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### Viewing cable 05PARIS7626, FORMER PM JOSPIN DEFLECTS SPECULATION ABOUT

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
05PARIS7626 | 2005-11-08 13:01 | 2011-02-10 08:08 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Paris
Appears in these articles: http://abonnes.lemonde.fr/documents-wikileaks/article/2011/02/09/wikileaks-les-visiteurs-de-l-ambassade_1477418_1446239.htm

`

    This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 007626

    SIPDIS

    DEPT ALSO FOR EUR/WE, DRL/IL, INR/EUC, EUR/ERA, EUR/PPD,
    AND EB
    DEPT OF COMMERCE FOR ITA
    DEPT OF LABOR FOR ILAB

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/07/2015
    TAGS: PGOV ELAB EU FR PINR SOCI ECON
    SUBJECT: FORMER PM JOSPIN DEFLECTS SPECULATION ABOUT
    CANDIDACY FOR PRESIDENCY; PROJECTS POSSIBLE SOCIALIST
    VICTORY IN 2007

    Classified By: Ambassador Craig Stapleton for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

    SUMMARY
    -------
    ¶1. (C) Over lunch with Ambassador Stapleton on November 2,
    former prime minister Lionel Jospin said that desire for
    change, along with widespread disappointment with the record
    of President Chirac and the center-right, "puts things in
    place" for a center-left victory in 2007. However, he also
    cautioned that disarray in both the center-left and
    center-right could lead to a 2007 presidential election "like
    the one in 2002" that would offer the people "no real choice"
    in the second round. He stressed that, for the institutional
    system of the Fifth Republic to work as intended, the
    Presidential election has to provide a mandate to govern,
    resulting from a choice between two credible second-round
    candidates. Pressed as to his own widely rumored return to
    politics to unify the contentiously divided PS, Jospin stuck
    to his script of insisting that he was retired and that, if
    he entered the nomination race at this time, he would only
    "add to the party's division problems." Jospin's energy and
    his evident relish in commenting on a range of domestic and
    international political issues belied both his age (68) and
    his self-deprecating dismissals of himself as "too old" and
    "a man of the past." END SUMMARY.

    "WE CAN WIN"
    ------------
    ¶2. (C) Jospin argued that the deep divisions that are
    clouding the future of France's Socialist Party (PS) result
    from both the May 2005 referendum (when the party's
    electorate largely did not follow their leadership's call to
    vote for the EU constitutional treaty) and the April 2002
    Presidential election (when the PS, led by Jospin, failed to
    make it to the second round). Jospin insisted that the
    center-left voters' 'no' vote May 29 "was not a vote against
    the constitution," but "a vote against the government." Had
    the 2002 Presidential election not deprived voters "of a real
    choice between left and right" in the second and decisive
    round, the Constitutional referendum might not have become
    such a lightening rod for frustration across the electorate,
    particularly on the left. Jospin stressed the importance,
    for the sound functioning of the institutions of the Fifth
    Republic, that a presidential contest in France end with a
    clear mandate for a program and a candidate. A "non-contest"
    like the 2002 second round run-off between incumbent
    president Chirac and right-wing extremist Jean-Marie Le Pen
    deprived the people of the opportunity to choose between the
    records and policy projects of the center-right and the
    center-left. "Chirac didn't even bother to take the election
    seriously," Jospin said, "because he knew he would win."

    ¶3. (C) "If we put forward a solid program" that speaks to
    French voters' concerns, then, Jospin said, "we can win" in
    ¶2007. COMMENT: By "we," Jospin meant "the governmental
    left" -- the social democratic center of the Socialist Party
    (PS) that has (1981 - 86, 1988 - 93, and 1997 - 2002)
    controlled a majority in the National Assembly and run the
    government. Like many in the center of the left, Jospin
    believes that President Chirac's dismal record, the
    relatively good record associated with Jospin's tenure as
    prime minister (1997 - 2002) and the natural tendency in
    democracies to alternate centrist parties in power puts
    victory in 2007 well within reach of a moderate, credible
    Socialist Party candidate. END COMMENT.

    ¶4. (C) Pressed as to who that PS candidate might be, Jospin
    resolutely struck to his script of insisting the party had
    first "to decide on a program" (at the upcoming party
    congress in mid-November), and then move on to "rallying
    behind whichever candidate emerges as the party
    standard-bearer." Jospin drew a (questionable) parallel with
    his own, "unexpected" emergence as leader of party and
    spokesperson for its platform. (Note: In 1991, after
    President Mitterand had hounded his prime minister -- and
    long-time rival for leadership of PS -- Michel Rocard out of
    office, Jospin, a Mitterrand protege, succeeded Rocard. End
    note.) Jospin said he envisioned the adoption of a party
    platform prompting the "natural emergence" of a spokesperson
    for it -- the PS's candidate for 2007.

    JOSPINS OWN AMBITIONS
    ---------------------
    ¶5. Jospin refused to comment on who he thought would
    eventually emerge as the Socialists' candidate for the
    Presidency in 2007, although he appeared to exclude Laurent
    Fabius. Prompted to comment on his own ambitious, he was
    consistent throughout the meeting -- as he has been in public
    -- in refusing to rule himself definitively either in or out
    of the race. On the one hand, he insisted on several
    occasions that it was time to pass the baton to the next
    generation and that he was not actively campaigning. On the
    other hand, his continued references to his recently
    published book and his insistence that the party needed to
    define its program before it chooses its standard-bearer
    suggested that he might still view himself as a potential
    unifier.

    U.S.-FRANCE RELATIONS -- AND IRAQ AND THE UN
    --------------------------------------------
    ¶6. (C) Jospin went to great lengths to affirm his admiration
    for the U.S. and his conviction that shared, core values
    unite the U.S. and France (and Europe) despite deep divisions
    over Iraq and the role of multilateral institutions. Jospin
    was skeptical that democratic self-government can be created
    in a society unadapted to it, while acknowledging that U.S.
    withdrawal from Iraq would only lead to chaos. Jospin also
    lamented what he called the U.S.'s "turning away" from its
    historical nurturing and legitimization of multilateral
    institutions, such as the UN. Notwithstanding these
    differences, Jospin insisted that part of being allies and
    friends was the freedom to disagree about important matters
    and say so. While he agreed with French policy on Iraq, he
    had strongly disapproved of President Chirac's decision to
    brandish publicly the threat of a French veto. Jospin also
    commented that multilateral agreements (for example, on
    Climate Change, Landmines, and an International Criminal
    Court) that may seem unworkable to the U.S. nevertheless have
    great "symbolic importance," and that the U.S. underestimates
    the damage done to its international standing in opposing
    them.

    IRAN
    ----
    ¶7. (C) Jospin said Iran's aggressive rhetoric contradicted
    its stated desire to play a more constructive role in the
    international community. Iran's ambitions as a regional
    power -- indeed, as a new rallying point for Islamic
    civilization -- Jospin implied, contradicted its claim to
    want nuclear energy purely for peaceful purposes. He
    nevertheless added that it "remained to be seen" what Iran's
    real intentions were, but then wondered whether recent
    statements by Iranian President Ahminejihad calling for
    Israel's destruction constituted a "turning point" beyond
    which there is no return.

    COMMENT
    -------
    ¶8. (C) Jospin's remarkable energy and voluble,
    forward-looking engagement across a range of issues belied
    both his age (68) and his self-deprecating insistence that he
    was retired and without specific plans for the future. While
    it is tempting to take his protestations at face value, there
    is also room for skepticism. Many experienced observers, in
    the press and in the political class, would argue that Jospin
    may well end in the right place at the right time as the
    presidential candidate judged most capable of leading the PS
    and uniting the center-left electorate in 2007. Jospin's
    just published book -- a crisp and comprehensive, if often
    commonplace, overview of the situation facing France and what
    to do about it -- lends credence to the view that, even if he
    is not actively plotting his return to power, he is carefully
    avoiding closing the door on a possible return. The success
    of such a strategy -- to win the PS nomination by not running
    for it -- depends on his concealing his goal until it's
    clearly inevitable. Whether or not it will become inevitable
    -- that the party concludes it has no other winner in 2007
    except him -- remains to be seen.

    Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
    http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
    Stapleton

`