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### Viewing cable 07CAIRO1417, PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION IN EGYPT

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
07CAIRO1417 | 2007-05-14 14:02 | 2010-12-13 21:09 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Cairo

`

    VZCZCXYZ0000
    RR RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHEGA #1417 1341423
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH ZUI RUEWMCF7023 1341432
    R 141423Z MAY 07
    FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC0000
    INFO ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
    ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L CAIRO 001417

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    NSC FOR WATERS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/13/2017
    TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM EG
    SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION IN EGYPT

    REF: A. CAIRO 671
    ¶B. CAIRO 974
    ¶C. 2006 CAIRO 2010

    CLASSIFIED BY: AMBASSADOR FRANCIS J. RICCIARDONE,
    FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).

    ¶1. (C) SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION: PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION IS
    THE ELEPHANT IN THE ROOM OF EGYPTIAN POLITICS. DESPITE
    INCESSANT WHISPERED DISCUSSIONS, NO ONE IN EGYPT HAS ANY
    CERTAINTY ABOUT WHO WILL SUCCEED MUBARAK, OR HOW THE
    SUCCESSION WILL HAPPEN. MUBARAK HIMSELF SEEMS TO BE TRUSTING
    TO GOD AND THE INERTIA OF THE MILITARY AND CIVILIAN SECURITY
    SERVICES TO ENSURE AN ORDERLY TRANSITION. IN THE CURRENT
    POLITICAL FRAMEWORK, THE MOST LIKELY CONTENDERS ARE
    PRESIDENTIAL SON GAMAL MUBARAK (WHOSE PROFILE IS
    EVER-INCREASING AT THE RULING NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY),
    EGIS CHIEF OMAR SOLIMAN, DARK HORSE ARAB LEAGUE SECRETARY
    GENERAL AMRE MOUSSA, OR AN AS-YET UNKNOWN MILITARY OFFICER.
    WHOEVER ENDS UP AS EGYPT'S NEXT PRESIDENT LIKELY WILL BE
    POLITICALLY WEAKER THAN MUBARAK. ONCE MUBARAK'S SUCCESSOR
    HAS ASSUMED THE POST, HIS FIRST PRIORITY WILL BE TO BUILD
    POPULAR SUPPORT. WE THUS EXPECT THAT THE NEW PRESIDENT WILL
    LIKELY ADOPT AN ANTI-AMERICAN TONE IN HIS INITIAL PUBLIC
    RHETORIC, IN AN EFFORT TO PROVE HIS NATIONALIST BONA FIDES TO
    THE EGYPTIAN STREET, AND MAY POSSIBLY EXTEND AN OLIVE BRANCH
    TO THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD, AS DID PREVIOUS EGYPTIAN
    PRESIDENTS AT THE BEGINNING OF THEIR TERMS. END SUMMARY.

    ------------------------------
    LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR SUCCESSION
    ------------------------------

    ¶2. (C) PRESIDENT MUBARAK IS FOND OF OBSERVING THAT NO ONE
    SHOULD HAVE ANY QUALMS REGARDING HIS SUCCESSION, SINCE
    EGYPT'S CONSTITUTION PROVIDES A DETAILED GUIDE FOR HOW A
    SUCCESSION SHOULD PROCEED. AMONG THE RECENT CONSTITUTIONAL
    AMENDMENTS WAS A NOTABLE CHANGE TO THE ARTICLE DETERMINING
    WHICH OFFICIAL ASSUMES POWER IN THE EVENT OF THE TEMPORARY
    INCAPACITATION OF THE PRESIDENT. ARTICLE 82, WHICH
    PREVIOUSLY DELINEATED THAT THE VICE-PRESIDENT SHOULD ASSUME
    PRESIDENTIAL POWERS "IF ON ACCOUNT OF ANY TEMPORARY OBSTACLE
    THE PRESIDENT IS UNABLE TO CARRY OUT HIS DUTIES," HAS BEEN
    AMENDED SO THAT, IF THERE IS NO VICE-PRESIDENT, THE PRIME
    MINISTER IS ASSIGNED PRESIDENTIAL POWERS. ARTICLE 84 READS,
    "IN CASE OF THE VACANCY OF THE PRESIDENTIAL OFFICE OR THE
    PERMANENT DISABILITY OF THE PRESIDENT," THE PRESIDENT OF THE
    PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY (PA) OR THE PRESIDENT OF THE SUPREME
    CONSTITUTIONAL COURT SHOULD TEMPORARILY ASSUME THE
    PRESIDENCY. NEITHER WOULD SUBSEQUENTLY BE ALLOWED TO
    NOMINATE HIMSELF FOR THE PRESIDENCY; THERE IS NO SUCH
    STIPULATION AGAINST THE PM RUNNING FOR THE OFFICE. ARTICLE
    84 GOES ON TO STIPULATE THAT, "THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC
    SHALL BE CHOSEN WITHIN A MAXIMUM PERIOD OF 60 DAYS FROM THE
    DAY OF THE VACANCY OF THE PRESIDENCY."

    ¶3. (C) CONSTITUTIONAL ARTICLE 76, WHICH PREVIOUSLY WIRED THE
    EGYPTIAN ELECTORAL FRAMEWORK TO GUARANTEE THE PRESIDENCY TO
    THE RULING NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY (NDP), WAS ALSO AMONG
    THE ARTICLES AMENDED IN APRIL (REF A). THE CHANGE WILL
    OSTENSIBLY FACILITATE MORE COMPETITIVE PRESIDENTIAL
    ELECTIONS, WHILE STILL PROTECTING AGAINST ANY SERIOUS
    CHALLENGE TO THE NDP CANDIDATE. UNDER THE REVISIONS TO
    ARTICLE 76, FOR AN INTERIM 10-YEAR PERIOD (I.E. UNTIL 2017),
    LEGAL POLITICAL PARTIES WHICH HOLD AN ELECTED SEAT IN THE
    PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY OR SHURA COUNCIL CAN NOMINATE A
    PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE (CURRENTLY, ONLY FOUR PARTIES MEET
    THIS REQUIREMENT - THE NDP, AL GHAD, AL WAFD, AND TAGGAMU).
    FOLLOWING THE INTERIM PERIOD, IN ORDER TO RUN A PRESIDENTIAL
    CANDIDATE:

    -- A PARTY HAS TO HAVE BEEN IN EXISTENCE FOR AT LEAST 5 YEARS
    PRIOR TO THE ELECTION;

    -- ITS CANDIDATE MUST HAVE BEEN A MEMBER OF THE HIGHEST
    LEADERSHIP BODY OF THE PARTY FOR AT LEAST 1 YEAR; AND,

    -- THE PARTY WOULD HAVE TO HOLD AT LEAST 3% OF THE SEATS IN
    BOTH PARLIAMENTARY HOUSES (I.E., 14 SEATS IN THE PEOPLE'S
    ASSEMBLY, AND 6 SEATS IN THE SHURA COUNCIL), OR 6% OF THE
    SEATS
    IN EITHER THE PA OR SHURA COUNCIL).

    ¶4. (C) GENUINELY INDEPENDENT CANDIDATES FACE AN ALMOST
    IMPOSSIBLE BAR TO ENTER THE RACE. TO COMPETE IN THE NEXT
    PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION, ARTICLE 76 STATES THAT AN
    "INDEPENDENT" MUST OBTAIN ENDORSEMENTS FROM 250 ELECTED
    MEMBERS OF EGYPT'S NATIONAL AND LOCAL REPRESENTATIVE BODIES,
    OF WHICH THERE MUST BE A MINIMUM OF 65 ENDORSEMENTS FROM
    MEMBERS OF THE PEOPLES ASSEMBLY, 25 FROM THE SHURA COUNCIL,
    AND 10 FROM LOCAL COUNCILS IN AT LEAST 14 GOVERNORATES. THIS
    WOULD BE A NEAR UNATTAINABLE FEAT FOR A NON-NDP CANDIDATE TO
    ACHIEVE, GIVEN THE RULING PARTY'S DOMINATION OF ALL EGYPTIAN
    ELECTED BODIES. IN EFFECT, THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 76
    ACCOMPLISH TWO OBJECTIVES REGARDING INDEPENDENTS: THE RULING
    PARTY CAN BLOCK THE EMERGENCE OF ANY GENUINELY "INDEPENDENT"
    CANDIDATE, WHILE IT COULD THEORETICALLY REACH BEYOND THE
    NDP'S TOP LEADERSHIP TO SELECT AN "INDEPENDENT" WHOM THE
    RULING ELITE JUDGES WILL BEST PROTECT THEIR INTERESTS,
    PROVIDED THE NDP RETAINS PARTY DISCIPLINE.

    --------------------
    POTENTIAL CANDIDATES
    --------------------

    ¶5. (C) PRESIDENT MUBARAK, WHO BEGAN HIS FIFTH 6-YEAR TERM IN
    SEPTEMBER 2005, RECENTLY TURNED 79. THE NEXT PRESIDENTIAL
    ELECTION IS DUE TO BE HELD IN 2011. BY THE TIME MUBARAK
    SERVES HIS FULL TERM, THERE MAY BE OTHER CANDIDATES IN THE
    WINGS, OR MUBARAK HIMSELF COULD CHOOSE TO RUN AGAIN FOR THE
    PRESIDENCY. HE IS ON RECORD AS SAYING, IN A NOVEMBER 2006
    SPEECH, THAT HE PLANNED TO REMAIN PRESIDENT "AS LONG AS I
    HAVE A HEART THAT BEATS, AND BREATH IN MY BODY." BUT IF THE
    SUCCESSION HAPPENED TOMORROW, EGYPTIAN PARLOR SPECULATION
    FOCUSES ON THE FOLLOWING AS POSSIBLE SUCCESSORS.

    GAMAL MUBARAK
    -------------

    ¶6. (C) CAIRENE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM HOLDS THAT GAMAL WANTS THE
    JOB, DESPITE HIS REPEATED DENIALS TO THE CONTRARY (REF B).
    THE MOST RECENT SUCH ABJURATION WAS ON MAY 2, DURING AN
    INTERVIEW WITH THE ORBIT SATELLITE TV CHANNEL, WHEN GAMAL
    STATED THAT, "I DO NOT HAVE THE INTENTION AND AMBITION TO RUN
    FOR PRESIDENT ... WHATEVER THE PARTY SAYS DOES NOT MATTER. I
    AM NOT LOOKING FOR ANY EXECUTIVE POST." SUCH COY DEMURRALS
    RING HOLLOW IN THE FACE OF HIS INCREASINGLY ROBUST ROLE
    WITHIN THE NDP (FAR EXCEEDING THAT OF HIS COUNTERPARTS IN THE
    PARTY HIERARCHY), HIS APPARENTLY CENTRAL ROLE IN CREATING NEW
    LEGISLATION, AND HIS RECENT TOURS TO VARIOUS GOVERNORATES
    FEATURING MINISTERIAL ENTOURAGES. IT IS HARD TO ARGUE THAT
    GAMAL IS NOT BEING GROOMED FOR THE PRESIDENCY.

    ¶7. (C) MANY IN THE EGYPTIAN ELITE SEE HIS SUCCESSION AS
    POSITIVE, AS HIS LIKELY CONTINUATION OF THE CURRENT STATUS
    QUO WOULD SERVE THEIR BUSINESS AND POLITICAL INTERESTS.
    GIVEN THE LEGAL REQUIREMENTS FOR CANDIDACY, AND WEAK
    OPPOSITION LEADERSHIP, THERE ARE CURRENTLY FEW OTHER EGYPTIAN
    PERSONALITIES WITH THE NATIONAL STATURE AND POLITICAL CAPITAL
    TO SERIOUSLY CONTEND FOR THE PRESIDENCY. LIKEWISE, DUE TO
    THE PARANOIA OF THE EGYPTIAN DICTATORSHIP, NO OTHER NAME CAN
    SAFELY OR RESPECTFULLY BE BRUITED AS A CONTENDER. WHILE THE
    PRESIDENT'S SON IS VULNERABLE TO OPEN CRITICISM FOR HIS
    PRESUMED AMBITION, HE IS THE ONLY PERSON IN EGYPT WHOSE TOTAL
    LOYALTY TO MUBARAK IS ALSO TAKEN FOR GRANTED, SO HIS IS THE
    ONLY NAME THAT CAN POSSIBLY BE BANDIED ABOUT.

    ¶8. (C) A KEY STUMBLING BLOCK FOR A GAMAL CANDIDACY COULD BE
    THE MILITARY. EACH OF EGYPT'S FOUR PRESIDENTS SINCE 1952
    AROSE FROM THE OFFICER CORPS, AND THE MILITARY HAS
    HISTORICALLY BEEN THE ULTIMATE GUARANTOR OF THE PRESIDENT'S
    RULE. GAMAL DID NOT SERVE AS A MILITARY OFFICER, AND WE
    BELIEVE HE DID NOT COMPLETE HIS COMPULSORY SERVICE. MANY
    OBSERVERS OPINE THAT TIMING IS THE CRUCIAL FACTOR FOR A
    POTENTIAL GAMAL PRESIDENCY - HIS POWER BASE IS HIS FATHER,
    AND SO WHILE HE COULD CONCEIVABLY BE INSTALLED PRIOR TO
    MUBARAK'S DEATH, THE TASK WOULD BECOME FAR MORE DIFFICULT,
    ALTHOUGH NOT INSURMOUNTABLE, ONCE THE PHARAOH HAS DEPARTED
    THE SCENE, AND PERSONAL LOYALTIES TO HIM ARE IN THE PAST.
    ALTHOUGH THERE IS WIDESPREAD POPULAR ANIMUS AGAINST A GAMAL
    CANDIDACY, WITH MANY EGYPTIANS OPINING PROUDLY THAT, "WE ARE
    NOT SYRIA OR SAUDI!", THE NDP MACHINERY COULD LIKELY STAGE AN
    ELECTORAL VICTORY, BASED ON POOR VOTER TURNOUT, SLOPPY VOTER
    LISTS, AND STATE CONTROL OF THE ELECTION APPARATUS.

    OMAR SOLIMAN
    -------------

    ¶9. (C) EGYPTIAN INTELLIGENCE CHIEF AND MUBARAK CONSIGLIERE,
    IN PAST YEARS SOLIMAN WAS OFTEN CITED AS LIKELY TO BE NAMED
    TO THE LONG-VACANT VICE-PRESIDENTIAL POST. IN THE PAST TWO
    YEARS, SOLIMAN HAS STEPPED OUT OF THE SHADOWS, AND ALLOWED
    HIMSELF TO BE PHOTOGRAPHED, AND HIS MEETINGS WITH FOREIGN
    LEADERS REPORTED. MANY OF OUR CONTACTS BELIEVE THAT SOLIMAN,
    BECAUSE OF HIS MILITARY BACKGROUND, WOULD AT THE LEAST HAVE
    TO FIGURE IN ANY SUCCESSION SCENARIO FOR GAMAL, POSSIBLY AS A
    TRANSITIONAL FIGURE. SOLIMAN HIMSELF ADAMANTLY DENIES ANY
    PERSONAL AMBITIONS, BUT HIS INTEREST AND DEDICATION TO
    NATIONAL SERVICE IS OBVIOUS. HIS LOYALTY TO MUBARAK SEEMS
    ROCK-SOLID. AT AGE 71, HE COULD BE ATTRACTIVE TO THE RULING
    APPARATUS AND THE PUBLIC AT LARGE AS A RELIABLE FIGURE
    UNLIKELY TO HARBOR AMBITIONS FOR ANOTHER MULTI-DECADE
    PRESIDENCY. A KEY UNANSWERED QUESTION IS HOW HE WOULD
    RESPOND TO A GAMAL PRESIDENCY ONCE MUBARAK IS DEAD. AN
    ALLEGED PERSONAL FRIEND OF SOLIMAN TELLS US THAT SOLIMAN
    "DETESTS" THE IDEA OF GAMAL AS PRESIDENT, AND THAT HE ALSO
    WAS "DEEPLY PERSONALLY HURT" BY MUBARAK, WHO PROMISED TO NAME
    HIM VICE-PRESIDENT SEVERAL YEARS AGO, BUT THEN RENEGED.

    AMRE MOUSSA
    -----------

    ¶10. (C) THE CHARISMATIC ARAB LEAGUE SECRETARY GENERAL
    PRUDENTLY HAS NEVER INDICATED INTENTION OR AMBITION TO ENTER
    INTO EGYPTS DOMESTIC POLITICAL FRAY, AND HAS NO EGYPTIAN
    INSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL PLATFORM FROM WHICH TO SPRING.
    HOWEVER, AS THE HIGH-PROFILE ELDER STATESMAN OF ARAB CAUSES,
    HE ENJOYS CONSIDERABLE STREET CREDIBILITY, POPULARITY, AND
    PERCEIVED GRAVITAS. IT IS FAR-FETCHED BUT CONCEIVABLE THAT,
    IN A LEADERSHIP CRISIS FOLLOWING MUBARAK'S DEATH, MOUSSA
    COULD EMERGE AS A PRESIDENTIAL CONTENDER, PROVIDED THAT HE IS
    AN NDP MEMBER, OR IF THE NDP WERE TO PROMOTE HIM UNDER THE
    CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS ALLOWED FOR INDEPENDENT CANDIDATES.

    MILITARY OFFICER
    ----------------

    ¶11. (C) CURRENTLY, THERE IS NO OBVIOUS CONTENDER FROM AMONG
    THE OFFICER CORPS, EGYPT'S TRADITIONAL PRESIDENTIAL
    RECRUITMENT GROUNDS. MINISTER OF DEFENSE TANTAWI, A
    CONTEMPORARY OF MUBARAK'S, APPEARS TO HARBOR NO POLITICAL
    AMBITIONS. LIKE SOLIMAN, HE COULD PLAY A ROLE IN CLEARING
    THE WAY FOR GAMAL, IF HE CALCULATES THAT IS IN THE BEST
    INTERESTS OF THE COUNTRY; CONVERSELY, HE COULD ALSO BE A KEY
    PLAYER IN PREVENTING GAMALS ASCENDANCE. WE HAVE HEARD SOME
    LIMITED REPORTS OF TANTAWIS INCREASING FRUSTRATION AND
    DISENCHANTMENT WITH GAMAL (REF B). IN THE EVENT OF A NATIONAL
    LEADERSHIP CRISIS, IT IS NEAR INCONCEIVABLE THAT GIVEN
    MUBARAK'S PERSONAL MANIPULATION OF THE OFFICE CORPS, THAT
    ANOTHER MILITARY OFFICER COULD EMERGE FROM OBSCURITY TO
    ASSERT HIMSELF AS A CANDIDATE. BUT TANTAWI AND HIS SENIOR
    COTERIE ARE NOT NECESSARILY POPULAR AT MID AND LOWER RANKS,
    SO THE POSSIBILITY OF A MID-20TH CENTURY STYLE COUP OF
    COLONELS CANNOT BE ENTIRELY DISCOUNTED.

    OPPOSITION MEMBER
    -----------------

    ¶12. (C) OF THE 10 PRESIDENTIAL CONTENDERS IN 2005,
    SECOND-PLACE AL GHAD PARTY LEADER AYMAN NOUR IS CURRENTLY
    SERVING A SEVEN-YEAR JAIL TERM, AND ACCORDING TO EGYPTIAN
    LAW, WILL BE BANNED FROM PARTICIPATING IN EGYPTIAN POLITICAL
    LIFE FOR SEVERAL YEARS FOLLOWING HIS RELEASE. THE
    THIRD-PLACE FINISHER, AL WAFD PARTY CANDIDATE NO'MAN GOMAA,
    LOST HIS PARTY POSITION FOLLOWING A VIOLENT AND
    SCANDAL-RIDDEN LEADERSHIP STRUGGLE. THE OTHER EIGHT
    CANDIDATES, MARGINAL FIGURES TO BEGIN WITH, HAVE FADED BACK
    INTO TOTAL OBSCURITY. CURRENT AL WAFD LEADER MAHMOUD ABAZA
    IS A TALENTED POLITICIAN, BUT AT THIS POINT, DOES NOT APPEAR
    TO HAVE NATIONAL APPEAL OR ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY TO MOUNT A
    SERIOUS ATTEMPT AT THE PRESIDENCY.

    DARK HORSE AND ALSO RANS
    ------------------------

    ¶13. (C) POPULAR REFORMIST MINISTER OF TRADE RACHID IS A
    POTENTIAL CANDIDATE, THOUGH A DISTINCT DARK HORSE.
    NONETHELESS, HE COMES FROM AN OLD AND RESPECTED FAMILY AND IS
    SEEN BY MANY AS LARGELY RESPONSIBLE FOR EGYPT'S IMPRESSIVE
    ECONOMIC GROWTH OF THE PAST THREE YEARS. INTERESTINGLY, THE
    HEAD OF CAIRO'S LARGE AND INFLUENTIAL AMCHAM, WHO KNOWS
    RACHID WELL, TOLD US THAT, AFTER NEGOTIATING THE
    CONTROVERSIAL QIZ PROGRAM, THE MINISTER "REALLY NEEDS
    MOVEMENT ON THE FTA FOR POLITICAL COVER," RAISING THE
    QUESTION: POLITICAL COVER FOR WHAT? WHILE IT IS HIGHLY
    UNLIKELY RACHID WOULD TAKE ON GAMAL HEAD-TO-HEAD, WE CANNOT
    DISCOUNT THE POSSIBILITY THAT HE WILLPLAY A ROLE IN A
    CARETAKER GOVERNMENT, AND MAY EENTUALLY EMERGE AS A LEADER.

    ¶14. (C) SAFWAT ELSHERIF (NDP SECRETARY GENERAL AND SHURA
    COUNCIL PEAKER), MUFEED SHEHAB (NDP ASSISTANT SYG, AND
    MINISTER OF STATE FOR LEGAL AND PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS, AND
    ZAKARIA AZMY (NDP ASSISTANT SYG AND MUBARA'S DE FACTO CHIEF
    OF STAFF) ALL, AS SENIOR LEADES OF THE NDP, MEET THE
    CONSTITUTIONAL CRITERIA T RUN FOR OFFICE. NONE OF THESE
    GRIZZLED NDP VETERANS HAVE PUBLICLY EXPRESSED PRESIDENTIAL
    ASPIRATONS, NOR DO THEY APPEAR TO POSSESS ANY CAPABILITIE
    TO GOVERN, NOR PERSONAL CONSTITUENCIES. HOWEVE, WHILE
    UNLIKELY, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT, ONCE MUBAAK PERE IS OUT OF
    THE PICTURE, ONE OF THEM COULD EMERGE IN AN ANTI-GAMAL PARTY
    PUTSCH. FURTHERMORE. MOST ANALYSTS HERE BELIEVE THAT ANY
    GOVERNOR PUSHING FOR THE PRESIDENCY IS A FAR-FETCHED
    POSSIBILITY - THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF GOVERNORS ARE
    FORMER SENIOR MILITARY AND POLICE OFFICERS CHOSEN FOR THEIR
    LOYALTY, FAR FROM THE CRITICAL POLITICAL FRAY IN CAIRO, AND
    WITH NO POWER BASES.

    MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD
    ------------------

    ¶15. (C) WHILE THE SPECTER OF AN MB PRESIDENCY HAUNTS SECULAR
    EGYPTIANS, IT IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY IN THE IMMEDIATE
    POST-MUBARAK PERIOD. UNDER THE CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK, THE
    MB HAS NO ABILITY TO PUT FORWARD A PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE IN
    THE EVENT OF AN ELECTION. THE ORGANIZATION DOES NOT APPEAR
    TO HAVE THE ORGANIZED MILITARY WING NECESSARY SHOULD IT WISH
    TO ATTEMPT TO SEIZE THE PRESIDENCY BY FORCE. CONSTANT
    OVERSIGHT OF THE ARMED FORCES AIMED AT ROOTING OUT POTENTIAL
    ISLAMIST SYMPATHIZERS MEANS THAT FEW LIKELY REMAIN, ALTHOUGH
    THE POSSIBILITY DOES EXIST THAT SOME CLOSE-MOUTHED MB-LEANING
    OFFICERS ARE PRESENT. OVERALL, IN THE VIEW OF MOST EGYPTIAN
    ANALYSTS, THE GROUP'S APPROACH SEEMS TO BE ONE OF PATIENCE
    AND GRASS ROOTS BUILDING OF SUPPORT, WAITING FOR THE DAY WHEN
    IT MIGHT COME TO POWER THROUGH POPULAR ELECTION, OR BY
    POPULAR DEMAND AFTER A GAMAL PRESIDENCY HAS FOUNDERED.

    ------------------------
    POST-SUCCESSION DYNAMICS
    ------------------------

    ¶16. (C) WHOEVER EGYPT'S NEXT PRESIDENT IS, HE WILL INEVITABLY
    BE POLITICALLY WEAKER THAN MUBARAK, AND ONCE HE HAS ASSUMED
    THE POST, AMONG HIS FIRST PRIORITIES WILL BE TO CEMENT HIS
    POSITION AND BUILD POPULAR SUPPORT. WE CAN THUS ANTICIPATE
    THAT THE NEW PRESIDENT MAY SOUND AN INITIAL ANTI-AMERICAN
    TONE IN HIS PUBLIC RHETORIC, IN AN EFFORT TO PROVE HIS
    NATIONALIST BONA FIDES TO THE EGYPTIAN STREET, AND DISTANCE
    HIMSELF FROM MUBARAK'S POLICIES. IF HISTORY IS ANY GUIDE, WE
    CAN ALSO EXPECT THE NEW PRESIDENT TO EXTEND AN OLIVE BRANCH
    TO THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD, AS DID GAMAL ABDEL NASSER, ANWAR
    EL SADAT, AND MUBARAK EARLY IN ALL OF THEIR TERMS, IN AN
    EFFORT TO CO-OPT POTENTIAL OPPOSITION, AND BOOST POPULARITY.
    RICCIARDONE

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