in the Middle East. He stressed that Brazil was
    pleased with the Annapolis process, but acknowledged that
    neither Israel nor the Arabs seemed to want it to continue.
    Referring to his trip to the Middle East in 2008, Amorim
    highlighted the importance of engaging Syria in the process.

    ¶14. (C) Amorim praised the "excellent" opening to Iran made
    by President Obama--"If they don't respond," he asked, "then
    what do they want?" Amorim described the Brazil-Iran
    relationship as "not deep, but pragmatic" and dominated by
    commercial concerns. He said the nature of the relationship
    should not be "overvalued"--"we are not buddies"--but that
    there is a channel between them, and Brazil was willing to
    help if it can, although "not just to pressure" Iran.
    Petrobras CEO Gabrielli told Gen. Jones that Petrobras is
    terminating exploratory activity in Iran, although a small
    office will be left open. Amorim and other officials
    expressed concern that there might be an effort to prevent
    Iran from pursuing enrichment even for peaceful purposes, and
    Amorim said, in particular, that the "zero-for-zero" approach
    "did not sound right." Gen. Jones told both Garcia and
    Amorim that we would be pleased to share our views on Iran as
    the process moves forward.

    ¶15. (C) All GOB interlocutors stressed the importance of the
    President's initiative on disarmament, which Amorim
    characterized as "the best argument for non-proliferation."
    U/S Tauscher noted the importance of Brazil in the 2010
    review conference on the NPT and asked for Brazil's
    assistance in making it productive. (Note: See also ref A
    on State/NSC discussions with GOB officials on
    non-proliferation. End note.)

    - - - Prospects for Defense Partnership - - -

    ¶16. (C) Jobim highlighted the fact that Brazil's new
    National Defense Strategy was crafted to ensure the defense
    sector would be an "enabler of development." Brazil is no
    longer an "off the shelf" buyer of defense equipment.
    Rather, it wants to be a partner in joint ventures with
    countries that want to sell equipment. Jobim said that, as a

    BRASILIA 00001113 004.2 OF 004

    lawyer and judge, he is inclined to look at precedents when
    considering the possibilities for technology transfer. The
    U.S. precedents "are not very encouraging." Tauscher and
    Carter acknowledged the complexity and history attached to
    the relationship, suggesting we focus on the way forward: a
    relationship of full partnership that allows both parties to
    prosper. (See ref C for additional reporting on their
    meetings.)

    - - - A Dissenting View - - -

    ¶17. (C) Former Brazilian ambassador to London and Paris and
    communications minister Sergio Amaral and former agricultural
    minister Roberto Rodrigues criticized GOB foreign policy for
    being too ideological. Arguing that foreign policy had
    become politicized under Lula to compensate for his orthodox
    economic policies, Amaral described it as too lenient with
    South American neighbors, favoring leftist governments in the
    region rather than remaining in a position to resolve
    disputes, and focused too heavily on South-South relations
    and too little on relations with the United States.
    Rodrigues criticized Brazil's rejection of the Free Trade
    Area of the Americas (FTAA), saying it had hurt the Brazilian
    economy.

    - - - Trade and Finance - - -

    ¶18. (SBU) Noting the excellent relations President Lula had
    with President Bush, Garcia stressed the "enormous
    expectations" that Brazil has for President Obama, adding
    that he saw "extraordinary possibilities" for the United
    States coming out of the current economic crisis.

    ¶19. (C) Amorim commented that countries had gone a long way
    toward concluding the Doha trade round, but criticized the
    current U.S. position, saying it seemed to be identical to
    that of the last Administration. Gen. Jones stressed that
    the United States wants to see a "balanced and ambitious"
    Doha agreement, and U/S Tauscher noted the difficulty the
    President faced in recasting the trade agenda to the American
    people in the midst of a recession. Amorim said he believed
    the last Administration had "lost sight of the big picture,"
    and encouraged greater political-level involvement from the
    USG, saying that "trade negotiations cannot be left to the
    trade negotiators."

    ¶20. (SBU) Brazilian Central Bank Governor Henrique Meirelles
    told Gen. Jones he anticipated the September G20 meeting
    would focus on regulation of the global financial system, and
    confirmed that although Brazil had not yet made its USD 10
    billion disbursement to the IMF, "it will happen." Regarding
    the global financial crisis, Meirelles credited Brazil's
    relatively strong position in part to strong domestic demand.
    He also pointed to the fiscal austerity law, passed
    following the financial crisis of the 1990s, which brought
    down domestic debt and allowed Brazil to become a net foreign
    exchange creditor. He indicated that the bigger surprise was
    that Brazil had been affected as much as it was; a fact he
    attributed to Brazilian reliance on foreign commercial credit
    for financing. This problem however, had been mitigated by
    the low level of credit in Brazilian society, previously as
    low as 22 percent of GDP, now at 43 percent, compared to over
    200 percent in the United States.

    ¶21. (C) In response to a question from Ambassador Sobel
    regarding the increasing discussion around countries
    abandoning the dollar in favor of local currencies in
    bilateral trade transactions, Meirelles commented that "it is
    happening and is operationally positive." Meirelles noted
    that, due to the large number of goods traded internationally
    that are priced in dollars, the volume of goods traded in
    local currency is never going to be too high.
    KUBISKE

`