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Sunday, July 31, 2005

U.S. Study Pinpoints Near-Misses by
Allies in Fathoming the Unfolding Holocaust

A National Security Agency
account says the Allies knew of exterminations in the Nazi camps but
failed to react.

By Sam Roberts

WHO in Allied governments, the Vatican and the
press knew what about the Holocaust and when? What could and should
have been done to save Europe's Jews? Ever since World War II, those
questions have been fiercely debated.

David Irving
comments:

IT is difficult to know where to begin with
this belated mish-mash of disinformation about the NSA report
and its statements on "the" Holocaust. We have already
commented sarcastically on its content elsewhere [Radical's Diary, June
21].
We
have never met (or even heard of) Robert J. Hanyok of
the NSA Center for Cryptologic History in Maryland. But we do
notice that there is no word even in his story about "gas
chambers". (In fact they are not referred to anywhere in the
intercepts).
The late Professor Sir
Frank Hinsley, a reliable British historian and expert,
and himself a veteran of the WW2 Bletchley Park codebreaking
operation, would write
explicitly in an appendix to volume II of the Official
History of British Intelligence in WW2 that there was
no such reference. For this remark he was excoriated,
disciplined, and future editions of his British official
history had to be altered to omit the scandalous
remark.
With the usual New York
Times faith in the accepted version of events, Sam
Roberts, the journalist who wrote this piece, has
interviewed "experts" from the Holocaust Museum in Washington
and The Wiesenthal Center, etc. and even the upstart "David
Wyman Institute"; but not any of those experts who challenge
the accepted canon.
The wartime Allies,
familiar with the wiles of the international Zionists, rightly
or wrongly did not believe the stories being fed to them by
that odious, knee-groping homosexual, Rabbi Wise, and his ilk;
but Hanyock saw no option but to attribute their contemporary
skepticism to ingrained Establishment
"anti-semitism".
The Allies had a
different order of strategic priorities. Unlike the Zionist
zealots and guerrillas who were fighting and killing British
troops in Palestine even during WW2, they had decided to win
the war first and listen to these obstreperous whiners
later.
What about Sam Robert's other
errors? He talks of January 1942 -- presumably alluding to the Wannsee
Conference of January 20, 1942 -- as being when the Nazis
convened on their decision to kill all the Jews. This has long
been discredited, even by the "Holcoaust
experts".
He talks clumsily of "the death
camps liberated by the Allies"; in fact the Anglo-American
armies did not liberate a single camp which has since then
been termed a Nazi extermination
camp.
Those (like Auschwitz)
were all overrun by the Red Army -- and these were the only
camps incidentally in which claims were later made for the
existence of "gas chambers". True, there were high mortality
rates in Dachau,
Buchenwald,
and Bergen-Belsen
in 1945, which were captured by the Americans and British, or
rather turned over by agreement between Heinrich
Himmler's officers and the advancing Allies; but in
the those the death rates increased immediately after
their liberation by the Americans and British -- so the less
said about them, perhaps, the better.
As
for that January
1943 intercept showing that 1,247,166 Jews had been
exterminated in the Lublin, Belzec, Sobibor and Treblinka
camps in the "Operation Reinhardt" plans of the Nazis. We
notice that Sam Roberts puts words into the document which do
not exist: namely, those four names -- the document refers
only to L, B, S and T, although at least one of the camps was
not known to the Nazis by that name in WW2 but by
another.
We have diffidently expressed
our own concerns about the
authenticity of that document elsewhere, and we shall now
invite the Public Record Office to examine it with the same
energy with which they recently tested the "Himmler-murder"
documents.
And one final thing: the
famous Operation was not called Reinhard (because of
the late Reinhard Heydrich), but "Reinhardt," after
Fritz Reinhardt the senior Nazi civil servant
(Staatssekretär) at the Reich finance ministry who directed
the programme to expropriate (i.e., rob) the deported Jews.
But the other version is just another Holocaust fantasy to
which Sam Roberts has willingly subscribed.

Website data: Robert J Hanyock is a
55-year-old historian, born Jul 2, 1950, with two addresses in
Laurel, Maryland (not far from Fort Meade, the NSA
headquarters).

In January
1942, the Nazis convened to map their Final Solution and by the
following December the Allies knew or suspected enough - mostly from
escaped prisoners and other partisans - to issue a public
denunciation of Germany's "bestial policy of cold-blooded
extermination."

Now, a United States government analysis suggests that while the
evidence was incomplete, gruesome details from coded Nazi messages
that Britain intercepted beginning in 1941 could have confirmed and
exposed the scope of German genocide well before 1945, when Allied
troops liberated the death camps and became witnesses to the horror.

In a striking parallel to assessments of intelligence gaps before
9/11, the analysis suggests that the Allies largely failed to
understand the information they had, information that might not have
given advance warning of the Holocaust, but could have prompted a
military response that could have interrupted the deportations or
mass exterminations or, at least a propaganda campaign against Nazi
atrocities.

The analysis - titled "Eavesdropping on Hell" and written by
Robert J. Hanyok, a historian with the National Security Agency's
Center for Cryptologic History in Maryland - was quietly released
last month.

In his report and in subsequent interviews, Mr. Hanyok amplified
earlier accounts that intelligence gleaned throughout the war from
German military and police communication and from foreign diplomats
provided lurid, though often fragmentary and episodic, accounts of
massacres, deportations and even statistics on the killing in
concentration camps.

But the bits of information often arrived without necessary
context.

For instance, one message, declassified in 2000 and barely
noticed except in scholarly journals, was intercepted on Jan. 11,
1943. It specified the number of Jews killed under "Operation
Reinhard" at four death camps - Lublin, Belzec, Sobibor and
Treblinka - through 1942: 1,274,166.

But, the report notes, "the message itself contained only the
identifying letters for the death camps followed by the numerical
totals."

The only clue that these were death camps would have been the
reference to Operation Reinhard, a tribute to the SS general
Reinhard Heydrich, who had been charged with organizing the Nazis'
plan to eliminate Europe's Jews.

But that was probably "unknown at the time" to the British code
breakers, the report says. Still, British analysts obviously
considered the message important. It was classified as "Most Secret"
and marked "To be kept under lock and key: Never to be removed from
the office."

Further, the report said, British and American efforts to sort
evidence were hampered by large case backlogs and a shortage of
translators.

Efforts were further slowed by the two allies' reluctance to
share information about German communications and, more generally,
by more pressing military priorities for intelligence sifting.

And the report suggests that anti-Semitism may have helped create
an atmosphere that affected how communications intelligence - or
Comint - was handled.

"Both President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill were often
hampered in their limited efforts to alleviate some of the suffering
by the general anti-Semitic sentiment in both nations," the report
said.

"Just how much British signals-intelligence analysts, either
individually or as a group, held this attitude is unknown," the
report said. "And how much it affected their reactions to the
intelligence is likewise unknown. But it must be considered in any
discussion about how Comint was received."

Mr. Hanyok said analysts had been looking for information about
internal security, impacts of bombing and prisoners or war rather
than potential evidence of war crimes and probably would not have
grasped the enormity of the Nazis' plan.

He also quotes a memorandum from a British cryptologic official,
dated Sept. 11, 1941, that takes account of German massacres in the
Soviet Union and concludes: "The fact that the police are killing
all Jews that fall into their hands should now be sufficiently well
appreciated. It is not therefore proposed to continue reporting
these butcheries unless so requested."

Mr. Hanyok attributed the British official's response to "either
his inability to appreciate the implications of the massacres, or
his willingness to ignore what the Nazis were doing."

The report is haunted by what-ifs, tantalizing hints, desperate
pleas, heroic rescues - belittling the Vichy government's overtures
to resettle 8,000 Jewish orphans in the West - and by what in
retrospect can seem like bureaucratic indifference in a number of
countries.

It also offers a revealing exchange involving Pope Pius XII, who
some historians say did not use his influence to halt the killing of
Jews. The conversation, relayed by an Ecuadorian envoy, was between
the Vatican ambassador and Marshal Henri-Philippe Pétain, the French
collaborationist leader. Over lunch at a Vichy hotel in July 1942,
Marshal Pétain said he was consoled that the pope approved his
policy of deporting Jews. The ambassador corrected him, saying, "The
Holy Father does not approve."

In a subsequent meeting, the ambassador delivered the pope's
personal appeal to stop the persecutions, but, the report said,
Marshal Pétain agreed "only to limit the ongoing deportations to
foreign Jews living in the occupied zone of France."

The Germans were careful to plug their own obvious intelligence
leaks. After Churchill, relying only on intercepts, delivered a
radio address in 1941 denouncing the execution of Russian "patriots"
- without mentioning Jews - the Germans as "a probable result"
switched to a more sophisticated code and stopped transmitting radio
reports on the executions, Mr. Hanyok wrote.

Could the intelligence, properly interpreted, have saved lives?

The National Security Agency report says that while Allied
intelligence intercepts allowed the British to "monitor" roundups of
Jews in Rome in 1943, "Allied communications intelligence, by
itself, could not have provided an early warning to Allied leaders
regarding the nature and scope of the Holocaust."

"There's a narrow window in which intelligence would have played
any kind of role," Mr. Hanyok said, "but we didn't see what was
happening."

Peter Black, a senior historian at the United States Holocaust
Memorial Museum in Washington, said, "Even in the unlikely event
that the decipherers and translators had figured out what this all
meant, there was nothing the Allies could have done militarily."

Other historians say there were other options.

"If they announced it, would it have saved lives?" said Aaron
Breitbart, a senior researcher at the Simon Wiesenthal Center, which
is based in Los Angeles.

"I think so, because there would have been greater pressure to
bomb Auschwitz in 1944, at least the rail lines on bridges. But
saving Jews was not a priority. Jewish leaders were told that the
best way to stop the Holocaust was to defeat Germany."

Dr. Rafael Medoff, director of the David S. Wyman Institute for
Holocaust Studies at Gratz College in Pennsylvania, noted that in
1943, the year after the British and Americans denounced the mass
killings, the Allies convened a conference in Bermuda and could have
allowed more European Jews to emigrate.

"Here they had significant detailed confirmation of mass murder
and, yet, still their response was to come up with ways to create
the impression of concern but no intention of taking any meaningful
action," Dr. Medoff said. "Some Jews could still have gotten out.
The logical response would have been for the British to relax their
immigration restrictions in Palestine and to let more Jews into
America."

Even by the last year of the war, the Germans were aware that the
Allies had not been roused to react. Mr. Hanyok wrote that the
extermination of Hungary's Jews was "remarkable because it happened
in full view of the outside world."

Mr. Hanyok said he had planned to produce only a brief pamphlet
on the historical record of communications intelligence but wound up
working six years on what became a 167-page book drawn from British
and American archives.

"I was surprised by the amount of material and the diversity of
it," he said.

He dedicated the report to "those cursed with the memory of this
horror and to those who assumed the burden of its remembrance."

also in The International Herald Tribune

The above item is
reproduced without editing other than typographical

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