Toronto, Ontario

--- Upon resuming on Tuesday, October 14, 1997

at 10:15 a.m.

THE CHAIRPERSON: Good morning.

We propose first to deal with the application of the Canadian Jewish Congress.

MR. WOODS: Good morning. My name is Seamus Woods. I am here on behalf of the Canadian Jewish Congress.

I am in the Panel's hands in terms of how they would like me to deal with the submissions. We did prepare a submission that I think the Panel should have received. If not, I have extra copies. I also have a small Book of Authorities which we put together on the issue of interventions.

THE CHAIRPERSON: Do all counsel have a copy of this material and the application?

MR. WOODS: I distributed it to Mr. Christie. I have extra copies of the Book of Authorities. The letter which Mr. Richler originally sent making the application, I think, was distributed to counsel. If other counsel want copies of the Book of Authorities, I will make them available.

If you have seen Mr. Richler's letter already, you will know the basis of our submissions in terms of the request that we be granted interested party status. I do not propose to go over the letter line by line. Instead, what I propose to do is just to set out some of the background on the Canadian Jewish Congress and some of the cases that it has been involved with in the past, and then the basis for its being granted status in these proceedings at the present time.

Just to give you some idea of the background of the Canadian Jewish Congress, the organization was founded in 1919. It is the single democratic decision-making organization for all segments of the Canadian Jewish community. It is organized at all government levels and has national and regional offices across this country. Virtually all organizations, societies, groupings and other sectoral and religious bodies which have a Jewish heritage participate in the Canadian Jewish Congress.

The organization has a well-established history as a participant in issues involving human rights and freedoms, especially with respect to the rights of ethnic, religious and other minorities.

A listing of some of the matters in which the Congress has been involved is set out in Mr. Richler's letter. It is about four or five pages long.

In brief, the Congress has been involved with public inquiries, royal commissions, legislative and parliamentary committee hearings, court cases and Human Rights Tribunal hearings.

Just dealing with the matters over the past 10 years or so, the Congress has been granted leave to intervene in a number of court cases and Human Rights Tribunal hearings. In particular, in the Supreme Court of Canada, the Congress has been involved in the cases involving John Ross Taylor, Keegstra, Andrews, Zundel, and Finta. Insofar as Human Rights Tribunal hearings are concerned, the Congress was a participant in the complaint against New Brunswick School District No. 15 and Malcolm Ross, not only at the Board of Inquiry level but also at the New Brunswick Court of Queen's Bench level, the Court of Appeal and, again, at the Supreme Court of Canada.

It was involved in the Kane and Church of Jesus Christ, Aryan Nations, Terry Long and Ray Bradley hearing and was also involved in the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces in Somalia.

The law as to when a party may be granted status to participate in a hearing such as this is perhaps not as clearly enunciated as it might be in other areas. Insofar as this Tribunal is concerned, the jurisdiction flows from section 50(1) of the statute which only speaks of interested parties. That has been used in the past to grant representative group standing. In the Book of Authorities, I have given you the Canadian Paraplegic Association case where a group representing disabled persons was allowed to participate in a Tribunal hearing regarding electoral laws. In that case the board that was hearing it likened it to participating in a royal commission.

Insofar as the courts are concerned, the Supreme Court of Canada has dealt with the issue of standing in a number of cases. I have given you a couple of them in the Book of Authorities. There is the Reference Re Workers' Compensation Act which is at tab 4 and the Finta decision at tab 7.

I will take you to the Finta decision briefly. That was an application for leave to intervene by a number of parties including the Canadian Jewish Congress in respect of the case involving Mr. Finta. Madam Justice McLachlin dealt with the issue. Insofar as the test was concerned, you will find that at pages 706 and 707 of the decision she sets out the test that was previously enunciated in the Newfoundland Workers' Compensation Act Reference, requiring that an applicant can establish (1) an interest and (2) submissions that will be useful and different from those of the other parties.

It might be interesting to point out at page 708 of her decision that she dealt with both the Canadian Jewish Congress and the B'nai Brith applications, indicating that insofar as that case was concerned both groups offered useful and novel submissions and had distinctive contributions to make in the area of international law theory, comparative law, the Nuremberg principles, and the criminal justice obligations and position of Canada vis-à-vis the victims of war crimes.

I note that in its decision on granting other interested parties status in this particular proceeding, this Panel, in fact, referred to that particular provision when speaking of the B'nai Brith. In my submission, it would be equally appropriate to use it insofar as my client, the Canadian Jewish Congress, is concerned.

THE CHAIRPERSON: The wording of the section is broad, but is there implicit in all this some numerical consideration? How many interested parties should be represented or admitted to a hearing such as this?

MR. WOODS: There is nothing in the particular statute that deals with whether one is enough or two is too many. In either case, it is going to be up to the Tribunal concerned to decide whether the party is going to bring something to the proceedings that is perhaps not already there.

In this particular case the Canadian Jewish Congress is the umbrella group for all Jewish organizations in Canada. As that, it brings something that is not present here with the parties who have already been granted interested party status.

THE CHAIRPERSON: I think the Tribunal would be interested in hearing more detail on that specific point. What does the Congress bring that the other groups who have already been admitted do not?

MR. WOODS: The Canadian Jewish Congress has not only a long history in terms of protection of the position of the Jewish community in Canada and the effects of hate literature and the like on that particular community but, insofar as the areas broadening out into what we have before the Tribunal, which is the whole aspect of the Internet and that particular area, the CJC has had particular interest in that area and has developed a special expertise in terms of the Internet. Mr. Bernie Farber who is, in fact, with us in the court today, seated in the second row, has written a number of papers on the effect of the Internet on this particular area, one of which I believe was submitted to the Tribunal with the original application that Mr. Richler made.

Mr. Farber has, in fact, participated in a number of panels that dealt specifically with concerns regarding the Internet. He brings, as a potential person involved in this hearing, a special expertise in this particular area.

Also, as was pointed out in the submissions that Mr. Richler made originally, the CJC has established a special subcommittee dealing particularly with this area and, as such, it has developed something special that is not present in the other people who are already parties before the Tribunal.

Insofar as the Tribunal may have a concern about whether the efforts of CJC are going to be simply a duplication of what the other parties are going to say, that, I think, is something that the Tribunal can deal with as the Hearing progresses. Certainly it is my client's intention not to be either unnecessarily duplicative of what other people have to say or to involve itself in issues on which it does not have a special expertise. We are prepared to work with the other parties and with the Commission to ensure that the material that we have at our disposal and can usefully offer to the Tribunal is, in fact, put forward in a way that is not going to result in a duplication of effort that has already been given.

In brief, my submission to the Tribunal is that the CJC brings something that other parties do not have and that, as a result, its participation in this Hearing would allow the Tribunal to hear evidence on other issues and perhaps a different point of view on some issues from what has already been presented by the others. In that result, in my submission, the CJC should be granted interested party status in these proceedings on the same basis as the other groups have already been granted that status.

Subject to any response I might have to what Mr. Christie may have to say or any questions from the Panel, those are all my submissions.

MEMBER DEVINS: I am hesitant because the Tribunal Chair has already asked this question, but I would be grateful for some assistance.

Could you spell out in perhaps more detail what the unique perspective is that the CJC would bring. I am sure you have seen the Tribunal's decisions granting interested party status to the other groups. Specifically, the League for Human Rights of B'nai Brith was granted status on the basis of their expertise in the Internet as well as their expertise in dealing with the issues that are before us. If you could provide me some assistance, I would be grateful.

MR. WOODS: If it would please the Tribunal, I will just check with Mr. Farber to see if he has any particular points he would like me to raise with you now.

--- (A Short Pause)

To some extent, I think I have gone over this one time. The main concern is that the groups that are already granted status, leaving aside the Internet and I will come back to that, are all representative of a particular aspect of the Jewish community. The Canadian Jewish Congress is not representative of one aspect of the Jewish community but, rather, the entire Jewish community.

When we are dealing with the particular issues that the Tribunal is going to have before it in this proceeding, it is important, in my submission, that we get all aspects of the Jewish community -- reform, conservative, orthodox, everything. The groups that have been granted status thus far perhaps are not as representative of the entire community. By being the umbrella group, the CJC brings something a little special to the Tribunal in that respect.

Insofar as the Internet is concerned, the CJC was one of the first bodies, if not the first, in the Jewish community to specifically look into the questions of the Internet. Because it was the first one looking into it, it has had a longer experience with the issues being raised in this particular proceeding. Mr. Farber, in particular, has authored the report that has already been provided to the Tribunal, setting out some of his background -- not necessarily the same point of view that the B'nai Brith would express in its submissions in this proceeding. If we do not have both groups there, the chances are that the one point of view may be somewhat lost.

Certainly by having his expertise available for the Tribunal and certainly insofar as submissions are concerned, I think that would bring something a little special that would not otherwise be present.

THE CHAIRPERSON: The Tribunal would not be deprived of his evidence.

MR. WOODS: I am sorry, I can't hear you.

THE CHAIRPERSON: The Tribunal would not be deprived of the benefit of his evidence.

MR. WOODS: No. Certainly he could be called as a witness by somebody else. You are right; that would get the evidence in front of you. I think having somebody testify as a witness would not necessarily be the same as having that point of view presented to the Tribunal in the form of submissions. Somebody who can give their evidence is not necessarily the same submissions that would be made. There is a distinction there that one has to accept.

Also, of course, Mr. Farber is not the only person in the organization who has an expertise in this area. While our submissions would certainly be putting him front and centre, there are other people whose point of view I think we will need to get across. Certainly that will be able to be done in the event that the CJC is granted interested party status.

MEMBER JAIN: My question pertains to the timing of the application for interested party status.

MR. WOODS: Unlike perhaps some of the other organizations that have already been granted standing, the CJC is a very large group. There is a certain process that has to be followed before it can get involved in proceedings. The net effect is that one person does not make the decision to have the organization involved in the proceeding; it has to go through a process.

It was explained to me as being a little like a bill becoming law in Parliament. It requires not just the approval of one person, but it has to go through Cabinet, through both houses of Parliament. It is not exactly the same thing within the Canadian Jewish Congress, but there are elements of that there.

That is the reason we are not here as early as we would normally like to have been. It was a matter of some debate within the organization about participating in the hearings. The decision has been made, and that is why we are here.

As I understand, we are not asking that the Tribunal slow down its decision-making or its dealing with the evidence. We have the set of hearing dates, and we will not be asking for any changes on the hearing dates.

THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, counsel. Do any counsel wish to speak in support of this application?

Mr. Christie, please.

MR. CHRISTIE: Thank you.

It is regrettable that Mr. Richler was not here himself to present the argument because, although the suggestion was made that the Canadian Jewish Congress intervened in John Ross Taylor and Zundel and Finta and in Malcolm Ross, the only one at which they were allowed to intervene at the hearing stage was in the case of Malcolm Ross.

In that case, being before a Human Rights Tribunal in the province of New Brunswick chaired by Brian Bruce, they were restricted from doing anything more than making submissions. They were not allowed to participate in cross-examination; they were not allowed to involve themselves in the case because the parties were adequately represented by the Ministry of Education, the School District, by Mr. Ross' own counsel and by the complainant who also had his own lawyer.

In that light, it is quite clear that intervenants are not normally granted, or were not at that time granted, intervenant status in the sense of full participants. Obviously, things have changed, and this Tribunal has taken the view that we have three organizations and one individual representing themselves to represent various segments of the Jewish community -- no one ever asked them how many. It was my recollection that they tended to regard themselves as representatives for all. Unlike the questions directed to me when I was seeking to introduce information on behalf of certain German groups, it was never suggested that they did not represent all Jews.

We have a situation where there are three Intervenants representing Jewish groups and one party representing herself as a Jewish person. The only solution, if more are to be accommodated, would be to move the Tribunal to a theatre where it would be easier to accommodate this large number of lawyers. We have three, apparently, for the Commission and several for various Intervenants. It becomes difficult for one person to cope with as much as we are being presented with.

Of course, myself and Ms Kulaszka represent Mr. Zundel, and there is really nobody speaking for us or on our side of any issue other than myself, I guess.

I don't know whether fairness is a factor to consider here but, if it is, I would like to submit that it has already become a situation where the Intervenants have more powers than they were granted in any tribunal where counsel opposed them, with the one exception of the tribunal involving Terry Long in Alberta where, I gather, these gentlemen who have made presentations here also made presentations on behalf of intervenants and participated. I might point out that that was a case in which no counsel opposed them. Mr. Long, himself, absented himself from the day that he was required to produce membership lists, and there really was no opposition.

There is one serious question arising out of that, and I think we have a right to know the Tribunal's position on this. That is the question of whether all these Intervenants, at the end of the day when they get what they want, will be entitled to costs. They were in Mr. Long's case and, of course, it bankrupted Mr. Long and anyone who had dared to oppose the intervenants. Properties have been seized. Homes and families have been dispossessed, and this comes as somewhat of a shock to people like me who did not realize that that was the plan. We now see it as more of a plan and more of an intention on the part of the Intervenants because they are not unfamiliar with the process. They did it in Alberta. We would like to know if it is their intention here and whether it is the position of the Tribunal that they view it as within their power to award costs.

We are not talking here of $20,000 or $30,000. I recall the figures getting over $100,000, and it was the liability of each defendant. We would be opposing this intervention for those reasons as well, but we don't know whether they seek costs or not. That is something I think we should be entitled to know.

Thank you.

THE CHAIRPERSON: Are there any further comments?

MR. WOODS: In terms of the status of the Canadian Jewish Congress, my submission is simply that we should be granted the same status as the other participants and that the Tribunal will definitely have the ability to deal with the questions of participation in the Hearing as the Hearing actually progresses. I think that is the basic distinction between this case and the situation in New Brunswick with Mr. Ross.

In terms of costs, at this point in time, without the Tribunal having started to hear evidence and certainly being very far away from making a decision, we are not in a position to give you what our submissions on costs are going to be. I can tell you that we are not here simply to seek costs from Mr. Zundel. That is not the purpose of our involvement. Our involvement here is to make sure that a point of view is expressed to the Tribunal.

THE CHAIRPERSON: The Tribunal will recess.

--- Short Recess at 10:40 a.m.

--- Upon resuming at 10:51 a.m.

THE CHAIRPERSON: Because of the unique and important issues involved in these proceedings, we are of the view that interested party status should be granted to the Canadian Jewish Congress.

Having said that, we remind the Congress and its counsel that these proceedings should not be unnecessarily prolonged by interventions which are not considered in conjunction with counsel for the other interested parties.

The ruling that we made with respect to the applications of the other parties applies as well to the Congress.

Mr. Binnie, are you ready to call evidence?

MR. CHRISTIE: If I may, in my letter of September 30 I asked to make the submission that any member of the Tribunal should consider and disclose any support for or membership in any of the intervenor organizations. I don't know if that has been considered or if it needs to be further considered, but I want that put on the record.

I, likewise, have difficulty with the 10-day rule which I indicated in my letter of September 30.

THE CHAIRPERSON: Let us deal with the first matter first, Mr. Christie. Let me help you with what you are trying to do here.

What you are seeking is a motion to the Tribunal to ask Panel members questions which might lead to a conclusion that there is or is not a bias. Is that not what you are doing?

MR. CHRISTIE: No. My question was whether any Panel member could disclose or at least acknowledge any support for or membership in any of the intervenor organizations.

THE CHAIRPERSON: The issue is larger than that. Implicit in what you are saying is that you have a right to question members of this Tribunal with respect to issues that may go to bias. Where is your authority to do that?

MR. CHRISTIE: I don't think I have a right to question them, but I have a right to raise the issue. I think what I am relying on is the position taken by Ms MacTavish who at one point disqualified herself because she found that her husband was a member of the firm that was prosecuting on behalf of the Commission.

THE CHAIRPERSON: No, that was a fact in existence that was brought to the attention of the Tribunal. Do you have any facts with respect to any member of this Tribunal which might lead to a conclusion that there is a reasonable apprehension of bias?

MR. CHRISTIE: I cannot have those facts. I don't know any members of the Tribunal. But I think it is incumbent upon members of the Tribunal to do what Ms MacTavish did. I had no knowledge of her husband's involvement in any law firm. She brought that to my attention.

I think that is the right and proper course, and I am simply saying that, if any member of the Tribunal is either a member of or a supporter of any of the intervening groups, it is not for me to have to inquire. It is not within my power to inquire. I think it is their duty to make that known. If it is known, it may not be prejudicial but, if it is, I should be entitled to know about it just as I was with Ms MacTavish.

THE CHAIRPERSON: Mr. Binnie, please.

MR. BINNIE: Mr. Chairman, with respect to Ms MacTavish, that was raised with the Tribunal by me at the time that we were retained to represent the Commission before the Tribunal. Ms MacTavish was, therefore, responding to an issue that had been presented by a party.

In light of Mr. Christie's acknowledgement a moment ago that he has no information of any facts or events that would give rise to an apprehension of bias, in my submission, it is a quite inappropriate line of inquiry for him to attempt to initiate.

MR. CHRISTIE: In reply to that, let me say this.

If it is true that Mr. Binnie brought this up at the Tribunal, he did not bring it up with me. The first I heard of it was from Ms MacTavish and the Tribunal itself. Consequently, if there were direct approaches to the Tribunal by Mr. Binnie in my absence, I suppose he considers that appropriate. He argued the same position in the Supreme Court vis-à-vis another matter.

I do not consider it appropriate that anyone should approach the Tribunal in the absence of other counsel. If that was the case, then it is neither here nor there. He had knowledge that should have been, and properly was, put to the Tribunal. The Tribunal is in the best position to know whether any of their members is either a member or a supporter of any of the intervenant groups.

If such be the case, as it was in the case, for instance, of the Human Rights Tribunal regarding McAleer and, I believe, the Payzant case -- it was Mr. Sinclair's tribunal in Vancouver where I raised the same issue. There was a consideration of the matter, and I later found out that Lois Serwa who sat on that tribunal was a member or a supporter of a group that was involved as a complainant.

I think, frankly, in those circumstances it is not a matter of a fishing expedition. It is a matter of a simple inquiry. If the Tribunal is of the view that nobody is, then that is fine. But I don't see how I can be put in the position of having to do investigative work on members of the Tribunal.

MR. BINNIE: Mr. Chairman, if I could respond to that, there was a letter written to Mr. Christie by the Registrar of the Human Rights Tribunal, dated January 21, 1997, copied to all parties including Mr. Christie, acknowledging receipt of a letter from the General Counsel of the Canadian Human Rights Commission, acknowledging receipt of his letter dated January 15, 1997, advising that Mr. Ian Binnie of the law firm of McCarthy Tétrault would be representing the Canadian Human Rights Commission.

It was raised in a letter. There was correspondence with the Tribunal to which Mr. Christie was a party, and that is how the issue arose.

THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

I know of no authority which would allow in these circumstances questioning of Tribunal members to elicit information pertinent to the issue of bias. It is always incumbent upon Tribunal members to ensure that they can fairly and impartially hear a matter. This is the view of the Tribunal members.

I am not going to allow those questions to be asked or answered.

Do you have something else, Mr. Christie?

MR. CHRISTIE: No.

THE CHAIRPERSON: Mr. Binnie, would you like to proceed?

MR. BINNIE: As a postscript to the point I just made, there is a letter from Mr. Christie to the Tribunal dated January 23, 1997 which acknowledges receipt of the earlier correspondence.

THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR. CHRISTIE: If my friend is making the point that that was conveying any knowledge of Ms MacTavish's position, I point out that it did not.

MR. BINNIE: Let's just read it, then, and I can file a copy with the Tribunal:

"As I have discussed with Mr. Zundel, he is of the firm view that the information provided in your letter raises a reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of the Tribunal when the prosecutor is the partner or the spouse of the judge. In our view, this is a clear case where either the Tribunal member or the prosecutor must step aside."

It can hardly be clearer that Mr. Christie knew exactly what the issue was --

MR. BINNIE: Mr. Binnie misunderstands. I said that I did not hear this in any submission from Mr. Binnie. The information came from the Tribunal itself. Mr. Binnie says that he made the Tribunal aware of the situation.

I simply point out that, if Mr. Binnie did that, it was not something that I had known about until the Tribunal brought it to my attention. It is a judge being approached by one party, and that Tribunal advises the other party.

THE CHAIRPERSON: We have made a ruling, so let's get on with it. Mr. Binnie, please.

MR. CHRISTIE: Very well.

MR. BINNIE: Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, before calling our first witness, what I would like to do is to introduce very briefly the matters which we are bringing before this Tribunal.

As the Tribunal is aware, the complaint arises out of the establishment on the Internet of the Zundelsite. It is the Commission's position in support of the complaints that the choice by Mr. Zundel of the Zundelsite is simply a way in which he can, through facilities in California, target the Jewish community in Canada and elsewhere for his particular brand of matter that is likely to expose them to hatred and contempt within the meaning of section 13(1) of the Canadian Human Rights Act.

I have provided to the Registrar a slim volume of the originating documents. I would ask the Tribunal to look first of all at the Complaint documents.

You will see at tab 1 the Complaint filed by Ms Sabina Citron to the Human Rights Commission, dated September 15, 1996. Having set out her allegation that the establishment of this Web site and the placement on the Web site of messages that are likely to expose her to hatred or contempt by reason of the fact that "we are identifiable on the basis of a prohibited ground of discrimination," which is to say race, is contrary to section 13(1) of the Canadian Human Rights Act.

She gives as her particulars that she is a Jew and a survivor of the Holocaust, and she identifies documents which she says were downloaded on August 14, 1996 from a Home Page called "The Zundelsite" offered by the Respondent Zundel on the World Wide Web.

Provided at this site were the full texts of several pamphlets, including "66 Questions and Answers on the Holocaust" and at least 10 other documents which I believe are likely to expose persons of Jewish faith and ethnic origin to hatred and contempt.

Attached to this Complaint Form are examples of the messages on the Home Page.

At tab 2 is the Complaint of the Toronto Mayor's Committee on Community and Race Relations which is substantially to the same effect, although it identifies a number of additional pamphlets. It includes "Did Six Million Really Die?;" the full text of the publication "66 Questions and Answers on the Holocaust;" the full text of an article "Jewish Soap;" and at least 10 other documents which we believe are likely to expose persons of the Jewish faith and ethnic origin to hatred and contempt.

At tab 3 you will see a letter from Mr. Christie in which he says he has reviewed the particulars of the complaint of Ms Citron and Ms Hall, and he says they are overly broad and fail to particularize the complaints adequately. He then lists items 1 to 7, being the articles that he has received.

He then says over the page that he wants particulars from both Complainants as to the exact articles complained of, the passages from the articles which are alleged to incite hatred. He says that these are necessary in order to permit Mr. Zundel to intelligently decide what witnesses and documents he needs to produce.

That was responded to on behalf of the Commission by letter dated August 15, 1997, which is at tab 4. You will see that there is, first of all, the listing of 320 documents, covering pages 1 through 18, in the Commission's possession, control or power, relevant to the Complaint launched by the Toronto Mayor's Committee and by Ms Citron.

Then at page 18 Mr. Zundel is alerted, following that list:

"In proving the respondent's contravention of s. 13(1) of the Canadian Human Rights Act, the Commission relies on all documents posted on the Zundelsite, located on the Internet --"

And it gives the Internet address.

"-- from April 1995 up to August 14, 1997 and continuing thereafter. This includes Power Letters, ZGrams --"

Which are categories of documents posted on the Zundelsite.

"-- and any other articles, press releases and documents found at that Web site during the relevant period.

The Commission will establish both that the content of the posted material is likely to expose members of an identifiable group to hatred or contempt and will demonstrate that the respondent, Ernst Zundel, on his own, or by acting in concert with others, is responsible for communicating these messages or causing them repeatedly to be so communicated.

The Commission may prove its case on the basis of any of the documents posted on the Zundelsite during the relevant period, including the specific articles referred to as examples by the complainants in their formal complaints. In addition to the documents referred to by the complainants, please find enclosed a binder of the thirty documents listed below --"

Which refers back to the at least 10 documents in the Complaints themselves.

"-- (the 31st item is a video which is not included) upon which the Commission will place particular reliance. You will observe that we have highlighted a number of passages which, among others, may be the subject of expert testimony."

There was included with that letter a tabulated book of 31 documents which are indexed on pages 18, 19 and 20 of this letter. The letter concludes by enclosing a list of witnesses which, as presently advised, the Commission intended to call.

There are documents included, as you will see, not only items downloaded from the Zundelsite, but also newspaper articles, such as items 10 and 11 on page 19, in which Mr. Zundel told journalists about his plans with the Internet.

What we have prepared for the Tribunal and for Mr. Christie and the other counsel is a book containing the documents downloaded from the Zundelsite on which the Commission will rest the case here. In accordance with the language of the Complaints, it includes the documents identified initially by the Complainants in September and July 1996 respectively, and it identifies the other documents which they refer to simply as at least 10 other documents. It lists those documents specifically and sets out copies.

All of this material has previously been provided to Mr. Christie and, through him, to Mr. Zundel. Those books I have left with the Registrar and would ask her to hand them to the Tribunal.

I should indicate to the Tribunal that there is a number of issues which we expect the Tribunal will have to deal with in the course of this Hearing, arising out of the language of section 13(1) of the Act.

There is an issue raised on behalf of Mr. Zundel as to whether he, either alone or in concert with a group of other persons, has made the communication complained of. There will be an issue, as indicated by Mr. Christie at the Pre-hearing, as to whether it can be said that use of the Internet is to cause to communicate telephonically or to use the facilities of a telecommunication undertaking. We will be calling evidence about the Internet, how it is used and how we say it conforms to section 13 of the Act.

There is the additional issue of whether the telecommunications undertaking referred to is within the legislative authority of Parliament, which raises a question of territorial jurisdiction also referred to by Mr. Christie at the earlier meeting.

There is, of course, the issue as to whether what the Commission says are documents communicated by the Respondent Zundel through the Internet does expose Jewish people to hatred or contempt by reason of their being of Jewish origin. Evidence will be called to prove those elements of the allegation.

In respect of those matters, I might ask the Tribunal to look briefly at this Book of Documents so that you will have some idea of what is to be discussed in the evidence before you.

There is an Index of Documents at the first tab corresponding to the tabs which follow. You will see at the first tab, for example, the text as downloaded from the Zundelsite which is a copy of a pamphlet which he previously published called "Did Six Million Really Die: Truth at Last - Exposed:" This is said to include a Foreword to the new edition, "Zundel's Story."

You will recall that both Complainants referred to the document at tab 2, "66 Questions and Answers on the Holocaust."

At tab 3 is an article put on the Zundelsite, we say, by Mr. Zundel, called "Jewish Soap."

At tab 4 you will see what is the index to documents available on the Zundelsite. If you flip over to the Table of Contents which appears about four pages in, you will see that the index is divided into a number of sections. I will just briefly identify those that we are particularly concerned with in this Hearing.

There is, first of all, a heading called "Politically Incorrect News." You will see under that heading a number of the items previously referred to, including "66 Questions and Answers on the Holocaust" and the article entitled "Jewish Soap."

There is then a section called "Freedom Alert." Those articles address the theory put about by Mr. Zundel that in some way what he is up to is a search for truth, a debate about history, and to endeavour to wrap himself in the mantle of freedom of expression.

There is then a section called "Power Letters" which extend over a period of three years, 1995, 1996 and 1997. There will be evidence that Mr. Zundel produces documents on a monthly basis which he calls his Power Letters which he signs and distributes. Those Power Letters have been transferred to the Zundelsite and are available from the Zundelsite, and several of those documents are included in the book in the tabs that follow.

There are then a number of miscellaneous headings, including "Censorship Through Law" where, again, Mr. Zundel attempts to portray all of this as what he somewhere describes as a civilized and cultivated exchange of views.

He then has some books and articles, including again this transcript, "Did Six Million Really Die?" and so on.

That gives you some idea of what is available on the Zundelsite from which the Commission has selected a number of particular items on which it relies in this proceeding.

By way of an example, if you look at tab 7, you will see "An Open Letter from the 'Zundelsite'" dated December 9, 1996. Over the page you will see a formulation that is repeated at several instances through the documents. In the bold face type the basic message of the Zundelsite is said to be a challenge to three specific commonly accepted, monstrous lies pertaining to the Holocaust. Then he lists three items:

". that there ever was a Fuehrer order for the genocidal killings of Jews, Gypsies and others

. that the chief murder weapon or instrument for the alleged mass killing, called a 'gas chamber,' was designed for the express purpose of targeting groups of human beings like Jews

. that the numbers of victims claimed to have been killed are anywhere near the number of people who actually died in concentration camps of whatever cause - including lack of food, lack of shelter and medicines, epidemics, old age and the vagaries of total war."

Then in the highlighted portion there is the statement as follows:

"To claim that World War II was fought by the Germans, as the Holocaust Promotion Lobby incessantly claims, just to kill off the Jews as a group, is a deliberately planned, systematic deception amounting to financial, political, emotional and spiritual extortion."

These passages that the Commission relies upon are of importance in light of the position taken by Mr. Zundel in these documents, that this is a dispassionate view of the historical record that he is interested in rather than simple propaganda aimed at raising hatred and contempt against an identifiable community.

Tab 8 is a communication by Mr. Zundel through the Zundelsite, which starts out saying: "My name is Ernst Zundel. I am a Holocaust Revisionist." Then he asks his questions about "Did Six Million Really Die?" Then he says:

"I am the cause of the first-time-ever censorship ban on the Net. I need not repeat details here. The German act of censorship - first CompuServe, then Telekom - brought forth a reaction the likes of which happens to dissidents only in Hollywood movies."

If you flip over a couple of pages, you will see that in this document he describes how he came to form the Zundelsite. At the bottom of the second page, in the second paragraph from the bottom, he says:

"Because of the persecution I experienced for expressing my unorthodox viewpoint on history, I decided with the help of some American friends to set up a world-wide web page in the USA, the last bastion of free speech. I quietly set about constructing my web page."

Then he carries on with a further discussion of his involvement in setting up and establishing this Web site, fundamentally for the purpose, so far as Canada is concerned, of attempting to publish through the medium of the Internet to Canadians this type of material which is calculated to raise hatred and contempt against an identifiable minority.

Then at tab 9 is, again, a document downloaded from the Internet which consists of an exchange between somebody called Jamie McCarthy of Nizkor and responses from Mr. Zundel. What this led to was some connection between the Zundelsite and the Nizkor site in which people travelling the Internet could link the communications on both sites and consider their views.

If you flip through tab 9 to the page that is marked 314 in the bottom right-hand corner, this is the passage I referred to a moment ago where the effort is made by Mr. Zundel to present what he communicates not as hate propaganda but as a scholarly and respectable exchange. In the bottom paragraph on page 314 he says:

"Our intent, as stated above and which bears repeating, is to offer an alternate viewpoint to the government- and media approved version of the 'Holocaust,' presented in a democratic forum. Scholars and researchers on both sides can post their replies and have the strength of their research and logic weighted, argued and judged. It is our hope that many intellectuals will participate - both actively by offering their findings and passively by judging evidence. I am very willing to extend a hand for a cultured, scholarly and respectable exchange and facilitate an easy navigational system that would allow an open, searching mind to read, to reflect and to compare."

We will be calling as our first witness Professor Gary Prideaux who is a professor of linguistics and who is in a position to analyze the actual content of the Zundel material to give you an analysis as to why what is set out in these documents is not a cultured, scholarly and respectable exchange, but is simply anti-Semitism and hate propaganda wrapped up in the flag of freedom of speech.

If you flip ahead to tab 12, you will see an example of why what we are dealing with here is hate propaganda, not an exercise of freedom of expression in any meaning of the term. If you look three pages in at the first highlighted portion, you will see an example of what is complained about. It says, according to Mr. Zundel:

"The problem is, very simply, that the German oligarchy and the Jewish/Zionist/Marxist racketeers who have conned the Germans, the Americans and, for that matter, the whole world with their Holocaust extortion scheme --"

"Holocaust extortion scheme" is a repeated expression all through this material.

"-- are both dependent for their own survival on the non-exposure of this fraudulent, parasitic enterprise."

Then there is more to the same effect as you look through the documents which follow.

If you flip over to tab 17, again this is a Power Letter which means that it is a Zundelsite reproduction of a document circulated in hard copy by Mr. Zundel. It is said in the heading to be the personal opinions of Mr. Zundel. Again, with respect to scholarly debate, if you go over to the third page, you will see a taste of what the Zundelsite offers.

Mr. Zundel says that he can expect little fairness or help from the media which, under normal circumstances, could act as a check on the doings of the spy agency -- this is the SIRC committee.

"The media of Canada, because it is largely blinded by self-induced Germanophobia for the last 50 years, can no longer be trusted to ring the alarm bells against this unholy troika of Intelligence Service, Intelligence Review Committee, and a Holocaust-Lobby-driven Government - headed by a Prime Minister who is surrounded by more Jewish staffers and 'advisors' than any other Prime Minister I can think of in my 38 years in this country!"

And so on.

Again, if you go over to tab 22, Mr. Zundel's own offering in his Power Letter dated March 1997 is his response to the Swiss government's announcement respecting Swiss banks and the amounts of money which were taken in by the banks and said to belong to victims of the Holocaust. Mr. Zundel's response is on the second page where he says:

"The Swiss ruling elite, with a few notable exceptions, has predictably caved in to the worldwide Holocaust Lobby pressure and announced their fatal error - a $6 Billion Holocaust Victims' Fund. The Holocaust terrorists are crowing triumphantly! The eternal parasite, riding high on a wave of victimhood, seems to have cast all caution to the wind, drunk with the feeling of influence and power of having brought yet one more gentile country to its knees."

This, again, in the ostensive pursuit of a scholarly exchange.

Finally, the next tab is an interview which Mr. Zundel gave to Australia's largest Internet magazine. You will see that in the second paragraph below the heading, "Good Morning from the Zundelsite," it says:

"Below is an interview that Ernst gave about a week ago to Australia's largest Internet magazine, Internet Australia. I am bringing it here for your perusal and edification."

The first question is of interest in light of the issue of authorship. He is asked:

"As you explain, your site has been subjected to various attempts at censorship. Please outline the main challenges that the Zundelsite has faced."

Mr. Zundel responds:

"Pressure was brought against our first server in California, which led to the abrupt cancellation of our website."

In the next couple of paragraphs down he says, "Our current server came under heavy pressure in January --" and so on.

That is a taste of the kind of material that will be discussed in the evidence before the Tribunal.

I can indicate briefly the witnesses that we expect to call in this portion of the Hearing. I had mentioned Professor Prideaux from the Department of Linguistics at the University of Alberta. He is going to assist the Tribunal to dissect these writings on which the Commission relies, to point out how far at variance what is produced here is from scholarly dialogue; that what fundamentally is employed here are rather old techniques of classic anti-Semitism, the stereotyping of Jewish people, the negative characteristics repeated over and over again, and the linguistic structure that is calculated to create hatred and contempt within section 13(1) of the Canadian Human Rights Act.

We will also be calling, with respect to the Internet, Mr. Ian Angus who is an expert in the field of telecommunications, who will provide the Tribunal with evidence as to whether the Zundelsite constitutes communicating telephonically or by means of the facilities of a telecommunication undertaking within the legislative authority of Parliament. That evidence will also go to the matter of territoriality.

As the Tribunal is aware, section 40(5(c) provides that conduct outside Canada is nevertheless actionable under the Human Rights Act if the victim is a Canadian citizen or person lawfully admitted to reside in this country. An understanding of how the Internet works is clearly of relevance to the matters that you have to decide.

There is also the evidence of Professor Frances Henry whom the Commission will call. She is a social anthropologist at York University. She will outline to the Tribunal how the Holocaust denial messages on the Zundelsite really conform to the classical anti-Semitism that section 13(1) was, in part, designed to redress.

There will also, of course, be witnesses to authenticate the documents downloaded from the Zundelsite and to bring home to Mr. Zundel the authorship of the works complained of.

I would say finally and before calling our first witness that the matters before this Tribunal are not matters pertaining to freedom of expression. As the Supreme Court of Canada has noted in a number of cases, freedom of expression is not absolute. There are limits imposed so that the freedom of one does not invade and disparage the freedom of another. The example often given is that no one has the freedom to cry "fire" in a crowded theatre.

The limitations which are imposed by section 13(1) of the Act, as upheld by the Supreme Court of Canada in the Taylor case, really address matters which go beyond freedom of expression and which are designed and targeted on the rights of others.

The other point I would ask the Tribunal to keep in mind during the course of the Hearing is that these documents which, in our submission, by any objective standard expose and are calculated to expose Jewish people to hatred and contempt were understood by Mr. Zundel to have that effect. As the portion in the article that I read to you demonstrated and as other pieces of his writings demonstrate, he went to California with a view to attempting to sidestep the Canadian legal system and spread into Canada a message of hate that he understood he was precluded from distributing directly here.

At the end of the day, one of the issues that the Tribunal will have to address is whether indeed the laws of this country in which Mr. Zundel resides and has resided, as he says, for 38 years, can be so easily sidestepped and circumvented.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Tribunal, with that I would propose that we call Professor Gary Prideaux as our first witness. My colleague, Mr. Eddie Taylor, will ask questions of Professor Prideaux.

THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR. BINNIE: I just want to put on the record that we are going to be asking for an order excluding witnesses in the usual form. I don't know whether my friend has any objection, but clearly it will be of assistance to the Tribunal to know that the witnesses called are not tailoring evidence or otherwise influenced by what they have heard from other witnesses.

THE CHAIRPERSON: I guess the issue is who is allowed to remain, who are exceptions to the order.

MR. BINNIE: I acknowledge that Mr. Zundel clearly is entitled to remain as the Respondent to the proceeding and for the purposes of instructing Mr. Christie.

THE CHAIRPERSON: The first several witnesses that you have listed are all in the nature of expert evidence?

MR. BINNIE: Yes.

THE CHAIRPERSON: Are experts to be called by Mr. Christie allowed to hear that evidence?

MR. BINNIE: I have not heard from Mr. Christie as to what, if any, testimony he expects to call.

THE CHAIRPERSON: I am asking whether you would agree that his experts would be allowed to remain, if he has any.

MR. BINNIE: I would agree that the order for exclusion extends to fact witnesses and does not preclude the experts who are going to testify on the subject matter of what is discussed in the evidence before the Tribunal. If they are to comment on that, then they are going to have to know what has been said.

THE CHAIRPERSON: Mr. Christie...?

MR. CHRISTIE: I have no comment.

THE CHAIRPERSON: There will be an order excluding witnesses. That order will not extend to Mr. Zundel who will be here to instruct counsel.

MR. CHRISTIE: Does it extend to experts?

MR. BINNIE: As I understood the ground rule, to the extent that experts are to be called to comment on the factual evidence presented to the Tribunal, they are entitled to hear that factual evidence. To the extent that they are simply called as expert witnesses, giving matters of opinion which are not directed to what is being said in the witness box before the Tribunal, they would be excluded as well.

MR. CHRISTIE: If that is the order, I don't know what it means. It is very obscure to me.

THE CHAIRPERSON: We will take our morning recess.

--- Short Recess at 11:45 a.m.

--- Upon resuming at 12:02 p.m.

THE CHAIRPERSON: There will be an order excluding witnesses with the exception of Mr. Zundel and expert witnesses.

MR. EARLE: Mr. Chairman, if I might, I would like to make a brief opening statement on behalf of the Toronto Mayor's Committee.

THE CHAIRPERSON: Does every representative wish to make an opening statement?

MR. ROSEN: I thought there was general agreement that there were not going to be any opening statements, that Mr. Binnie would speak and then witnesses would follow.

THE CHAIRPERSON: That was my expectation, if not an order. At the appropriate time, perhaps we can hear from you later.

Can we proceed with the evidence now?

MR. TAYLOR: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, the Commission calls as its first witness Dr. Gary Prideaux.

AFFIRMED: GARY D. PRIDEAUX

Mr. Chairman and Members, the Commission will offer Dr. Prideaux as an expert witness. Dr. Prideaux is a linguist, and we wish to have him qualified as able to give expert opinion evidence in the area of discourse analysis which is a subset of the field of linguistics.

EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF RE QUALIFICATIONS

MR. TAYLOR:

Q. Good afternoon, Dr. Prideaux.

Could I ask you to take up Exhibit HR-3, and I direct you to tab 1. I will just ask you, sir, to leaf through those 16 pages and ask you to identify that document, please.

A. That is my curriculum vitae.

Q. Thank you. I note, Doctor, that you were born in the United States. You have citizenship in both Canada and United States. You obtained a B.A. at Rice University in Houston and a Ph.D in Linguistics at the University of Texas at Austin.

Could you tell me, sir, your thesis topic in your Ph.D studies.

A. It was "The syntax of Japanese honorofics." It was a thesis addressed to the question of the use of language, Japanese honorofic language, and a syntactic analysis of it. It is a document that took a theoretical position that was current at that particular period, namely Chomsky's theory of the aspect of syntax and tried to explore the ramifications of that theory in a really complicated language totally unlike English.

Q. Why did you choose the Japanese language, Doctor?

A. Because, when I was a student, Japanese was one of the languages that I chose to take. I was interested in the language. I studied the language for three years and worked on it there and in Japan as well.

Q. I will ask you, Doctor, just to keep your voice up. This is a large room and you are competing with air conditioning and the security devices.

If I could take you to your professional experience, sir, you are affiliated with the University of Alberta and have been since 1966; is that correct?

A. That is correct.

Q. Could you just run through some of the positions you have had at the University of Alberta?

A. As you can see from my CV, I first went to University of Alberta in 1966, upon completion of the Ph.D at the University of Texas at Austin. I have been associated with that university for my full academic career. The times that I have been away from the University of Alberta have been when I was either on sabbatical or in Japan on a Fulbright Lectureship.

I became an Assistant Professor upon arrival. I was promoted to Associate Professor in 1971. I was granted tenure in 1970. I was Chair of the department for about 12 years, two terms plus some acting time as Chair. I was promoted to Professor in 1978. I also served a term as Associate Dean in the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, dealing with departments on our campus with graduate programs in areas of the social sciences primarily.

Q. I note at the bottom of page 1, under the headline "Research and Teaching Specializations," Discourse analysis, psycholinguistics, syntactic theory, structure of English, and structure of Japanese.

If I turn you to page 2, sir, under the headline "Courses Taught," in your undergraduate teaching responsibilities, could you describe the course, Psycholinguistics. I think it is the third from the bottom there.

A. This is an undergraduate course that I taught in different forms over several years. The course is an introduction basically to psycholinguistics, psycholinguistics being the experimental study of language phenomena, language comprehension and language production, language acquisition, and the interface between linguistic theory, theoretical constructs, and psychological constructs -- that is, issues in experimentation, experimental design.

The goal of the course is to familiarize the students with the basic literature in this discipline and in the subdisciplines of linguistics and also to introduce them to the actual workings of the psycholinguist. That is, they carry out their experiments and so forth under direction.

Q. The last one of your undergraduate courses that you have listed here, Discourse Analysis, could you describe that, please.

A. Discourse Analysis, again, is an undergraduate course. It is an introduction to the discipline. Discourse analysis involves a variety of facets. It is, again, a subdiscipline of linguistics, but it takes as its input not only linguistics and psychology but some issues from other disciplines such as philosophy, sociology, et cetera.

The course is designed as a kind of survey course, a course designed to introduce the students to various approaches to discourse analysis -- those taken by people like psycholinguists versus those taken by conversational analysts, for example, and also, from a philosophical point of view, theoretical issues that have been developed in discourse analysis.

The goal of the course is that at the end of the course the students should have a working familiarity with several different approaches to discourse analysis and be able to function in each of those approaches in a literate way.

Q. I take you down to the graduate courses that you have taught and draw your attention to Advanced Topics in psycholinguistics. What are the advanced topics that you would cover?

A. Some of the topics that I have dealt with -- this is a seminar, so the topic in the seminar might change from year to year or from term to term. One topic that I dealt with fairly recently and actually published on a bit as well has to do with language comprehension processes, processes that are basically cognitive and psychological in nature as opposed to sociological in nature -- that is, processes like parsing strategies, the effect of numerous constraints, the effect of lexical choice, et cetera, on the way people process language. The idea is that, with certain kinds of structures, processing is inhibited; with other kinds of structures processing is facilitated. The use of those kinds of structures which might fit into a particular extended stretch of speech can still be looked at, to some extent, in isolation with respect to particulars of the structures.

For example, if we were looking at some canonical properties of English, that is, properties that are sort of common to English structure -- English is a language that has a subject-verb-object order, as you know. We can have structures in which that order is changed. We can have structures where the order might be object-verb-subject, like "Black beans I can't stand them" -- structures in which you have non-canonical forms.

The question for the psycholinguist in that particular seminar that I did was to look at these non-canonical forms and ask what kinds of strategies, what kinds of cognitive processing phenomena were involved in order to facilitate or inhibit the process.

Q. I will just take you down to the next headline, the Professional Societies that you are a member of. Could you describe those, Doctor.

A. Taking them from the top, Mr. Taylor, the first society is simply a local Conference of Linguists in Alberta and B.C. and a few from Saskatchewan. It is an opportunity for linguists to meet on an annual basis in a very informal situation and to exchange ideas.

The Canadian Linguistic Association is the flagship society for my discipline. It is the major linguistic association of Canada. I have served in various capacities on the Executive of that committee as well.

Cognitive Science Society is a relatively new society where people interested in empirical aspects of linguistics, like discourse analysis, pragmatics, psycholinguistics, language acquisition and so forth, come together to participate and exchange ideas cross-disciplinarily.

The Linguistic Association of Canada and the United States is another international organization. It is an association of linguists from both countries who meet annually and publish a journal.

The Linguistic Society of America is the flagship professional society of our discipline. It is a society which has a long history. It was formed probably in the 1920s by some very eminent early linguists, Leonard Bloomfield, Edward Sapir and others. It has membership all over the world. It publishes the flagship journal in my discipline, the journal "Language."

The other two conferences are, again, relatively local organizations. I participate in the Southern Conference on Linguistics because I have colleagues who work in the southern United States, and that is where I originate, so I have an opportunity to see those people every three or four years, perhaps. They publish a journal.

The Western Conference on Linguistics is, again, a western Canadian and western United States association which meets annually in different universities. Its focus is primarily on formal syntactic analysis.

Q. Under the next headline, "Awards, Grants and Fellowships," I won't take you, sir, through each of these. I will just note that it spreads from page 2 over on to page 3. I have specific questions about the second SSHRCC grant. Could you describe that grant and what it was for.

A. We are talking about the second entry there?

Q. Yes, the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

A. SSHRCC, Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada is, as I am sure the Panel must know, the primary federal funding agency for the social sciences and humanities for academics. This particular research grant is a three-year grant, and its subject matter is basically discourse analysis carried out in an experimental and text analysis methodology.

The funding is spread over three years, and the funding is used primarily for graduate student support and research, for assisting graduate students in their own research, but also, and more important, in carrying out group research which we engage in.

It is a continuation of grants. It is not the same grant, but it is a continuation of a series of grants that I have held over the last few years in which I started my work in psycholinguistics and expanded into discourse analysis.

Q. Could you just describe the process, then -- how that grant came about, and the process that the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council puts you through in order to make the grant.

A. These grant applications are made in my discipline on a three-year basis; they are usually three-year grants. The application forms simply involve -- I shouldn't say "simply" -- involve specification in some considerable detail of the projects, usually a series of projects linked together under the aegis of a common thread; statements of the theoretical basis, the methodologies to be used; the kinds of support needed; the venues for publication of those results; the qualifications of the participants, including if one is asking for a post-doctoral fellow or graduate students and the like. Those applications are locally adjudicated by the universities and then sent forth from the university's granting office to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council.

In the year that I received this, 1996, there were for all linguists in the country only 13 grants awarded in this area, so I was very fortunate to get one.

Q. Can you comment, Doctor, on the size of the award? Where does the size of the award fit into the other grants, to your knowledge?

A. I think it is probably, if not the largest, one of the largest, which doesn't look all that large when you look at NSERC awards and the like. In linguistics it is a large award.

Q. I draw your attention next, Doctor, to your election to the Scientific Research Society in 1994. Could you describe that society, please.

A. That is a society, Sigma Xi, which, I guess, has members all over the world. It is a society where people engaged in scientific research come together and exchange ideas at meetings and the like.

The process of election follows by nomination from members. The University of Alberta has a fairly active chapter of this society. I was asked to submit documents for nomination. I was approached by the President of that year of our local chapter of Sigma Xi and asked to provide documents so that my nomination could go forth, and it did. I don't know, frankly, what the procedures are for accepting or rejecting nominations.

Q. Just following down the page, Doctor, I note that in 1993 to 1996 you also had a Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council grant.

A. Yes.

Q. Following down, in 1991-92 a McCalla Research Professorship. Could you describe that, Doctor.

A. Our university, as many universities I suppose, has a small set of research professorships which are awarded annually. There are two or three generally awarded, and these are awarded by someone making a nomination of an individual scholar, and they are adjudicated by a committee.

I was nominated by my department chair and my Dean of Arts for this award, and I was fortunate enough to receive it. It involves full-time attention to research and no teaching duties in that particular year.

It provided me with an opportunity to get a lot of work finished, which was nice.

Q. I will just take you over to page 3 where your Awards, Grants and Fellowships continue. I note throughout those more Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council grants.

A. Yes.

Q. I note there a Fulbright-Hayes Grant to Japan. I think you mentioned that earlier, the third one from the bottom of that list.

Could you describe what the Fulbright-Hayes is.

A. It is a fellowship program open to American citizens. It involves either having scholars who are American citizens go abroad to teach or to study or to have scholars from foreign countries come to the United States to teach or to study. The number of countries involved, as you may know, is large. There is a large contingent of Fulbright-Hayes research grants to many countries.

I was nominated for this just after I had finished my doctoral thesis and was invited to Japan in the function of being both a teacher and a researcher, primarily a teacher in this instance, teaching linguistics at two universities on the west coast of Japan, Tottori and Shimane Universities. I spent a year in Japan doing that and carried out more research on Japanese syntax as well.

Q. Just to take you down to the headline, "Publications, Books and Monographs," I won't take you through each of these, but could you describe the first one, the one you authored with Mr. Baker.

A. This is a research monograph that my colleague Bill Baker and I wrote. It is a research monograph in the extent that it reports on several sets of experiments, psycholinguistics experiments, that we conducted in both English and a some smaller set in Japanese and Ukrainian. I don't know Ukrainian but, fortunately, we had people who do in our research group.

The issue, really, that was the focus of the study is the way English structures are processed and how variants in these structures contribute to or inhibit processing, what the function of short-term memory is in this processing, and what is the function of expectation of canonicality of grammatical structures, lexical choice and the like, how they relate to processing.

The book talks about six studies that we carried out, as I say, primarily on English, but some in other languages as well. Korean was another language we used in one study.

What we tried to show, the thrust of the study, was that there are a couple of cognitive processing principles that can be shown to be active, primarily, in comprehension. Those principles have to do with how propositional information is encoded and interrupted or not, what information is construed to be shared or not, and whether the canonical forms of the relative clauses themselves contribute to that process and complexity.

I don't know if that made sense.

Q. The next one, Doctor, is the book "Psycholinguistics: The experimental study of language." Could you describe that one.

A. That is a textbook, Mr. Taylor. It was a book that I was asked to write by Croom Helm. It is an undergraduate survey text dealing with the basic issues in psycholinguistics dealing with processes of language, comprehension, language production, to a modest extent language acquisition. It was an attempt to bring together certain theoretical concerns that were current at the time with experimental methodology.

The book is now out of date, in my view, but it was used pretty widely when it was first published.

Q. Used widely at the college and university level?

A. Yes.

MR. TAYLOR: I note that it is almost 12:30, Mr. Chairman. I am in your hands as to when you would like to take the luncheon break. I am about one-third through the examination on Professor Prideaux' CV.

THE CHAIRPERSON: We were planning on rising at one o'clock and coming back at 2:30, if you want to continue.

MR. TAYLOR: Very well, thank you.

Q. Doctor, could I take you now to the entries under the headline "Refereed Articles" and ask you to describe the one that is at the bottom of page 3.

First of all, Doctor, could you tell us about the International Journal of Psycholinguistics and give us a sense of where that stands in the hierarchy of these refereed publications.

A. It is a good journal; it is an international journal, as the title says. I would say that it is probably, within the psycholinguistics segment, one of the top three journals.

Q. And the content of that article?

A. The issue I was addressing was, again, language processing and, in particular, language production in this case.

There is a current theory in language processing which suggests that in the processes of comprehension, as opposed to production, when one is listening to a sentence, if that sentence has some ambiguity in it, some sort of local ambiguity, such as a sentence like, "John knows that answer" versus "John knows that answer is wrong," where you have two possible structures after the verb "know," one current theory of language processing, a very influential one, suggests that in comprehension there is evidence for serial processing -- that is, that one takes a certain structure and tries it and, if it works, fine, and, if it doesn't work, he restructures the system.

That serial processing has been challenged by some recent work in cognitive science. What I was trying to do in this particular study was to elucidate that issue by some experimental evidence -- that is, by evidence which would suggest that, in fact, we have evidence for parallel processing or parallel activation. When a person encounters a sentence that is locally ambiguous in that fashion, what happens is that both structures are activated in parallel and are weighted according to some sort of expectation constraints, given the context and the like.

Many of the results of the earlier theoretical position can be accommodated by this position as well; whereas, some of the problems with the earlier theoretical position cannot be.

Q. Could I turn you to page 4 and ask you about the fifth one down, a 1995 article with Hogan, "Constraints on the form of oral narratives." Could you describe the journal and then the content of that article.

A. The journal focuses primarily on socio-linguistic issues. It is published in Germany. Its major interest is in, I think, what one might call applied linguistics, but applied linguistics from a theoretical perspective. The journal is widely distributed; it is known in all linguistic domains.

Dr. John Hogan and I had shared a research grant, a SSHRCC grant, for three years, and we carried out a series of experiments on oral narratives and the production of oral narratives. We asked our subjects to engage in a kind of experiment in which one participant would describe some set of events to another participant.

The social constraints that we looked at were questions of how the narrative structures differ, not the quality but the structures, when the participants in the conversation are either friends or not -- that is, intimates or not -- or same sets or different sets. Those are the social domains.

We also looked at some of the cognitive factors -- that is, issues having to do with attention focus, memory, narrative structure, organization, and the like.

In this particular paper we summarized the work on the social factors and demonstrated that, under certain kinds of controls, you get no punitive sets difference although you often get an intimacy difference in terms of the kinds of interaction you get. There was no gender difference at all across the cognitive domains -- that is, the information focusing, comparative strategies in our task were virtually identical for all the participants.

Q. Could I draw your attention next to the article which is eleven from the bottom, just below the middle of the page, a 1993 article. "Subordination and information distribution --." Again, could you describe that journal.

A. You will notice that this was the first issue of the journal. I was one of five or six people invited to contribute to the première edition. The journal has gone on now to become quite influential, especially in the study of pragmatics. It is one of the journals that I read relatively faithfully, not just because my paper was in it.

The paper looked, again, at the way subordinate clauses, not just relative clauses but subordinate clauses, are distributed in both oral and written narratives in controlled conditions. That is, our participants in our experiments were to provide oral or written narratives of the same set of events, and then we examined those.

By information distribution, what I mean is the distinction between what is often called given and new information or shared and non-shared information in discourse. If a speaker is addressing a hearer, that speaker makes some assumptions about what the hearer shares and knows, and uses that as a starting point for a discourse. For example, if I wanted to tell Mr. Taylor about a movie or something, I would have to first flag that as an issue, and then he would tune into that, and then we would go on.

For example, I could say, "What is the difference between a sentence like 'John gave Mary a book,' and 'John gave a book to Mary'"? It sounds like the propositional content is identical, but in actual discourse those structures are used in quite different ways in terms of what is shared information and what is not shared. That is the kind of issue we were addressing here.

Q. Could I take you down to the fourth entry from the bottom of the page, a 1991 article, "Syntactic form and textual rhetoric." Could you again describe the journal and the content.

A. The Journal of Pragmatics is the flagship journal in the subdiscipline of pragmatics; it is the best of the lot.

Would you like me to tell you about the content as well?

Q. Yes, thank you, sir.

A. It has often been argued in pragmatics that certain aspects of social linguistic interaction are based upon social convention -- issues like politeness; issues like complexity of sentence use; assessment of audience, and the like.

What I tried to suggest in this paper was that some of those issues are not arbitrarily social in nature, but have a cognitive underpinning. That is, they again have to do with issues of our cognitive architecture, of the way we process information in terms of packaging information, in terms of focus of attention on parts of information, and on distribution of that information.

It has often been suggested that certain structures which have an aberrant kind of syntactic form, with very heavy material at the end of the sentence, are simply socially primed. We were successful in our research group in showing that those are cognitively driven as opposed to socially driven. That was the thrust of it. I was trying to argue in this paper that a lot of the so-called social or textual rhetorical processes have cognitive underpinnings.

Q. I ask you to turn to page 5, Doctor. I want you to comment on the first item there, the 1989 paper, "Text data as evidence for language processing principles."

Again, describe the Language Sciences journal and the content of the article.

A. Languages Sciences is a relatively eclectic journal. It doesn't have a particular focus on the kinds of research that I do. It publishes in the areas of syntactic theory as well as language processing. It is a good journal; it is not the best journal in the discipline.

The text data issue is this. It has been argued by many psycholinguistics that, really, it is necessary to look at language processing on line -- that is, with techniques that access particular kinds of strategies and language production or comprehension on line as in reading, scanning and so forth. What I was trying to suggest here is that there is a large domain of data which can give us evidence about processing simply in terms of the form of the texts themselves, in terms of the way the texts are organized and whether texts are organized reflecting the intentional stance of the author.

Again, I was looking at processing considerations like canonicality of syntactic representations. I was looking at principles that can be modelled in terms of interruption processes.

I think that particular article was able to link some processing considerations with some textual structural considerations. That was its point.

Q. I draw your attention to the article that is the fifth down from that. It is a paper with McCormick in 1987, "Discourse constraints on the syntax of temporally ordered events."

Could you describe the Thirteenth Annual Symposium.

A. This was a proceeding of a linguistics group at Brigham Young University in Provo, Utah. It is an annual conference. I was invited, with my student Ms McCormick, to make a presentation at that conference.

We had been working together on a problem in the way events are ordered syntactically -- for example, before X, Y, or Y after X, or whatever. We were trying to unpack the discourse effects of each of those kinds of ordering structures. It was on that topic that we presented the paper, and it was later published in the proceedings.

Q. One more example from this page, Doctor. I believe it is the twelfth from the bottom, just below the middle of the page. It is your paper with Dr. Baker in 1984, "An integrated perspective --." Could you describe that publication.

A. META is a journal that focuses on psycholinguistics and language processing, to a large extent. This was a special issue of that journal to which four or five individuals or groups were invited to contribute on this particular topic of neurolinguistics, psycholinguistics and translation issues. It was an issue which was designed to bring together those three disciplines into one.

Our contribution in that paper was to try to provide a kind of orientation or framework or perspective for processing strategies as opposed to partitioning those apart and social constraints in looking at language processing, primarily in this instance reporting on experiments from English.

Q. I will not take you to any other of these articles, Doctor. I would just ask the Tribunal to note that the articles of Dr. Prideaux continue on to page 6.

After those are listed Review Articles. I won't discuss those two.

Doctor, I want to draw your attention under the headline "Reviews" to the first item, Review of J.F. Kess. Could you describe that journal and what your review involved.

A. Canadian Journal of Linguistics is the organ of the Canadian Linguistic Association; it is a publication of that organization. It is, again, our flagship linguistic journal in Canada.

The book I was asked to review by Kess is a fairly up-to-date summary textbook on psycholinguistics, dealing with the issues of comprehension, production, acquisition, but also second-language acquisition to some extent, speech perception and production as well. It is a book that has become pretty much a standard over the last year or two in our discipline.

Q. Who is Kess?

A. He is a professor of linguistics at the University of Victoria, and department chair there.

Q. The next one is Review of Jackendoff.

A. The journal WORD is an international journal in linguistics. It publishes all kinds of subdisciplinary materials.

Ray Jackendoff, a professor of cognitive science at Brandeis, has written a series of very, very influential books. "Patterns in the Mind: Language and human nature" is a kind of popularized approach to his position with respect to language processing. It is similar in extent to Stephen Pinker's book that folks might be familiar with, that sort of level of popularization.

Q. Just to complete that page, Doctor, could you comment on your review of the Blakemore book.

A. Diane Blakemore is a linguist who I think is at Georgetown University. Her book is dealing with pragmatics and relevance theory -- that is, the work of Sperber and Wilson which has really been very influential in discourse analysis and pragmatics. What she does is provide in this book a kind of overview of the way the relevance principles apply to comprehension processes.

Q. I ask you to turn over to page 7. I won't ask you any more about these reviews. I will just note for the Tribunal that Dr. Prideaux has obviously done reviews in several other journals as well.

Under the headline "Other Publications," Doctor, I will draw your attention to the one that is sixth from the bottom, the 1990 paper, Proceedings of the Ninth World Congress of Applied Linguistics. Could you describe that congress, please, and then the content of your presentation.

A. The publication here is just, as you see, an abstract of the paper that I presented. The World Congress of Applied Linguistics is an international body that meets every three years; most recently, it met in Australia. I wasn't there.

It examines research or invites research publications and presentations and plenary sessions and the like from scholars working in applied linguistics construed broadly -- that is, things ranging from very applied, as language teaching, to more theoretical work.

This particular congress was attended by about 2,000 people. It was held, as you see, in Thessaloniki.

Q. I will turn over to page 8 and ask the Tribunal to note that the other publications continue on

page 8.

Could I draw your attention next, Doctor, to "Invited and Conference Presentations". As an example, could you give an explanation of the first one there.

A. The first invited conference was "Theoretical constructs and empirical contents." This is a paper that I was invited to present at a conference at the University of Chicago this past April, a conference that was assembled by an emiritus professor there and Professor Jim McCauley and their colleagues. The purpose of the conference was to look at some kinds of interdisciplinary commonalities in linguistics, psycholinguistics, socio-linguistics, historical linguistics, in terms of methodological assumptions that we held in common.

It was my task to comment on the psycholinguistic aspects of our discipline, so I did.

Q. Would you go two down, Doctor, to the 1996 discussion at Provo, Utah, just as another example. Could you describe that one.

A. This was a panel session held at the annual meeting of the Linguistic Association of Canada and the United States. It was hosted in Provo by Brigham Young University that year.

The conference normally has presented papers, invited papers and panel sessions. The panel session that I was invited to participate on had to do with neurocognitive aspects. My contribution had to do yet again with psycholinguistics and the methodology of psycholinguistics in these kinds of studies.

I won't ask you any more examples of those, but I will ask the Tribunal to note that these presentations continue on page 9, page 10, page 11 and at the top of page 12.

Under the next headline, "Miscellaneous Presentations," Doctor, could I ask you to comment on the second one down, the 1992 presentation, "On the origin and evolution of language."

A. This was a rather unexpected invitation. I was invited by the Genealogical Society, which has great interest in personal family histories, to talk about the issue of language change and evolution, primarily language change. The topic was simply a kind of Linguistics 101 overview of historical linguistics and the way language changes. I found it a bit strange to be asked to do that because it was so distant from what I would have thought to be the concerns of this association, but it turned out that people had an enormous interest in language change.

Q. Then under the next headline, "Appraisals and Assessments, Evaluations," I note that you were an expert witness before the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal in 1996 in the case CARPS v. Pastor Charles Scott in Vancouver.

A. Yes.

Q. Could you just tell us what that evidence was that you were asked to provide at that Tribunal.

A. The evidence was some transcriptions of telephone messages which were -- my task was to assess the messages to see if they had racist or anti-Semitic content, and my analysis said that they did have that. They were texts with materials that are not unlike, I guess, some of the ones that Mr. Binnie was talking about earlier today, although these were transcriptions of telephone conversations, not Internet stuff.

Q. At that tribunal, sir, were you accepted as an expert witness by the tribunal?

A. Yes.

Q. Were your qualifications or credentials challenged in any way?

A. No.

Q. I will just take you down three items there, to 1994, "Expert witness (linguistics and discourse analysis) for the Canadian Human Rights Commission: Payzant v. Canadian Liberty Net" Vancouver, January 24-26. What was the content of your evidence at that time?

A. I was asked to provide an analysis of, again, transcriptions of telephone messages. The issue in this instance wasn't anti-Semitism; this issue was anti-homosexual language, hate language.

The evidence was -- I am trying to remember how many, maybe eight, ten or twelve pages of text.

Q. Were you accepted by the Human Rights Tribunal as an expert in that proceeding?

A. Yes.

Q. Were your credentials or your expertise challenged in any way?

A. Yes.

Q. How were they challenged?

A. They were challenged by Mr. Christie who asked questions about my competence.

Q. Further down under "Appraisals and Assessments," I just want you to describe -- in 1992 you were a referee for Linguistica Atlantica and Journal of Pragmatics. I think those were the ones you identified earlier as --

A. The Journal of Pragmatics is a top-rate journal. Linguistica Atlantica is a more minor journal.

Q. Then down the page continues the appraisals and assessments. I will just note for the Tribunal that several of them are for the National Science Foundation in the United States. They continue over on to page 13.

Just below the midway point on page 13, Doctor, I will draw your attention to your headline "External Referee," and note that you were external referee for several tenure positions. I see in 1988 one at UCLA.

A. Yes. That was actually not a tenure. That was a promotion referee.

Q. Just below that at McGill University.

A. Yes. I was an external evaluator called in. As universities in Quebec normally do, they have regular reviews of their departments to assess the quality and so forth. I served as one of the referees for the Linguistics Department at McGill at that time.

Q. I will just ask the Tribunal to consider the other universities where you have acted in that capacity.

If I could turn you to page 14, Doctor, to your duties as a Thesis Supervisor, I will just ask you a couple of examples here. The Abraham paper in 1995, a Ph.D thesis-- could you describe that paper and your work on it.

A. This was a student who was working on a kind of classic notion of rhetorical devices and syntactic properties, what we call markedness. Her analysis was basically an analysis of several distinct texts -- some of the speeches of Martin Luther King, for example; some of the speeches of John Kennedy; as well as some more casual texts, television texts and the like.

What she was interested in doing was examining the kinds of syntactic or rhetorical devices that those people used and how they differed, depending upon the genre and the kind of audience that the texts were designed for.

That study won the Gold Medal at our university that year for the finest doctoral dissertation of the year.

Q. The next one down, the 1994 Wang paper.

A. This was a study in what is called grounding -- that is, how grammar and grammatical structures distinguish between foreground and background information, what kinds of cues are used to distinguish between foregrounding and backgrounding. She being a speaker of Mandarin was working in Mandarin. She took the topic of a particular structure of Mandarin called the ba construction which has different syntactic properties from the other structures and demonstrated that it was a device that had a strong salience in the discourse grounding strategies.

Q. Then, as another example, I will go to the sixth one from that, Kawashima. Could you describe that, please.

A. This was a thesis which looked at children's acquisition of certain kinds of connections, of sequence and simultaneity. In Japanese, for example, you can connect two clauses by various kinds of syntactic devices, and they have different syntactic complexities and also they arise under two different kinds of conditions. One is the kind of discourse that is being engaged in, and the second is in terms of a kind of developmental pattern that most children seem to undergo as they acquire language from simplex structures or complex structures.

She was looking at these and demonstrated that the acquisition order of these connectives was a function not only of the developmental stages but also a function of the kind of language that the children were using. They would acquire certain kinds of structures for certain kinds of contexts. In a sense, it was a kind of discourse study of Japanese.

Q. I will just ask the Tribunal also to note the other thesis supervision papers.

At the bottom of page 14 we have "University Committees" that travel on to pages 15 and 16. I won't ask you about these.

I draw your attention to the headline "National Committees." Could you describe the first one, Doctor, the Japan Foundation Program Grants.

A. The Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada serves as the host body for the Japan Foundation Grants program, at least one component of them, grants which the Japan Foundation awards to universities for teaching positions and books and acquisitions.

I was asked in 1992 to sit on this adjudication panel which meets every November in Ottawa. Its function is to assess various project proposals from the universities of Canada to the Japan Foundation and to judge them on their scholarly merit and make recommendations to the Japan Foundation for the disbursal of their funds.

THE CHAIRPERSON: Maybe this would be a good time to recess. I have a question which perhaps you could answer at 2:30.

I am not clear as to the linkage between your expertise and the issue to be addressed in your evidence. Perhaps you can enlighten me on that.

--- Luncheon Recess at 1:00 p.m.

--- Upon resuming at 2:36 p.m.

THE CHAIRPERSON: Mr. Taylor, please.

MR. TAYLOR: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Now comes the point in the examination that will answer the question you posed just before the break, Mr. Chairman.

Q. Dr. Prideaux, could I ask you to turn to tab 2 of this document, HR-3, and ask you to flip through all 36 pages there.

A. Yes.

Q. Identify this document, please.

A. These are a series of notes I constructed on parts of the materials that were provided to me by the Human Rights Commission, along with an introductory section sketching very briefly what discourse analysis consists of.

Q. Doctor, it is to that introductory material that I want to focus your attention.

You will note, Mr. Chairman and Members, that that is pages 2, 3 and 4 and then there is a small paragraph at the bottom of page 4 about the methodology that we will get to in a second.

I ask you, Doctor, just to describe discourse analysis as a subset of linguistics.

A. Discourse analysis uses linguistic methodology to some extent, but the basic purpose or insight of discourse analysis of all sorts is that an extended text, be it oral or written, is not just a bunch of sentences put together but, rather, organized in some particular way. In order to make sense of a discourse in terms of its organization, one needs to know not only the rules of the language that we speak, which we know, but also those discourse constraints and principles and rules that help us in assembly, coherence and cohesion to a discourse.

You might consider discourse analysis as a set of methodologies to use to analyze the structure and the content and the effect of particular kinds of language, be they polemical, as these documents seem to be to some extent, or ordinary conversations or whatever.

Q. How does the linguist then use the analysis of the discourse to reach a conclusion? How do you lay over the template of that analysis on the text?

A. I suppose at the first level one could say, given a particular text, that it might be subject to alternative interpretations or it might be subject to alternative understandings. There are principles that are well established in my discipline for looking at those contrary opinions and trying to derive from them some sort of systematic understanding of the text. The use of particular, let's say, vocabulary words might in fact reveal the attitude of the speaker toward some particular group, as in these documents that I was given -- terms, for example, like "eternal parasites" or "the Holocaust Lobby Promotion group" or whatever, which have a function of, by the choice of those terms, expressing a propositional attitude of the speaker toward the content.

Q. I will just take you into the notes that you made there under "Discourse Analysis" that follow along to the discussion of a large body of scientific research that has developed around this.

I take it that there are standard rules of practice that are used by speakers and by listeners so that there is understanding and communication.

A. That's right. In fact, the way discourse analysis perhaps extends ordinary linguistic analysis is that it looks beyond just specific sentences and looks at the entire text as a structure which is organized according to pretty well defined principles, principles that scholars have looked at and examined and discovered and tested for years and years.

I have listed in my little introduction some of the components that reflect some of that attitude.

Q. Could I take you, then, to "Pragmatics." Could you unpack that a bit for us and explain what that is.

A. Pragmatics is traditionally the study of language use from a social perspective. Perhaps the most important contribution to this subdiscipline was made by a man named Paul Grice, who continues to work. He noted that in interactive conversations or texts certain basic assumptions are held when a speaker and a hearer or a reader and a writer interact with that text. Those include that the material is going to be relevant, is going to be truthful, is going to non-ambiguous, and it is going to be clear.

For example, if you were to look at some of these documents that I examined, I find in some places that those presuppositions, those notions, are not satisfied. For example, if one were to look at -- I think it was the "66 Questions."

MR. CHRISTIE: Mr. Chairman, I am not sure if I need to give 10 days' notice of this, but I am having trouble understanding whether we are at the stage where the witness is qualified to express opinions or whether the question that you asked at the end of this morning has been answered, or if this is an attempted answer.

What troubles me is that the witness appears now to be launching into the realm of opinion and analysis of what he has formed an opinion on.

THE CHAIRPERSON: I suppose he is doing that in an attempt to answer the question, but we are certainly still in the inquiry concerning whether he is to be qualified as an expert witness. I am sure counsel will be careful not to go too far into the evidence but, rather, to assist the Tribunal and explain the focus of this evidence in terms of the issue that he intends to direct his evidence to.

Mr. Binnie touched on that in his opening remarks, and perhaps that is what we may be looking for in terms of what we expect to hear from him in a broad context.

MR. TAYLOR:

Q. Would you carry on with your example, Dr. Prideaux.

A. Let me back off a little and give a more general overview.

I guess what I am trying to do is assemble here a set of principles, a set of concepts, that will assist the Tribunal in understanding or drawing conclusions which might have to do with, at first blush, just different opinions. That is, are there methods that can guide us in the interpretation of texts? Is there an arsenal of methodologies that are useful to address the issue of the type of language that is used in these texts?

I will be either as specific or as general as you care to be with respect to that. That is the intent of my response, Mr. Taylor.

MR. TAYLOR: I was asking about pragmatics and the general definition.

I think he was using, Mr. Chairman, as an example, something from the material that he has reviewed, certainly not getting into the merits on that issue alone. I think, for the understanding of the Tribunal and certainly in answer to your question, sir, that would be useful for Dr. Prideaux to describe what he found in this material since he has reviewed it, as an example of these lexical strategies or the strategies that are part of that overall framework that he described at the beginning of his answer.

Q. Do you have other examples on the first element of pragmatics, Doctor?

A. I think there are probably several examples throughout the texts that we could refer to. We could refer to cases in which, for example, assertions are made without warrant -- that is, without providing us with reasons for those assertions. The pragmatics principle of relevance typically assumes that, when people make assertions, they have reasons for them. If the warrants are, in fact, lacking, then those statements can be very misleading.

Q. I will just take you to the next strategy that you have described here and ask you to unpack that one a bit and, if you wish, to use examples again.

A. Propositional and syntactic analysis is the bones of linguistics -- that is, having to take a grammatical structure and extract its basic semantic, syntactic roles.

Any sentence that one wants to look at can be said to have a propositional content, so we extract the basic meaning and abstract away various factors like the tense or the mood and the like.

MR. CHRISTIE: I couldn't hear the witness.

THE WITNESS: Sorry, I will speak louder. Shall I say it again?

THE CHAIRPERSON: Can you repeat it?

THE WITNESS: I doubt it, but I will try.

The propositional content of a sentence is simply a representation of its basic semantic core, the basic predicate and its arguments, the basic verb and its subjects and objects, if you like.

According to virtually every type of semantic or discourse analysis that has been proposed, they all converge on the necessity of representing meaning and some sort of sense, and the propositional notation of history is the sense in which that is taken.

I can give you a simple example: Fred drank a glass of water. The basic propositional content has to do with "drink" and "Fred" and "the water" and the relationship that would obtain amongst those.

MR. TAYLOR:

Q. Could I take you to the third one, discourse coherence and cohesion.

A. Discourse is not just a bunch of sentences, as I have suggested and as we all know. There are devices that provide some sort of both coherence and cohesion.

By "coherence," we mean the kind of overall hanging together of the discourse. It is thematically consistent; it takes one theme and develops it or whatever; it changes themes.

By "cohesion," I mean the devices, the actual grammatical devices such as pronominalization or an anaphoric relationship or sequencing of tenses, or the like, that provide that glue that holds the discourse units together.

Q. Perhaps an example would help us in this, too, Doctor.

A. Perhaps we could look at tab 18.

Q. Of HR-2?

A. Of whatever evidence --

Q. HR-2.

A. This is a Power Letter of July 1996. In the first passage I just want to call your attention to the -- let me find it in this document.

Q. Just ensure we are all on the same page, Doctor.

A. How about page 5, the first highlighted passage. I just want to call your attention to the pronoun "they" in the third line, "they will have no choice." Notice that that pronoun does not have an antecedent. Most pronouns have antecedents. You say, for example, "John went to town and he bought a book." We know who "he" is from the context. Here there is no antecedent. There is no overt reference.

What the reader must do in order to construct a reference to satisfy coherence and cohesion is to take some information that is present in that discourse and try to construct an arbitrary or non-arbitrary antecedent.

Who is the "they?" It would appear that the "they" comes from an activation of terms like "Jewish Professor," "Zionist myth," "Israel's propaganda", "armory collapses," et cetera. so we have these three references to Jews as a group, and then we say, "Knock that shield away and they --." In those circumstances, "they" has a clear, although unexpressed, antecedent, so we know who the "they" is.

This is a matter of discourse coherence. It is very simply and obviously pointed out, although it is not so obvious at first blush.

Q. Your No. 4 point is lexical choice. Could you describe this as a rhetorical strategy.

A. Just the choice of words one uses to state a position. One could use words that are relatively neutral or one could express one's opinions and attitudes toward them by making particular kinds of choices.

For example, if you see constantly a collocation of terms -- that is, an aggregate of terms -- that says "Jewish Holocaust Promotion Lobby," those meanings come together in a specific way to talk about or to activate or to construct in the reader not only a certain group of people but also an attitude toward them.

If I say, for example, "John proved that theorem," that is a simple, straightforward sentence. If I say, "John proved that theorem beautifully," it tells me something about my attitude toward his proof. If I said, "John proved that theorem sloppily," it tells you something about my attitude toward that statement.

These kinds of lexical choices can reveal attitudes; they can call up other references, and the like.

Q. Your next point is information management.

A. Again, this is something that we can talk about. I used the term "packaging," and that is common parlance in discourse analysis -- that is, how one takes information and puts it together.

One of the most important aspects of information packaging is entering into a dialogue or a discourse by assessing what the hearer knows, what is shared information. Only with that shared information as an anchor or an address can additional information be added and enhanced to it. Information packaging is an issue that has been studied enormously in the discourse analysis literature.

Q. Your point No. 6 is syntactic structure.

A. I think we could probably use the same kind of analysis with the "they," but looking at it from a grammatical as opposed to a discourse point of view. When I was giving my reference to tab 18 earlier, I talked about the establishment of an antecedent, but one can talk about the grammatical properties of those antecedents and their grammatical structures as well.

For example, if you have a sentence that is passive, without an agent, such as "Fred was hit," we don't know who the hitter is, but we know that Fred was the recipient. Those agentless passages have important discourse functions, and they are represented syntactically.

Q. Point No. 7 is rhetorical organization. I note in there that you note that this is a common strategy used in polemical discourse. I understood you earlier to say that the material that you reviewed, which was provided by the Commission, was this type of textual material.

A. It certainly manifests many of these strategies. These strategies are pretty well established in the discourse literature. People have talked about virtually all of them for many years.

Q. Could I ask you to go through each of those five, Doctor, under Point No. 7, discussing each of the strategies with examples, if you wish, to make it clear to the Tribunal.

A. The targeting strategy is simply a strategy that uses a linguistic device to isolate one person or a group of people on whatever grounds and then associate with them certain properties, and then later use those properties as characteristics of the entire group.

Somewhere in tab 10, I believe, the expression "the Jew" is used. That is a generic notion; it is not this individual or that individual, but a generic notion. Then to that term is attributed certain properties.

The targeting strategy is to take a particular collocation and then associate properties with it, positively or negatively.

Q. Continue please with the inversion strategy.

A. The inversion strategy is very commonly used in these documents. It is a situation in which conventionally held situations, interpretation, is inverted, such that, for example, in many of the texts it is inferred that the Jews who were victims of the Holocaust were really, in fact, the aggressors, that they were the ones who were responsible, and the Nazis were the victims or the German state in some cases was the victim. The particulars vary all over the place in the texts.

The inversion strategy is one that has been talked about for many years. It simply inverts a particular position, reverses it, and then uses a set of arguments or stipulations to support that inversion.

The alibi strategy is something that has been talked about in a lot of post-modernist analysis, about which I cannot speak as an expert. The alibi strategy works like this.

Suppose one uses a particular term and set of definitions -- maybe good definitions, maybe bad definitions. Then later that same term is used again, but with a different meaning. For example, one might say in the discussions here that the term "Holocaust" has that property. In some places its existence is denied and in some places it is asserted as having happened but being minor, and in other places it is asserted to have no meaning at all. If one looks at the expression "Holocaust" in various of the texts, very different meanings accrue.

The code strategy is self-evident, I think. The code strategy simply says that we have a particular metaphor, a particular expression, and we build a network with that expression. You build an expression and you attach to it predicates or propositions. Those predicates or propositions accrue in a kind of snowballing effect so that any time any of the particular parts of the metaphor are mentioned, the entire network is activated in a kind of metaphoric sense.

For example, the terms "Zionist," "Marxist" and "the Jews" are used here in some places interchangeably, such that one would activate the notion of being a Marxist if one uses the term "Zionist" or "Jew", for example.

The last strategy that I have mentioned is the metonymy strategy. This is, again, a case in which a particular is used to classify the whole. That is, some member of a set is used to generalize to the entire set.

For example, there were a couple of instances in which I recall that a couple of gangsters were named as having immigrated to Israel, and then that was extrapolated to thousands of others and extrapolated to the set of Jews in general.

The metonymy strategy is using a member of a set to refer to the entire set.

Those are the kinds of devices, Mr. Taylor, that discourse analysts look at in order to unpack meanings from extended discourses.

Q. I note also that you made a summary at the bottom of page 3.

A. I guess I just said it, didn't I?

Q. Yes.

A. In other words, when we analyze discourse, we have syntactic properties to look at, we have semantic ones, pragmatic ones; we have the use of various strategies

-- strategies taken in a positive sense, not a negative sense, a sense of how we organize things in full intentionality to represent ourselves.

Q. At the bottom of page 4, just to confirm that this was the methodology you used, could you describe the methodology briefly.

A. I was given these documents, and my attention was drawn to several passages in those documents, and others as well. I looked at those and I asked the question: Do these passages employ particular kinds of strategies to draw particular conclusions or points, or do they use these techniques, rhetorical strategies, rhetorical devices, syntactic devices, et cetera, in order to draw the reader to draw a certain kind of conclusion? Those are arbitrary; those are calculated; and every writer uses them implicitly if not explicitly.

That is the methodology I used, Mr. Taylor,

MR. TAYLOR: Thank you, Doctor.

Mr. Chairman and Members, the Commission asks that Dr. Prideaux, on the basis of this examination of his qualifications, be accepted by you as an expert in linguistics, able to give expert opinion evidence on discourse analysis as he has described it.

The Commission submits that this evidence is relevant to your inquiries here. Clearly, Dr. Prideaux, from his CV, is properly qualified, and the results of his investigations will certainly be helpful to you in making your conclusions on the nature of the messages that will be put before you.

MR. CHRISTIE:

Q. What method do you use to assess the importance of truth in regard to the discourse you are analyzing?

A. I look at the kinds of assumptions that are made or that are invited to be made by the writing. I have very little interest, in this particular case, in looking at the truth or falsity of some of the claims. That is not what I was asked to do.

Q. So what is the answer, then, to the question as to what part truth plays in your assessment of the discourse?

A. Truth plays an important part in my assessment because I am using methods that are rigorous and are well established and well tested by many scholars.

Q. How do you determine the truth of factual statements?

A. I don't determine those.

Q. Are you qualified to determine those?

A. I am qualified to determine some of them, yes.

Q. Which statements of fact are you qualified to determine the truth of?

A. "My name is Gary Prideaux." I am qualified to determine the truth of that.

Q. I don't think we are going to be asking you that. I don't think that is part of what you were asked. I just wondered what areas of expertise qualify you to determine the truth of any matter of fact in any of the writing you analyzed.

A. I suppose there is an equivocation in the word "truth" as I understand you to be using it, Mr. Christie.

Q. Does it not have a clear meaning to you?

A. No, it does not.

Q. If there is a factual statement, are you qualified to ascertain the truth of the statement?

A. In some cases I am, and in some cases I am not.

Q. In any of the statements that you were called upon to analyze, what qualifications do you have to determine the truth of any factual aspects?

A. I wasn't asked to determine the truth of any factual aspects.

Q. So it took no part in your assessment of the discourse?

A. That is correct.

Q. Thank you.

What method do you use to assess the importance of truth in the discourse?

A. I examine the way the language is constructed and I ask myself the question, that any ordinary reader would ask I would assume, and that is: Is this extended text coherent or are there missing links in the arguments, so that we could replace propositions by other propositions and look at the same structure configurations with the same methodology?"

Q. How are you qualified to decide what any ordinary reader would ask?

A. I am an ordinary reader, but --

Q. So it doesn't require expertise?

A. Can I finish? I am an ordinary reader, but I also have an arsenal, an assembly, of methods that are not mine alone, but the product of many scholars for analyzing issues of the sort that I have already discussed -- pragmatics, strategic use of language, and the like.

Q. Are there any limits to your discipline?

A. I don't understand.

Q. Are you competent to ascertain actual social effects of writing?

A. I have done that.

Q. I asked you if you are competent to do it.

A. I am.

Q. How are you qualified to assess actual social effects of writing?

A. I have done experiments; I have published them; and they have been peer reviewed.

Q. What experiments have you done to determine the actual social effects of writing?

A. Can I refer you to some papers in the CV? Some of these were mentioned earlier today.

One of several is a paper on planned and unplanned narrative descriptions, in 1995, which I did with my colleague Dr. Hogan.

Q. What studies did you do to ascertain actual social effects of language?

A. We looked at the types of discourses, types of narratives, that were uttered under particular control conditions, people relating sets of events, and we looked at the kinds of effects that those utterances had upon the hearers in terms of such social factors as relative friendship or intimacy and same or different sets.

Q. What effects were you ascertaining?

A. What particular results did we have?

Q. What effects were you ascertaining?

A. Whether the sex, for example, of a hearer, with one kind of narrative -- whether the response to the narrative was different if the hearer was of a different sex.

Q. To determine if there was a sexual bias in reception of language?

A. No, to determine whether people reacted differently to the language.

Q. On the basis of sex.

A. On the basis of sex and intimacy.

Q. Sex and intimacy -- I am not sure I understand.

A. Whether the speaker was speaking to someone he or she knew or not. "Intimacy" is just a term for whether you know the person or not. You can talk about relative degrees, of course, as well.

Q. Did you reach any conclusions on the effect of any particular speeches?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you? What was the speech you were assessing?

A. I told you the speech.

Q. A set of texts?

A. No, a set of narratives that were written by one set of speakers -- that is, one set of participants -- and then exposed to the others. We asked the question: Are there any differences? Do you react differently to these, and how, and so forth?

Q. As I understand it, some were written by men and some were written by women.

A. A balanced set, yes.

Q. And the question was: How do you react to these?

A. That is right.

Q. To see if they react differently to men and women?

A. Whether they reacted differently to the texts written by men and women.

Q. And then you would assess whether they reacted --

A. There are experiments for doing that, yes.

Q. Sorry...?

A. There are methodologies to ask about relative comprehension, relative familiarity, et cetera.

Q. Did you do any other experiments to determine the actual social effects of communication?

A. Yes, I mentioned some other ones.

Q. What others?

A. I have done a series of experiments along exactly those lines, looking at different kinds of social effects, but primarily cognitive processing effects as well as the social effects.

Q. What social effects have you tried to ascertain from any experiments involving communication?

A. Whether or not the text itself was reacted to positively, neutrally, negatively by either readers or, in other instances where the narratives were taped, by hearers.

Q. This is oral communication, is it?

A. And written. Both.

Q. Have you done tests with written communication?

A. Yes, I just told you about some of them.

Q. Positively, neutrally or negatively are the categories of reaction --

A. No, those were one possible set of reaction types.

Q. What others?

A. One can construe a set of dimensions. For example --

Q. What have you construed? What have you used?

A. One is a positive or negative response to the content. One is a response to particular lexical choices -- that is, taboo words, swear words, and the like. One is responses to the perspective or point of view that the writer or the narrator took when describing those events and whether the hearer or the reader associated with or did not associate with -- that is, when the hearer himself or herself replicated that content, what point of view did that individual take?

For example, if you have -- did you have an example?

Q. You are the professional here. You tell us.

A. I will tell you, if you want an example. I would be glad to do that.

Q. Or I have another question, if you prefer. Take your pick. Don't let me interrupt you.

A. Thank you, Mr. Christie.

Suppose we had a narration, a text, in which some particular kind of activity is being described. It could be described from the point of view of one or the other of the participants. This is, maybe there is a kid and a dog and a little girl; they are going down the street, and things happen in this narrative.

Someone else is asked to respond to that kind of narrative. Oftentimes, the way they will respond to it is in terms of association. They will take the point of view or perspective either of an abstract narrator or of one of the characters.

Q. Are you telling us now about an experiment that you performed or is this --

A. It is an experiment we have done. We have done several such experiments.

Q. What did you use, children for the tests?

A. No, we used adults. We used university students primarily as subjects.

Q. Do you have any empirical reference to these studies?

A. We can talk about the results achieving some degree of significance, if that is what you would like.

Q. I just wondered whether you have ever had a study or done a study to determine the difference in reaction between dislike and intense dislike?

A. Only to the extent that our scale is not truly valued. If you are using a scale of evaluation of, let's say, from one to five, from intense like to intense dislike, people will use that scale in making assessments differently on an individual basis; nevertheless, one can look at clustering kinds of results.

In answer to the fine-grained analysis, yes. In answer to the rougher interpretation, marginally.

Q. What study have you ever done that tested whether people reacted with dislike or intense dislike to any text?

A. I think I just gave you an example of a situation.

Q. Not an example; I want a factual statement.

A. Do you want me to find you a study?

Q. If you have done one, yes. Can you remember any?

A. Yes, I think I can find one.

Do you see the study which is written by two of my colleagues and I in 1993, "Firsthand and secondhand narratives: Differences in the telling?"

Q. "First and secondhand narratives: Difference in the telling?"

A. "Differences in the telling." That was the title of the study.

Q. I just wanted to establish that. What did you do in that study?

A. The study had three parts. The first part of the study was to have participants, subjects, who came to do the experiment, either look at a short film clip or read a little story. They then had to tell the story to a friend or a stranger who was not present, and then tell the same story to the other case -- that is, the stranger or the friend. In some cases you had a friend who was told the story first and in the second case the stranger, and so forth. These were balanced for the sex of speakers and the hearers.

When we looked at the way those stories were told to the friends and to the strangers, we looked at the way the friends and the strangers responded to those stories as well -- whether they asked questions, whether they liked them or made valuative judgments on the narratives.

Q. Whether they liked them or not?

A. I didn't say that. Whether they made a valuative judgment on the narratives -- that is, whether the narratives were well done, not well done; whether they liked the content or disliked the content, et cetera.

Q. So it had nothing to do with the assessment of whether the content was generative of like or dislike of anyone mentioned in the story.

A. It was an attempt to be neutral with respect to that.

Q. My question is: It did not involve an assessment of whether a story generated like or dislike of anyone in the text?

A. That is right it did not.

Q. Have you done anything in your discipline to consider or ascertain the limits of free speech?

A. I participated in two of these tribunal situations in which I have assessed text. That is the extent of my involvement.

Q. Have you ever testified as an expert witness for anyone other than the Canadian Human Rights Commission?

A. No, I have not.

Q. And they paid you for both those appearances, I take it?

A. Yes.

Q. Have you ever in your discourse study or in your discipline had to ascertain the limits of cultural discourse?

A. I don't quite understand the question.

Q. I will repeat it. Have you ever in your discipline had to study the limits of cultural discourse? Is that an ambiguous sentence?

A. I am not quite sure what you mean by "cultural discourse."

Q. I wasn't either, but I heard Mr. Binnie use the term, so I thought I would ask you if you were an expert in this field. He said that you could tell us what was not cultured, scholarly or respectable. So, can you tell me --

A. I said "cultured" in the sense of cultured as opposed to cultures. I understand the distinction now.

Q. I just used the word "cultural discourse." Maybe I should have used "cultured discourse."

Are you an expert in ascertaining the limits of cultured discourse?

A. In the academic domain, I am.

Q. How are you qualified in the public domain to determine the limits of cultured discourse?

A. If one looks at academic publications -- and I think this is the issue --

Q. No, I am sorry, for me at least it is not the issue. My question was not about academic discourse. If I am not mistaken, we are interested in public discourse; we are not all academics.

I want to direct you to the question of whether you are competent, through your discipline, to ascertain the limits of cultured discourse in the public sense.

A. I can look at a document, a text, and ascertain whether it meets the canons of appropriate representation, whether it stands as a piece of scholarly work or a piece of opinion.

Q. I don't think I asked you that question. I am going to ask you again.

A. Could you paraphrase it, please.

Q. I will try to make it clear and very simple. I do want to ask you a very permanent and definite question.

The question is whether you, in your discipline, are any more qualified than anyone else to ascertain the limits of cultured discourse in the public sense.

A. I am sorry, I just don't understand, Mr. Christie.

Q. You don't understand.

A. I don't understand. If I understood the question -- perhaps you could unpack it for me.

Q. We will try again.

Public discourse -- do you understand that?

A. Yes, I do.

Q. That is what anybody can say in society, and often does. Right?

A. You mean talking?

Q. I could mean talking; I could mean writing. Discourse can include both, can't it?

A. It certainly can.

Q. So I mean talking or writing, public discourse of ordinary people. Are you competent to tell us what are the limits of cultured discourse?

A. I have to say that, in all honesty, I don't understand what the thrust of your question is.

Q. I will try again. If you don't understand, it is my duty to try again. At some point, if I think you are not being fair with me, I will tell you. You are saying you don't understand; I will try again.

Do you feel that you are trained and especially competent to decide what is culturally acceptable speech?

A. Culturally acceptable speech -- that is what, the mores of a particular culture?

Q. Yes.

A. No, I think I can't do that for more than one or two cultures.

Q. Can you do it for our culture?

A. In particular circumstances I think I can, and in particular circumstances I probably cannot.

Q. Let me ask you: What do you think qualifies you to tell us in this day and age what is culturally acceptable speech? What training, skill or special knowledge?

A. I participate in a culture which has social norms.

Q. We all do that, don't we?

A. We do that. To that extent, I can make assessments not only in this kind of discourse but in other discourses that I am more professionally involved with.

Q. I am not going to ask you about your professional discourse because I think, subject to what the Tribunal says, we are dealing with public discourse, not academic discourse, but I will be guided on that.

I want to ask you what it is that you think makes you competent, by any training, skill or ability, different from anybody else, to decide what is culturally acceptable in our society.

A. I am sorry, I really just don't see what you are getting at. I don't want to be the arbiter of people's--

Q. Culturally acceptable speech.

A. That's right. I would like to be --

Q. Let me put it to you this way: You would like to be, but you aren't.

A. I would like to be the arbiter of my own.

Q. Of course. But, to be honest, you are no more competent to decide that than anyone else.

A. That is not true.

Q. Why are you more competent to decide what is culturally acceptable speech or discourse or writing than anyone else?

A. I felt that I had given you ample evidence about the research that I have done and done with others to deal with the way that discourse is organized.

Q. All that does is study grammar and language.

A. It studies language; that's for sure.

Q. All right, but it doesn't study cultural mores; it doesn't study anything to do with human psychology --

A. Yes, it does. It has to do with human psychology. It does not study cultural mores.

Q. It has to do with human psychology. Have you ever studied psychology?

A. Yes. I have taken courses in psychology.

Q. Do you have a Ph.D in psychology?

A. No, I have a Ph.D in linguistics.

Q. Do you have an M.A. in psychology?

A. No, I don't.

Q. What courses have you taken in psychology?

A. I have taken courses as a graduate student, when I was doing a Ph.D in linguistics, in psychology.

Q. Were they post-graduate courses in psychology?

A. Of course. they were.

Q. What were they?

A. Cognitive psychology, primary processing.

Q. Even that doesn't qualify you to say what is culturally acceptable in our society, does it?

A. That doesn't qualify me to talk about the qualities of music, either.

Q. That's a smart answer, but it is not a full answer. It is not even answering my question.

A. It is a cultural phenomenon, though, and I was using --

Q. I wasn't asking about cultural phenomena. I asked you a very definite, clear question.

Are you any more competent through any of that training to decide what is culturally acceptable discourse than any other member of our society?

A. Culturally acceptable in the terms I think I understand you to mean, my answer is "no."

Q. Are you competent to ascertain the limits of scholarly discourse?

A. If I can reframe the question so that I understand it -- the term "limits" is what I am concerned with. In terms of the properties of scholarly discourse, whether something qualifies under the norms of scholarly discourse, I have participated in that culture and am qualified to talk about it.

Q. Do you have any special training or skill or ability to decide what is acceptable scholarly discourse and what is not?

A. Yes. It is the training that most academics get in the sense of knowing what peer review means, what appropriate citation means, what constructing a viable argument means in a particular discipline.

Q. In a particular discipline. Have you any experience or training in regard to history?

A. No.

Q. Do you accept the proposition that what is acceptable scholarly discipline in history depends on what historians might have to say?

A. Yes, I do.

Q. Through your discipline and what you have told us about your expertise, do you claim any special skill or ability to ascertain the limits of respectable discourse?

A. Respectable discourse. Can you unpack "respectable" for me? Do you mean polite? Do you mean satisfying the norms of the --

Q. I mean what Mr. Binnie meant when he used the term. He said that you would tell us that it was not cultured, not scholarly and not respectable. I took it to mean respectable, which I understand to mean respectable.

So I ask you: Are you specially trained by any means whatsoever, because you are a linguist or otherwise, to ascertain the limits of respectable discourse?

A. I think I have answered your question, and I will answer it again. That is, I am trained as an academic, as most academics are, to assess by principles of peer review whether or not a particular text or discourse, presentation, satisfies the criteria of being appropriate academic discourse -- that is, whether it uses the conventionally assumed and received canons of appropriate argumentation. I have said it before.

Q. If it meets the academic standards of appropriate canons. Is that about right?

A. No, I said the accepted norms for, let's say, peer review.

Q. Let's assume we are not talking about acceptable academic speech. We are talking about acceptable public speech in the free marketplace of ideas -- and we will assume for the moment that there is such a thing.

Are you any better qualified, stepping outside this academic cloak, to ascertain the limits of respectable discourse?

A. I am qualified to look at a piece of text and ask the question: Is this text masquerading as academic discourse or not? That I am qualified to do.

Q. So the answer, then, honestly is "no."

A. No, the answer is "sometimes."

Q. In terms of academic discourse, yes, you can decide what is acceptable academic discourse. Right?

A. And I also, as virtually any other academic trained in this way, know where something is pretending to be academic or scholarly and, in fact, is not.

Q. Can you ascertain whether something is pretending to be scholarly and academic as opposed to trying to be?

A. I think so. I can look at the difference in terms of arguments, the differences in the way things are set out.

Q. Rather than be led off the point of my question, let me ask you: Do you claim any special expertise in regard to general public discourse as to what is respectable and what is not?

A. No, I don't. What is respectable and what is not?

Q. That's right. So the public limits of respectable discourse you are not competent to comment on.

A. I think that is not entirely the case.

Q. Why isn't it?

A. Because --

Q. How are you competent to decide --

A. A lot of public discourse is, in fact, academic discourse.

Q. Is what?

A. Is academic discourse.

Q. Let's assume that we are talking about something that is in the nature of public discourse. I know you say you are competent to decide what is respectable academic discourse, but are you also a competent expert to tell us what is a respectable public discourse?

A. I don't know, because I don't know what -- in some cases perhaps yes, and in some cases perhaps no. I can't make a general affirmation or negation.

Q. I ask you to tell us in what circumstances, any circumstances, are you competent as some expert to tell us what is acceptable respectable public discourse.

A. I think I have answered that, but I will try it again.

Q. No, you haven't, outside of academic performance which you have told us you are competent to tell us all about. I am speaking now about public discourse.

Can you tell me any instance in which you are any better qualified than anyone else to decide what is respectable public discourse?

A. The question hinges on the term "respectable" --

Q. I understand.

A. -- and I am not sure if by "respectable" you mean legitimate or if you mean politically correct or even proper according to some set of standards, or what.

Q. I see. You don't understand the term "respectable."

A. I understand the term "respectable" --

Q. It could have a variety of meanings.

A. A variety of senses, yes.

Q. I see. Are you competent to tell us what is politically correct discourse?

A. Absolutely not.

Q. Are you competent to tell us -- what were the other examples you used?

A. I don't remember what they were.

Q. You don't? In any sense, are you able to tell us what is respectable public discourse?

A. Respectable in the sense of the discourse having a certain kind of argumentative integrity, coherence, organization. In that sense of respectable, the answer is "yes." In terms of whether it is appreciated, proper, nice, et cetera, the answer is "no."

Q. Are you competent to ascertain the effects of discourse psychologically on any potential reader?

A. Under the assumption that the kinds of studies that my research group has looked at, under the assumption that our subjects are ordinary non-specialists, and under the assumption that they represent a population, then the answer is: To a certain extent, yes.

Q. Have you ever done any study to determine how representative your samples have been?

A. No, we haven't.

Q. What do you use, university students?

A. And sometimes others as well.

Q. How often others?

A. Probably about a third of the time.

Q. Have you any special training or competence to ascertain the effects of discourse emotionally on anyone?

A. We have actually done some studies of the sort having to do with emotional responses. I mentioned some earlier.

Q. Whether you like the story or not?

A. No, in terms of association with characters or whatever, as well.

Q. Association with characters in the narrative?

A. As represented by the narrator, yes.

Q. So whether you like the characters in the story or not.

A. As represented by the narrator.

Q. As represented by the narrator.

A. Some narrators might represent a character in one way, and some might represent the character in a different way.

Q. So how do you assess the emotional impact of these stories on people?

A. We ask them.

Q. You ask them. What do you ask them?

A. We ask them issues having to do with identification. Could the story be better presented from this particular character's point of view if a different kind of language had been used? Those kinds of questions.

Under those circumstances, we have a hypothesis having to do, for example, with the choice of lexical items and whether you attribute certain kinds of properties -- happiness, sadness, et cetera -- to certain characters, and see if that lexical choice, if lexical choices are made, influences the way the hearers respond to the story or how they associate with the stories.

Q. Other than asking these students and others how they reacted to the stories, have you done any tests of emotional responses?

A. No, we have not.

Q. So studying emotions, do you agree, is a little bit outside your discipline?

A. Studying emotions is outside my discipline.

Q. Do you think that contempt is an emotion?

A. I don't know; I suppose it is.

Q. You are really not competent to decide that, are you?

A. I feel I am competent to assess in my own mind if something is contemptuous.

Q. "In my own mind" meaning that, like anybody else, you can decide whether someone is being contemptuous.

A. Not necessarily like anyone else, but probably like a lot of people.

Q. You have no particular training, skill or ability to decide whether a thing has crossed the line between dislike or intense dislike.

A. We discussed that. That's right.

Q. And no particular training, skill or ability to decide if a piece of text generated the emotion known as contempt.

A. I suppose, as I mentioned earlier, the only text that I have looked at with respect to that are the texts that we have before us here and the texts of the previous two cases.

Q. Two cases? Yes, two cases. Was there anyone cross-examining your expertise in the Scott case?

A. No, there was not.

Q. As usual, Mr. Scott was unrepresented. Right?

A. As far as I know, he wasn't even there.

Q. He wasn't even there. Have you studied the differences in the effect of writing rather than oral communication?

A. Yes, we have.

Q. Have you drawn any conclusions as to the difference?

A. Yes, we have.

Q. Have you published those?

A. Yes.

Q. What is the difference in impact between oral and written communication generally?

A. You didn't ask me about the impact. The differences I can tell you about.

Q. I did ask you about the impact.

A. I must have misunderstood you, Mr. Christie. I understood you to say: Have you studied the difference between oral and written communications?

Q. I said: What is the difference in impact between written and oral communication?

A. I am sorry, I can't answer that, because I don't know what you are getting at.

Q. Emotional impact, I suppose, is what I am getting at. Have you done any studies --

A. I have not done any studies on emotional impact, just oral versus written communication.

Q. Are you qualified to distinguish between the effects of language in psychological terms on individuals between ridicule or contempt or between suspicion and dislike or hatred?

A. I have never done studies in those areas.

Q. Can you establish the boundaries between suspicion or dislike by any special training or skill?

A. I don't know. I would have to consider that. I would have to think of an experimental paradigm that one could use.

Q. Have you ever done one?

A. I have not.

Q. Have you ever been asked to do one?

A. I have not.

Q. Not even in this case?

A. In this case I was asked to analyze texts.

Q. But in this case were you asked to define the boundary between suspicion and dislike?

A. No.

Q. Between dislike and hatred?

A. I was asked to look at passages and analyze them to ask the question whether or not particular groups of people were singled out and given negative attributes, and that is what I did.

Q. Have you done any studies to determine the intensity of an emotional reaction in average people to a text?

A. I have not done any emotional studies, as I think I mentioned.

Q. In your existing studies, have you done any testing to determine whether the subjects of those studies were average, susceptible or above average to influences of an emotional nature?

A. We have not.

Q. So you just take people and do no psychological testing to determine their reactions or likely reactions?

A. No. The point of those studies is not their emotions. The point of those studies is social factors having to do with interactives.

Q. In any studies you have ever done you have made no attempts to ascertain whether the study group constituted psychologically average or otherwise people.

A. No, we make some typical assumptions that most academic psychological studies make, and that is that we are going to get a small subset of the population with the extremities probably cut off in both ways.

Q. Have you done any controlled experiments with the Zundelsite written narratives that you were given?

A. I have not.

Q. What is the meaning to you of the word "hatred?"

A. I guess it is intense and perhaps, to some extent, irrational dislike.

Q. Intense and irrational dislike?

A. Hatred seems to me -- and I am speaking just as a speaker of English here. Hatred seems to me to have as one of its components irrationality.

Q. As a purported expert in linguistics, that is what you would say, is it not?

A. I am speaking as a speaker of English.

Q. Is that a psychological state?

A. What is that?

Q. Hatred.

A. I guess it is a psychological emotional state.

Q. Are you competent in any way to define if hatred has been generated or communicated as opposed to the emotions of dislike, suspicion, concern or ridicule?

A. I have not done any studies to that effect.

Q. Linguistics doesn't qualify you to do that, to make those assumptions.

A. I suppose, if one carried out experiments with that in mind, it would. I haven't carried such experiments out.

Q. To your knowledge, is contempt a psychological state?

A. I don't know. I guess it is an emotional state.

Q. How would you define it?

A. I suppose I would define it as -- how would I define it? I suppose I would define "contempt" as holding somebody or some group or something as being unworthy of my consideration or unworthy of my time or unworthy of my attention for probably some particular kinds of reasons. I don't know what they would be, except in individual cases.

Q. So contempt could be rational as well as irrational, according to your definition.

A. I didn't say that it was irrational. Yes, I suppose that is right.

Q. You could have contempt for someone for good reason.

A. For good reason.

Q. Have you ever discussed this case with any other experts?

A. No, I have not.

Q. You never discussed it with Noel Chomsky?

A. No.

Q. Is he an expert in the field?

A. Not in discourse analysis.

Q. He is not?

A. No.

Q. Is there any other expert greater than yourself in this field?

A. There are lots of people who are better experts in this field.

Q. Can you name any?

A. Sure. If you look at the references I have provided, you could probably see some: Professor Chafe at Santa Barbara; Professor Price at Penn; Professor Renkma in Holland; Professor Schiffrin at Georgetown; Professor Thompson at Santa Barbara; Professor Blakemore at Oxford. Those are a few.

Q. Have you consulted any other experts in regard to your evidence in this case?

A. I have not.

Q. As a linguist, do you have the ability to distinguish between statements of fact and statements of opinion?

A. In some cases.

Q. It is not possible to do so in all cases then?

A. I think probably not.

Q. So all of your discourse analysis relates to what you say was the speaker's either intent or linguistic effect?

A. I don't know that I understand "linguistic effect."

Q. Aren't all the opinions that you have, in which you are competent, opinions revolving around linguistics?

A. They are all opinions revolving around the analysis of these texts through linguistic methods, yes.

Q. And none of your opinions nor any of your qualifications relate to any of the psychological states that are possible for potential readers of the text in question?

A. Other than to the extent that the kinds of strategies and the like that I have discussed here, which are widely discussed in our discipline's literature, have been examined by other scholars over and over again and found to have the kinds of effects that I have mentioned.

Q. To have the kinds of effects that you have mentioned?

A. That is, to be able to fill in bridging phenomena, to create target groups, to look at inversion strategies, and that sort of thing. These have been widely discussed.

Q. When you speak of your colleagues, you are speaking of other linguists?

A. I am speaking of other linguists and psycholinguistic discourse analysts; that is right.

Q. And none of the studies you have referred to nor any of your own personal training, skill or experience relates to the psychological assessment of recipients of speech or writing.

A. No. I mentioned studies that we have done which have related to those kinds of properties, not so much emotional ones but other factors, cognitive ones.

Q. Can you point to any study that you have done that assessed whether or not a recipient of a text acquired hatred?

A. No, I cannot.

Q. Contempt?

A. Under none of those emotional categories have I done studies.

Q. Any of the studies that you say exist in the linguistic literature?

A. Yes.

Q. Whose?

A. Teun van Dijk at Amsterdam is probably the most prominently discussed analyst.

Q. He has done psychological studies of the impact of language on the subject of hate and contempt?

A. Yes, he has. I have read his papers. He reports studies he has done, and I assume that they are true.

Q. You assume they are true. Have you any knowledge of the accuracy of the testing methods to assess the strength of those studies?

A. I have no knowledge other than what he reports in his experimental studies. They are fairly traditional kinds of studies.

Q. What study are you referring to?

A. I am referring, in particular, to a book of his which is fairly recent, dealing with the discourse of racism.

Q. What is the name of that book?

A. I am just trying to remember. It was only out about two years ago. I think it is "The Discourse of Racism." I believe that is what it is.

Q. And who wrote it?

A. Teun van Dijk.

Q. Do you know who published it?

A. I think it was probably published by either Blackwell or Oxford University Press, but I don't have the reference.

Q. Have you read it?

A. I have read bits of it, pieces of it, hunks of it, important parts of it.

THE CHAIRPERSON: Are you going to be a while yet, Mr. Christie?