Abstract

Federalism has commonly been identified with the theory of federal government. A different interpretation has been put forward by the "personalist" movement, promoting the Proudhonian vision of a federal society. This paper argues that the theory of federalism developed by Mario Albertini enables us to establish a more definite interpretation of federalism, as a "mature" political ideology, containing both interpretative criteria (theory of social-historical development, critique of national sovereignty, etc.) and guiding criteria (the aspect of value, choice of peace, federal government, federal society, etc.).

In Albertini's interpretation, an ideology has a "specific" or a "generic" relationship to historical reality. It has a specific relationship when it "corresponds to a turning point in history". It has a generic relationship when it has "won the battle for its existence" and corresponds to "a given and stable factor of the historical process". Federalism now has a specific relationship to reality, and will in turn develop a generic relationship.

According to Albertini, federalism is a form of political thinking and behaviour with both a "social basis" and an "historical reference". The social basis corresponds to the character of a federal society, i.e. the sense of community and cosmopolitanism. The historical reference is provided by the stage of evolution of economic and political interdependence. Earlier federations (e.g. the American) consolidated social groups very similar to national ones. The struggle for European federation marks a new stage in the historical process, that in which federalism must overcome national sovereignty itself. The process of European unification is therefore seen as the beginning of a world-wide transition from the national stage of historical development to the federalist one.

An examination of the history of federal ideas bears out Albertini's interpretation. It is possible to discern three stages in the historical development of federalism. During the first stage, Kant expressed the "value" aspect of federalism (peace), and Alexander Hamilton defined the aspect of "structure" (juridical and political theory), but the conditions were not ripe for the overcoming of national sovereignty. In Britain the Imperial Federation League and the Round Table developed the political and practical aspects of federalism, but failed to federate the Empire. In continental Europe the federal theorists developed the critique of nationalism, but were able only to give a utopian expression to the values of European civilisation.

The second stage, coinciding with the period between the two world wars, saw the development of federalism as a theoretical alternative to nationalism. The writings of British and continental theorists provided a comprehensive critique of national sovereignty and its dual consequences, international anarchy and the degeneration into totalitarianism of national political life. However the movement towards European union was cut short by the economic and political consequences of the Wall Street crash.

The resurgence of European militarism by the late 1930s marked the beginning of the third stage in the development of federalism, in which the application of federalism has become necessary to resolve the international crisis. In the United States and Britain, Clarence Streit's followers and the members of Federal Union produced a remarkable (although short-lived) federalist movement, whose literature influenced the members of the Resistance movements in Europe who in turn launched the European federalist movement. This movement has been based on a critique of nationalism, a recognition of interdependence and a demand for democratic control of decision-making, whose

logical end will be a world, not purely European, federation.

After the Second World War, European countries were forced to face the facts of their political and economic interdependence, and of the necessity of decision-making in a European context. The followers of Jean Monnet advocated an intergovernmental approach to this decision-making, working towards eventual federation by way of incremental functional cooperation. The followers of Altiero Spinelli advocated a constitutional approach, enabling European democracy to control decision-making by means of federal structures from the start. The adoption of the first approach has meant the growth of a "democratic deficit' in the institutions of the European Community.

Three stages in the process of European unification can be discerned. During the first stage, no common institutions were built, but great advances were made on the "psychological" level. The second stage was characterized by economic unification, largely in response to the economic recovery of Germany. The third stage, which we have now entered, is the political stage, resulting from the "democratic deficit", and finding expression in the struggle for democratic control of European decision-making, by means of new federal structures.

WHAT IS FEDERALISM?

Towards a General Theory of Federalism.

The Theory, The History and its Application to European Unification[1]

In the field of political science, federalism has not yet achieved definite status. Yet it is true that the federal idea has developed since the Enlightenment an autonomous conceptual nucleus which includes an interpretative criterion of social-historical knowledge and a guiding criterion for political action.[1]

The concept of federalism is still quite vague in the common domain and it is used to refer to two quite different political ideas: federal government (i.e. the working mechanism which establish a `federation') and the Proudhonian vision of a federal society (i.e. a global vision of society founded on federalist values).

I. What is Federalism?

Federalism is commonly identified with the theory of federal government. According to this interpretation, put forward particularly by the Anglo-Saxon school, federalism is a specific form of government, a constitutional model, with an historically determined juridical structure. There is therefore an American federalism, a Swiss federalism, a German federalism, an Australian federalism and so on. The definition of federal government by Wheare is - according to this interpretation - the most accurate: "In a federal system, the functions of government are divided in such a way that the relationship between the legislature which has authority over the whole territory and those legislatures which have authority over parts of the territory is not the relationship

of superior to subordinates ... but it is the relationship of co-ordinate partners in the governmental process".[2]

A different interpretation of federalism has been put forward by the `personalist' movement, which stresses the relevance of a `federalist' way of thinking and acting. `Personalist' or `integral' federalists, such as Robert Aron, Arnaud Dandieu, Alexandre Marc, Emmanuel Mounier, Daniel Rops, Denis de Rougemont, and Henry Brugmans, have developed "a global conception of society with a metahistoric character, starting from the thought of Proudhon".[3]

A forceful criticism of the reduction of federalism to the theory of federal government has been expressed by the `Italian school', which regards federalism as a mature ideology, with a definite view of the historical process, of society, and of political struggle. According to Mario Albertini - the founder of this school of thought - this reduction prevents an adequate knowledge of federal government itself. Knowledge of the working of the mechanism of a state is not enough to know its character, which is related to the character of the society in which that mechanism can operate successfully. An adequate knowledge of federal government depends on knowledge of the social behaviour which constitutes the character of a federal society, i.e. the federalist way of thinking and acting: "The theory of federal government describes an organisation, not the human environment in which it can come into life and maintain itself. It identifies the political structure of a form of behaviour, not its social basis and historical reference".[4]

In order to overcome that reduction and offer a comprehensive definition of federalism, Albertini produced a general theory of ideologies, which considers ideologies for their relation to the historical process, and to the values and the mechanism of their

realisation. Albertini also criticised the personalist approach, which prioritises reform of the whole of society along federalistic lines, arguing that the main object of the federalist movement should be to unite all the different political and social forces to create fundamental federal institutions. The call for a reform of society would inevitably divide them and should be a matter for political debate after the creation of the federation.

According to Albertini an ideology has a *specific* or a *generic* relation with the socio-historical reality. It has a specific relation when it "corresponds to a turning point in history". This manifests itself at a point of historical transition. It is "the eternal pattern of all things new" that their transition from a state of non-existence to existence must always mean a displacement of something old to make way for something new. "In these moments", continues Albertini, "history presents - beside its incessant evolutive complexity - a point of extreme simplicity, that in which the new or the old stay, and an absolute `no' should be pronounced. This has happened with liberalism towards absolutism, democracy towards the political privilege of class (limited suffrage), socialism towards the economic privilege of class (the bourgeois monopoly of economic power), and it seems that it is also happening to federalism towards the national monopoly of political and economic power, which avails itself of the brute force of armies to preserve the hierarchy of nations".

An ideology has a "generic relation" with history when it "has already won the battle for its existence and no longer corresponds to a turning point of history, but to a given and stable factor of the historical process". It is true that liberalism and socialism have yet to evolve towards those new forms which will achieve the values which mark them, i.e. freedom and social justice, but it is a matter of fact that the propulsive shove of the liberal and socialist revolutions has been exhausted in the process of developing the

necessary institutions to realise their values. The case examples of socialism and liberalism demonstrate that the time of greatest cultural and political achievements comes before that of the complete realization of the values which mark them.[5]

The great stages of a revolution, according to Albertini, always had two meanings: a practical one, immediate and ascertainable in the new institutions and in new political and social behaviours, and a historical one, ascertainable in culture only, if we understand culture to mean what deeply motivates the formation of human thinking. Using the intellectual categories of historical materialism, Albertini observed: "During the first stages of the industrial revolution the growth of the interdependence of human action develops mainly in depth within the nation-states. With the liberal and democratic struggle of bourgeoisie against aristocracy and the socialist struggle of proletariat against the bourgeoisie itself, this trend first intensified and then overcame the class division which had always existed in evolved societies. However, this trend towards class integration has also strengthened the division of mankind into separate groups, i.e. the bureaucratic states, which are idealised, in the ideological representation, as consanguinity ... as nations". The growth of the interdependence of human affairs will disrupt this division of mankind into nation-states.[6]

Analysing the relation of federalism to socio-historical reality, Albertini observes that the central problem of our time is no longer a question of achieving a higher degree of freedom, democracy or social justice, but how to organise peaceful and constitutional relations among nations. If one accepts, therefore, the view that the historical novelty of our time is the economic and political integration of mankind, then it is plausible to argue that this novelty is reflected in federalism. In fact, federalism is the only possible international democratic bond which can create a reign of law among nations. Federalism enlarges the sphere of democratic government from the ambit of the state to

that of a group of states.

According to the Italian `school', federalism is seen not simply as a mechanism which operates within society, but as a form of political thinking and behaviour with a *social basis* and an *historical reference*. The social basis identifies the character of the society in which federalism operates, which is the sense of community and cosmopolitanism. The historical reference is given by a certain stage of evolution of the forces of production which coincides with the age of industrial interdependence.

In order to define the character of the federal society, Albertini makes a fundamental distinction between federalist behaviour within and outside a federal state. The first is characterised by a bipolarity, i.e. the division of the loyalty of the citizens between the union and the states. All the citizens are united in a single and vast society on the one hand, and on the other they are divided into smaller societies, distinct among themselves and with clear-cut boundaries within the boundaries of the comprehensive society. A federal society is, according to Albertini, a "community with autonomous social differences on a territorial basis" or "with social groups on territorial basis, strong enough to support independent governments and to rise above all kinds of social differences, but not enough to produce separate societies, simply because they are formed of citizens loyal at the same time also to a larger society". The human tendency to belong to different social circles does not produce such a bipolarity either in the unitarian states or in the imperial societies created on a feudal basis. Federalism can therefore work successfully in a society "too unitarian for a simple system of balance of power among sovereign states and too differentiated ... for the close and compact formula of the unitarian state".[7]

Federalist behaviour outside a federal state has manifested itself, before the Second

World War, only in isolated exponents of European culture, in the form of opposition to the dogmatism into which the traditional ideologies fell as a consequence of their compromise with the nation-state. It was only during and after the Second World War that federalism organised itself as a popular movement, giving birth to a new form of political behaviour. The struggle for the European federation marked, according to federalists, the beginning of a new historical stage, clearly distinct from any other. Previous federations have consolidated social groups very similar to national ones. "As a new form of the modern state", notes Albertini, "federalism is an American product. But the United States of America had not to overcome historically constituted nations in order to constitute itself". In Europe, on the contrary, the overcoming of historically constituted nations means, if the process leads to an organic union, "the overcoming of a stage of historical evolution", and constitutes a historical stage clearly distinct from any other and with an "exclusively federalist character". The creation of the European federation therefore marks the beginning of the transition from the national stage of historical development to the federalist one. The process of European unification is therefore seen by federalists as the beginning of a world-wide process which will overcome the division of mankind into sovereign states.[8]

Albertini reached a comprehensive definition of federalism by identifying within federalism an aspect of value (the choice of peace), one of structure (the federal government), and a social-historical one (a stage of the historical process in which the division of mankind into antagonistic classes has already been overcome and the division of mankind into antagonistic nations is going to be overcome). Peace, federal government and federal society constitute therefore the three fundamental elements for a definition of federalism.

In order to formulate this theoretical reasoning comprehensively it is necessary to test it

by the touchstone of experience.

II. Federalism in the history of political thought

The study of the development of the federal idea analyses the formation of ideas and behaviours which emancipated federalism from being, to use a Kantian expression, a simple `idea of reason', to becoming the content of an historical process: the overcoming of the nation-state, i.e. the modern political formula which institutionalises the political division of mankind. To write the history of federalism therefore means to trace the thin line which goes from the cosmopolitan element of the French and American Revolutions to the process of European unification happening now.

According to Albertini, the history of European federalism is simply the history of the revelation of the contradiction between the success of liberalism, democracy and socialism at the national level and its negation at the international one. This contradiction was to generate in European culture a federalist trend of thought, which since Saint-Simon in 1814 tried to explain, and to offer a concrete solution to, the problem of the international failure of liberalism, democracy and socialism. Liberalism, democracy and socialism, which have progressively filled with democratic and social content the nation-state, had a federalist element from their origin, even if, according to Albertini, quite "uncertain for the theoretical confusion between federalism and its opposite, internationalism, which assigns to the leaders, instead of the people, the solution of international problems". This confusion, justified by the lack of material and political conditions for the realisation of European federation until the Second World War, implied the risk of yielding to nationalism, in which the nation-state came first and liberty, democracy and socialism second. If it is true that the ideals of the French Revolution found in the nation-state a political form which was indispensable for their

realisation, it is also true that they found in the nation-state the limit to their success at the international level. National sovereignty, which had been a necessary instrument of liberty and social progress, if treated as an end in itself, destroyed the liberties it created.[9]

Albertini identifies three stages in the development of the federal idea, which correspond with three cycles of European history: during the first, from the French Revolution to the First World War, federalism was used to give an expression - even if only a utopian expression - to the values of European civilisation denied by nationalism. During the second, from the First to the Second World War, federalism offered a criterion to understand the European crisis. The third, which is actually taking place, is characterised by the fact that the application of federalism is necessary to resolve the European crisis.

If federalism found its first conceptually articulate expression in Kant, who expressed better than anybody else the aspect of value of federalism, peace, it was only in the American Constitution and its application to the unification of that sub-continent that federalism was able to show a new character and potential. It was Alexander Hamilton in particular, in his *Federalist Papers*, who raised the American Constitution - a political compromise between the parties at the Philadelphia Convention - into an institutional model, thus defining the aspect of structure of federalism. From then on, federalism entered the field of juridical and political thought.[10]

The Philadelphia Convention created "the model of the political mechanism" of federal government. "Hamilton described with great clarity and insight", notes Albertini, "the character and the consequences of the enlargement of the orbit of representative government from the area of a single state to that of many states. From his writings it

emerges also that within the federal system it is possible to attribute to the juridical power the capacity to subordinate all the powers to the constitutional law, as well as possible on the other hand, to confer on the executive - through the merging in a single person of the offices of head of state and head of Government - the necessary strength to govern well without running the risks of tyranny and caesarism".[11]

During the nineteenth century, however, federalism did not show - according to Albertini - all its character and potential, because it had only been realised in "dead corners" of the main stream of history "where exceptional historical circumstances have kept men sheltered from the most grave consequences of conflicts among classes and nations". The federations of the nineteenth century were "socially premature" since the social conditions within states and the divisions among consolidated nation-states prevented the growth of a sense of community and cosmopolitanism, which constitute the fundamental elements of federalist behaviour.

During the last century, federalism did not have a unitary, comprehensive and positive theory, because the condition for the formation of a theory of this kind was the existence of independent federalist behaviour, and this had not yet developed: "Experience only revealed some uncertain and subordinate federalist data of other kinds, and there were only two possibilities: either to interpret these data without thinking of fixing a criterion for relating federalism to the values, the institutions, the historical process and the human condition, and attributing to it, in the cultural domain also, the subordinate role which it had in society; or overcoming the experience and trying to grasp its global sense and to end in utopianism, the detachment of thought from reality".[12]

The first trend manifested itself within the British Empire and the United States, offering a contribution to the development of the Hamiltonian theory of federal government. The

writings of Edward Freeman, James Bryce, Montague Bernard, J.S. Mill, Lord Acton, Henry Sidgwick, James Lorimer, John R. Seeley, W.T. Stead, Charles Donald Farquharson, and Brooke Foss Westcott helped to bring the problem of federalism, war, and peace to the forefront of the debate on the future of the Empire and of Europe, but that literature was still anchored in that part of the British tradition of political thought which emphasised `moral' over `scientific' study of international relations.[13]

An exception was Seeley, who in *The Expansion of England* pointed out the tendency of industrialisation to unify human society in larger and larger areas, and forecast that within half a century Russia and the United States would have overtaken England in economic and military power, just as the great nations of the sixteenth century had overtaken Florence. As a leading figure in the Imperial Federation League, Seeley supported the transformation of the British Empire into a federation. In so doing he gave his historical analysis a practical application, thus bridging the gap between theory and political experience which was typical of nineteenth century federalism. Moreover, in relating his conception of international relations to the doctrine of *raison d'état*, Seeley linked the continental and the British historic traditions.[14]

Seeley's grand design found expression in the Imperial Federation League, which was active between 1884 and 1893, creating the journal *Imperial Federation* and the Imperial Institute, a centre for research on the economic and social development of the Empire's populations. The League gained momentum in April 1892 when a `federal plan' for the empire was put before Gladstone. But the rejection of federalism by the British Government virtually put an end to the action of the League.

The League's campaign was continued by Milner's `Kindergarten', whose members, after playing their part in the unification of South Africa, founded in 1910 the Round

Table movement in Britain and the self-governing Dominions. The movement's principal aim - according to leading figures such as Lionel Curtis, Lord Lothian, Leo Amery, Robert Brand, Frederick Oliver and William Marris - was to promote a new organisation of the Empire on a federal basis. In defining the demarcation line between the powers to be exercised by the body representing peoples in their capacity as citizens of the Empire and those exercised by the bodies representing them in their national capacities, the Round Table proposed an Imperial Government for foreign policy and defence, responsible to an Imperial Parliament, directly elected by the peoples of Britain and her Dominions. Matters of national competence would be handled by the respective national parliaments.[15]

When it was apparent, after the Great War, that the project of federalism within the Commonwealth was not immediately practicable, the Round Table played a decisive role in the creation of the Royal Institute of International Affairs (better known as Chatham House) in London and the Council of Foreign Relations in New York, promoting the political integration of the English-speaking peoples.[16]

The second federalist trend developed in continental Europe, where federalism took on the character of a utopia, but nevertheless made a fundamental contribution to the understanding of nationalism and the centralisation of power. Proudhon pointed out "the negative aspect of the history of last century, showing that nationalism was the consequence of the artificial character of modern nation-states and that centralisation was reducing the supreme guarantee of freedom, i.e. the separation of powers, to an empty juridical form". Having understood the character of the nation-state, Proudhon, Cattaneo and Frantz were able to foresee the development of nationalism in Italy and Germany and "the tragic fate of Europe as a system of sovereign nations". Federalism was thus regarded as the theoretical alternative to the centralisation of authority, which

found in nationalist ideology an indispensable means of persuasion for consolidating the nation-state. Federalism's concrete achievements were, however, modest, because the ideas of Proudhon, Cattaneo and Frantz were too divergent from the culture and interests on which nineteenth century national realities were based.[17]

During the second stage of the development of the federal idea, which coincides with the interval between the two wars, the concept of federalism made it possible to discern more clearly the cause of international anarchy and the degeneration into totalitarianism of national political life. Inter-war federalists were able to offer a non-contradictory interpretation of the structural aspects of the European crisis, that is the contradiction between the growth of the forces of production and their inter-exchange beyond the geographical borders of European states and the closer and closer identification between state and nation. The historical process which had led to the Balkanisation of Europe, with the concession of independent government to the nationalist claims on the continent, collided with the universalisation of production, consumption and exchange realised by the industrial mode of production.

In the British federalist literature of this period Lothian pointed to the cause and the consequences of international anarchy; Curtis to a comprehensive federalist conception of the origin, the development and the end of history; Lionel Robbins to the limits of an international liberal economic order within a system of sovereign states; and Barbara Wootton to the international failure of socialism.[18]

The main contribution of this literature to the development of the federal idea was to produce a critique of national sovereignty as the fundamental cause of international anarchy. National sovereignty carried with it, according to Lothian, Curtis and Robbins, certain inescapable consequences:

a) Between sovereign states there is no middle course between agreement by negotiation and violence. For where agreement fails the only instrument by which the sovereign state can defend its existence or promote its rights is by resort to force. This is equally true whether the nations endeavour to exist in isolation, or to act together in alliances or in universal contractual obligations towards one another, such as the UN. Sovereignty implies that the only instrument which nations, in the last resort, can use to bring pressure on other sovereign nations is the violence of power politics or war.

b) Every state is inevitably driven to sacrifice the rights and independence of its own citizens in order to increase its own strength in the struggle for existence.

c) Sovereignty leads inevitably to economic nationalism, whereby each state tries to be self-supporting, disregards the economic interests of other nations, and erects higher and higher barriers against international trade, migration and the movement of capital. These artificial obstacles progressively dislocate both the national and the world economy, by over-developing the industrial production of every national area so that there is no balance between the production of foodstuffs, raw materials and manufactures either in those national areas or in the world as a whole. This is equally true whether nations operate a capitalist or a socialist economy: national sovereignty makes it impossible for either of them to work properly. It is sovereignty, and not capitalism or socialism, which has been the basic cause of poverty, unemployment and war.

d) In all world crises co-operation between nations is made more difficult by the fact that, being sovereign, every state looks at every proposal for collective action primarily from the point of view of its own interests. It will only assume the risks involved in any system of collective security when its own interests are clearly involved and a majority of its people are convinced that such commitments are the best road to their own security. Under conditions of anarchy there is therefore a constant temptation for powerful armed states to impose their will on their neighbours. Indeed imperialism,

either in a relatively benevolent or in a ruthless form, is an inevitable consequence of sovereignty, because where a world government is out of reach it may be the only way in which anarchy and the risk of war can be ended.

Inter-war experience showed, according to Lothian, Curtis and Robbins, that there is no remedy for international anarchy in any form of international contract for co-operation. International co-operation or alliances may succeed in uniting sovereign nations for a time in dealing with a common emergency threatening them all. But the anarchy implicit in sovereignty inexorably forces them apart and into competition again as the pressure of the crisis disappears, for the reason that sovereignty implies the predominance in the counsels of every national government of selfish national interests. The fatal weakness of all systems of co-operation like the United Nations or even the European Community is that they are leagues of governments, whereas the essential unit in a true democracy is not the government but the citizen. Leagues of governments are necessarily concerned with making the world safe for national sovereignty and not for either democracy or the people.

During the inter-war period, however, only a handful of European writers or politicians understood that the supranational course of history was wide open, and that the formula of the nation-state was about to be called into question. Federalist literature of this period "is not", according to Albertini, "the fruit of a federalism which recognises itself, but of the activity of some great liberal leaders and a few isolated socialists who supported federalism simply to try to understand the significance of their time and to present an alternative to a political world which doubted - with still lasting consequences - the very ideas of human dignity, of civilisation and of progress".[19]

Moreover, the voice of inter-war federalists was weak, and they were divided. In fact,

there is no evidence of any correspondence between the British federalists and their continental counterparts, such as Count Coudenhove-Kalergi, Luigi Einaudi, Giovanni Agnelli, Andrea Cabiati, Maurice Renoult, Bertrand de Jouvenel, Roger Manuel, Herman Kranold, and Sobei Mogi. Each of these did his best to make sense, through federalism, of current events, which traditional ideologies, such as liberalism, socialism and democracy, failed to comprehend, but they were unable to put forward a practical plan to fill the gap between theory and political experience.[20]

The only exception was Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, who in 1923 founded in Vienna the Pan-Europa movement, which favoured political union of the European continent on a federal basis. Despite the support of Edouard Herriot, who, in a speech to the French National Assembly on 29 June 1925, launched the idea of a European union, Aristide Briand, author of the famous plan for European union, and Gustav Stresemann, the movement was short-lived and unable to raise significant popular support for the federal solution. Being elitist in the same way as contemporary federalist literature, it was intrinsically weak. On the other hand, it is true that the period of time favourable to political and economic integration in Europe was not long enough to bring about its eventual fruition. International anarchy forced the various governments to seek national solutions to their own financial and economic difficulties which had begun with the Wall Street crash. Thus, political and economic nationalism swept away not only the hopes of federalists, but also the common ideals of liberty and progress.[21]

At the end of the 1930s, European militarism, as represented by Germany for the second time in a quarter of a century, might have realised, even if for a short time, the objective which the democracies had failed to achieve: the political and economic union of the old continent - not by agreement, however, but with Satan's sword, to use Luigi Einaudi's famous expression. It was the public acclaim of *Union Now*, a book by the

American journalist Clarence Streit, published in the spring of 1939, that encouraged federalists to organise themselves into a popular movement, to stand up to the challenge of militarism on the continent.

The democracies, Streit suggested, had to construct a barrier. However, this barrier should not be constructed as a mere defensive alliance, but as a new form: a political union on a federal basis. It was Streit's purpose to give life to democracy on a supra-national level, thus overcoming the contradictions which had reduced it to an empty form. Democracy could have achieved, by revolution, the objective that militarism attempted to attain through war. The result would have been very different: a federation founded on public approval could have opposed an empire held together by German militarism.

Streit's proposals for the fifteen democracies included common citizenship, a defence force, a tariff-free market, a currency, and a postal system. He observed that one could not find a more congenial group than these fifteen democracies. No two of them had been at war with each other for more than a century. Each bought most of its goods from, and sold the majority of its products to, the others; they owned almost half the countries of the world and ruled all its oceans; they governed half the world's population and handled two-thirds of its trade.[22]

A few months before the publication of *Union Now*, three young and unknown men, Charles Kimber, Derek Rawnsley and Patrick Ransome, had started in London the nucleus of a federalist movement, Federal Union. In the space of few months this became - thanks to the success of *Union Now* and the preparatory work by Lothian, Curtis and Robbins - a movement with 225 branches all around the country with a membership of over 15,000. The contribution of Federal Union to the development of

federalism in Britain and Europe was to express and organise the beginning of a new political behaviour: the aim of the political struggle was no longer the conquest of national power but the building of a supranational institution, a federation (not a league) of nations. The third stage of the development of the federal idea had begun. With Federal Union, European federation was no longer an `idea of reason', but the first step of an historical process: the overcoming of the nation-state.[23]

In the year leading up to and the early part of the Second World War a substantial and powerful literature was produced by a number of distinguished representatives of liberal and socialist thought, such as Lord Lothian, Lionel Robbins, William Beveridge, Lionel Curtis, Lord Lugard, Henry Wickham Steed, Arnold Toynbee, James Meade, Kenneth Wheare, Norman Bentwich, J.B. Priestley, William Curry, Ivor Jennings, Henry Noel Brailsford, Cyril Joad, Konni Zilliacus, Barbara Wootton, Ronald Gordon Mackay, and Olaf Stapledon.[24]

Between the Winter and Spring of 1940, not only intellectuals, but also some of the most prominent politicians - such as Chamberlain, Halifax, Churchill, Eden, Attlee, Bevin, Sinclair, and Amery - and members of the Anglican Church - the Archbishops of York and Durham - openly supported the federalist project. The major national daily and weekly newspapers - *Times, Daily Telegraph, Manchester Guardian, News Chronicle, Daily Express, Daily Herald, Daily Worker, Observer, Sunday Times* - gave wide coverage to a lively debate on federalism. The Foreign Office seriously studied, from March 1940, an "Act of Perpetual Association between the United Kingdom and France", setting up an *ad hoc* inter-ministerial committee chaired by Hankey. Finally, in the afternoon of 16 June, a few hours before the French Government accepted capitulation, Churchill made the famous offer of "indissoluble union": "we had before us", commented Sir John Colville, private secretary to Churchill, "the bridge to a

new world, the first elements of European or even world federation".[25]

The fact that the British proposal came too late to succeed, and that in France public opinion was not ready to accept it, shows that the material conditions needed to create a European federation on the basis of an Anglo-French nucleus were then lacking. The resistance to the bitter end, which mobilised in Britain all available forces, together with the turning of Great Britain towards the United States, marked a rapid decline of organised federalism in Britain.

The renaissance of the federal idea on the continent from 1943, however, owed much to British federalism. The most influential and dynamic starting-point of federalist resistance was the island of Ventotene, off the coast of Naples, where Altiero Spinelli and Ernesto Rossi were confined as anti-fascist militants. At the beginning of 1939, Luigi Einaudi (later to become President of the Italian Republic), who was then Professor of Economics at the University of Turin and one of the very few liberal intellectuals to whom the fascists accorded a certain freedom of speech, sent Rossi some books by British federalists, which he had received from Federal Union. Spinelli explained why these writings influenced him: "Since I was seeking clarity and precision of thought, my attention was not attracted by the nebulous, contorted and hardly coherent ideological federalism of the Proudhonian or Mazzinian type, which throve in France and Italy, but by the polished, precise and antidoctrinaire thought of the English federalists ... who proposed to transplant to Europe the great American political experience".[26]

The literature produced by Federal Union was, therefore, seminal to the drafting of the *Manifesto di Ventotene*, a basic text for the formulation of a federalist strategy for the political struggle. The birth in 1943 in Milan of the Movimento Federalista Europeo

continued, not without producing a clearer strategy, the political battle of Federal Union. The pioneering role of Spinelli within the European Parliament in the drafting of the Union Treaty, and Albertini's achievements in elaborating a general theory of federalism, principally through the journal *The Federalist*, represent the full maturation of the new political behaviour started by Federal Union.[27]

The federalist project born with the Resistance was based on two simple assumptions of fact. First, the advent of the world market, the process of production, exchange and consumption, increasingly unites mankind, particularly in Europe. Secondly, this new world which was shaping itself in an economic and social sphere beyond the nation-states could be politically organised with the method of democratic political participation only if the historical vision of federalism and the mechanism of federal government were added to the ideas and methods of liberalism, democracy and socialism.

The only remedy for the evils of national sovereignty was seen by members of the Resistance as a federal union of the peoples, in which every nation was completely self-governing in its own internal affairs, yet all people were united into a single federal union for their common affairs. The principal common affairs were identified as foreign policy; defence; economic, monetary and fiscal policy; communication and migration; and the environment.

The establishment of a single world constitution could not be accomplished in a single step. European federalists saw that those nations who already presented sufficient unity of spirit, civilisation and institutions should constitute the nucleus of world government. To force incompatibilities into a union would have risked substituting civil for international war. The federal nucleus had to consist of nations which accepted the

principle that government must be conducted with the consent of the governed, and based their political life upon the generally recognised rights and responsibilities of the individual. This did not mean that such a federation of free and responsible peoples would have been opposed to any other nation or group of nations. It would have been willing to participate in any universal system of co-operation like the UN, especially if it was equipped with machinery not for the coercion of other states but for equalising the economic opportunity and standard of living among nations. However, such common government had to be based upon the acceptance of certain common principles, and thus free institutions were the only possible basis for the new federal community.

The battle for the unification of Europe had, however, according to the federalist members of the Resistance, a special meaning for the unification of the world as a whole, because Europe was then at a crossroads between the old system of sovereign states and a new one, characterised by democracy at an international level. The history of Europe was seen as just an aspect of the history of the world. Europe was the first region of the world in which barriers between nation-states collapsed. Fascism and nazism were considered the ultimate attempts to prolong the autonomy of the nation-states, by restraining economic and political activities within the borders of the state. The Second World War destroyed the might of European states, releasing in Western Europe the supranational trend, which along with American protection made possible the post-war creation of a single integrated continental market, and with it the formulation of a common foreign policy and European defence.[28]

The European federal state would, in practice, have denied the division of Europe into sovereign states and would have denied, in theory, the nation as identified with the state, i.e. the culture of the division of mankind. Federalism entailed a culture which negated the political division of mankind and affirmed the right not to kill. European federalists

only fought for a European and not a world federation because their sense of political responsibility did not allow them to "escape from reality". Even if since 1945 federalists played a fundamental role in the construction of Europe, they were aware that their place, in a European federal state, would be as the opposition. Albertini explains the paradox of this participation in the construction of a state which they knew they would oppose as the paradox of any progress along the road of revolution: "The revolution is world-wide and universal. For this reason, any progress on this road loses, for those who undertake its responsibility, its meaning if one does not accept the fate of remaining in opposition after having performed one's task. This has always happened, either in a positive way, where the revolutionary leaders detach themselves from power, or in a negative way, where those responsible for the revolutionary transformation reject the historical perspective and seize political power".[29]

III. Federalism and European Unification

At the end of the Second World War, European countries, faced with the problems of economic recovery and how to re-order their defence, had no alternative but to accept American protection. Protected by this shield, they organised their economy and defence in the only suitable context: the European one. In fact, the Americans realised the situation even before the Europeans, who had reluctantly accepted American protection. It was only after the failure of the French attempt to re-establish the Franco-Russian alliance as an anti-German measure that Europeans understood the need for the most important decisions concerning defence, currency and economic control to be made in a European context.

This realisation had three important consequences. The first was that the final seat of power for member states of the European Community was shifted from a national to a

European context. The second was that, because of this, it became necessary to have a European policy (conceived and managed in the European context, in co-operation with other countries) alongside national policy (conceived and managed in the national context). The third is that such a European policy created a power vacuum - only partly covered by American leadership - which had to be filled. The history of European unification is the history of attempts to fill this vacuum.

There were only two possible ways to fill this power vacuum: either by starting with a European government of a federal nature, or by moving towards this federal goal with a step-by-step convergence of the national policies of the different countries. The first solution (which Altiero Spinelli fought for, supported to some extent by the Italian government) puts federation at the beginning, conceiving it as the goal of a constitutional struggle. The second solution (followed by Jean Monnet, and in fact adopted by European governments) placed federal power at the end of a gradual process, which could be conducted by an intergovernmental mechanism mobilising the national forces interested in European solutions.

The advantage of Monnet's strategy is that it can involve the active forces of the nations without asking for a constitutional reform. The disadvantage of the strategy is that it cannot be carried out in a democratic manner because it entails European decisions which are no longer controlled by national parliaments and not yet controlled by the European Parliament. Hence the `democratic deficit' of the Community.

The advantages of Spinelli's strategy are derived from the fact that, with federal power as the starting point, it would be up to European democracy to determine the ways and means, structures and deadlines, for European unification. The disadvantage consists in the extreme difficulty of setting up a constituent assembly at the beginning of the

process, with the parties still closely tied to the national powers.

Spinelli's criticism of Monnet's strategy (even though the two actually worked closely together during and after the establisment of the first European Community, the ECSC) was that federation cannot be the result of a gradual process because the power indispensable for the existence of a federal government cannot be transferred by degrees from the nations to Europe: either it is transferred or it is not. Spinelli acknowledged that Monnet's strategy was effective in keeping European unity on the agenda, bringing the process of integration to the threshold of the single market, but he also remarked upon its ineffectiveness in transferring sovereign powers from national to supranational institutions.[30]

According to Albertini, the character of the process of European unification is that 1) it feeds off the institutions of the member-states - the institutions which divide Europe into nation-states, 2) during the transitional phase it produces some provisional and *sui generis* institutions such as those of the European Communities, and 3) it will replace both national and Community institutions with a new one, a federal government. It is "a process which consumes its own institutions".[31]

Albertini produced a typology of the process of European unification, identifying a unity factor, a division factor and a development law.

The unity factor is rooted in the character of European civilisation and its national contradictions, which, with the Second World War, brought to an end the European system of states and brought about the creation of a world one. The process of European integration is therefore seen as a by-product of the bipolar order and a consequence of the fact that, since the Second World War, European states have no

longer been able to face alone the two fundamental duties of every state: economic development and defence. For as long as European states were able to face economic and defence matters alone, they constantly attempted to increase their own power and to diminish that of others, thereby engaging themselves in the European sruggle for hegemony and the balance of power. After the Second World War, for the first time since the establishment of the nation-state, they were faced by the alternative "of impotence in division or strength in unity". "By now", Albertini observes, "willing or unwilling, their own *raison d'être*, the elementary need to survive, forced them, without any possible escape, to solve the problems together which, whilst they cannot be eluded, also cannot be solved separately by each state. This is the unitarian trap". Therefore, rather than each country following a separate national way, they decided, very much against their own `natural instincts', to march together.[32]

The division factor is caused by the absolute sovereignty of the states. This attempts to ignore the unitarian factor of their existence and tends to manage the internal political life "as normal", i.e. within the limits of the absolute sovereignty of the state. As long as political life runs within the limits of the national institutions it divides Europe. However, when political life is no longer "normal" and overcomes the limits of national institutions it requires new supranational institutions which will unify Europe. This inability of national political institutions to build new institutions able to organise a supranational political life denotes the historical anachronism known as the absolute sovereignty of the state. Since national institutions cannot overcome division, they perpetuate it. They base their strength on the inertia of the state. It is the needs of daily life which preserve the powers of the state and constitute its consensual basis.

This, then, is the contradiction between the irresistible push towards unity - driven by the problems which only the unitarian approach can solve - and the inertia of national

institutions, which deal with the administration of the "normality". Therefore, not surprisingly, the progress towards European unification has been a democratic fudge, in which the decisions taken by national governments - representing the institutional division of Europe - have been placed within a European framework which promotes a unitarian solution to common problems, and has created a supranational institution, the European Community.[33]

The transfer of problems from a national level to a European level also transfers them from a framework in which they can be solved democratically, to another in which they cannot be solved democratically, due to the lack of democratic institutions within the constitutional framework of the Community. This is the `democratic deficit' of the European process: "where there is democracy there are fewer and fewer important decisions to take, but where they should be taken there is not yet democracy". With the ever-quickening progress towards integration, national governments are faced by a call of increasingly strong unitarian cohesion urging for a single government. The day of crisis for national governments will be the day when the federalist vanguard achieves a sufficient degree of maturity to provoke the decision which governments cannot reach alone, that of founding the European government. The decision to establish a European federation must be made by the national governments, together, the same day, by conferring upon a European institution the mandate to draft a Constitution. Therefore, the law governing the development of this process is that existing national institutions, created to defend national sovereignty, entrust new institutions having no democratic legitimacy (the European Communities) with administering the process of pooling the competences of national governments into a European framework. It is the contradiction between the national organisation of political power and the need for a unitarian solution for common problems which marks the law of development of the process of European unification, and which is leading towards the establishment of a federal government.[34]

Albertini also indicated the different aspects and protagonists of the process itself: 1) organised Europeanism, which is constituted by members of Europeanist and federalist movements who have become aware of the limits of national political life and have realised that they must fight in order to give birth to a European political life; 2) organisable Europeanism, which is formed by those forces which, although engaged in the national political life, "are not willing to accept its degenerative process and are looking for an alternative"; and 3) widespread Europeanism, which is rooted in the cultural bond which characterises European civilisation and which seeks to strengthen - beside a loyalty for the nation-state - the confused desire to belong to a larger community which overcomes the boundaries of the nation-state. It is this which constitutes the "embryo of a new supranational loyalty which, coming alongside with the old national loyalties and eliminating their exclusivity, will give rise to a splitting of citizenship, and which is the social basis of federalism". Widespread Europeanism constitutes the popular strength to be employed in the struggle for Europe. The organised and organisable Europeanism constitutes the political class of this struggle, the leadership of the widespread Europeanism.[35]

Albertini identifies three stages in the process of European unification. Each has been determined by crucial problems which has forced European states to take unitarian measures, which on each occasion has advanced the process as a whole.

The first is the "psychological stage", characterised by the post-war agressiveness of the USSR, which was successfully countered through the American leadership of European economic co-operation and Atlantic political and military unity. During this stage of development Europeanism became politically subordinate to atlanticism, which produced - through the Truman doctrine, NATO, OEEC, and EUP - the consolidation

of the Atlantic bloc and the liberalisation of exchanges in Western Europe. At this stage, the idea of European unity represented among the political class and public opinion the "real psychological basis of western and European policy", and it found an expression in the Council of Europe, without powers, as well as the European Movement, which was without political autonomy. Without a policy of European unity, the United States would not have succeeded in containing the Soviet menace and promoting the economic and political reconstruction of Western Europe. "Without this mobilisation of the European spirit", Albertini observes, "there would only be a passive subordination to an external pressure, almost to real orders coming from outside. It would not have developed a policy in the real sense of the word, and the indispensable energies necessary to realise it would not have taken shape".[36]

The American policy of European unity was accepted by many Europeans not only because of necessity, but also because it allowed the hope of a possible rebirth of Europe and the regaining of its independence and autonomy, i.e. the restoration of the conditions which would have allowed Europeans to refind their freedom and the possibility to decide their destiny, rather than to see it decided from outside. Europe could think of the future: "If it was just a question of yielding to an American policy with only the French, German, Italian perspective, then we would have found ourselves in the psychological position of mere satellites, of men who have lost freedom and cannot regain it again. However, because of the European perspective it was possible to accept these policies as a necessary sacrifice in order to regain our own dignity as citizens. Therefore, even though there was neither a foreign policy nor an economic policy decided by Europeans during the first stage of integration, there existed a great European hope. Men became progressively aware that in order to save everything that was valid in the past of France, Germany, and Italy it would be necessary to work for the unity of Europe".[37]

The crucial problem which produced the second phase, the economic one, was the German question. The problem was the size, situation and character of Germany. The German people (1) are nearly twice - including East Germany - as numerous as the next largest nation in Western Europe, (2) occupy a central geographical position, which had enabled Germany in the past to insulate the small nations lying to the East of her from France and Great Britain (3) are potentially the dominant economic power in Europe and (4) are apt, as repeated experience has shown, to fall into the hands of despotic and aggressive rulers.

What has happened since the end of the Second World War shows that a defeated and dismembered Germany has played a constructive role in the world of nations because of American control over German defence and because of the European Community, which guaranteed the growth of the German economy in harmony with the economies of the other member-states, and which created a psychological atmosphere of European detente. The issue was to prevent German nationalism from looking eastward and thereby attracting into its orbit Central and Eastern European countries. Thus, Germany would again have become the master of an unorganised cluster of separate sovereign independent states.

There was only one possible way to prevent Germany from ever making herself dominant in Europe - since the attempt to disorganise Germany failed - which was to render such a German domination impossible by creating a supranational authority to control the growth of the German economy. This was the only way of reconciling the necessity to do justice to Germany, by allowing her to keep her national unity, with the necessity to do justice to Europe, by making her secure against the danger of falling under German domination. In order to reconcile these two demands of justice it was

necessary to place an undismembered Germany into the structure of a politically united Europe.

In the early 'fifties, with the social and economic life of Western Europe back to normality, and the Soviet menace remaining serious, the problem of the status of Germany - her relations with other European countries in the context of an integrated post-war economy - became urgent. The Americans and British were willing to restore her national sovereignty by giving her back her army and returning her control of economic and financial life. The French, however, opposed this, and suggested a European solution, since the unity factor provided the only possibility of escaping from this contradiction. France could not control Germany, but accepted that European control could produce the guarantee that Germany should submit to it. It was therefore suggested to build a supranational control of Germany's army and of German heavy industry: hence the ECSC and EDC. The ECSC succeeded because it did not involve the creation of a federal state. However, the EDC failed because it was not possible to build a European army without a European government and to maintain the national states without a national army. The ECSC was an example of an "institutional means to take decisions at an international level without disposing of political power in sectors which normally demand a real government". This formula, invented by Jean Monnet, constituted the basis on which the process of Western European economic integration grew. The failure of EDC showed, however, the difficulties of trying to form a federal government on the basis of the `functional' principle.[38]

The success of the European Communities in promoting the economic integration of Europe had the effect of producing authoritarian tendencies within national governments, due to the transfer of competences from the national level, on which citizens have a direct control, to the Community one, on which citizens do not. To offset

this trend, which is intrinsic to `functionalism', it was therefore necessary to put in motion a process, with the direct elections to the European Parliament, of allowing citizens to exercise a direct control on European affairs.

The third stage is the political one, which coincided with the direct elections to the European Parliament. Its inevitable goal, as Spinelli argued, is the calling of a Constituent Assemby to draft a European Constitution, which would set out the political structure for a European federal state. The growing influence of the European Parliament in shaping Community policy is a consequence of its first attempt, in 1984, with the Draft Treaty, to become the `federator' of the Community. Today it is inconceivable that the European consitutional process could function without the European Parliament at its core. The battle for the conferral of a constituent mandate to the European Parliament has become the strategic objective of those political and social forces which are at the forefront of European and world-wide democratic revolution.[39]

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1. The author who has developed a general theory of federalism as ideology is Mario Albertini (*Il Federalismo. Antologia e definizione*, Bologna, 1979; idem, *Lo stato nazionale*, Milano, 1960; idem, *L'integrazione europea e altri saggi*, Pavia, 1965; idem, *Proudhon*, Florence, 1974), founder of the journal *The Federalist*.

2. Kenneth Wheare, "What Federal Government is", *Studies in Federal Planning*, Patrick Ransome ed., London, 1990, pp.23-24.

3. The philosophy of `personalism' was developed by the founders of the journals *L'Ordre Nouveau* and *Esprit*. For a presentation of the personalist doctrine, see Ferdinand Kinsky (*Fédéralisme et personalisme*, Paris, 1976), Alexandre Marc (*De la méthodologie et la dialectique*, Paris, 1970), Henry Brugmans (*L'idée européenne*, Bruges, 1965; idem, *La Pensée politique du fédéralisme*, Leiden, 1969) and Bernard Voyenne (*Le Fédéralisme de Pierre Joseph Proudhon*, Paris, 1970). For a critique of the personalist approach see Albertini, *Il Federalismo,* op. cit., p.10.

4. *Ibidem*, pp.12, 62. A federalist behaviour can reveal itself only within "multi-state areas which have reached the material and ideal conditions for political freedom and a certain degree of unity" and cannot express itself completely without the "disappearance or the attenuation of the class struggle and military power". "The class struggle extinguishes", according to Albertini, "the solidarity between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie of the social groups on a territorial basis, and it subordinates these groups to the general division of the entire society into antagonistic social classes. On the other hand the military power promotes the centralisation of power by the central government, breaks the political balance between the centre and the periphery, and therefore prevents the bipolarity of the

social dominion". Otherwise one pole - the one constituted by the comprehensive society - tends to develop itself too much, and the other - the one constituted by the social group on a territorial basis - too little. "Until the historical framework shows the attenuation only of the class struggle and of the military power or of their consequences, federalism cannot realise itself except in privileged sections of the world population and in an unstable and imperfect form". Federalism can in fact realise all its potential only "at a stage of development of material production, and of the consequent human interdependence, in which the division of society into classes has been already overcome, and in which it is possible to overcome the division of humanity into nation-states" (*Ibidem*, pp.65-7).

5. Albertini, *Il Federalismo* op. cit., pp.255-6. Albertini defines ideology as the form in which the thought deals with the future. Without thinking of the future it is not possible, according to Albertini, to understand and to exercise, in the present, rational choices, deep committments, and a conscious exercise of responsibility.

6. *Ibidem*, pp.75-6; Albertini, *Il Federalismo* op. cit., p. 254. The practical product of the French Revolution was, according to Albertini, a modest one: the Jacobin-Napoleonic centralised and bureaucratic state. But the French Revolution also asserted in the culture of mankind the democratic principle: "despite its imperfect realisation, despite all the defeats of democracy, this principle firmly rooted itself in the heart of man and has never been removed. Fascism, which openly denied it, has been swept away. The socialist states with single party rule, which deny it in practice, cannot deny it in theory and in ceremonies of political life". Regarding the Soviet Revolution Albertini noted in 1973 that: "the gap between the revolutionary aspirations and the Soviet state is so wide that it is by now obvious that it has not realised communism but a rigid state capitalism". After the Soviet Revolution, however, "the private property of the social means of production is no longer

legitimate. The real social property of the means of production is still far away, as is, on the other side, a real democracy. But as absolutism has died, I think for ever, in the hearts of men, so also has the principle giving legitimacy to the private ownership of the social means of production" (Albertini, Petrilli and Chiti-Batelli, *Storia del federalismo* op. cit., pp.77-8).

7.   Albertini, *Il Federalismo* op. cit., pp.64, 65.

8.   *Ibidem*, pp.113, 114; Albertini, Chiti-Batelli and Petrilli, *Storia del federalismo* op. cit., p.69.

9.   The advent of the nation-state disrupted the old European system of absolutist states with limited sovereignty, governed by European dynasties, bringing a closer and closer identification between the state and the nation and producing an unlimited national sovereignty, causing international anarchy and the crisis of the system as a whole. While British sea-power was paramount it was able to localise wars and prevent world war. This exercise of world-authority by one sovereign state was tolerated for nearly a century. World control exercised, however temperately, by one sovereign state could not in fact last. The internal combustion engine alone as applied in flying and submarine warfare was enough to destroy its foundations. On the one hand it was the success of the national principle in Italy and Germany, coinciding with the definitive overcoming of the international politics of sovereign *illuminati*, which put in motion the drift to the First World War. On the other hand it was the universalisation of the national principle, based on the doctrine of self-determination, generated by the First World War, which led to the Second World War. See Mario Albertini, Andrea Chiti-Batelli and Giusepe Petrilli, *Storia del federalismo europeo*, Torino, 1973, pp.64-6. For other conceptions of federalist theory see Preston King, *Federalism and Federation*, London, 1982; idem, "Ideology as politics", *The Political Quarterly*, Vol. XLVIII, No. 1, pp.78-83; W. H. Bennett, *American*

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11.   Albertini, *Il federalismo* op. cit., p.60.

12.   *Ibidem*, pp.115-6.

13.   *Ibidem*, pp.113-4. For a discussion of the British federalist tradition during the nineteenth century see John Pinder, "The Federal Idea and the British Liberal Tradition", pp.99-118 of this volume.

14.   John Seeley, *The Expansion of England*, Cambridge, 1883.

15.   At the end of the Boer War, the British Government entrusted Lord Milner, as High Commissioner for South Africa, with the task of rebuilding the administration, policy and economy of the four colonies: Natal, Orange River, Cape and Transvaal. Aware of the necessity to promote the political union of the four colonies, he formed a political-cultural coterie, which was called Lord Milner's `Kindergarten'. The political project of a federal union of the four colonies was upheld by *The State*, a periodical of which Philip Kerr was editor. See Walter Nimocks, *Milner's Young Men*, London, 1970; B. Williams, *The Selborne Memorandum*, Oxford, 1925; John Kendle, *The Round Table Movement and Imperial Union*, Toronto, 1975. On the

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29. Mario Albertini, Giuseppe Petrilli and Andrea Chiti-Batelli, *Storia del federalismo europeo*, Edmondo Paolini ed., Torino, 1973, pp.80, 76, 75.

30. See "Thesis for the XVI Congress", *The Federalist*, No. ,pp. . On Spinelli's and Monnet's strategies see: Altiero Spinelli and Ernesto Rossi, *The Ventotene Manifesto*, Pavia, 1989; Altiero Spinelli, *The European Adventure*, London, 1972; idem, *The Eurocrats*, Baltimore, 1966; idem, *Il progetto europeo*, Bologna, 1989; idem, *Dagli stati sovrani agli Stati Uniti d'Europa*, Florence, 1950; idem, *L'Europa non cade dal cielo*, Bologna, 1960; idem, *Rapporto sull'Europa*, Milan, 1965; idem, *La mia battaglia per un'Europa diversa*, Manduria, 1979; idem, *Come ho tentato di diventare saggio*, Bologna, Vols. II, 1984-86; idem, *Diario Europeo*, Bologna, 1990; Jean Monnet, *Cittadino d'Europa*, Milan, 1978; idem, *Les Etats-Unis d'Europe ont Commencé*, Paris, 1955; Merry and Serge Bromberger, *Jean Monnet and the United States of Europe*, New York, 1969; P. Fontaine, *Le Comité d'Action pour les Etats-Unis d'Europe de Jean Monnet*, Lausanne, 1974; Lucio Levi ed., *Altiero Spinelli and Federalism in Europe and in the World*, Milan, 1990; E.B. Haas, *Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Relations*, Stanford, Ca., 1964; Charles Pentland, *International Theory and European Integration*, New York, 1973.

31. Albertini, *Il Federalismo* op. cit., p.249.

32. Mario Albertini, "L'integrazione europea, elementi per un inquadramento storico", *L'integrazione europea e altri saggi*, Pavia, 1965, pp.77-8.

33. *Ibidem*, pp.81-3.

34. *Ibidem*, pp.85-7.

35. *Ibidem*, pp.88-9.

36. *Ibidem*, pp.90-2.

37. *Ibidem* pp.93-4.

38. *Ibidem*, pp.96-8. On economic and monetary union see: John Driffill and Massimo Beber, *A Currency for Europe. The Currency as an Element of Division or of Union of Europe*, London, 1991; M.V. Agostini, *Regioni europee e scambio ineguale*, Bologna, 1976; Mario Albertini, Alberto Majocchi, Domenico Moro, Guido Montani and Dario Velo, *Monnaie européenne et état fédéral*, Lyon, 1975; R.S. Masera, *L'unificazione monetaria e lo SME*, Bologna, 1980; Antonio Mosconi, *Dalla fine di Bretton Woods alla nascita del Sistema Monetario Europeo*, Milan, 1980; Franco Praussello, *Il Sistema Monetario Europeo*, Florence, 1979; Dario Velo, *La crisi economica internazionale e l'alternativa europea*, Milan, 1976; P. Werner, *Vers l'Union monétaire européenne*, Lausanne, 1971.

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